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ABSTRACT 
The Contribution of Management Buy-ins to Corporate Restructuring: 
Concep4 Characteristics and Performance 
From the mid-1980s many UK venture capitalists, as an extension to their involvement'in 
management buy-outs, made investments in management buy-ins where they backed new managers 
to purchase equity stakes in an existing company. This Thesis analyses the corporate restructuring 
and entrepreneurial influences behind buy-ins taking note of turnaround and venture capital 
influences. It draws on general buy-in characteristics from a database of 750 management buy-ins 
and the results of a representative questionnaire survey of 59 management buy-ins (mailed in 
Febnruary 1990) and backed by individual case studies. It is hypothesised that management buy-ins 
are a distinctive corpora te restructuring form and have major differences with management buy-outs. 
Buy-ins are shown to be significantly different from buy-outs in terms of source, activity and 
realisation; they are more likely to be bought from a private source and to end up in receivership. 
Financing structures are more conservative but not on a statistically significant basis. Buy-in teams 
are smaller than in buy-outs, frequently have initial skills gaps, and in a minority of cases are led by 
second time entrepreneurs. The target company is normally identified through informal networks. 
Buy-ins are followed by a significantly higher degree of action in financial, product and marketing 
areas than Buy-outs and other restructuring processes uch as turnarounds. Compared to US LBOs 
more attention is paid to working asset management with little unbundling of fixed assets and higher 
capital expenditure. Team Leaders are shown to be mainly opportunist in terms of entrepreneurial 
typology with a minority craftsmen and, unexpectedly, a few mainly motivated by push factors. This 
is in contrast to buy-outs where a typology is developed showing a preponderance of craftsmen. 
x 
Overall performance after buy-in was below original Business Plan but heavily influenced by adverse 
economic and financial conditions. Different types of Team Leaders were not associated with 
significant differences in performance although opportunists were more likely to be acquisitive. 
Contrary to the principles of corporate restructuring, discriminant analysis showed equity ratchets 
and higher rates of leverage being negative influences on profitability. Case studies showed 
ineffective monitoring and control by some venture capitalists. Buy-ins of privately owned 
companies, where there are particular problems of information assymetery, and those bought in the 
late 1980s where unrealistically high prices may have been paid for the target company were poor 
performers. Among entrepreneur related variables, the team's knowledge of each other was an 
important positive influence but education was negative. 
xi 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
During the 1980's considerable changes occurred in the role of management in industrial 
ownership in the British economy. After moves in the 1970's to greater concentration of industrial 
ownership (Chiplin and Wright, 1980), the 1980's showed a different pattern with an increase in 
the number of companies being incorporated, a revival of flotations on the Stock Market 
including the newly created USM (Ingram 1985), increases in the sales of subsidiaries between 
companies and the emergence of transactions which involved management taking control of 
companies for which they had previously been salaried employees. Such changes reflected major 
political, cultural, structural, economic and other developments including the rc-emcrgence of the 
Enterprise Culture (Bannock 1987, Burrows 1991). Part of this transformation was reflected in 
the revival of the Mergers and Acquisition market which reached a peak in 1989 but in a 
markedly different form from that in the 1960's and 1970's, paralleling developments, in the U. S. 
In the 1960's acquisitions reflected unrelated diversification, but in the 1980's there were moves 
to consolidation and specialisation (Shleifer and Vishny 1991 a) with a large minority of bids being 
hostile. These later transactions also included companies divesting subsidiaries to other corporate 
entities and in some cases to internal or external management groupings who were frequently 
seeking to acquire control in competition with other bidders. 
This thesis focuses on an aspect of this last form of corporate restructuring, the management buy- 
in where external management gain executive control of a target company. 'It is the initial 
contention of this thesis that while buy-outs and buy-ins involve certain similar concepts within 
corporate restructuring, there are major differences between the two. The Thesis examines the 
nature of these differences in terms of motivation of both vendor and management, characteristics 
1 
of the target companies and the management teams, initial performance and actions and compares 
these with the longer established management buy-out, where incumbent management is the key. 
1.2 Previous Research 
Despite the existence now of a significant amount of research on aspects of restructuring, the 
relationship between restructuring and its consequences for the firm and its stakeholders is 
unclear. Restructuring may be seen as complex and multidimensional (Bowman and Singh 1993, 
Singh 1993). Management buy-outs and buy-ins may be considered to pose a complex set of issues 
related to corporate restructuring, the entrepreneurial nature of the managers involved, finance, 
the degree of post transaction restructuring and resultant effects on performance. 
In the UK interest in management buy-outs started in the early 1980's (see eg Arnfield, Chipliny- 
Wright, Jarrett 1981) with an increasing flow of research output in both the US and UK by the 
end of the 1980's (see eg Palepu 1991, Wright, Thompson, Robbie, Wong (1992), Fox and Marcus 
1992 for a review of the major studies). However cases where external management and their 
financial backers in the UK buy control of the company, the management buy-in, have yet to 
attract detailed research interest beyond professional journals (eg Shaw 1987, Hutchings 1987, 
Chatterjee 1988). 
The relatively recent development of buy-outs in the UK has meant that research findings on 
their long term impact are only tentative (eg Houlden and Brooks 1989, Bannock 1990a, Wright 
Robbie, Starkey, Thompson 1994, Wright, Thompson, Robbie, Wong 1992), interest being 
orientated more towards aspects such as motivational factors, changes in strategy and the re- 
organisation which follows buy-out (Wright and Coyne 1985, Hanney 1986, Houldcn 1990, Green 
and Berry 1991, Wright Thompson Robbie 1992). 
In contrast the emergence of the leveraged buy-out market in the United States several years 
2 
before the UK buy-out and buy-in markets generated U. S. academic interest since the early 1980's 
(eg De Angelo et al 1984, Maupin, Bidwell and Ortregen 1984, Lowenstein 1985). Much of the 
early research focused on the rather narrow issues of the gains which are obtained at the time of 
the initial buy-out. Studies concentrated on the price announcement effects for leveraged buy-outs 
of quoted companies and issues relating to the ethical considerations involved in bids being made 
for quoted companies by their internal management and directors and the extent of possible abuse 
of management's inside knowledge. Indeed US research has until recently been concentrated on 
these 'going private' transactions rather than divestment buy-outs. Since 1989 there have been 
several studies of performance aspects of leveraged buy-outs in the US which go beyond concepts 
of gains to previous and new shareholders to examine aspects such as efficiency improvement, 
changes to R&D expenditure, spending on fixed assets and employment changes (eg Kaplan 
1989, Lichtenberg & Siegel 1990, Singh 1990, Smith 1990) and more recently the longevity of buy- 
outs (eg Kaplan 1991). In the main, though not exclusively, these studies remain orientated 
towards going private transactions, in some cases examining buy-outs which have subsequently 
been floated on a stock market (eg Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1990). 
Limited US attention has been paid to the entrepreneurial and motivational effects involved in 
smaller transactions (eg Bull 1989, Malone 1989, Taylor and Hooper 1989). There have been only 
a relatively small number of case study approaches despite their use in explaining pertinent factors 
behind changes in financial and accounting ratios (eg Baker and Wruck 1989, Magowan 1989, 
Bruner and Eades 1992). However, the act of corporate restructuring involves a complex 
interaction of forces relating to the need to restructure, the preferred mode of doing so, the 
availability of a suitable form for this to occur, motivation of both vendor and purchaser, financing 
considerations including sources of supply and relative roles of equity and debt, the role of 
operating and strategic actions in achieving operating efficiency improvements and the subsequent 
performance and implications of realisation strategies for the life cycle of the firm. 
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While much of the experience of the early and mid 1980's appears to support a highly favourable 
view of the characteristics of buy-out transactions and the benefits of the re-organisation which 
they entail, since 1989 this has not been so obvious: in both the US and the UK buy-outs, 
especially those which are more highly leveraged, have suffered serious performance difficulties 
with a high incidence of bankruptcies (Kaplan, 1991, Fridon 1991, Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). 
Research has also been pursued in some other countries, eg France (Binz et al 1985, CEGOS 
1990), Holland (Bruining 1992), Australia (Brookes 1992), Italy (Carulli 1991) and South Africa 
(Van Heerden 1992). 
1.3 Development of Corporate Restructuring in the UK 
The extent of corporate restructuring in the'UK may be seen through examination of trends in 
the growth of the Mergers and Acquisitions Markets (Table 1.1). After growth in the 1960's the 
market reached a peak (in current prices) in 1972/73, fell back sharply in the mid 1970's but 
recovered towards the end of the 1970's. The 1980's proved to be a period of unparalleled 
restructuring with the value of mergers and acquisitions reaching a peak of L27.3 bn in 1989, 
although the volume high was in 1987 (1528 transactions). Considerable contraction occurred in 
1990/1992. 
Over the years the form of restructuring has changed. Until the early 1980's it typically had 
involved divestment of subsidiaries and divisions with the purchaser almost always being another 
corporate entity. In contrast the 1980's brought the role of management and their financial 
backers into greater prominence. Indeed, in 1991/92 over one half of all takeover transactions (by 
number) involved management participation (CMBOR, 1993). Comparisons can be made with the 
US where the take-over wave of the 1960's represented mainly friendly acquisitions in a major 
diversification strategy while those in the 1980's were much larger, frequently hostile and paid for 
in cash rather than stock (Shleifer & Vishny 1991a). 
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TABLE 1.1: ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS BY INDUSTRIAL 
AND COMMERCIAL COMPANIES WITHIN THE UIC, 1964-92 
Year Number Acquired Willion 
194A 940 505 
1965 1,000 517 
1966 807 500 
1967 763 822 
1968 946 1 1,946 
1969 906 935 
19691 846 1,069 
1970 793 1,122 
1971 884 911 
1972 1,210 2,532 
1973 1,205 1,304 
1974 504 508 
1975 315 291 
1976 353 448 
1977 481 824 
1978 567 1,140 
1979 534 1,656 
1980 469 1,475 
1981 452 1,144 
1982 463 2,206 
1983 447 2,343 
1984 568 5,474 
1985 474 7,090 
1986 842 15,370 
1987 1,528 16,539 
1988 1,499 22,839 
1989 1,337 27,250 
1990 779 8,329 
1991 506 10,432 
1992 433 5,940 
Source: CSO 
'Note: Series break in 1969 
The desire to sell may be occasioned by many factors including financial distress, redefinition of 
core activities and acquisition through larger transactions of subsidiaries which may have no long 
term strategic rationale within the expanded group but could not be separated from the rest of 
the purchase agreement (cg Chiplin and Wright 1980, Ravenscraft and Scherer 1986). Although 
the need for companies to trade subsidiaries in this way is not in itself remarkable, the ability of 
individual managers in the 1980's to be an acquirer was more so. 
Management's purchase of a company is dependent on a strategic and financial vision of the 
future of the firm which is sufficiently viable to attract financial backers. Equity financiers will 
expect to achieve significant targeted internal rates of return with banks providing debt finance 
on more modest lending margins against security. Other financial backers, including mezzanine 
players and the vendor, may be involved. Management through the ability of the backers to 
leverage the deal will put in a disproportionately small amount of finance for their relatively high 
equity stake in the company. All will expect to incur significant although varying degrees of risk; 
The reduced agency costs (see 2.2 for definition and discussion) involved in such transactions may 
be expected to produce actions which make the company more efficient and. through the debt 
bonding effect and managerial equity incentive the management shareholders are keen to create 
shareholder value rather than be overly influenced by desires to create large empires for the sake 
of them or indulge in wasteful company expenditure (Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen 1989a). Such 
developments may be strengthened by management adopting a more entrepreneurial approach 
than had been possible under previous structuring (cg Bull 1989). 
During the second half of the 1980's the UK management buy-out became an accepted part of 
corporate restructuring providing many opportunities for divestors, management and financiers 
(Wright, Tbompson, Chiplin, Robbie 1991). This process was accelerated by rapid increases'in 
funding committed to buy-outs, evidence of successful investor realisation within relatively short 
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time periods of some of the early buy-outs and fiscal reform. As the buy-out market became more 
mature, deal sizes became larger and near the top of the stock market and mergers and 
acquisitions market cycles, buy-outs became more orientated towards financial engineering. Many 
company managers were in positions where a buy-out was not feasible, but wanted to become 
owner managers; divcstors were not always willing to sell to management; and financing 
institutions, given the influx of new entrants to the market, were keen to expand into areas where 
traditional principles associated with venture capital could be applied but where projected rates 
of return were higher than in buy-outs (Chatterjee 1988, Shaw 1987). Additionally concerns were 
expressed by divestors and City institutions as to the possible extent of the 'insider' role of 
incumbent management leading to company under-valuation especially in going privates (NAPF 
1989), echoing concerns in the United States (eg Bruner and Paine 1988, Schadler and Karns, 
1990). 
The development of the management buy-in, which involves external rather than incumbent 
management gaining control of the company with the support of specialist financiers, can be seen 
as a proactive response by certain venture capitalists to these factors (eg Hutchings 1987). 
Management buy-ins were seen initially as a way by which the entrepreneurial talents of good 
managers and of entrepreneurs who had been previously backed but sold their business could be 
applied to opportunities where a buy-out was not possible (Batchelor 1987). They could satisfy 
growing concerns felt about the privileged information which managers possess, provide stronger 
management for turnaround situations and would involve financiers in providing additional skills 
to those seen in normal buy-outs increasing their ability to generate fees in the short term and, 
if successful, a higher rate of return in the medium and long term (eg Hutchings 1987, Shaw 
1987). They would be particularly suitable in cases where the company had been under-performing 
under existing management and turnaround was required. This type of manager may also be able 
to grow companies more successfully than in management buy-outs where management despite 
their proven competence may not have the same degree of vision. While managers buying in had 
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much to gain, it was a riskier venture than a buy-out, where management had intimate knowledge 
of the company and its position. As in management buy-outs, equity ownership incentives and 
debt bonding could be expected to be a major influence on subsequent performance. Additionally 
the concept of the buy-in could be applied to the quoted company without the particular ethical 
concerns applicable to buy-outs by incumbent directors. 
The buy-in market grew rapidly in the late 1980's, its peak in 1989 of 148 transactions worth 
L3.6bn accounting for 48.2 percent of the total UK buy-out market by value (see Chapter 5.2 for 
detailed examination of trends in buy-ins) but coinciding with the start of the downturn in 
economic activity and the early stages of a period of high interest rates (Robbie and Wright 
1992b). After significant restructuring and bankruptcy of many existing buy-ins and changed 
institutional attitudes, growth of private buy-ins resumed in the autumn of 1991 (Chiplin, Wright, 
Robbie 1992). Analysis of early buy-in performance and their restructuring characteristics is 
therefore inevitably influenced by general economic and financial factors which make earlier 
studies of UK buy-outs, mostly carried out in a period of economic expansion, not strictly 
comparable. 
1.4 Identification of Differences Between Management Buy-in and Buy-outs 
Management buy-outs and buy-ins may be expected, while both involving management teams 
taking a significant equity stake in a company alongside specialist external equity investors with 
relatively high degrees of leverage also necessary to complcte funding, to have major differences 
in characteristics, produce different performance effects and incorporate several different 
theoretical concepts. Justification for buy-outs comes from a combination of agency cost and 
entrepreneurship theories (Bull 1989, Wright Thompson Robbie 1992), both of which are 
considered applicable, but in different ways, to management buy-ins. In buy-ins considerable 
emphasis is placed on the role of external management in target company re-organisation with 
the introduction of the concepts of the role of new management in initiating necessary change, 
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applying new strategies and thereby helping to effect turnaround from a frequently declining 
position. Management buy-ins may therefore be able to form an effective restructuring method 
in companies where the narrower buy-out concept may be unlikely to be successful as the existing 
management team may be lacking in entrepreneurial skills and not capable of producing the type 
of performance improvements required. Management buy-ins may also result in a contested and 
possibly hostile bid should incumbent management or another company be interested in acquiring 
the target. In so doing they may enhance the market for corporate control as managers compete 
for the right to manage the corporate assets. 
The probable success or failure of the buy-in may be influenced by factors concerning the target 
company; the new management's entrepreneurial and other characteristics; the role of the 
financier and the mix of financing supplied; the choice of restructuring strategies; and the longer 
term aims for company, management and financier. These are discussed below. 
Factors concerning the target company include the reasons for sale or divestment in the first 
place, the state of the business concerned in terms of size, profitability, company and industry 
growth prospects, price, competition between potential purchasers including buy-out teams and 
cash requirements and the type of previous ownership. The way the company has been run before 
(eg the potential contrast between the systems orientated control in the subsidiary of a 
multinational with a privately owned company where the founder entrepreneur dominates all 
decision making and pays minimum attention to accounting considerations) may well influence the 
extent of initial problems found by the new management team. 
Management themselves may come from a combination of educational, managerial and 
professional backgrounds (3i, 1992a). These may range from MBAs working in the Head Office 
of major quoted companies through professionally qualified managers who could have been in 
either quoted or privately owned companies to people with few qualifications but have been 
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successful through their deployment of entrepreneurial talent. Additionally there are former 
owner-managers ranging from members of former buy-out teams to entrepreneurs who established 
their own companies, who have subsequently sold out and found a fresh challenge in a buy-in. 
The adaptability of these various backgrounds to particular buy-in situations will vary. The 
transferability of skills to a different company, sometimes in different regions or even sectors may 
not always be successful. Teams may be motivated in different ways from those in buy-outs. In 
addition to the personal, managerial and entrepreneurial strengths of these management 
entrepreneurs is the need to be able to work with like-minded people as part of a cohesive team. 
The role of advisers and especially financiers will be critical to the successful future of the 
company. Managers buying in face an asymmetry of information which buy-out managers do not 
have. Consequently the role of Due Diligence, the process through which key financial factors 
such as accuracy of accounts, valuation of assets is checked, is especially important. The 
structuring of finance must also reflect the higher risk this information asymmetry implies as well 
as ensuring funds are available for expansion. Managers require to be suitably inccntiviscd through 
their equity holding and to continue to have sufficient incentives even when performance targets 
may have been missed. At the same time the role of the providcrs of debt will also be crucial. The 
system of governance will be considerably different from traditional models. Both debt and equity 
financiers, through the imposition of covenants and Shareholders Agreements, will have the ability 
to monitor and control the company in a particularly active way making major contributions to 
the direction and success of the company. 
The success of the buy-in will depend not only on the entrepreneur's characteristics and the 
financial background to the transaction. The actions taken by the Team will prove critical in 
turning an under-performing company into a good performer. While the pressure of debt on 
management and the incentive of managerial equity will clearly be important- influences, the 
correct balance and application of operating and strategic actions will be essential. 
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A further important aspect concerns the longer term aims for the company, management and 
financiers and especially whether buy-ins arc permanent or transitory forms in terms of the 
company life cycle. Like management buy-outs, the management team and their venture capital 
backers are likely to have plans for eventual rcalisation of their share holdings (Lorenz 1989) 
although the method and timing may differ significantly from original intentions (see cg Wright, 
Robbie, lbompson, Starkey 1992). However in the case of management buy-ins, increased risk 
compared to buy-outs can be seen through the information asymmetries concerning the company 
as well as the nature of the turnaround action which may be required. 'Ibc higher risk perceived 
in the transaction and reflected in the financial structuring of the management buy-in will have 
implications for the expected period of investment and the method of control employed by the 
venture capitalist to achieve it. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to scrutinise the role the management buy-in has to play in corporate 
restructuring and the ways in which buy-ins differ from buy-outs. The concept contributes to an 
understanding of the corporate restructuring process by examining a new and alternative form of 
transfer of ownership with important interactions with the role of the entrepreneur, the strategy 
required to turnaround under-performing companies, the role of networks in identifying and 
completing ventures, the effects of changes in Chief Executives on a company and the life cycle 
of firms. The thesis explains the differences between the buy-in and the buy-out and the essential 
characteristics of the Team, the target company, the buy-in process and the organisational and 
performance benefits which can be expected to come from a buy-in. In so doing the thesis 
critically reviews the impact of general corporate restructuring concepts, the role of the 
entrepreneur, finance, methods of restructuring action and evidence of longer term performance 
and life cycle aspects. The thesis also develops a typology of the buy-in Team leader and identifies 
important differences in characteristics both between the types of leader identified_ and those of 
management buy-outs. These differences are then extended to identify links between performance 
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and types of Team Leaders. 
The thesis starts in Chapter 2.1 by developing a model of the management buy-in process which 
serves to highlight the issues involved in management buy-in transactions: these include the 
formation and composition of the Team, the restructuring opportunity, team and vendor 
motivation, search and identification of a target company, the existence of appropriate 
infrastructure for transactions to occur, aspects of deal completion including financial structuring, 
and post transaction issues including performance, governance, actions and the life cycle of the 
company. The relevance of these main areas is explained and literature critically appraised. 
Examination is first made of the types of restructuring forms which have evolved during the 
1980's, the development of buy-outs and the role of buy-ins within the general family of corporate 
restructuring forms (2.2.2). Attention is paid to the distinctions which can be made in terms of 
the different sources of transactions (2.2.3). Moreover, whilst buy-ins share certain common 
characteristics with each other, the management buy-in concept is not homogeneous. The 
characteristics of buy-ins will differ enormously ranging from the highly leveraged transaction of 
a large quoted company such as in the cases of the LBOs of Gateway by Isosceles or DRG by 
Pembridge Investments to the smaller buy-ins of less than ;EI mn involving activities which were 
formerly parts of privately owned companies (see for instance cases in Chapter 14 and Appendices 
7-12). 
Consideration is then given to the vendor's motivation in selling to management (2.2.4) and how 
the decision to divest can be partially seen as a reaction to issues associated with multi-divisional 
firm organisation and Agency Cost considerations (2.2.5). While a vendor may seek to sell a 
subsidiary or company for a variety of reasons (eg strategic rc-dircction, undcr-performancc, 
financial distress of either the subsidiary or parent, unwanted part of an earlier acquisition), the 
actual choice of purchaser will dcpcnd on various factors. In some cases buy-ins may produce 
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particular advantages over buy-outs, eg the credibility of management to implement a recovery 
strategy to preserve employment. One of the main considerations in acquiring the target company 
is likely to have been the belief that under its previous ownership and management it was under- 
performing relative to its competitors. Chapter 2.2.6 analyses the strategic and managerial aspects 
of turning round a target company, assessing the literature on corporate under-performance and 
turnaround actions. 
As a result of the different circumstances urrounding management buy-ins compared to buy-outs, 
the managers involved in buy-ins may be expected to possess entrepreneurial characteristics which 
show certain distinctions from those of Team Leaders in other types of venture capital 
transactions and are also separable from those typically displayed by managers who are not 
owners. Chapter 2.3 provides an initial examination of the Team Leader and Team including 
consideration of the role of the Entrepreneur (2.3.1). The development of entrepreneurial 
characteristics, however, have been seen to derive from a complex of issues: personal backgrounds 
including age, education, culture and religion (2.3.2), the relevance of previous entrepreneurial 
experience (2.3.3), and psychological and motivational aspects including the Entrepreneur's need 
for achievement, risk taking capacity and the influence of displacement effects (2.3.4). The 
relevance and development of entrepreneurial typologies is also assessed (2.3.5). 
Another important element in the buy-in process is ensuring that an appropriate infrastructure 
exists for the generation of transactions and compIction of opportunities. The desire of Teams 
to buy a company must be matched by a willingness of the vendor to sell and the presence of an 
appropriate financial, legal and taxation system to complete the transaction. Relevant general 
factors are described in 2.4.1 with particular emphasis on the role which the Team Leader's 
incubator organisation may have (2.4.2). Entrepreneurs are likely to employ a combination of both 
formal and informal networks (2.4.3) to identify and complete the transaction. While much of the 
identification process may be done using existing informal networks, final negotiations and 
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completion will involve advice from accountants and the use of venture capitalists (2.4.4). There 
will be a clear trade-off between the desire of the venture capitalist to be involved in this type 
of transaction and the business acumen skills, abilities and experience of the buy-in team 
members. The accounting adviser may play an important part, assisting the entrepreneur in his 
search for venture capital and helping to originate the venture capital proposal. An important 
element of the venture capital process will be due diligence procedures. 
Completion of the transaction (2.5) involves a range of issues including financial structuring 
(2.5.1) and a pricing which ensures fair value for the vendor (2.5.2). Corporate restructuring as 
well as creating suitable forms for changes in ownership structure may also be expected to create 
wider managerial and employee share ownership and produce incentives towards significant 
improvement in the operating performance of the target company. By giving the new management 
(and in some cases a wider band of incumbent managers and employees) the opportunity to 
acquire an equity stake, significant incentives are created which may be expected to improve the 
performance of the company. These may be enhanced by the use of equity ratchets. In addition 
by using higher degrees of leverage than conventionally employed in UK corporate finance, 
management in both buy-ins and buy-outs enter a different style of contract with financiers 
designed to reduce the agency costs of transactions and give incentives from equity ownership but 
also creating a bonding factor through the commitment to service debt. Clearly the degree of 
leverage has to be finely tuned to the individual transaction- allowing gains in operating efficiency 
not only to be achieved in the short term but to allow for the appropriate structures for these 
gains to be retained in the longer term for the success of the buy-in. Completion also involves 
issues concerning the pricing of the transaction and ensuring that the selling shareholders (2.5.2) 
achieve a fair value for the assets disposed. Consideration is given to the possibility of the misuse 
by management in buy-outs of insider information in the deal negotiation process. 
Chapter 2.6 critically reviews post transaction issues starting with an examination of the issues 
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relevant to performance (2.6.1) before presenting existing evidence on buy-out performance 
(2.6.2). As explained in Chapter 1.2, the short time period which has elapsed since buy-outs 
became common has meant that few large sample, long term performance studies have been 
completed. For buy-ins there are none except studies of United States LBOs, which, despite their 
similarities, do differ significantly in some major respects (cg degree of leverage, initiation of 
transaction, average size) from the private buy-ins which are the subject of this thesis. 
Nevertheless there are implications for UK buy-ins from these US studies in respect of both the 
anticipated beneficial and negative aspects which could accompany such transactions. Turnaround 
action is examined in 2.6.3 and the roic of ncw managcmcnt in achieving performance 
improvements assessed in 2.6.4. 
Ile type of control exercised by the financier and the methods of finance used are crucial to the 
buy-in transaction and a distinct form of corporate governance is introduced (2.6.5). Shareholders 
Agreements and Articles of Association will state the framework for a new system of Governance 
which will include tight monitoring systems, controls on certain major developments (eg capital 
cxpcnditurc, divestments, acquisitions) as well as right of equity investors to Board of Directors 
representation. The shorter chain of command between shareholder and company than in the 
conventional subsidiary of a quoted company status allows more flexibility of action and the ability 
to counter adverse trends or take advantage of opportunities at an early stage. The new system 
of governance is appraised in 2.6.5. To help attain expected financial and operating efficiency 
improvements, management and institutions may introduce more appropriate accounting and 
reporting systems. 
There arc additionally longer term aspects concerning the period for which the company remains 
independent and whether there is the possibility of a consistent life cycle theory approach (2.6.6). 
Development of the buY-in's business may imply different long-term ownership forms which 
require to be made consistent with the aims of both management and the venture capital 
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investors. The latter will, in general, seek realisation of their investment in the medium term by 
several methods. The extent to which a financial engineering approach by certain institutions and 
advisers in the late 1980's affected the development of the market and imposed a dcgrcc of short- 
tcrmism rather than long term support for an independent company is also rclcvanL Ile buy-out 
funds which dominated the mcdium and large end of the buy-in and buy-out market in the late 
1980's frequently worked on comparatively short life cycles themselves requiring investments in 
the companies to be rcaliscd at a relatively early stage so that capital gains could be accrued for 
the investors in the funds (Robbie and Wright 1992a, Wright, Robbie, Thompson, Starkey 1994). 
Issues discussed in Chapter 2 have tended to reflect buy-out experience in that there has been 
no other published academic literature specifically on UK management buy-ins. Issues raised are 
applied to management buy-ins in Chapter 3 through a model of factors influencing management 
buy-ins which provides a synthesis of the various strands of theory which are considered relevant: 
entrepreneurial influences (3.2), vendor motivation (3.3), the target company (3.4), search and 
identification (3.5), deal completion (3.6) and post transaction issues (3.7). In this Chapter the 
distinctive form of management buy-in is highlighted. As well as possessing the known advantages 
of buy-outs derived from corporate restructuring and entrepreneurship theories, buy-ins may be 
seen to have particular applications. Similarities and differences between buy-outs and buy-ins in 
general are identified through examination of management, personal background and motivational 
aspects of the Team, company characteristics and financial aspects. This leads to the statement 
of the main hypotheses and propositions of the thesis. 
The remainder of the thesis presents empirical work covering management buy-ins in general 
which has been obtained through the establishment by the author of a database on over 750 UK 
management buy-ins, a questionnaire survey of buy-in Team Leaders and case study interviews 
carried out with buy-in Teams at their companics. The methodology employed is explained in 
Chapter 4. 
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In order to describe the context of the development of the buy-in market, Chapter 5 discusses the 
growth in the UK of buy-ins in general and their basic characteristics, making comparisons where 
possible with buy-outs and testing for significant differences. Buy-ins may have different sectoral, 
size and regional characteristics while risk factors may have resulted in financing structures and 
realisation methods which are significantly different from those in management buy-outs. 
Chapters 6 to 11 use descriptive statistics from the buy-in questionnaire survey to test 
entrepreneurial, motivational, network, strategic, restructuring, performance and life cycle issues 
raised in the earlier literature review. I'his analysis commences with the backgrounds of managers 
who have bought in, initially investigating the personal and educational background of the buy-in 
Team in an attempt to look for characteristics which tic in with conventional entrepreneurial 
theory (Chapter 6). 7bc presence of specific background features such as parents who were owner 
managers of enterprises, the age at which the entrepreneurial decision was made and educational 
background may all have an impact (6.2). Patterns of career dcvclopmcnt may also be relevant 
(63). Some managers may also have had previous cxpcricncc of being owner managers either 
through a new venture or through bcing part of a buy-out (6.4). Additionally the composition of 
the team and the possibility of a skills gap could be important for subsequent cohesiveness of the 
Team and successful target performance (6.5). 
Chapter 7 considers questions relating to the motivations involved in the buy-in: these issues have 
to be seen in terms of both the Team (7.2) and the vendor (7.3). In the case of the latter 
consideration is also given as to why a management buy-in Team should be the preferred 
purchaser. 
The need to identify a suitable target company, ascertain that the company is for sale and to go 
through financial, accounting and lcgnl proccsscs is csscntial to cnsurc compiction of the buy-in. 
The potential Managcr-owncrs may use a variety of search methods, some of which may be seen 
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to rely on informal and others on formal networks. Issues relating to these arc discussed in 
Chapter 8. Within this there arc important questions discussed concerning the differences and 
similarities between the buy-in target and the Team Leader's incubator as well as the importance 
of networks in identifying or helping in establishing the buy-in (83). Furthermore the 
characteristics of the target company provide some cvidcncc as to whether buY-ins reflect general 
perceptions of buy-outs being in cash gcncrativc, mature industrics. Buy-ins may also be seen by 
Teams during their search to provide attractive turnarounds or to be suitable vehicles for a series 
of corporate acquisitions (8.4). 
Methods of financial structuring arc clearly extremely important in terms of the gains which can 
be expected from the corporate restructuring process and Chapter 9 examines the way in which 
the buy-in sample have been financed. The role of equity and debt in making management 
perform is clearly critical through bonding management to servicing financing instruments but at 
the same time giving them the necessary incentive for personal financial gain. There is also the 
question as to how widely the new managcmcnt arc prepared to spread the equity ownership to 
incumbent management. As part of the new Govcrnancc financc will have been accompanied by 
a large number of conditions: whilst these will have been seen by the banks and venture capitalists 
as necessary for completion of the transaction, they may be seen by management as restrictive and 
unnecessary (9.4). This Chapter considers these conditions and their effects on institutional 
relations. 
The success of the buy-in will depend on the effectiveness of the actions taken by the new 
management (and the institution's monitoring and control) both in the areas of redefining the 
aims of the company including new invcstmcnt, the reform of marketing, sales, financial and 
production systems and practices, making acquisitions and introducing management changes and 
incentive systems (Chapter 10). Spccific comparisons tcsting for significant differences are made 
with earlier studies of management buy-outs, sharpbcnders, turnarounds and new ventures (10-6). 
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Some insight into performance can be gained from the results of the survey questionnaire 
although the relatively short pcriod since the buy-ins were completed and lack of accounting data 
means that only an examination of general trend effects is possible (Chapter 11). Evidence of 
direction of performance is linked to relevant variables relating to the background qualities of the 
management, he company and the buy-in structuring (11.2) as well as placing performance in an 
overall economic and financial context. Problems which emerge post buy-in arc identified (113) 
and finance requirements examined (11.4). Realisation intentions and actual exits by the buy-in 
sample arc discussed (11.5). 
Entrepreneurship theory has developed typologies of entrepreneurs. These arc typically classified 
into two main groupings 
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opportunists and craftsmen and have been tested principally in the US 
although there have been two mijor European studies (see Chapter 23. S). Using factor and 
cluster analysis Chapter 12 examines motivational and certain background demographic features 
of Team Leaders to develop a typology of UK Buy-in Team Leaders. The types identified are 
then examined for their closeness to classifications of entrepreneurs described in other studies as 
well as Buy-out Team Leaders. The possibilities for the existence of differing performance 
characteristics between the various typcs of Buy-in Team Leader 'clusters' (12.4) as well as 
between Buy-out and Buy-in clusters (12.6) arc also examined. 
A fullcr analysis in made in Chapter 13 of performance determinants. Employing discriminant 
analysis on a measure of pcrformancc, major variabics identified earlier in the Tbcsis as likely to 
affect the performance of buy-ins and representing a range of entrepreneurial, personal 
background and company characteristics and aspects of financial structuring arc used in a stepwise 
sequence. 
Chapter 14 analyses case study interviews in terms of the management buy-in process and the 
issues which emerged in the literature survey and the cmpirical evidence from the questionnaire 
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survey. A model of the buy-in process is developed to provide a suitable background framework 
for this examination. This synthesis of case study issues allows an analytical approach to be made 
extending discussion of the issues arising which include consideration of the types of backgrounds 
of buy-in managers; the methods of identification of the target company; modes of approach to 
institutions; due diligence; financing structures; problems which emerged on buy-in and 
consequent re-organisation; factors influencing initial performance; the influence of debt bonding 
and equity incentives; the new style of corporate governance; rcalisation and the life cycle of the 
target company. 7be variety of cases covered represented the diversity of backgrounds in buy-ins 
and corporate restructuring: these cover buy-ins from privately owned companies including a 
management buy-out, divestment from both a UK controlled quoted company and an overseas 
owned company and a buy-in leading to a going private of a stock market quoted company. 
Chapter 15 presents the conclusions of the thesis appraising the differences between management 
buy-outs and buy-ins and discussing the salient issues. I'lie Chapter contains implications for policy 
makers, providers of capital and potential management buy-in teams as well as recommendations 
for further research. IMis is followed by Appendices which include copies of the survey 
questionnaire, forms used to gather more general information on buy-ins, the names of the 
companies participating in the survey and detailed case studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ISSUES INVOLVED IN MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter I described the outline of the Thesis and the importance of management buy-ins within 
corporate restructuring. This Chapter explores the issues which are relevant to the management 
buy-in process thereby paving the way in Chapter 3 for the raising of various propositions and 
hypotheses concerning management buy-ins and their differences with management buy-outs and 
other forms of venture. 
For expositional purposes, the issues involved in management buy-ins can be structured in terms 
of the management buy-in process (Figure 2.1). Key to the achievement of a buy-in is the 
matching of an appropriate Team to a Target Company. This means that a corporate restructuring 
opportunity must be seen to exist and that the potential vendor must be willing or be persuaded 
to sell- ic there is a corporate restructuring opportunity to be exploited. The need for such 
restructuring and the vendor's motivation arc important issues and lead to an examination of types 
of ownership and forms of restructuring which may be relevant. A major reason for restructuring 
is seen as poor performance leading to consideration of issues relating to turnaround of poor 
performers. 
Within the Team there are issues concerning the type of experience of the members, how the 
team is formed and their personal and entrepreneurial characteristics. Entrepreneurship literature 
has pointed to the importance of certain personal characteristics uch as age, education, parents, 
cultural and religious influences while previous experience of business ownership- either by 
themselves or their parents- may also be relevant. The motivation of the Team is a key factor and 
the extent to which there is a clear need for achievement, the entrepreneurs are prepared to 
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Figure 2.1: MANAGEMENT BUY-IN ISSUES 
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engage in risk taking or whether they have been displaced from a previous venture or 
employment. Recent entrepreneurship literature has also pointed to the possibilities of 
entrepreneurs being classified into certain typologics, and there is the question as to how 
management buy-in Tcams may fit into these more general approaches. 
Tbc matching of the vcndor with the buyer relies on the existence of an appropriate infrastructure 
for the transaction to take place. Within this there arc issues concerning the type of company 
which the Team arc searching and how it can be identified. This includes for instance the role of 
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incubators and networks. Key issues will be the role of professional advisers such as accountants 
as wcll as the prescncc of vcnture capitalists. 
Assuming that the deal is completed, issues arise as to the structuring of the transaction and 
especially financial aspects. Ibc need for corporate restructuring has been frequently seen to 
derive form a need to reduce agency costs, provide more equity incentives, more debt bonding 
and control by shareholders including direct control, by executive managcmcnL The way in which 
bonding and inccntive issues can be incorporated into financing structures requires examination. 
After the completion of the transaction there are however more long term issues which require 
to be examined. Tbesc include the way in which performance of the target company can be 
expected to improve and the infIucncc of turnaround strategies and actions. Ibc role of new 
management as opposed to the case of buy-outs where existing management continues is highly 
relevant. Longer term issues arc also important in terms of whether a rcalisation is sought by the 
investors in the short or mcdiurn terms or whether a long term approach is used. The way in 
which this may be achieved has relevance also for governance issues. 
Tbc Chapter proceeds by examining the main issues illustrated in Figure 2.1 as follows: the 
corporate restructuring opportunity (2.2), the Team Leader and the Team (2.3), Infrastructure 
Aspects (2.4), Deal Completion (2.5) and Post Transaction Issues (2.6). 
2.2 The Restructuring Opportunity 
2.2.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, from about 1980 in the United Kingdom the ability of management 
0 (supported by specialist financing institutions) to purchase a set of business activities which they 
had previously been managing has produced major alternatives to traditional acquisitions in the 
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form of management buy-outs. 7bis development came after the emergence of Leveraged Buy- 
outs in the US which usually involved external management and frequently that of the specialist 
financing institution. Tbcsc developments were followed in the UK in the mid-1980's by venture 
and development capital backed external management acquiring target companies, the 
managemcnt buy-in (Robbie 1988). While in the UK the vast majority of buy-out transactions 
have been of firms which have not been listed in the stock market or have been subsidiaries of 
listed firms, in the United States an extremely important variation has been the 'going private, 
whereby institutions have backed incumbent management or provided their own management to 
purchase the company and dc-list it from the stock market, although in some cases refloating it 
several years later and frequently using high degrees of leverage. By 1987 one third of the US 
market for corporate control was in the form of LBOs (Hall 1989) and by 1991 over half the 
number of corporate control transactions in the UK were in the form of management buy-outs 
and buy-ins (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). 
Corporate restructuring may be seen as having three main inter-rclated strands- the re- 
organisation of activities between and within firms; a greater link between equity ownership and 
dccision-making and a shift in financial structures involving more leverage as well as changes in 
control for equity holders. Before examining the issues involved in deciding to restructure, the 
various forms of restructuring are described. 
2.2.2 Typcs of rcstructuring 
Corporate Restructuring may be initiated by a single interest or by a combination with 
management having a variable level of control in the new entity. The major parties involved are: 
financing institutions, management, LBO partnerships, vendors and consortium. Thc range of 
forms of buy-out and the relevant initiators are shown in Table 2.1. 
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TABLE 2.1: INITIATORS AND TYPES OF CORPORATE RESTRUCI'URING 
INVOLVING BUY-OUT AND BUY-INS 
Type of Restructuring Initiator New Owncr(s) 
1. LJ30 LBO Partnership (1) LBO Partnership and 
backers 
(2) Management 
2. MBO (1) Management (1) Management 
(2) Institutions 
Large MBO (1) Institutions (1) Institutions 
(2) Management (2) Management 
(3) Employees (3) ESOP 
3. MBI (1) Institutions (1) Management external 
(2) External Management (2) Institutions 
4. BIMBO (1) Institutions (1) Institutions 
(2) External Management (2) Old + New Management 
(3) Internal Management 
5. Spin-off (1) Vendor (1) Vendor 
(2) Man3gcment 
(3) Institutional 
6. Going Private (1) Man3gemcnt/Institutional (1) Managcmcnt/Institutional 
(2) Consortium (2) Consortium 
7. Public MBI (1) External Management (1) Management external L- (2) Institutions (2) Institutions 
7bc traditional UK management buy-out involves the transfer of ownership of an entity from 
its current owners to a new set of shareholders in which the existing management arc a significant 
element. In the most clear cut case, a management team comprising the senior staff covering the 
line functions of the business will have a majority or even total stake in the equity of the newly 
independent firm, the remainder of the funding being provided by financial institutions in the 
form of a mixturc of debt and equity. In small buy-outs the management team may have a 
majority of the equity but for the larger transactions the majority is likely to be held by a syndicate 
of institutions (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). 
The proportion of shares held by management and employees may frequently depend upon the 
mcdium term performance of the firm and may be adjusted up (and sometimes down) by means 
25 
of a ratchet mechanism (Ilompson, Wright 1991). In large buy-outs, it may permit a majority 
equity stake to be obtained if performance targets arc met. 7bc reasons for the use of such 
techniques arc varied but concern the need to motivatc management to perform at levels which 
allow institutions to achieve target rates of return, and resolve conflicts between institutions and 
management as to the lattcr's appropriate equity stake. 
In transfers of ownership involving large firms, or where managers below the senior level arc key 
to ensuring the targets needed to service a highly leveraged financial structure are met, equity 
participation may be extended beyond the core team of managers. Occasionally, all employees may 
be offered the opportunity to purchase equity, without there being an obligation to invest, 
producing an employee buy-out. Another option is through the establishment of an Employee 
Share Ownership Plan or Trust (ESOP, ESOT) which is effected by the establishment of a trust 
(Brennan 1990). The trust may borrow to buy shares on behalf of the employees. This type of 
scheme offers a more widespread ownership of shares, although employees as a body will tend 
to hold a minority stake. It is unusual, in practice, for all employees to take up their opportunity 
-to own shares, let alone for there to be an even distribution of the size of holding across the firm. 
However, schemes can be constructed to permit this pattern of ownership. 
In contrast to management and employee buy-outs the Management Buy-in can be broadly 
defined as the transfer of ownership whereby management control of an existing business is gained 
by a m4nager or group of managers who have not been working for the company before and who 
have not necessarily worked together before. 71is management control will have been obtained 
through the acquisition of a significant equity stake in the company conccrned. 'Ibe transaction 
will normally involve the purchase of equity in the target company not only by the new 
management but also by the buy-in team's financial backer. Management buy-in teams need to 
be seen as distinct from corporate acquisitions or rcvcrsc takeovers where it is the company rather 
than the management taking the risk. Tbc necessary degree of management control post 
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acquisition to constitute a management buy-in varies: it is however essential that the overall equity 
held by the parties involved should be the dominant shareholding roup and the new management 
have effective managerial control. Ilis may imply an equity pcrccntagc in a range from as low 
as tcn percent to as high as 100 percent. 
Buy-ins may be further divided into two main categories: private buy-ins, ic those that occur 
exclusively in private companies or through the divestment of parts of larger or quoted or 
overseas companies; and public buy-ins where companies which arc quoted on the Stock Market 
arc the target. Private management buy-ins reported on in this thesis exclude purchases of 
businesses by private individuals which can be financed entirely through their own equity and 
commercial bank finance unless they are of a substantial size, taken to be over 11 mn. The normal 
buy-in transaction reported on here will involve vcnture/dcvclopmcnt capital institutions backing 
a new management team, although other private or public providers of equity may also be 
involved. The public buy-in refers to the management take-ovcr of a quoted company. In come 
cases wealthy private investors have been able to arrange this without financial support of 
merchant banks, but in the more general case the new management act with financial backers. In 
many ways this is similar to the US Leveraged Buy-out involving external management groups with 
specialist equity backers frequently using leveraged financial structures. 
Ibcrc is an increasingly grey area where a combination of external and internal management join 
to form the new team. In some cases the team may include former members of staff Of the target 
company. 7bc hybrid form may be referred to as a BINIBO (Buy-in/management buy-out) (3i 
1992a). What is important in distinguishing between these hybrid forms is from where the original 
initiative for the transfer of ownership came. buy-out transactions in the US. There the term 
MBO usually rcrcrs to buy-outs of companies quoted on the stock market which subsequently 
cease to be listed and where management have a significant equity stake, thc'Going Private. Ibc 
US L4cvcragcd Buy-out (LBO) usually involves a specialist dcal-maker or LBO partnership, who 
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negotiate the deal, and directly and indirectly supply equity and debt f inancc; this represents more 
a highly geared version of the UK MBI rather than the UK MBO. Typically, a small amount of 
cquity is put forward with substantial amounts of debt being used to fund the major portion of 
the purchase price. After the LBO is complete, new senior management, often employees and 
equity holders of the LBO partnership, are likely to play a key role in the running of the business 
and ensuring it meets its debt repayment targets. Incumbent management may or may not receive 
an equity stake. 
In some buy-outs and buy-ins, vendors may wish to place executive control of an entity at arm's 
length whilst retaining a minority stake. 71c retention of some element of ownership serves 
several purposes. it helps the vendor participate in future gains and possibly avoid some of the 
problems of selling at a price which subsequently appears to be too low-, it permits continued 
influence where trading relationships remain; and it may be key to actually effecting the transfer 
of ownership whcrc it rills a funding gap and may make the buy-out credible as an independent 
entity in the eyes of its suppliers and customers (CMBOR/NAO, 1991). Where the vendor retains 
a majority stake the terms spin-off and corporate venturing may be appropriate. This form of 
organisation, which provides management with an equity incentive and the freedom to develop 
the business has so far been little used in the UK, though it is quite common in the US (Garvin, 
1983). Ile alternative to these routes has traditionally been for entrepreneurial management to 
leave the incubator environment of the parent and establish an entirely new firm (Johnson and 
Cathcart, 1979). 
A joint bid with an existing firm may be appropriate where incumbent employees, though 
possessing important skills necessary for the business to survive, are unable to raise sufficient 
funds to acquire the critity on their own against competing bidders and where market conditions 
are such that extra resources are needed for viability. 
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213 Sources of Transaction for Buy-outs and Buy-ins 
Concern as to the performance of firms in dynamic market environments has led to the 
possibilitics for corporate restructuring in both private and public sectors. In the former in the 
mid and late 198N the volume and value of takeover activity in the UK rose dramatically and 
included acquisitions of very large firms as well as sales of large subsidiaries or divisions to other 
groups checking a long period of increasing aggregate concentration in UK industry (Department 
of Enterprise 19S8). In the public sector significant restructuring also occurred with government 
ownership of assets seriously questioned (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
Thc most important source of buy-outs in the UK has been divestment, first as parent groups 
sought to restructure by disposing of unwanted, peripheral, poorly performing subsidiaries, and 
later as parents sought to shift their core activities. Such shifts were often out of areas of failed 
earlier diversification attempts. In a smaller but significant number of cases important trading 
relationships remained between the former parent and the buy-out/in. In these ways corporations 
were able to effect restructuring and metamorphose themselves into entities which enhanced 
shareholder value. 
71c relative position of divestment declined throughout the 1980s (although their absolute 
numbers increased) as buy-outs involving whole firms, privately owned firms and companies 
quoted on a stock market, became more important. The last have been most closely associated 
with highly leveraged US corporate restructurings, where quoted firms or very large divestments 
has often been associated with subsequent divestment or unbundling activity to refocus the spread 
of a firm's activities. Importantly, this divestment may also be key to reducing what arc initially 
very high debt levels to amounts which can be serviced comfortably from normal cash flow. In the 
UK, the bust-up approach to buy-outs has generally been limited and below levels seen in the US 
(Chiplin, Wright, Robbie, 1990). In principle buy-ins also have an important role to play in 
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mccting thcsc divcstmcnt opportunities although they have been relatively less important as an 
avcrall sourcc than for buy-outs. 
A common theme in several continental European countries has been the use of buy-outs and 
buy-ins to cffcct succession in often large family-owncd businesses ensuring that independence 
is retained (Robbie, Wright, 1991). In France spcciric government legislation was introduced 
through the RES scheme to encourage such transfers of ownership to management (Hcuzc 1990). 
In other countries such as Italy and Spain a problem in succession has been the likelihood that 
the forceful and successful entrepreneur may not have an adequate Deputy to be able to gain 
institutional support for a buy-out. In such circumstances the management buy-in can play a more 
important role in corporate restructuring than in the UK 
Some divestments by forcign-owncd firms restructuring to concentrate on their home markets 
have also provided scope for buy-outs. In countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain where 
accurate accounting information and management systems arc significantly different from the UK, 
the management buy-out may be more appealing to the institution than a transaction involving 
a local divestor: the likelihood is that the accounting and reporting systems as part of an 
international group will allow more effective due diligence to be performed. Additionally 
management may be of a more internationally acceptable calibre. At the same time, such 
companies may through the acceptability of information standards provide suitable opportunities 
for management buy-ins. 
Buy-outs from the stock market, 'going privates' have been a major elcmcnt of the US buy-out 
market since the early 1980's although they have been a comparatively rare element of the UK 
and European markets. In the United States a significant number of these transactions have not 
been initiated by the incumbent *management but by external investors in the form of an LBO 
Association. They can be divided into six main types depending on the circumstances under which 
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they arose (Wright, Thompson, Chiplin, Robbie, 1991): as a defence against an actual or 
anticipated hostile takeover bid; an opportunistic venture by incumbent management; as a hostile 
Buy-in or LBO; as a response to serious performance difficulties; to allow the transfer of 
significant/controlling shareholders; and key shareholder dissatisfaction with the share price, 
analysts' comments or disclosure levels. 
The public buy-in however presents an interesting comparison with the US LBO in that the 
initiative has come from outside with incumbent management not necessarily being involved. 
Additionally the UK public buy-in may be complete or partial, in the latter case effective power 
being transferred to the new management team and their investors without having to acquire all 
the shares and retaining the advantages of a stock market listing. 
Buy-outs have frequently provided a means of privatisation from the public sector where a float 
was not technically appropriate (Wright, 'Ihompson, Robbie, 1990). Buy-outs range from the 
employee buy-out of a complete nationaliscd industry (National Freight) to those on the break 
up of National Bus and BTG/NEB. In addition, a substantial number have arisen on divestment 
of parts of state enterprises such as British Rail and British Shipbuilders as they have undergone 
major restructuring. Despite the restructuring and turnaround opportunity in many privatisation 
cases, buy-ins have been rare, reflecting the significant negotiating positions which incumbent 
management and employecs'have in such situations. Buy-outs have extended to a wide variety of 
governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. Buy-outs in the local authority and ancillary 
health service sectors as alternatives to contracting-out or awards to in-house departments are also 
occurring in increasing numbers in the UK (Wright, Robbie, 1991). However reports by the Audit 
Commission and the National Audit Office have cmphasiscd that authorities need to take steps 
to ensure fair bidding procedures and introduce detailed contractual specifications regarding the 
services to be provided (Audit Commission 1990, CMBOR/NAO 1991). 
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2.2.4 Motivation for Selling to Management 
Before a management buy-out or buy-in can take place, a decision has to be taken to sell by the 
current owner of the assets whether it is being done on a voluntary or involuntary basis. Bradley, 
Desai and Vim (1983) explain divestment motivation in terms of information and synergy 
hypotheses: the target assets may be undervalued in the capital market because investors are not 
fully informed about future cash flows while an offer presents evidence of the mispricing. Under 
the synergy argument potential productive gains can only be obtained after the transfer of the 
assets to the buyer's control. Reasons cited by Hite. ' Owers and Rogers (1987) included the 
subsidiary experiencing poor operating results, a lack of fit between parent and subsidiary and a 
need to raise capital for expansion of other existing lines of business or to reduce high levels of 
existing debt (ie as an option to the sale of new securities). Divestments may also follow 
acquisitions. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) studying divestments made following acquisitions found 
the most common reasons stated as being changes in corporate focus or strategy, to finance 
subsequent acquisitions* or leveraged buy-outs and performance related reasons. Other possible 
reasons such as antitrust, needing cash, defending against a takeover and receiving a good price 
were infrequent. 
Vendors may have no overriding preference between divesting via a buy-out or trade sale, 
companies preferring to deal with the issue on a case by case basis (Bleackley and Hay 1992). 
Nevertheless individual deal considerations may make a management buy-out preferable to a 
conventional divestment through a trade sale in circumstances where there may be important non- 
financial objectives to satisfy- cg a vendor's local reputation, the need for a speedy sale, the 
possibility of a management walk-out where management are a significant part of the value of the 
entity or if there are particular problems in long term trading relationships (see eg Wright et al 
1991, p 78). Decisions may be complicated if management are suspected of possessing important 
insider knowledge about the company. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that for a buy-out to 
take place the management must value the entity more than the vendor and any other potential 
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acquirer. Some of these reasons are also applicable to buy-in Teams who may also be attractive 
to the vendor in terms of entrepreneurial skills and business acumen. 
Vendor motivation for management buy-outs clearly reflect similar. reasons to those in more 
conventional divestments described earlier. Research has typically concentrated in areas such as 
strategic and financial distress rationales (see eg Wright et al 1991, Green and Berry 1991, 
Bleackley and Hay 1992). The former typically revolves around the need to refocus around one 
or a few businesses by disposing of activities considered now to be non-core as a result of a 
variety of factors- eg under-performing businesses, excessive diversification, results of previous 
acquisitions policy. The second may reflect serious cash flow problems within the Group 
(sometimes as a result of financial problems within the subsidiary or division being divested) 
forcing the parent company to release funds for the continued growth or survival of the remaining 
operation. The former can be seen as being equivalent to a voluntary divestment while the latter 
will frequently be involuntary. 
Such views are supported in Wright et al (1991) who reported on a survey of management buy- 
outs completed in the mid 1980s. 
TABLE 2.2: DIVESTOR'S REASONS FOR SELLING 
Divestor 
UK Parent Non-UK All Sellers 
Parent By Buy-out 
Liquidation 5.78 7.00 4.26 
Lack of Profitability 3.00 3.10 3.04 
Cash Flow Problems 3.35 4.33 3.54 
Poor Growth Prospects 3.48 3.89 3.67 
Change of Group Core Activities 2.06 2-12 2-31 
Company's future capital requirements 3.65 2.89 3.44 
Scores are averages, based on 1= Most important, through to 7= Least important. 
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Managers felt (Table 2.2) that the parental decision to redefine core activities of the group was 
clearly the most important reason for sale, followed by other factors relating to performance. For 
non-UK parents, future capital requirements of the divested subsidiary was'the most important 
element in the decision to sell. 
In an extreme case buy-outs may take place when financial distress has effectively ended the life 
of the parent group with it being placed in administrative receivership. In such cases management 
buy-outs may subsequently take place from the receiver. There is evidence that buy-outs may have 
been attempted in the period running up to receivership but failed because vendors were not 
prepared to accept the prices being offered by the management. Almost half of managers who 
complete buy-outs after their companies had gone into receivership had attempted to buy the 
company prior to it being placed in receivership (Robbie et al 1993). 
Since the pressures facing the vendor and consequently his motivation are different in these 
various circumstances leading to a divestment management buy-out, there may be differences in 
both the valuation placed by the vendor on the divestment of the business depending on, the 
positive and negative background to the sale but also on that attributed by potential purchasers 
of the business. A company under financial pressure may accept a lower price for a unit it was 
divesting whereas one with a stronger background may be able to delay selling until a more 
advantageous point in the market for inter-firm asset sales was reached. Markets may react 
differently'to the news depending on the type and fullness of reasons given and interpretation of 
this in terms of future earnings ability of the company and management capability signals. 
A further consideration reflects general competitive influences in a market and whether there are 
trading relationships between the vendor and the subsidiary. Attractions of reducing control costs 
and possibly gaining benefits from economies of scale and scope that sale to a specialist producer 
might provide, may be offset by the possibility of a dominant supplier exploiting his position to 
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charge a higher price. Sale to a management buy-out avoids these problems, as long as the bought 
out company is more reliant upon the vendor than the vendor is upon its former subsidiary. 
Where a managed market or quasi-vertical integration relationship is required by the relatively 
specialised nature of the product, management who have bought out the entity have a stronger 
incentive to cooperate than may a potential trade buyer. The vendor may also exert pressure by 
requiring management to bid initially and at subsequent intervals for contracts separately from 
buying the assets of the business. 
In the US, studies by Duhaime and Grant (1984) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1986) which 
addressed the strategic rationale behind divestments in the form of sell-offs concluded that they 
were likely to involve more peripheral businesses and that it was unusual for divested units to 
have had a vertically integrated relationship with their parent group. However UK evidence from 
the first half of the 1980s (Wright, 1986; Wright, Chiplin, Thompson and Robbie, 1990b), shows 
that while the disposal of peripheral activities was a major characteristic of buy-outs, almost two 
fifths of buy-outs of divisions or subsidiaries sold their products and services to the former parent 
and around one quarter of buy-outs purchased goods from their former parent. These links, 
however, accounted for a relatively small share of the buy-out's sales and purchases. For buy-outs 
from UK parents, the former parent was more likely to be a customer, whilst for buy-outs from 
non-UK parents a supplier relationship was more probable. i 
2.2.5 The Influence of M-Form and Agency Cost Considerations 
In reaching the decision to divest (2.3.4), major issues arise as to the way that the firm has been 
organised, whether the structure has allowed the whole and parts to be efficient and whether 
managers act in the best interests of shareholders. Should the last not be the case, the agency 
costs (ic the total costs of the opportunities neglected or foregone,, together with those of 
monitoring) may be considerable. The internal structure of the firm plays an important role in 
checking this (Williamson, 1975, etc). Creation of a multi-divisional form, of 
- 
organisation, 
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characterised splitting the firm into a strategic headquarters and profit accountable divisions, may 
reduce the propensity for managerial pursuit of non-profit goals. Headquarters staff constitute a 
relatively small part of the whole firm, whilst divisional managers, whose promotions and 
remuneration depend on divisional performance, have lower incentives to misdirect resources.. In 
the strict multi-divisional form of organisation, divisions compete for investment funds, with the 
head office overseeing this process. I'lie e)dstence of an internal labour market ought to permit 
better-informed recruitment to senior positions and the possibility of internal promotion and 
enhance job security ought to encourage employee commitment to the organisation. 
A substantial number of studies has tended to support the argument that large complex firms 
organised into the multi-divisional form have greater efficiency and higher performance than those 
which are not organised in this way (see Cable, 1988 for a review of the studies). However, there 
is also strong evidence that many firms apparently organised on a strict multi-divisional basis do 
not meet the necessary'conditions on resource allocation and incentives. Investment funds may 
not be allocated on the basis of rates of return but as a result of relative internal power relations 
or strategic planning based on non-profit maximising objectives (Hill, 1984). The problem may be 
exacerbated by a shortage of internal investment funds provoked by profit crises. Some units may 
be designated as cash cows and deliberately starved of investment funds even though they have 
profitable investment opportunities. The functioning of an internal capital market may be 
hindered by the need to monitor an increasing number and diversity of operating divisions. As a 
result, increased reliance may need to be placed upon standardised performance targets. With 
limited central office resources, it may not be possible to intervene directly to raise divisional 
performance when performance targets are not met. 
Internal labour markets may also be problematical. The corollary of increased job security may 
be decreased responsibility and free-riding. The inability to write complete employment contracts 
raises the possibility of opportunism on the part of employees. Incomplete employment contracts 
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give rise to the need for a monitoring function. Senior management may not carry out this 
function satisfactorily. Moreover, divisional management, especially in the UY., have traditionally 
been salaried employees with little incentive to engage in profit-oriented activities. The spread 
of executive stock option schemes and of profit-related remuneration packages has gone some way 
to reversing this problem. However, there are key issues concerning the proportion of the total 
remuneration package which needs to be performance related in order to motivate managers, the 
ability to reward individual performance, the danger of encouraging short-term performance to 
the detriment of longer term prospects, and the exploitation by divisional managers of an 
advantage of informational asymmetry, which need to be dealt with. The incentive effects of 
equity-based remuneration packages may be significant for head office managers (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), but may be less so for divisional managers. 
In the absence of congruence between managerial and owners' interests, managers cannot be 
relied upon to behave efficiently in their adoption of flexibility. As Mueller (1972) and Marris, and 
Mueller (1988) have pointed out, managerially controlled firms may not divest as readily as those 
which are owner-controlled. The common incrementalist approach to strategy may limit the extent 
of flexibility by the divestment route (Johnson, 1988). Miller (1982) has drawn a distinction 
between evolutionary and quantum changes and has suggested that organisational processes lead 
to the absorption of inefficiencies and that adaptation will be delayed until crisis conditions force 
change to occur. These points also have implications for the notion of management being involved 
in a continual search process for the configuration of activities which produces the best returns 
for shareholders (Cable, 1977). As part of this process, subsidiaries may be acquired which are 
subsequently found not to fit with the parent firm's overall objectives. Poor fit may mean 
unsatisfactory performance, but it may also relate to mistakes in acquiring an entity which cannot 
economically be integrated into the group as a whole. The degree of fit will also be influenced 
by changing environmental and technological conditions and the life cycle of product markets, so 
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that something which was originally compatible is no longer (Harrigan, 1980; Duhaime and Grant, 
1984). For these reasons, divestment may be required to maximise returns to shareholders. 
The ability of firms to adapt to changed circumstances may be constrained by various barriers to 
exit from existing activities (Harrigan and Porter, 1983). The strengthening of the secondary 
market in divested divisions and subsidiaries facilitates exit where changing the use to which 
specific assets may be put May be limited. Where a public auction develops for the control of a 
division or subsidiary, the vendor ought to benefit from an increased sale price. In a typical case, 
the outside party may be bidding on the basis of anticipated synergy with its existing financial or 
operating activities, whilst the insiders act on detailed knowledge of the division's potential. Exit 
may be facilitated both prior to acute financial distress and as a response to it. In the extreme 
case of bankruptcy this is self evident. Either a loss making division itself may be sold or a 
profitable division may be disposed of to restore financial health to the parent. Consequently two 
main types of rationale can be seen for divestment by buy-out to occur- strategic disposal involving 
a return to core activities including the disposal of under-performing units- and financial distress- 
where parents may have severe cash flow problems, are forced to sell release funds for their own 
future growth and indeed survival (see eg Bleackley, Hay 1992). Of course, firms may not 
necessarily return to their original core activities but instead may choose to emphasise one or 
more of the segments into which they have diversified believing greater returns can be earned by 
so doing. 
Divestment of the unwanted parts serves a number of purposes: it is a means by which funds can 
be raised for acquisition activity in the area with perceived greater potential with a reduced need 
for outside additionat- funding; it is a means by which, clashes of corporate cultures can be 
resolved; it avoids control problems which may arise from attempting to monitor two or more very 
different activities; and it may help as a takeover defence strategy where it enables a low share 
price, which arises from a firm being seen as a conglomerate to be "corrected". 
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2.2.6 Corporate Under-Performance and Turnaround 
As detailed above a major reason why divestment may occur is because of the under-performance 
of a subsidiary. Management in both a buy-out or a buy-in will be expected to take rapid remedial 
action adopting a co-ordinated series of policies and strategies. This Section examines the likely 
causes of the need for turnaround. 
Success will depend on the correct identification of ways in which adverse factors be overcome. 
The most frequently encountered situations may be seen as where there was a decrease in 
organisational profitability followed by decreases in sales and market share with less attention 
being paid to increases in asset utilisation. Financial condition, market position, technological 
stance and production capabilities were important factors to be examined. In most, regardless of 
performance area, time is needed especially if the situation of the firm is quite severe. 
The causes of the corporate decline which are the prelude to the need for turnaround have been 
described in a number of studies, eg Argenti (1976), Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976), Hofer 
(1980), Slatter (1984), Muller (1985), Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan (1988) and Zimmermann 
(1991) and may be internal or external (Hoffman 1989). Turnaround may be seen to lie between 
organisational decline (eg Ford 1980, Harrigan 1980) and actual failure or bankruptcy (eg Argenti 
1976b, Altman 1983, Keasey and Watson 1991). Major problems exist in comparability of the 
studies in terms of definition of turnaround, size of samples, type of companies included and date 
of study. 
Despite the differences in severity of conditions which warrant turnaround definition, common 
threads behind reasons for corporate decline in these studies may be seen. They revolve around 
issues concerning management, competition, market demand, internal and external financial 
influences, policies and controls, marketing, cost structures, acquisitions, big projects and 
overtrading. 
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FIGURE 2.2: CAUSES OF NEED FOR TURNAROUND 
Factor Contributory Aspects 
Management Inadequate skills; skills gaps; lack of depth; ineffective 
direction, monitoring; neglect of core business; relative roles of 
CEO and Chairman, combination of roles; leadership and 
technical abilities of CEO; over cautious v over optimistic 
styles; failure to create shared vision and values 
Financial (internal) Inappropriate financial structuring including gearing levels; 
poor financial management and control systems; poor cash 
flow, working capital, budgetary control; lack of internal 
communication on financial matters; disputable overhead 
allocations; unsatisfactory costing factors; tendency to overtrade 
Financial (external) Adverse currency, interest rate and commodity price factors 
Cost Structure Inadequate internal information; poor purchasing management; 
scale economies not present; learning and experience curve 
effects; low productivity-, low utilisation of fixed assets;. 
competitor may have more favourable location, labour costs; 
overhead levels; operating inefficiencies (restrictive practices, 
poor plant layout); government intervention 
Market Demand Secular, cyclical and changing patterns of demand 
Production and Labour' Cost; quality; labour force morale; inflexible, outdated 
practices; poor production layout and control 
Marketing Non focused targets; poor distribution arrangements; possible 
dependence on single customer; inappropriate advertising focus; 
lack of sales incentive motivation; lack of market research; 
promotional aspects; lack of new product development 
Competition Products over priced; lack of product market focus; 
undifferentiated product; unjustifiable high price because of 
cost structure; lack of product development and ideas for new 
products; comparatively poor after sales service 
Acquisitions, Divestment and Earlier acquisitions of losers (eg weak competitive position in 
Prestige Projects own market; overpricing of acquisitions; poor post acquisition 
management; misdirection of management time to potential 
acquisitions and to big, prestige projects; financial over runs 
following poor costing and commissioning delays; divestment o 
non core or loss making subsidiaries may not have been made 
at the appropriate time 
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Additionally symptoms of the decline may also have been in evidence through decreasing 
profitability, decreasing sales volumes at constant prices, increase in debt, decrease in liquidity, 
restricted dividend policy, accounting practices, top management fear, rapid management turnover, 
declining market share and lack of planning/strategic thinking (Slatter, 1994) as well as 
organisational and ethical problems (Zimmermann, 1991). The actual changes are likely to have 
been triggered by one or a multiple of events, the more dramatic sharpbends being associated with 
multiple triggers (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1990). These include intervention from external 
bodies, change of ownership or the threat of such a change, new chief executive, recognition by 
management of problems and perception by management of new opportunities. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the major areas where problems are likely to exist in companies which 
require turnaround and the types of problem which may be evident within these areas. Individual 
cases are likely to show considerable variance between each other; studies involving case study 
approaches to a significant number of companies (eg Slatter 1984, Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan 
1988, Zimmermann 1989,1991) and others based on implications of a single or small sample of 
cases (eg Zimmerman 1986, Melin 1985, Robbie and Wright 1989 a etc) confirm the multitude 
of different factors which lie behind corporate decline which leads to the need for turnaround. 
Consequently studies may not be strictly comparable. 
Management has been seen as the single most important factor behind much corporate decline 
with inadequate overall managerial skills, the existence of skills gaps, ineffective vision, direction 
and monitoring, and the questionability of the role and abilities of Chief Executives especially 
where they also act as Chairman. Performance may be affected both by over cautious CEOs at 
one extreme and over optimistic ones at the other. CEO's may lack vision of the company or fail 
to share their vision and values. 
''', -1 ''1 11 
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Financial factors also play an important role. External financial factors, which may largely be out 
of the sphere of control of the firm, can influence the decline- eg adverse currency movements, 
high interest rates or sudden movements in commodity prices, especially where hedging devices 
have not been used. Internal financial problems may arise from poor control mechanisms, 
inadequate working capital control and low emphasis on cash flow, lack of budgetary systems and 
monitoring, inappropriate costing systems, unjustifiable overhead allocations and inadequate 
financial communication with and lack of financial education of non-financial departments. 
Financial structuring through perhaps excessive gearing for the type of company may have 
aggravated the company's financial stability. 
Related to these financial areas may be a cost structure which is too high, reflecting not only 
inadequate information and controls but also lack of scale economies. Fixed assets may be under 
utilised while productivity may be low. Overheads may be excessive and competitors may have 
access to cheaper factors of production. Government policy may have distorted cost structures. 
Management may also have engaged in an unwise acquisition strategy, eg by acquiring companies 
which turned out to have a weaker competitive position in their own markets than expected. The 
price paid may in retrospect have been excessive while post acquisition management may have 
been poor or have resulted in a misdirection of senior management's time from other pressing 
problems in the company. Similarly management may have misdirected resources into big projects 
which involved high capital expenditure and significantly altered gearing levels. Over-run of 
financial costs, communication problems, commissioning delays may have added to the 
management and financial strains on the parent company. I 
The level and mix of sales may have been depressed through poor marketing, competitive factors 
and changes in the market. Marketing targets may not be adequately focused, there could be over 
reliance on one or a handful of large customers. Promotional aspects and advertising may not be 
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adequate and sales incentive systems inappropriate for current market conditions. Market research 
may be incomplete or wrong. Sales may also be affected by fears over the state of new product 
developmenL 
The overall product markets within which the company operates may also be affected by various 
long term factors which may be difficult for the company to control. It could be subject less 
severely to a cyclical decline which will affect the short term prospects. More seriously there may 
be a long term secular decline in demand which will warrant more severe turnaround action. 
Within the market there may be changing patterns of demand which may affect one firm which 
does not adjust differently from others. 
Management may have seriously under assessed the effects of competition. Ibis may be not just 
price but also product related, eg a growing technical gap, lack of ideas for new products. There 
may be a lack of product market focus while on pricing grounds the product may be 
uncompetitive because of the high cost structure. 
The company's poor position may also reflect production and labour problems. Low productivity 
and or morale may have affected both the costs of production and the quality of the finished 
product. Production and labour practices may be inflexible and outdated aggravated by poor 
production layout and controls. 
Should there be need for turnaround, remedies may be found internally; in other cases the 
existing owners of the form may no longer wish to institute the necessary change and seek 
alternatives through new ownership structures. 
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23 The Team Leader and the Team 
23.1 The Role of the Entrepreneur 
The phenomenon of Entrepreneurship is essentially multi disciplinary (Gartner 1985) with 
definitions of entrepreneurship varying significantly depending on the type of background (eg 
economics, psychology, sociology, politics) of the commentator. Reviews of research into 
entrepreneurship show that many researchers have effectively used a wide spread of definitions 
with few employing the same definition (see eg Gartner, 1990) leading to major criticism of lack 
of homogeneity, both within and between samples, to lack of homogeneity of research. Indeed 
the startling number of traits and characteristics attributed to the entrepreneur has been seen to 
produce overall a person larger than life, full of contradictions, and, conversely, someone so full 
of traits to be a sort of generic 'Everyman'. Despite entrepreneurship research surfacing in the 
fields of cultural an thropology, history, political science, education, sociology, mass 
communications and economics, Wortman (1986) notes that few main line researchers from 
management, marketing, accounting or finance have chosen to work in this area. 
It is clear that the meaning of the terms entrepreneur and entrepreneurship varies considerably 
between different theorists and researchers. In bringing together qualities of the entrepreneur 
from various theories, Hebert & Link (1988) have suggested various themes (see Table 2.3). The 
entrepreneur assumes the risk associated with uncertainty; supplies financial capital; is an 
innovator; dccision-maker; industrial leader; manager or superintendent; organiser and coordinator 
of economic resources; owner of an enterprise; employer of factors of production; a contractor; 
an arbitrageur; and an allocator of resources among alternative uses. While this covers a large 
variety of characteristics, the entrepreneurship writings of Schumpeter and Leibenstein are seen 
to be of particular relevance. 
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TABLE 23: ENTREPRENEURIAL THEMES IN ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
Assumes Risk associated with uncertainty Cantillon, Thunen, Mangoldt, Mill, Hawley, 
Knight, Mises, Cole, Shackle 
Supplies financial capital Smit, Turgot, Bohm-Bawerk, Edgeworth, Pigou, 
Mises 
Innovator Baudeau, Bentham, Thunen, Schmoller, Sombart, 
Weber, Schumpeter 
Decision Maker Cantillon, Menger, Marshall, Wieser, Amasa 
Walker, Francis Walker, Keynes, Mises, Shackle, 
Cole, Schultz 
Industrial Leader Say, Saint-Simon, Amasa Walker, Francis Walker, 
Marshall, Wieser, Sombart, Weber, Schumpeter 
Manager or superintendent Say, Mill, Marshall, Menger 
Organiser and co-ordinator of economic 
resources 
Say, Walras, Wieser, Schmoller, Sombart, Weber, 
Clark, Davenport, Schumpeter, Coase 
Owner of an enterprise Quesnay, Wieser, Pigou, Hawley 
Employer of factors of production Amasa Walker, Francis Walker, Wieser, Keynes 
Contractor Bentham 
Arbitrageur Cantillon, Walras, Kirzner 
Allocator of resources among alternative 
uses 
Cantillon, Kirzner, Schultz 
Source: Derived from Hebert and Link (1988) 
Schumpeter perceived the entrepreneur 'to be an extraordinary person who promotes 'new 
combinations' or innovations (Cheah, 1990). The entrepreneur thus reforms and revolutionises 
Opatterns of production by exploiting an invention, or more generally, an untried technological 
possibility for producing a new commodity or an old one in a new way by opening up a new 
source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products or by re-organising an industry 
... 
(This) 
requires aptitudes which are present in only a small fraction of the population and that define the 
entrepreneurial type as well as the entrepreneurial function' (Schumpeter, 1950). 
, 
71be 
entrepreneur required not only technical skills and ability but, also_ was expert, in the use ý qf 
45 
intuition and strategy. Clearly the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is primarily interested in the 
successful transformation of an existing situation rather than the creation of a totally new venture 
although the range of innovation outlined includes the creation of a new type of organisation of 
industry and in particular the creation (or indeed destruction) of a trust or monopoly. He however 
is extremely innovative. Furthermore the Schumpeterian entrepreneur appears to be a short term 
phenomenon: the entrepreneurial element only exists for as long as the introduction of the new 
combination of inputs lasts and loses this character as soon as the business has been built up. 
Thus he guides the enterprise through its formative period of development into a stage of growth 
and maturity. Additionally Schumpeter does not see entrepreneurial functions as being performed 
by managers or capitalists. Consequently the entrepreneur is not a risk bearer, the function of the 
capitalist, and is not identified by the position he holds. He appears to have a managerial or 
decision making role. He is identified by the function he performs- innovation. The changes 
introduced by Schumpeter's entrepreneur are major and discrete involving major discontinuity and 
disequilibrating effects. 
Leibcnstcin subsequently looked at entrepreneurship in terms of his work on X-efficiency with 
the x-incfficient world being one of permanent slack implying the existence of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and developed this into the identification of two distinct types of entrepreneurial 
activity. 'At one pole there is routine entrepreneurship, which is really a type of management, and 
for the rest of the spectrum we have Schumpeterian or "new type" entrepreneurship (N- 
entrepreneurship)' (Leibenstein 1966,1968). The entrepreneur in both cases co-ordinates 
activities that involve different markets but in routine entrepreneurship he is operating in well 
established and clearly defined markets. In N-entrepreneurship however not all the markets exist 
or operate perfectly and the entrepreneur must rill in for market deficiency. The entrepreneur 
connects different markets, makes up for market deficiencies, is an "input completer" and creates 
or expands firms. Entrepreneurship is also a scarce commodity as entrepreneurs are gap-fillcrs and 
input-completers which are scarce talents. Ibc personality factors of entrepreneurs were seen as 
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important as apart from gap-filling and input-completing capacities, the potential entrepreneur's 
response to opportunities will depend on their preference for certain modes of behaviour as 
opposed to others. Relevant to buy-outs and buy-ins is Leibenstein's theory development to look 
at the supply of and demand for entrepreneurs drawing further conclusions that some 
entrepreneurial characteristics could be in surplus supply; some types of input, eg certain types 
of higher education provided to potential entrepreneurs, seen as being normally functional may 
in fact prove to be dysfunctional; and training may be able to increase the supply of 
entrepreneurship and help to assess areas of opportunity once perceived. 
23.2 Entrepreneurial Characteristics 
Reliability of investigation into entrepreneurial characteristics clearly suffers from the different 
interpretations as to the definition of entrepreneurship by various researchers. The problem is 
compounded by small samples in many surveys, static terms of reference and non-comparability 
of samples. Additionally much of the earlier entrepreneurship research may be seen to be over- 
descriptive rather than identifying causal relationships and deriving implications for practice. Hofer 
and Sandberg (1987) note that entrepreneurial factors may be only one of several (eg industry 
structure and strategy, personal environmental and strategic variables) which are relevant. Indeed 
many surveys appear to attribute characteristics to entrepreneurs which could just as easily apply 
to executives. 
Entrepreneurial characteristics may be classified into three areas but with certain overlap: 
general, psychological and motivational and parental and own entrepreneurial experience. Topics 
covered under general background characteristics include education, age, culture, religion, 
disadvantaged minorities and immigrants. The last four also form part of the parental group along 
with parental business ownership and self employment. Psychological and motivational aspects 
include need for achievement, tolerance for ambiguity and risk taking propensity. Issues relating 
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to religious and cultural background, age and education are discussed below, entrepreneurial 
experience issues in 2.3.3 and psychological and motivational factors in 2.3.4. 
(i) Age 
The most appropriate age at which the decision to become an entrepreneur is made has been 
seen as being between twenty rive and forty, eg Shapero (1971), Mayer and Goldstein (1961), 
Cooper (1973) and Howell (1972). This age range, Liles (1974) suggested, was more a 'free choice 
period'when the individual sees himself as able to act and follows a period of rapid increases in 
experience, competence, and self confidence and is followed by a time of rapid increases in 
personal financial and other obligations and also a shift in values to encompass areas in addition 
to career. Susbauer (1969) however found the age of high-technology entrepreneurs at the time 
of company formation closely paralleled the distribution of the general population between the 
ages of 25 and 60. 
Hunt and Collins (1983) also suggested that people working in large corporations in their mid- 
thirties undergo a period of rethinking their goals and ways of life which may provide the impetus 
for starting their own business. Gibb and Ritchie (1981) postulated that the entrepreneur has 
different attitudes to risk depending on his age and this affects the development of his business. 
Slatter, Ransley and Woods (1988) note that the majority of USM Chief Executives started their 
firms in early and middle age, their 30's marking 'decision points' in their life. 3i (1992a) note that 
breaking out' of corporate employment might reasonably be expected to peak when, managers 
reach their mid-fortics, a time when the frustrations of working for someone else grow and the 
individual re-asscsses how he wished to spend the remainder of his working life. 
(ii) Education 
Education is an important issue as it may give an insight into whether entrepreneurs are born or 
can be created through training (see eg comments on Leibenstein above). Indeed the most likely 
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entrepreneurs to fail would be those with experience but no education and the second most likely 
those with education but, no experience (Vesper 1980). Conversely entrepreneurs with both 
experience and education would be associated with the most profitable business enterprises. 
- 
Casson (1982) argued that further education was advantageous but not essential for the private 
entrepreneur. This reflects firstly that professional skills are not essential to the private 
entrepreneur provided he knows how to delegate to professionals and to motivate those that he 
employs and secondly that formal education has an opportunity cost in terms of on-the-job 
training forgone; time spent in academic pursuits could have been spent 'learning the trade' as 
a delegate entrepreneur. However in many cases formal education is used to obtain qualifications 
which give exemption from all or part of training programmes. The potential entrepreneur may 
thus begin his career in a post where he is delegating tasks he has not had to perform himself, 
and as a result the motivation he can supply to his delegates and quality of supervision may be 
poor. Additionally formal education may inculcate uniform attitudes among entrepreneurs and so 
destroy the individuality and diversity of their views. 
Brockhaus and Nord (1979) in their comparison of owners of new businesses to managers found 
that the period of education of entrepreneurs was less than for managers. The latter with their 
higher levels of education may have been able to obtain more satisfying jobs or alternatively to 
find more desirable employment elsewhere. Managers with less high educational qualification may 
however have decided to start their own venture. For instance it should be noted that in this study 
the average period of education for entrepreneurs was in fact higher than the national average. 
Douglas (1976) compared studies to census data and showed that entrepreneurs have more 
education than the general population although majority of Cooper and Dunkelberg (1986)'s 
sample had less than a college degree. Generally results into educational characteristics have 
frequently been distorted as much research has been directed at industries such as specialist high 
technology sectors where high levels of intelligence and educationappear " as prerequisites. 
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Education may have an important influence on entrepreneurial performance as at different stages 
of the development of the firm the small business owner/manager will require different mixes of 
entrepreneurial and administrative skills (Brockhaus 1982). Education may have an influence on 
other crucial variables such as open-mindedness, business ideology, information processing and 
general performance. As the firm grows, more knowledge of managerial, strategic and planning 
techniques and principles may be required. 
Nevertheless investigation into the relationship between level of education and venture 
performance has produced mixed returns. Roubidoux and Garnier (1973) for instance showed that 
the more educated the entrepreneur, the higher the rate of growth of the firm. In contrast, 
however, Douglas (1976) found no significant correlation between educational background and 
rate of growth and Stuart and Abetti (1990) a negative relationship of education with 
performance. The latter noted that it was not just that those with PhDs who were doing poorly 
but those with limited education were doing well. Education was also negatively correlated with 
entrepreneurial experience implying that those who went out and started companies early rather 
than going on for advanced education did better. 
In the UK the link between entrepreneurship and educational background has been identified in 
several studies. Educational qualifications can be seen as being very important in reducing the 
constraints imposed by personal wealth (Casson, 1982) as they give entry to establishment 
institutions and thereby regulate the entrepreneur's access to other people's capital. Better 
educated entrepreneurs were expected to pose a more aggressive threat to large companies in the 
future (Scott, 1976, Stanworth and Curran, 1973). Storey (1982) noted that academic qualifications 
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for entrepreneurial success while Pickles and O'Farrell 
(1986) noted that the level of education was highly significant. The probability of founding a new 
business was seen to peak at a complete secondary level of education. It however then fell steeply 
for those who advanced beyond secondary level. Although additional educational, qualifications 
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may reduce the likelihood of entrepreneurial behaviour, there was evidence that firms owned by 
graduates were more successful than companies run by entrepreneurs with fewer educational 
qualifications. 
(iii) Culture and Religion 
Another issue is whether particular sections of the population are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs. Throughout history particular social and cultural groups have been identified with 
entrepreneurship. These include Jews, the Lebanese, various immigrant groups (eg Kenyan Asians 
in the UK or Cubans and Indo-Chinese in the United States) and frequently come from some 
displaced set of circumstances. Hard-working and with high abilities to form new companies they 
appear to have had a significant economic impact. Studies have shown contrasting levels of 
entrepreneurship in different countries (McLelland 1961) while others have pointed to particular 
ethics arising from religion which might help to explain this phenomenon. 
Weber (1930) argued that the Protestant Ethic had encouraged hard work, thrift and striving for 
material advancement which had helped to advance capitalism and economic development. Hill 
(1961) however points out that there is nothing in Protestantism which automatically leads to 
capitalism: what is important is that many of the old obstacles put in place by the Catholic 
hierarchy and thus preventing earlier development of capitalism were effectively undermined. Low 
and MacMillan (1988) argue that there must be congruence between ideological constructs and 
economic behaviour if entrepreneurship is to flourish. 
Another major alternative cultural theory was advanced by Hagen (1960) who saw disadvantaged 
minorities seeking redress of social grievance as displaying entrepreneurial behaviour. This may 
arise from displacement by force (eg war, political upheaval), denigration of valued symbols 
(religion), inconsistency of status symbols with changes in the distribution of economic power; and 
non acceptance of the expected status of immigrant groups. A development of this theory 
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(Brenner 1987) is that it is those groups which have lost or face the prospect of losing social 
status that are driven to take entrepreneurial risks. 71cse people could for instance include what 
is described by Shapero (1975) as displaced persons- people who arc forced to make career 
decisions such as new graduates, discharged servicemen and immigrants. In many cases they arc 
going to have nothing to lose through entrepreneurial actions and this way may be the only way 
forward for them. Studies such as Collins and Moore (1970) have demonstrated a high rate of 
such people in a population of entrepreneurs. Brockhaus; (1982) notes that the foreign immigrant 
born with more limited opportunities may have regarded ownership of small businesses more 
favourably than the native born who was able to choose from a much wider range of occupations. 
233 The Relevance of Entrepreneurial Experience 
Another important issue is whether direct or indirect experience of entrepreneurship is able to 
influence further entrepreneurial activities and performance, Teams learning from previous 
experience. Team members may have had previous entrepreneurial experience, for instance 
through having established a company earlier, selling it off and starting another one or 
alternatively starting up a new company following the failure of an initial venture. Mayer and 
Goldstein (1961) noted that it was fairly common for an owner-manager to own and run several 
different businesses during his lifetime; whereas experience as an employee in a given line of 
business did not ensure success as an owner in the same line, previous experience as an owner 
was important, particularly so if in the same line of business. Lamont (1972) noted that 
entrepreneurs with previous experience in founding and developing a company exhibit substantial 
learning when they start a new business; more often than'not their experience was reflected in 
superior corporate performance. Cooper (1971) noted that many of the entrepreneurs he studied 
had formed more than one company and many had experienced previous business failures. Vesper 
(1980) confirmed that entrepreneurs who had started one organisation 
- 
tendcd to be more 
successful and efficient in the start-up of their second and third organisations. Stuart and Abetti 
(1990) in examininglactors behind early performance in new ventures noted that the most 
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significant variable in their study was the entrepreneurial experience of the leader reflecting the 
number of previous ventures and the role played in them. A related measure, the previous level 
of managerial experience, similarly showed high correlation with performance. 
Ronstadt (1988) in advocating the 'corridor principle' argued that multiple entrepreneurs are 
relatively common and that the best new venture opportunities are most often revealed after an 
individual is already involved in a start-up. The entrepreneur gains more access to relevant 
contacts, viable markets, product availability, competitive resources and response time. The use 
of earlier ventures may produce an 'experience curve'which may significantly help the multiple 
entrepreneur to overcome problems and obstacles (Executive Forum 1986). 
Studies in the UK also indicate that a significant number of new firm founders had previous 
experience of owning and managing a business (Lloyd and Mason, 1984; Mason, 1989; Storey, 
Watson and Wynarczyk, 1989) and to a more minor extent in Turok and Richardson (1991). , 
A further important determinant of entrepreneurial background is seen to be the occupation of 
the entrepreneur's father and in particular whether he has been an entrepreneur or small business 
owner. Parents are likely to play the most powerful part in establishing the desirability and 
credibility of entrepreneurial action for an individual (Shapero and Sokol 1982) as well as family 
as being a potentially valuable source of information with the nature and extent of the family's 
connections influencing the opportunities available to the entrepreneur (Casson 1982). A family 
tradition of business ownership exposes the young potential entrepreneur to 'role models' and to 
the educational experience of learning what is involved in owning and managing ýa business. 
Pickles and O'Farrell (1987) suggested that a household in which the father was self employed 
may have exposed the potential new firm founder to the expertise and values of entrepreneurship 
and in the household there may have been a commitment to the ideology and to the nature of 
the reward system inherent in self employment. Litvak and Maule (1971), - Roberts andWainer 
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(1971), Roubidoux (1975), Shapero (1971), Susbauer (1969), Collins and Moore (1970), Shapero 
and Sokol (1982), O'Farrell (1986), Cooper and Dunkelburg (1986) and Donckels and Dupont 
(1987) all suggest that an unusually high percentage of entrepreneurs had fathers who were also 
founders of new ventures, entrepreneurs or farmers. Such findings are however not universal, eg 
Brockhaus; and Nord (1979) finding managers and new entrepreneurs no different as to whether 
they had any close relative had owned a business. Indeed there seems no justification in assuming 
that having a parent with entrepreneurial experience will in itself mean that the individual is a 
better entrepreneur. 
23.4 Psychological and Motivational Aspects 
Although discussion of the typology of entrepreneurship has provided researchers with different 
models of entrepreneurs, the factors on which these are based are clearly extremely important. 
Despite the diversity of factors noted earlier, the search for common areas of characteristic 
psychological factors received significant attention for some period of time. Major reviews of the 
literature in this area have been provided by Brockhaus and Horwitz (1986) and Low and 
MacMillan (1988). Nevertheless it should be noted that there have been criticisms of attempts to 
identify and measure personality traits of the entrepreneur using conventional psychological 
techniques (Stevenson & Sahlman, 1989) with the ability to attribute causality to these factors 
seriously in doubt. This may be partially caused by differing definitions of the entrepreneur, the 
inadequacy of the research design and the measuring instruments (Chell et al 1991). 
(i) Need for Achievement 
Heavily influenced by the study of the achievement motive by Murray (1938), McClelland (1961) 
based his research on the'need. for achievement (nAch), those with a high nAch having a strong 
desire to be successful. They possess attributes (McClelland 1962) such as taking personal 
responsibility for finding solutions to problems; set moderately challenging achievement goals and 
take calculated risks; and want concrete feedback rejaiding performance. 'McClelland 
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demonstrated that high nAch scores and subsequent manifestation of these behaviours correlated 
strongly with entrepreneurial success. McClelland hypothesised that Protestantism (self-reliance 
values, the work ethic, etc) led to independence and mastery training by parents, to high nAch 
in sons, and ultimately to the spirit. of modern capitalism and economic development. 
0 
The nAch model, however, can be criticiscd from several perspectives. These include biased data 
selection, analysis and interpretation; seriously underestimating the impact of social factors while 
overestimating the importance of psychological variable in the economic growth equation; the low 
predictive validity and low re-test reliability of the Thematic Apperception Test; and the extremely 
wide spread of entrepreneurs included in his sample which resulted in him not directly connecting 
nAch with the decision to own and manage a business. 
Brockhaus and Horwitz (1986) point out that while the research continues to find that 
entrepreneurs are high achievers, the same thing could be said about successful executives. Thus 
a definitive link between achievement motivation and entrepreneurial success have not necessarily 
been established. In an analysis of research in this area Johnson (1990) however concludes that 
the lack of definitive research results regarding the link between achievement motivation and 
entrepreneurship is more likely to be the result of flawed research methodology rather than the 
absence of a positive relationship. 
A further aspect related to the need for achievement is the belief in an internal locus of control. 
Rotter (1966) explains that an individual perceives the outcome of an event as either being within 
or beyond his personal control and understanding. 'Ibus it could be expected that entrepreneurs 
perform best in situations where they have personal responsibility for results, ie they are internally 
rather than externally controlled (Berlew, 1975). Several other studies eg Shapero, (1975), 
Brockhaus (1975); Panday and Tewary (1979) and Borland (1974) have confirmed that 
entrepreneurs are more internal in their locus-of-control beliefs than the general population. 
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Several other studies (Brockhaus and Nord 1979; Mescon and Montanari 1981; Sexton and 
Bowman 1985) have however indicated that there'were no significant differences between 
entrepreneurs and managers. Brockhaus and Nord (1979) compared the locus of control beliefs 
in entrepreneurs and managers and while the mean scores did not differ significantly between the 
owners of new businesses and entrepreneurs, the mean score for entrepreneurs was lower than 
all but one of the earlier studies. Brockhaus (1982) feels that an internal locus of control belief 
may therefore be associated with a more active effort to affect the outcome of events. This 
internal belief and the associated greater effort would seem to hold true for both successful 
entrepreneurs and successful managers. While it fails to distinguish entrepreneurs uniquely, it 
holds promise for distinguishing successful entrepreneurs from the unsuccessful. 
Sexton and Bowman (1985) in reviewing their earlier studies comparing potential entrepreneurs 
to potential managers noted that potential entrepreneurs were found to have a significantly lower 
need for conformity (indicating self-reliance and independence), interpersonal affect (indicating 
emotional aloofness), harm avoidance (indicating an unconcern for physical harm), and succora nce 
(indicating a low need for support, sympathy, reassurance or advice). They had a significantly 
higher need for risk-taking (indicating a willingness to expose themselves to situations with 
uncertain outcomes), social adroitness (indicating subtlety and persuasiveness), autonomy 
(indicating self-reliance and independence), and change (indicating an ability to adapt readily to 
changes in the environment). 
(ii) Risk Taking Propensity 
Another aspect of the psychology of the entrepreneur is his ability to take risks. Clearly both 
management buy-outs and buy-ins involve degrees of personal risk taking which are significantly 
different from 'those encountered in a normal managerial role. Issues arise as to whether 
entrepreneurs are prepared to take higher degrees of risk than the general population; Palmer 
(1971) for instance saw the entrepreneurial function as primarily involving risk me asurcment and 
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risk-taking. McClelland (1961) however argued that people with high nAch actually had only 
moderate risk taking propensities. It is in the high belief in their ability to influence the 
achievement of business goals that the perceived possibility of failure is relatively low. Mancuso 
(1975) states that established entrepreneurs tend to be moderate risk takers. Brockhaus (1980) 
found no significant statistical difference in the general risk preference patterns of a group of 
entrepreneurs and a group of managers and indicate that the risk taking propensity does not 
distinguish new entrepreneurs either from managers or from the general population. Brockhaus 
(1982) suggested later that the perception hcld. about two components of risk- the perceived 
probability of failure and the perceived consequences of failure for a specific venture (which had 
not been included in the earlier study)- may be due more to specific environmental conditions 
rather than to personality related characteristics. Indeed the financial backer/ investor may have 
far more to lose than the entrepreneur (see, eg Webster 1977). 
Low and MacMillan (1988) in their review of entrepreneurship research suggest that it is perhaps 
more insightful to view entrepreneurs as capable risk managers whose abilities defuse what others 
might view as high risk situations. Lisle (1974) points out that risk is not just financial but includes 
career, family/personal and psychic elements. Kets dc Vries (1977) argues that more often than 
not a great decline in prestige and status income is a common phenomenon in the initial phases 
of entrepreneurship. The 'purgatory of entrepreneurship', ic the period preceding recognition of 
one's entrepreneurial abilities can be a time of extreme hardship during which considerable socio 
psychological sacrifices have to be endured. Naturally a certain tolerance for economic risk is 
necessary but a tolerance for psychosocial risk might be more important. 
(iii) Displacement 
A buy-out or buy-in may be precipitated by some action which produces essentially a displacement 
motivation- eg threat of redundancy, plant closure, bankruptcy, move, of location, limitation of 
future prospects, for instance being overlooked for promotion or even being demoted. 
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Displacement may arise as a response to lack of social mobility through other channels. A person 
may become just totally bored with a job function or frustrated with the way the company is run 
and feel that he can do significantly better on his own, being fired or feeling that one could run 
the company better, economic conditions, geographic isolation (see eg Susbauer (1982), Draheim 
(1982), Shapero and Sokol (1982), Cooper (1970), Vesper (1983)). In the UK Boswell (1972) 
identified the emigration of frustrated men from corporations as being a prime generator of new 
engineering and hosiery/knitwear firms. Brockhaus, compared successful and unsuccessful 
entrepreneurs and found that the former were more dissatisfied with previous jobs at the time 
when they decided to start up their businesses. An employer's lack of understanding of the 
entrepreneurial personality may lead to a work environment full of frustration leading to the 
employee leaving and indeed creating new competition. 
At the same time it is evident that not everybody who suffers displacement will react by setting 
up a new business, seek to buy-out or buy another company. The displaced individual may, for 
instance, seek employment with another company. The course of action chosen will also depend 
on the individual's perception of alternative courses of action. This may depend for instance on 
the general level of economic activity. 
Storey and Jones (1987) and Hamilton (1989) have suggested that the level of employment loss 
in redundancies and establishment closures may push individuals into self-employment and new 
firm formation. Storey and Jones in studies of the East Midlands and the North of England found 
evidence that suggests that local labour market conditions are of greater importance in influencing 
local rates of new firm formation than national indices of profitability. The transition to self- 
employment is seen as the outcome of a subjective calculation. When individuals reckon that the 
discounted stream of monetary and non-monetary net benefits of being self-employed exceed 
those of remaining in their present positions, they will move into self-employment. Hamilton 
(1989) notes, however, that there is a critical level of unemployment estimated to be about 20 
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percent where further rises in unemployment will be associated with falling business formation 
rates. Binks and Coyne (1983) noted a high proportion of entrepreneurs in their sample had been 
'pushed' into starting their own businesses. However the 'push' sources were seen to offer a less 
reliable source of future growth as a smaller number are likely to enter new product markets or 
introduce innovations in techniques of production. Pickles and O'Farrell (1986) noted in their 
Irish survey that there was no evidence of self-employment being associated with or in response 
to unemployment although there was some evidence of association with double job holding 
experience. Gould and Keeble (1984) observed no recession-related increases in firm formation 
with periods of upswing in the economic cycle stimulating the highest levels of entrepreneurship. 
2.3.5 Entrepreneurial Typologies 
Clearly there are attractions in trying to obtain classifications of entrepreneurial types to see if 
entrepreneurs possess homogenous characteristics. Indeed this may be of particular relevance in 
comparing buy-out and buy-in Team Leaders. The search for key variables to differentiate 
frequently do not stand up under close scrutiny. Rather there may be many different types of 
entrepreneur and the creation of a new venture is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Vesper 
(1980) for instance identified eleven different kinds of entrepreneur, Webster (1977) rive types, 
Stanworth and Curran (1976) three types (artisan, classical and managerial), and Gartner (1983) 
eleven entrepreneurial archetypes while Woo, Cooper and Dunkelberg (1989) indicated that 
entrepreneurs in different industries can be very different from those in others. 
With such diversities evident among entrepreneurs it is not surprising that efforts have been made 
to see if entrepreneurs can be grouped together according to certain common characteristics 
(Smith 1967; Braden 1977; Filley and Aldag 1978; Dunkelberg and Cooper 1982; Smith and Miner 
1983; Lorraine and Dassault 1987; Davidsson 1988; Woo et al. 1988; Lafuente and Salas 1989; 
and Woo, Cooper and Dunkelberg 1991). Individual studies in the main have successful 
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entrepreneur while examination may reflect more on entrepreneurial traits as a product of 
entrepreneurial experience. 
However studies have generally identified two main types of entrepreneurial individuals: craftsmen 
and opportunists. Smith (1967) saw the craftsman as having less education and work experience, 
being essentially blue collar and less adaptive to change. He is likely to run his business in a 
hands-on manner and be paternalistic to his employees. He runs his business for intrinsic 
satisfaction, such as independence and autonomy and neither financial gain nor growth are key 
motivations. Deeks (1973) also noted that owner-managers do not make financial gain their key 
reward. In contrast the opportunist had managerial orientation, better education and broader 
experience and were from a more middle class background. Opportunists have been seen as more 
adaptive to change, more flexible, seeking more diverse sources of external financing, having more 
balanced attention to different tasks and adopting formal plans. Given that many opportunist 
entrepreneurs have earlier managerial experience, they may start their entrepreneurial career later 
than the craftsman, perhaps spurred into action by a mid-life crisis (Scott 1976). Filley and Aldag 
(1978) suggest a three way classification, differentiating craftsmen, promotion and administrative 
organisation types. Slatter, Ransley and Woods (1988) argue that entrepreneurs can be divided 
into'Classical, craftsman, opportunist and R&D entrepreneurs. 
Woo, Cooper and Dunkelberg (1991) additionally point out that the opportunist entrepreneurs 
are more likely to be motivated by financial gains and the opportunity for building a successful 
organisation while the craftsmen entrepreneurs were likely to have narrow educational and 
managerial experience, had primary motivations of 'making a comfortable living' as opposed to 
'making a lot of money', avoided risk-taking and were less likely to seek multiple investors or 
partners. II 
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While research into entrepreneurial typologies has been essentially carried out in North America 
two major studies have been published identifying typologies in two European countries. Laftiente 
and Salas (1989) looked at 360 owners of Spanish private firms and deduced that the two 
entrepreneurial types of 'craftsman'and 'opportunistic'were not sufficient to describe the Spanish 
population of entrepreneurs. Lafuente and Salas saw four main categories: the craftsman, giving 
an opportunity to prove oneself or build something perfect; managerial, working in a prestigious 
company, the opportunity to develop oneself; security/family, build family welfare; and risk- 
challenge, work, diversity as key motivation. Different paths to becoming entrepreneurs also 
emerged: 'managerial'individuals became entrepreneurs relatively more often through inheritance, 
'craftsmen' more often through the purchase of the firm (ie through a management type of 
action), and finally 'family' and 'risk' entrepreneurs reach that situation more often through 
founding. However no clear patterns emerged between entrepreneurial types and personal 
characteristics, management and performance. 
Westhead (1990) presented a typology of six founder types of 269 new manufacturing firm 
founders in Wales. The contrasting routes to new manufacturing firm formation led to different 
founder types to establish firms that had contrasting levels of performance. Individuals drawn from 
families with a strong entrepreneurial tradition and who have held professional and managerial 
positions in small locally controlled manufacturing establishments have acquired the necessary 
skills and made the necessary contacts that have enabled them to establish new firms with 
potential for employment and wealth creation. 
However caution must be exercised in the examination of entrepreneurial typologies. Not only 
may differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs be excluded but the type of 
analysis involved requires much personal interpretation. While similarities may be seen to link 
studies, there may be major hidden divergences while direct comparisons may not strictly be 
possible because of different methodologies and instruments employed across studies. 
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2.4 Infrastructure Aspects 
2.4.1 General Concepts 
Another important element in the development of entrepreneurship and with some overlap into 
networks is the presence of other factors which may make the overall environment suitable for 
generation of opportunities such as new ventures, buy-outs and buy-ins. These can be seen to 
include national, regional and local factors and cover areas such as the presence of local market 
contacts; incubator industries; technical manpower resources; universities with appropriate 
doctoral and research programmes; research laboratories of major companies and governmeni; 
sources of venture capital; commercial banks; local stock underwriting firms); appropriate formal 
and informal advisers; attitudes towards entrepreneurship and presence of skilled entrepreneurs; 
opportunities for interim consulting; economic conditions; and favourable government policies 
(see eg Vesper and Albaum (1979), Cooper (1970,1971,1973), Bruno and Tyebjee (1982) and 
Pennings (1982)). 
In applying environmental factors to the UK, Lorenz (1989) has also referred to social barriers 
(eg the social unpopularity of trade and industry as a career and preference for the professions); 
educational barriers (eg discrimination against industry Within school curricula); employment 
security (until the 1980's job mobility in the UK was relatively low); the ability to develop teams 
which embrace both qualities of technical entrepreneurship and disciplined business management 
skills; fiscal handicaps limiting both the ability of a new entrepreneur to invest a significant 
amount of personal capital in a new venture or the disincentive of a capital gains tax rate the 
same as income tax; and concerns shown in surveys over the ability to fund the small business and 
the possibility that the gain would not justify the effort. Robbie and Wright (1991) have also 
remarked on the importance of fiscal and legal restraints which may make buy-out and buy-in 
transactions difficult to engineer efficiently, the presence of professional advisers skilled in these 
transactions and the existence of adequate funds to finance such ventures whether they be 
provided by venture capitalists or banking sources. 
62 
Within Europe there are still considerable differences in the state of buy-out (Chiplin, Coyne and 
Wright, 1987) and buy-in markets (Clutterbuck, Snow, Wright, Robbie, 1990). Actual activity and 
future prospects for buy-outs and buy-ins in Europe can be seen to be dependent on the presence 
of three main factors (Wright, Thompson, Robbie, 1992): the generation of buy-out opportunities; 
the infrastructure to complete a transaction; and opportunities for the investors in a buy-out to 
realise their gains. These broad issues may be further sub-divided. Ile generation of opportunities 
will be heavily influenced by attitudes to entrepreneurial risk and hence willingness of managers 
to buy, the ownership structure of industry and hence the generation of entities which are for sale 
and the state of development of mergers and acquisitions markets. 
The measurement of attitudes to entrepreneurial risk is perhaps rather difficult, although authors 
have recognised that marked differences do exist between countries (Tyebjee and Vickery, 1988). 
Additionally the entrepreneurial culture of a country will cover not only the entrepreneurial 
orientation of individuals but also its presence in formal institutions such as banks and venture 
capital firms and can be expected to change over time. Within the UK attitudes towards the 
acceptability of entrepreneurship changed significantly during the 1980's (Lorenz, 1989). Bannock 
(1990b) noted that in France, Germany, Italy and the UK attitudes towards 'breaking-out' (ie 
carrying out a buy-in or buy-out) had become significantly more favourable over the previous ten 
years reflecting funds being more readily available and were more market opportunities. The 
establishment of role models as well as changes in culture towards risk taking were also cited as 
less significant but also important reasons. 
The infrastructure to complete transactions includes sources of funding both in respect of venture 
capital availability and the ability of banks to fund transactions, the nature of legal and taxation 
regimes and the existence of intermediaries and advisors who can both identify and negotiate buy- 
outs and buy-ins (eg Wright, Thompson, Robbie 1992, Ooghe et al 1991). 
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2.4.2 The Importance of Incubators 
The process of identifying the appropriate target company is an essential and time consuming part 
of the buy-in process. Major issues arise not only concerning the methods used but also relating 
to the relative backgrounds and experience of the team. In this context the role of incubators is 
likely to be important. Low and MacMillan (1988) point to a diversity of definition for incubators, 
ranging from simply the organisation where the entrepreneur worked prior to launching a venture 
(Cooper, 1985) to Smilor and Gill (1986)s understanding of a formally organised facility offering 
laboratory and other space, support services, technical and business consulting services, and 
contact with other entrepreneurs. 
Incubators appear to influence the processes by which entrepreneurs, at particular times and 
places, leave to start new firms. Particularly relevant factors are its size; the extent to which there 
are negative factors or 'pushes' associated with the decision to leave it; the relationship between 
the business of the incubator and that of the new firm; and whether the incubator is 
geographically located closeby (see eg Cooper and Dunkelberg 1985). Cooper (1985) and Gibb 
and Ritchie (1982) in particular have emphasised the importance of the nature of the last 
organisation for which the new founder worked prior to the new venture. 
Employees who work in small firms are generally seen as being more likely to start a business than 
those who have been working in large organisations. The small firm incubator is likely to provide 
broad work experience including exposure to technology and markets which will be important 
factors in the new venture. Cooper (1971), Johnson and Cathcart (1979), Storey (1982), Gould 
and Keeble (1984) and O'Farrell and Crouchley (1984) confirm that small companies are likely 
to have significantly higher spin-off rates of entrepreneurs than larger organisations. Cooper and 
Dunkelberg (1986) note that a further factor favouring the small company entrepreneurial 
background is that they may in the first place have attracted more entrepreneurial inclined 
employees who are then exposed to the role model of the company president. Westhead (1990) 
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hypothesizes that employees working in large factories are not provided with the relevant 
experience necessary for entrepreneurial training and management. In contrast the presence of 
a very active small firms sector can provide plenty of examples for potential founders to follow- 
contact with other small firms could be made as part of an employee's job, and informal contacts 
with potential and actual founders may be more likely. 
A further important aspect is the activity of the incubator organisation. Clearly the ability to draw 
upon the technical and market knowledge acquired in the incubator organisation will encourage 
the entrepreneur to found businesses in fields which he already knows (Mayer and Goldstein 
1961; Hoad and Rosko, 1964; Cooper, 1970,1985; Storey 1982; Johnson and Cathcart, 1979; 
Cross 1981). Cooper (1985) noted that the new firm typically depends on what the founder knows 
or can do which is often related to what he learnt in the incubator organisation. Implications are 
that the nature of new firms started in an area is likely to be related to the nature of 
organisations already there and that organisations may vary widely in the extent to which their 
employees acquire the skills and knowledge that could be easily applied to starting a new firm. 
The incubator provides an important source of information about commercial opportunities and 
gives individuals particular skills and outside contacts. While new firm founders may improve on 
the products and services offered by their former employers, in practice many ventures may 
initially reproduce products and services rather than offer anything technically or organisationally 
new. 
A further issue is whether the activities of some incubators will be more appropriate for 
generating change. Westhcad (1990) notes that since industries vary widely in the extent to which 
they offer opportunities for new ventures, the strategy of the incubator organisation determines 
to a great extent whether its employees will ever be in a position to spin off and start their own 
businesses. An established organisation in a mature industry with little growth and heavy capital 
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requirements is unlikely to have many spin-offs. New firm formation can be expected to be 
depressed in areas which are dominated by industries with high barriers to entry although it could 
be countered by the contrary argument that individual workers in such industries may have a 
range of engineering and management- skills that could be applied to starting new enterprises in 
another industry (Mason, 1991). New firms may be closely related to the business of incubator 
firms for most high-technology firms but less so for other manufacturing and service firms (Cooper 
and Dunkelberg 1996). 71bose who purchased organisations (ie a set of circumstances imilar to 
the UK management buy-in), although searching for businesses they knew well, may be less likely 
to be involved in a business closely related to what they did before (Cooper 1985). 
A further issue is whether the entrepreneur moves from the area where he has been working. 
Ibcre arc clear advantages in that starting in the same geographic area in that it permits the 
founder to draw upon personal contacts and market knowledge, to start if necessary on a part- 
time basis while keeping an existing job, and to avoid the disruption of a family move. 
Confirmation that founders arc most likely to establish businesses close to their existing home or 
work can be found in studies such as Cooper (1970), Susbauer (1972), Watkins (1973), Johnson 
and Cathcart (1979), Cooper (1985), Gould and Keeblc (1984), Birlcy (1985) and Hakim (1988). 
Incubators also have a significant role to play in the formation of teams necessary for the new 
venture providing the setting within which teams can be formed (Cooper and Dunkelberg 1985). 
Cooper (1985) observed that members of founding teams often meet each other in the incubator 
organisation while teams in themselves permit the assembly of a broader range of skills. - 
2.43 The Role of Networks 
Issues arise as to the methods and contacts employed by entrepreneurs in identifying and 
establishing venture opportunities. Within complex networks of relationships, entrepreneurship 
is facilitated or constrained by linkages between aspiring entrepreneurs, resources and 
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opportunities (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986) Both management buy-out and buy-in processes require 
varying uses of networks which in the case of buy-ins could extend to help in the identification 
of a target company. Entrepreneurs typically differentiate between two kinds of networks (Birley 
1985): informal (eg family, friends, previous colleagues, or present employers) and formal (banks, 
accountants, lawyers, Chamber of Commerce, local and central government agencies). Dubini and 
Aldrich (1991) further develop the types of network by including the company's activity and 
structure through the co-existence of two different types of network- extended networks 
associated with organisations and the informal, personal networks associated with individuals. 
Formal networks are seen as often being expensive and time consuming, most of them offering 
help to the entrepreneur only as a small part of their service; additionally they are not in the 
business of diagnosing needs but rather responding to specific requests. In contrast informal 
networks are frequently less informed about the options and schemes open to the entrepreneur 
but may be more willing to listen and to give advice. While entrepreneurs rely heavily on the 
informal network extensively, they seem seldom to tap into the formal network, entering it at a 
late stage, cg at the point of arranging bank finance. However the type of network used may vary 
with the stage of development of the firm and its size, the emphasis moving to professional 
bankers, accountants, lawyers suppliers and even government agencies in later stage and larger 
ventures (see eg Birley et al 1991, Cooper et al 1989). 
2.4.4 The Venture Capitalist 
Networks will be particularly relevant in the search for venture capital for a new venture, buy-out 
or buy-in. The entrepreneur has to use appropriate means to identify and approach an 
appropriate venture capitalist and then undergo a process of both business proposition and 
personal examination by the venture capitalist. His ability to understand fully the process involved 
will strongly influence both his own buying decision and hence selection of the most appropriate 
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venture capitalist but also the ability of the venture capitalist as supplier of funds to rind a deal 
which meets its appropriate deal quality and projected rate of return criteria. 
A key issue however relates to the relative roles of venture capitalists and management in 
initiating transactions. In order to reduce the constraint of a deal flow controlled by third parties, 
a number of venture capitalists may actively search for deals themselves. Tyebjcc and Bruno 
(1985) note the ways in which venture capitalists monitor the environment for potential 
candidates through an informal network. Venture capitalists may also use direct marketing 
activities (Robbie and Murray 1992) although this is relatively undeveloped in the UK (Cranfield 
1990). The difficulty of gaining consumer recognition is high for a service that remains an 
'occasionally bought'product for most entrepreneurs with few UK entrepreneurs able to recognise 
other venture capital firms other than 3i (Llanwarne 1990). 
Considerable variations exist in the organisation, size, activities and targeted markets of individual 
venture capital firms with only a few covering all areas of the market (Venture Economics 1991), 
the majority focusing on particular stages and size of investment and some on specific geographic 
regions (Martin 1989), industrial sector(s) or technology (Dixon, 1991). Major differences may 
emerge in how long the venture capitalist is prepared to be an investor, and the type of 
relationship between the venture capitalist, the CEO and his board (cg Rosentein ct al 1993). The 
entrepreneur has to identify the most appropriate venture capitalists not only for initial deal 
completion but also for the longer term relationship (Lorenz, 1989, Bygrave and Timmons 1992). 
However, a significant part of the investor's decision will rely on the personality and background 
of the individual applicant, the characteristics of the management team and the interpersonal 
chemistry created between the two parties. Venture capitalists have their own individual 
prejudices and approaches to selection. Individuals seeking equity funding need to recognise this 
diversity and adjust their approach accordingly to different providers (Hisrich and Jancowicý 
1990). 
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Few venture capital proposals are accepted, the most common reasons for rejection being the 
qualities of the entrepreneur and/or an unattractive assessment of the market by the venture 
capitalist. Professional assistance through the use of intermediaries in practice increases the 
chances of the proposal not being rejected at the earliest of stages by the venture capitalist 
(Robbie and Murray 1992). 
Given the initial information asymmetries between applicants and providers (Dixon 1991), the 
search period for venture capital support is often onerous and time consuming for new ventures 
(Bruno and Tyebejee (1985) and buy-outs (Wright, Normand, Robbie, 1991). Particular problems 
are clearly involved in management buy-ins where a target company has to be identified as well 
as a satisfactory purchase price agreed with the vendor and finance obtained from the venture 
capitalist. In this process the entrepreneur relies very much on his own experience in identifying 
a suitable target and few on their financing institutions' or accounting advisers while the buy-in 
Team Leader may have a conflict of interest which results in him having to resign his existing 
employment. 
In searching for venture capital finance unsolicited cold calls from entrepreneurs approaching the 
venture capitalist directly without any previous connection represent the largest volume of 
proposals received. Referrals may come from a wide range of sources including other venture 
capital companies; associate or parent organisations; clearing and merchant banks and other 
finance providers; existing venture capital clients; and past successful entrepreneurs (Lloyd and 
Mason, 1984, Storey, Watson and Wynarczyk, 1989, Tycbjee and Bruno 1985). If entrepreneurs 
do not have direct knowledge of the venture capitalist (Hall and Hofer 1993), other contacts 
whose track record the venture capitalist appreciates- such as lawyers, bankers, accountants, 
consultants and business school faculty- could be utilised. Of these (in the UK) accountants 
represent the key, independent, financial intermediaries with whom the venture capitalists 
associate (Robbie and Murray 1992). 
kC 
69 
In approaching potential sources of finance Teams may have received negative advice from 
advisers concerning venture capitalists including fears about the release of equity (eg Lanwarne 
1990, Johnson 1991) or may have different rankings as to the potential uses of venture capital 
than the venture capitalists themselves (Colville 1991). However many professional intermediaries 
may not have had personal contact with a venture capitalist (Hovgaard 1991) while professional 
managers may have a better understanding of the role of venture capitalists than entrepreneurs 
in general (Murray 1991a). 
Formal intermediaries may play an important role in searching for finance. The complexities of 
management bUY7out and buy-in financing require that entrepreneurs, seek professional 
accountancy advice and guidance for both personal and corporate reasons at an early stage of 
their search for capital (eg Sharp 1991, Kreiger 1990, Omcrod and Burns 1989, Franks and 
Blackstone 1990, Wright, Normand, Robbie, 1991). The accountant may also front negotiations 
with the vendor in a management buy-out and frequently plays a major role in the final 
preparation of a Business Plan to present to the venture capitalist. The accountant is also the first 
source of advice to the majority of entrepreneurs considering additional sources of finance 
(Llanware 1990). Frequently, the accountant assumes a major responsibility in generating and 
reviewing competing offers from venture capitalists to an attractive proposal. 
In seeking finance the accounting adviser is likely to play an important role in refining the 
Business Plan. This provides an important aid to the screening process (Lorenz, 1989, Sharp, 
1991); several studies (eg MacMillan, Siegel and Naraimha 1985, Dixon 1991) confirm the critical 
weighting given to the personality, commercial experience and employment history of the 
entrepreneur. Tyebjce and Bruno (1985) note four features which are particularly important- the 
marketing factors and the venture's ability to manage them effectively; the products' competitive 
advantage and uniqueness; quality of the management team, especially in, its balance of skills; and 
exposure to risk factors beyond the venture capitalist's control. MacMillan et al (1985) deduce 
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that venture capitalists appear to assess ventures systematically in terms of the risks of losing the 
entire investment; being unable to bail out if necessary; failure to implement the venture idea; 
competitive risk; management failure; and leadership failure. Despite sophisticated quantitative 
analysis, the intuitive impression that the entrepreneur makes on the venture capitalist executives 
remains extremely important in the final decision of whether or not to invest. This process must 
be seen as two-way: it is extremely important for the entrepreneur to realise that he can have a 
long term relationship with the venture capital firm and its personnel. 
This essentially subjective evaluation at times may seem to amount to 'gut feel' analysis (eg 
Hisrich and Jankowicz 1990) but is frequently justified in terms of the funding being just the first 
stage in a continuing and often intimate relationship between the funder and the investee's 
management team. The success of that relationship, including the professional advisory'scrvices 
that the venture capitalist may provide and the willingness of the entrepreneur to be influenced 
by external parties, may be very material in influencing the successful outcome of the venture. 
Issues relating to the post transaction governance are discussed in 2.6.5. 
Once interested in a proposal, the venture capitalist will carry out extensive due diligence, a 
process which has been described (Silver 1985) as a series of rive audits: the size of the problem 
the business is attempting to solve, the elegance of the solution, the entrepreneurial team, the 
financial statement and legal aspects. In doing so (Sharp 1991) the venture capitalist will carry out 
a factual verification of the company's trading history and statement of fact in the business plan; 
management review; product and technical appraisal; independent market review; references; and 
accountant's investigation. The completion of the process will allow the venture capitalist to assess 
whether the proposal is attractive enough with which to proceed or if it should be renegotiated 
on terms different from those originally indicated or indeed whether an investment should be 
made under any circumstances. It will also indicate areas in which warranties from the vendor 
should be carefully worded. As well as commissioning reports from reporting accountants, "the 
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venture capitalist will also commission independent reports where necessary and take up extensive 
references both on the company and its standing in the market as well as on individual members 
of the Team. 
To carry out satisfactory due diligence is a time consuming and costly procedure which, may 
produce difficulties where there is competition for purchasing the company. Clearly there may be 
considerable dangers to the plan should due diligence not take account of all relevant factors and 
a decision by financiers made too quickly on the viability of the business proposal. 
2.5 Deal Completion 
2.5.1 Financial Structuring 
A key element of corporate restructuring was the development in the late 1980's of much more 
highly geared financing structures with debt assuming a much more important role than hitherto 
at the same time as the introduction of a much greater link between ownership and control of the 
company through a review of equity incentives and governance systems. 
Proponents of corporate restructuring argue that the increase in debt was both inevitable and 
beneficial. First the trebling of the market value of U. S. public-company equity during the 1980's 
meant that corporate borrowing had to increase to avoid de-leveraging. Secondly debt creation 
without retention of the proceeds of the issue helps limit the waste of free cash flow by 
compelling managers to pay out funds they would otherwise retain. Interest payments arc 
effectively a substitute for dividends bonding managers to pay out future cash flows in a way 
which simple dividend increases or share repurchase schemes do not. Debt therefore forces 
management to disgorge cash, limiting their opportunities for spending cash flows on projects with 
low or even negative returns. Borrowing allows for no such, managerial discretion, the breaking 
of interest obligations and/or covenants moving the company towards the declaration of insolvency 
or even the bankruptcy courts. Thirdly debt can be seen as a powerful incentive for change. High 
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rates of leverage may create a feeling of crisis which forces managers to slash unsound investment 
programmes, shrink overheads and dispose of assets that are more valuable outside the company. 
The proceeds from this action can then be used to reduce debt to more sustainable levels, 
creating a more efficient and competitive organisation. Violation of bank covenants could also be 
expected to create a board level crisis bringing new actors onto the scene, motivating a fresh 
review of top management and strategy and accelerating response allowing actions to be taken 
more quickly. 
Support for the role of bankers may be seen in suggestions that those lending to the firm may be 
better able to control the activities of its managers than are equity owners- not least because of 
the sanction of refusing to renew loans (Stiglitz 1985) while Cable (1988) demonstrates the 
importance of banker involvement for German firms. Nevertheless between 1989 and 1992 in both 
the UK and US there was considerable evidence that financiers may have misjudged levels of 
optimal leverage with both refinancings and bankruptcies of many large and highly leveraged buy- 
outs being necessary (see Shleifer and Vishny 1992 and Kaplan and Stein 1993), the sheer weight 
of available finance, especially junk bonds, being a contributory factor. Supervisory authorities 
became active in their monitoring of the HLTs (highly leveraged transactions) of banks. This 
contrasts with problems in the early 1980s which were solved within relatively short time scales 
by re-organisation frequently with new management. While in retrospect some may attribute this 
development to overpricing and consequent over-leveraging (Jensen, 1991), it does raise questions 
as to the way in which larger buy-outs in particular are completed, competition between buy-out 
funds, the structure of renumeration of both fund executives and fees charged by funds and the 
quality of due diligence carried out. 
The main issues involved in overall financial structuring are described below in terms of the major 
financial instruments used. 
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(a) Equity 
Key features of buy-out funding are the significant monitoring and control roles of the external 
equity providers (see 2.6.5) while management are given large equity incentives to perform 
thereby reducing the agency costs seen in the traditional corporate relationships. To do this 
involves different forms of equity finance and the re-writing of traditional monitoring and control 
aspects attributable to different classes of shares. 
Equity will normally be subscribed in the form of Ordinary Shares and Preference Shares (Wright 
and Robbie (ed) 1991, Franks and Blackstone (1990), Wright Normand, Robbie 1990). While the 
financing institutions may occasionally subscribe for ordinary shares which have the same basic 
rights as those of the entrepreneur and his team, for the most part they will subscribe for variants, 
which may have some or all of the following characteristics: convertibility, stated redemption 
dates, cumulative and/or participating dividend rights, preferred status in the winding-up of the 
company and mechanisms whereby ratchet stakes may be activated. A full set of monitoring rights 
will be built into the Articles of Association including board composition and will restrict 
management's action in terms of areas such as acquisitions, divestment, diversification and capital 
expenditure (see Robbie and Wright, 1990a). This will be supplemented by a Shareholders 
Agreement which will formulate the relationship between management and investor in more 
depth. 
A key element in the structuring of a buy-in or buy-out with external equity finance is that 
managers with very limited resources are able to acquire what may be very large businesses and 
obtain a share which is disproportionate to the amount of capital put in by the entrepreneur. Only 
rarely does flat pricing occur in which management pay the same pro rata for their Ordinary and 
Preferred Ordinary Shares as the institutional backers (see eg the case of Mallinson Denny, 
Robbie & Wright 1989b). Consequently the amount of finance subscribed by managers may be 
expected to represent a small fraction of the purchase price. 
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In some cases a performance ratchet on equity is used under which beyond the levering effect 
built into the initial deal structure, further gains in equity share may be made by management on 
achievement of certain pre-agreed targets (TIompson and Wright 1991). Ilese are normally one 
or a combination of. cumulative profits over a particular period, market capitalization on exit 
within a specified time period, redemption of financing instruments, meeting of the investor's 
internal rate of return targets or combinations of these. Alternatively the equity may be scaled 
down if targets are not met, providing the choice by the financing institution depending on their 
perception of the management to adopt a 'stick or carrot' approach. 
Although ratchets may theoretically be expected to maximise incentives to perform, in practice 
they can cause protracted disputes between institutions and management both at the time of the 
negotiation of the buy-out and over its interpretation when the ratchet is crystalliscd. Accounting 
based payments may reward effort but they suffer from the disadvantage that accounting numbers 
are subject to excessive manipulation (eg Healy 1985). Flexibility in UK accounting rules (Taylor 
and Turley, 1986) provides scope for alternative interpretations of the conditions specified in a 
ratchet formula. For example, disputes may arise over the treatment of exceptional gains from the 
sale of assets affecting the outcome of the ratchet formula. Such issues may become particularly 
important in cliff-cdge ratchets where at the margin a small increase in apparent profits can lead 
to a large increase in managerial equity stakes. Particular problems may exist in reconciling the 
objectives of all parties in syndicated deals which have to be refinanced. 
(b) Debt 
While much of the basic financing concept for a management buy-out or buy-in is likely to come 
from the external equity financier, his ability to achieve acceptable rates of return as well as that 
of the management entrepreneur to obtain a disproportionate size equity stake for the level of 
funds committed derives from acceptance of banks (and. more recently mezzanine players) to 
provide relatively high levels of debt, thereby leveraging up management and equity institutions 
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returns. In Going Privates the proportion of debt in the capital structure more than triples on 
average (Marais, Schipper and Smith 1989). The optimum amount of debt in the financing 
structure will be influenced by a number of factors. The ratio of borrowing to equity, the capital 
gearing ratio, may in itself provide little guidance. Rather than relying heavily on some 'carcass 
value' of assets, as in the traditional clearing bank approach, emphasis shifts to'the ability of the 
firm to meet the costs of servicing and repaying debt.. The optimal capital structure is also 
significantly influenced by the development of a secondary market in assets and the costs of its 
operation. In an imperfect world, any lowering of the costs of operating markets for the control 
of corporate assets should reduce the costs of financial distress and so shift the optimal capital 
structure in the direction of greater leverage. 11at is, the amount which may be recovered when 
a business unit is sold in distress circumstances is likely to be higher when buyers exist who are 
willing to pay a price which includes both the value of tangible and intangible assets. The more 
favourable the economic context, the more debt is used in financing a takeover and less outside 
equity used (Grammatikos, Makhija and Tbompson 1988). 
In assessing the financial suitability for a buy-out, financiers will assess income gearing or coverage 
ratio, that is the ratio of profit before interest and tax to interest payments as well as the ratio 
of free cash flow to debt interest. However, whilst such ratios may be satisfied at the outset it is 
necessary to ensure that they will also be met throughout the expected period of the buy-out's 
financing structure. Sensitivity exercises under varying assumptions about markets, costs, etc. will 
need to be carried out to establish the likelihood of problems occurring. The amount of 
investment required will also affect the free cash flow to debt interest ratio. For these reasons, 
appropriate targets for buy-outs are generally firms operating in mature and stable markets, with 
relatively low investment needs and which are highly cash generative. Unbundling or selling-off 
surplus assets may be used to pay down debt to levels which can comfortably be serviced from 
trading profits and free cash flow. Firms vulnerable to general economic conditions which affect 
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variable interest rates paid on the debt may frequently protect themselves through the use of 
hcdging techniqucs such as intcrest ratc swaps, caps and collars. 
(c) Other Forms of Finance 
Where adequate senior debt is not available, mezzanine debt may be used to fund the financing 
gap. Mezzanine is a form of subordinated debt generally accompanied by an 'equity kicker' of 
some form, eg warrants to subscribe to equity at a future date (Bartlam 1992). Mezzanine has 
been used to bridge a financing gap where the price of the deal may too high in terms of 
conventional bank asset backing, with a high degree of goodwill or conventional senior debt 
returns would dilute the returns to the equity providers including management to make the 
transaction unacceptable. Lack of asset backing may be countered by significant positive cash flow. 
This form of finance has a level of risk which intermediate between senior debt and equity with 
commensurate intermediate return. 
In addition to these three main forms of finance, alternative sources may be required to ensure 
that a buy-out or buy-in can be completed at an acceptable price to the vendor (see eg 
NAO/CMBOR, 1991, Robbie, Wright, 1992a). These range from the provision of deferred loans 
(traditionally interest free and subordinate to all other debt) to direct participation in the equity 
of the company, sometimes through preference shares or more frequently through ordinary shares 
or a warrant convertible into ordinary shares should the company be sold or floated on the stock 
market. Such devices serve two functions in that they both provide what may be an essential layer 
of finance without which the buy-out or buy-in would not be possible to complete as well as 
through equity participation protecting the vendor from charges from shareholders that they have 
not participated in any uplift of value in the company should it be sold in a relatively short term 
at a price which implies undervaluation in the original buy-out/in. Vendor loan notes have also 
been used, allowing vendors where the loan note has been guaranteed by a prime name of 
receiving the discounted value of the note immediately after buy-out completion. Such procedures 
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may allow the buy-out to be financed on much more attractive terms than if mezzanine finance 
had been used. Additionally vendors may employ earn out escalation clauses allowing them to 
receive additional payment should certain levels of profitability be achieved. Vendors may also 
provide non-loan methods of helping the divested subsidiary under its new ownership- for instance 
the provision for a certain period of rent free premises or the guarantee of a certain level of 
turnover where there is a mutual trading arrangement. 
Besides vendor finance other sources of finance are frequently employed in buy-outs and buy-ins. 
These may include instruments such as leasing, hire purchase, factoring and invoice discounting 
such as the effects of improvements in working capital management- extension of facilities with 
crcditors and beter control of dcbtors. 
2.5.2 Pricing and Ensuring Fair Value for Vendors 
Major issues surround the pricing of buy-out transactions and ensuring that vendor shareholders 
receive a fair price for the assets sold. While such concerns apply to all sources of buy-outs, most 
research has revolved around going privates. Concern may of course not be: so great in 
management buy-ins wherc the bidder is external. Increases in share valuation may be attributable 
to two main arguments: heightened expectations of a control transfer which will lead to value- 
increasing changes in the firm's operation; and the hypothesis that managers propose a buy-out 
when they have favourable inside information about the firm's value which is unrelated to the 
buy-out transaction, such inside information contributing to managers' proposal decisions. Clearly 
a prime motivation in proposing a buy-out may be that the firm's shares were undervalued. Kaplan 
and Stein (1993) found some confirmation that US large buy-outs in the later 1980S became over 
priced because as the large availability of junk bonds forced up acquisition prices generally and 
especially those buy-outs where junk bonds were used. 
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The largest batch of studies Telate to "going private" deals in the U. S. (DeAngelo et al 1984, 
Smith 1990, Kaplan 1989, Marais, Schipper, and Smith 1989, Lehn and Poulsen 1989 and others 
reviewed in Amihud 1989 and Yago 1989b). These typically examine the announcement effects 
of LBO offers on the stock price of the target. However since a bid premium is almost always 
necessary by an unquoted bidder to secure the stock, a positive market response is virtually 
inevitable except in exceptional circumstances. Studies show that the size of the average bid 
premium over the equity value sometime before the announcement (typically two months) appears 
to be over 40 percent with compensation of as high as 76 % in cases involving multiple bidders 
(Lowenstein 1985). UK bid premia for going private buy-outs are in line with those for hostile 
takeover bids (see Chiplin, Wright, Robbie, 1990). The size of the firm (Amihud 1989), the level 
of undistributed free cash flow and managerial equity holdings (Lehn and Poulsen 1989), the 
target industry's adjusted price-earnings ratios (Travlos and Millon 1989), the degree of risk 
(Grammatikos and Savory 1986) and the relative compositions of boards between independent 
and non-independent directors (Rosentheirn et al 1992) have been identified as other 
determinants of the magnitude of the premium. Lee (1992) deduced that managers of firms with 
completed buy-outs arc no more likely to have access to inside information than managers who 
withdrew proposals. 
While announcement effects literature has concentrated on going privates, a smaller set of studies 
has examined the effect of divestment announcements on share price effects on the vendor 
parent. These studies have covered equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs as well as 
management buy-outs. Hite and Owens (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983 and 1988), Klein 
(1985), Denning (1988) and Alfsar et al. (1990) suggest that on balance the announcements have 
had a positive effect on security returns. II 
An announcement effect study of divestment buy-outs in the US by Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) 
found small but significant wealth gains to vendor shareholders in the two days surrounding the 
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announcement of the sale. Alexander et al (1984) and Denning and Shastri (1990) found no 
significant excess return associated with divestment. Similarly Madden et al (1990) reported 
positive excess returns on Management Buy-outs. However Briston et al (1992) in examining UK 
divestments by management buy-out showed that shareholders do experience negative excess 
returns following the announcement of a management buy-out although the decision to sell parts 
of the assets of the parent company to management tends to be announced after a period of 
positive abnormal return. MBO teams may therefore have been able to negotiate their deal at a 
price lower than their current market value to the parent or lower than the expected value to an 
outside buyer. Ilis latter survey may have been distorted by a significant number of small 
management buy-outs, while most of the US studies may have been focused on extremely large 
transactions. 
These increases in stockholder wealth appear substantially to exceed any gains made by 
downgrading senior debt (Marais et al 1989, Jensen 1989a) or from tax benefits of the buy-out 
(see KKR 1989). Pre- buy-out bondholders may however suffer small losses (Asquith and Wizman 
1990, Cook, Easterwood and Martin (1992) confirm the presence of significant bondholder wealth 
losses of about 3 percent associated with the announcement of management buy-outs. 
A major concern clearly is that management may have manipulated accounting or other 
information. However DeAngelo, (1986) found no evidence of biased information in an analysis 
of accounting data. DeAngelo (1990) examined the valuation procedures used by US investment 
bankers in going privates: they were seen to make use of accounting data in conjunction with 
share price information, comparative prices of other company acquisitions, management forecasts, 
etc. Accounting information used included a wide range of valuation techniques and sensitivity 
analyses including analyses of comparable firms, comparable acquisitions, discounted cash flow 
analysis, leveraged buy-out models and leveraged re-capitalisation models. De Angelo concluded 
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that the ultimate buy-out price is constrained to fall within the approximate range of value implied 
by a broad variety of valuation techniques. 
Despite the lack of evidence, concern over the use of insider information and the potential for 
manipulation of data by unscrupulous managers has led to several proposals being made both in 
the US and UK for control. In the US concern about losses to shareholders led to proposals for 
a mandated auction'particularly as some evidence suggested that premia tended to be higher in 
such instances (Lowenstein 1985). Amihud (1989) has expressed serious reservations pointing out 
that while premia are higher in competitive bidding contests, mandated auctioning may actually 
reduce the probability that an initial auction is made as potential bidders fear that the likelihood 
of success be reduced in a competitive bidding situation. The result of a mandated auction may 
be fewer buy-outs and consequent economic losses from the benefits they can create not 
occurring. 
Bruner and Paine (1988) argued that managers have certain fiduciary obligations and concerns 
about conflicting interests, insider advantages and misappropriation of corporate opportunities 
reflect management's pecial obligations to the corporation and its shareholders. By refinancing 
the company with debt managers may be able to leverage up the value of the firm at the expense 
of existing shareholders. They suggested that management should pay a price equal to the value 
that would be placed on the company if shareholders were to refinance the company the company 
with debt, a 'synthesiscd' buy-out, themselves. Jones and Hunt (1991) dismiss the utilitarian 
defence of buy-outs. 
Schadlera and Karns (1990) note that control over information is an ordinary and expected part 
of the responsibility of a firm's management and suggest that in the short term as a legal device 
the management buy-out process should be seen as being comparable to a preliminary merger 
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negotiation with an external firm, while in the longer term the disclosure protection provided by 
security laws should be extended to management buy-out transactions. 
In the UK following proposals made by the Investment Committee of the National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF 1989) at the time of the controversy surrounding the going private of 
Magnet, the Takeover Panel in De6ember 1989 issued new rules including requirements to 
appoint an independent adviser to the offeree board; rules on the secrecy with which such a buy- 
out may be organised, prohibitions on share dealings by those with privileged information; 
provision of information provided to prospective financiers to all shareholders and other bidders 
and a description of the proposed financing structure. In turn these rules raise questions as to the 
desirability of passing confidential information to a bidder who may be a competitor and whether- 
the opportunist manager who launches a bid for his company is serving his company better than 
a board which agrees a bid with another company without exposing the company to proper take- 
over criteria. It is also easy to forget the real risks to managers which are present in these 
transactions. Furthermore the issues have to be seen in the general context of the increasing 
interest in corporate governance and whether increased share ownership of the directors and 
management could have a beneficial effect. For example Amihud (1989) has suggested that 
management and the buy-out specialist could buy the necessary controlling interest without 
actually going private and thereby achieve the necessary incentive structure and control 
mechanism. 
Concerns as to ethical and insider trading considerations are clearly in most cases not applicable 
to buy-ins, giving them a significant advantage. External management seeking to acquire a 
company are not in a position of privileged information and have to make a bid on the basis of 
the information available to them. Incumbent management and other shareholders may dispute 
the valuation placed by the external management bidder but have to mount a defence to show 
why such valuations may be unrealistically low while the option remains open for either internal 
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management to mount a bid or another party to do so to determine a more realistic value. Thus 
the Isosceles buy-in resulted in competing bids between management and the external 
management bid. Public buy-ins in the UK may also meet some of Amihud's suggestions: the 
partial public buy-in allows a wider group of shareholders to retain an interest in the company and 
profit from any subsequent success. Alternatively the use of stub equity in several UK buy-out and 
buy-in transactions gives vendor shareholders the chances of benefitting from long - term 
restructuring (Wright, lbompson, Chiplin, Robbie 1991) 
2.6 Post Transaction Issues 
2.6.1 Buy-out Performance: The Issues 
Two particular theoretical approaches indicate that improvements may be expected in the 
performance of firms which are subject to buy-outs: AgencyTheory and Entrepreneurship Theory 
(Bull 1989). 
Jensen (1989b) suggests that the characteristics of buy-out deals ought to produce reductions in 
agency costs (see 2.2 above). First, the use of quasi-equity and debt-related instruments introduces 
a commitment to perform on the part of managers since if they fail to meet the cost of servicing 
such funding, the providers of such funds have the power to remove them. Second, these 
institutional financiers and investors are motivated to defend their debt and equity interests using 
other control devices such as board representation, detailed access to information, etc which may 
enhance performance. Third, the existence of significant managerial equity stakes may reduce 
previous differences between principals and agents which heightened agency cost problems (in 
general, increasing management equity raises the risk of management and entrenchment, Demsetz 
and Lchn, 1985; however in the particular context of a management buy-out this difficulty is 
countered by the role of debt and institutional control devices). These issues may relate to buy- 
outs of whole companies quoted on a stock market (Jensen, 1989b), companies which were part 
of a state owned entity (Wright, Thompson, Robbie, 1990b) and inappropriate and restrictive 
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hierarchial control in the case of buy-outs of divisions of larger groups (Wright and Thompson, 
1987). Companies or divisions of larger firms which have stable business histories and generate 
substantial free cash flow (ie low growth prospects but high potential for generating cash flow) 
are likely to be suitable candidates for leveraged buy-outs (Jensen, 1986). Before the buy-out 
transaction fixed asset investment may not have been in projects earning optimal returns while 
there may be significant organsiational inefficiencies. The venture may be expected to be 
successful because of the strong interest which the managers and venture capitalists have in that 
their equity investment is subordinate to other claims. Success will require (inter alia) 
implementation of other changes to avoid investment in low return projects to generate the cash 
for debt service and to increase the value of equity. While an agency relationship does still exist 
(albeit in a different form), the primary objective of debt repayment is shared by both the 
principals and agents. 
It can of course be argued that high levels of debt may result in assets being unloaded at less than 
their cost, the "fire sale" approach while also limiting the amount of finance available for 
expansion. It may give the buy-out a certain inflexibility compared to competition and it is 
questionable whether it involves transferring resources in a way which increases market power. 
Entrepreneurship theory would suggest that rather than simply involving mechanisms to control 
agency costs, buy-outs enable managers to be alert to take advantage of opportunities for growth. 
Bull (1989) argues that as the new group of owners is small in number and includes top managers, 
most owners will tend to be personally involved in the business and can be expected to observe 
and exploit opportunities for personal gain. Baumol (1988) describes the entrepreneur as a person 
who acts in accordance with the reward structure of the economy; this in the 1980's in the UK 
could be seen to be orientated towards the pursuit of wealth. Chell (1985) argueý that the limiting 
factors on the growth of a business are the entrepreneur's capabilities in terms of having the 
necessary skills to cope with the increased information which will arise from the greater number 
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and variety of situations which he or she will encounter and the need to negotiate if the business 
is to grow and/or be successful. 
Entrepreneurial experience of the Team Leader has also been shown as the most significant single 
variable in determining successful early performance (Stuart and Abetti 1990). Vesper (1980) 
demonstrated that a variety of experience in different formal areas and prior entrepreneurial 
experience (even failure) was an indication of better performance. MacMillan ct al (1985) showed 
the venture capitalist's strong dependence on the entrepreneur's personality and experience and 
a lesser dependence on the market, product and strategy. 
Although entrepreneurship theory implies that performance should benefit from higher degrees 
of innovative action, performance may also vary at different stages of the entrepreneurial process 
and if different types of entrepreneur adopt varying mixes of operating and strategic actions. A 
major problem clearly exists in that through the wide variation of some studies and the statistical 
problems inherent in small samples, it may not just be entrepreneurial characteristics in much of 
the research but also environmental and strategic variables which are important. 
The actual act of mounting a buy-out may be seen as highly entrepreneurial (Green and Berry 
1991, Wright and Coyne 1985). Furthermore the buy-out enables managers to undertake actions 
which they were not able to do within the well known restraints of large multi-divisional 
organisations (Wright and Thompson 1987). Entrepreneurship is probably more evident, and more 
critical, in the case of management buy-outs where the group of entrepreneurial manag6rs/owners 
are striking out on their own for the first time (Wright and Coyne, 1985, p5). Agency cost and 
Entrepreneurship approaches overlap to some extent since the equity ownership incentive 
mechanism contributes both to reducing agency costs and encouraging managers to seek out and 
exploit opportunities. 
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In addition to the performance benefits which may be expected from Agency Cost and 
Entrepreneurship Theories, the fact that in management buy-outs the businesses acquired are 
established ones with experienced managers should imply higher success rates than many other 
new ventures 
-(eg Hanney 1986). The venture capital and bank screening processes may also 
significantly improve the chances for success with their stringent investment criteria. 
/2.6.2 
Buy-out Performance: The Evidence 
This review of buy-out performance concentrates on operating and financial performance, UK and 
European studies, the role of management equity stakes and employment considerations. Before 
examining these studies in more depth, problems in their interpretation must be noted. First 
virtually all the US studies refer to large buy-outs, with average size considerably greater than the 
average UK buy-out with many being of "going private" transactions, a relatively minor clement 
of, the UK market. Many of the samples are relatively small, giving rise to the possibilities of 
biased results. There may also in some cases be a bias towards the more successful buy-outs, eg 
some refer to cases which have been bought out and then are floated on the stock market within 
a relatively short period. Indeed questions may be asked as to why such improvements were not 
achieved before and whether they can be maintained into the longer term. 
(a) Financial and Operating Performance 
The majority of studies examining operating performance confirm the beneficial effect of the LBO 
on profitability (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice 1984), return on equity (Lowenstein 1985), 
revenue growth (Singh 1990), working capital (Smith 1990), better utilisation of resources 
(Scherer 1986) and productivity (Yago 1989a). Efficiency benefits appear more significant in 
divisional buy-outs as opposed to independent buy-outs (Singh 1990, Muscarella, and Vetsuypens 
1990) 
86 
A necessary caveat is that most of these studies concerned leveraged buy-outs which occurred in 
the early and mid 1980's. In the later 1980's the leveraged buy-out market had developed to the 
point where pricier and riskier transactions took place (Kaplan and Stein 1990, Jensen 1991, 
Summers 1989) implying that real operating gains may have been more difficult to achieve in the- 
later deals. Oplcr (1992), however, in a survey of 1985-89 buy-outs, shows that these were not 
accompanied by smaller operating improvements than observed in the earlier studies suggesting 
that they were not 'more marginal' as had been suggested by some observers. 
- 
Singh (1990) in examining performance in the first three years before entry to a stock market 
found that buy-outs tended to outperform their corresponding industry averages in terms of 
revenue growth, inventory management, operating income and debtors. Buy-outs of former 
divisions of larger groups tended in particular to grow faster than industry averages whilst 
maintaining the same levels of operating income. Inventory management and accounts receivable 
register substantially favourable levels of improvement over time than the industrial average and 
indeed over a remarkably short period suggesting that managers make radical changes in the 
operations of their firms to achieve these benefits. 
Kaplan (1989) looking at 76 going private buy-outs between 1980 and 1986 noted that in the 
three years after buy-out, they experienced increases in operating income (before depreciation), 
decreases in capital expenditure and increases in net cash flow. Changes in the ratio of operating 
income to assets and to sales (which helped control for divestiture and acquisitions) exceeded the 
industry average changes by 20 percent in the first three post buy-out years. Operating changes 
were seen to be due to improved incentives rather than lay-offs or managerial exploitation of 
shareholders through inside information. 
Including 35 companies used in the Kaplan study in the sample, Smith (1990) examined operating 
returns as measured by operating cash flow before interest and taxes, deflated by operating assets 
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and the number of employees. Before and after adjustment for industry trends increase from the 
year preceding to the year following completion of the buy-out. Subsequent changes in the 
operating returns suggest that the increase observed in the first year is maintained with 
adjustments in the management of working capital contributing to the increase in operating 
returns. Like Kaplan, Smith concludes that the increase in operating returns after buy-out most 
likely reflects an increase in operating efficiency stemming from improved management incentives. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypcns (1990) in looking at 72 firms which went public since 1983 but 
previously had been subject to a divisional or going private LBO noted that the companies 
appeared to have undertaken numerous restructuring activities designed to increase the efficiency 
of the firm's operations. Ibcse 'reverse' LBOs had experienced significant improvements in 
profitability when compared with random samples of publicly traded firms over similar time 
periods resulting from the sample's ability to reduce costs rather than to generate more revenues 
or improve asset turnover. The efficiency gains were independent of acquisition or divestment 
activity after the LBO and were more pronounced for those which had been a divestment rather 
than a going private LBO. While firms on average reduced their relative capital expenditures, they 
did not implement reductions in employment. However over two fifths had divested some assets 
or had re-organised production facilities. 
Scherer (1986) undertook a series of case studies of buy-outs on divestiture. He found evidence 
of important improvements, including a reduction of delays and distortions in decision-making and 
resource utilization. However, he expressed concern that over-strict financial control could 
jeopardise advertising and R&D budgets. Direct evidence on this point is hard to come by. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) found no evidence that manufacturing firms which have undergone 
an ownership change reduce their R&D spending although they confirm the findings of previous 
studies that LBO targets are much less R&D intensive than other firms. Smith (1990) also found 
no support for the assertion that pervasive cutbacks in discretionary expenditures such as R&D, 
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advertising, and maintenance and repairs are responsible for the short run increases in operating 
cash flows. Opler (1992) found that while leveraged buy-outs were followed by substantial 
increases in operating and net cash flow, both capital expenditure and R&D expenditure 
declined after the buy-outs were completed. KKR (1989) noted increases of an average 15 
percent in R and D expenditure after LBO in a sample of 15 companies although they noted that 
the companies most appropriate for buy-out generally had well-established products and were not 
in the high technology and hence did not require large-scale research and development to remain 
competitive. Long and Ravenscraft (1989) noted that the KKR study had not controlled for 
industry effects. However, a small sample study by the National Science Foundation, reviewed by 
Yago (1989b, Chapter 9) reported lower growth rates in R&D for LBO firms. However Yago 
(1989b, Chapter 5) with a different sample noted that the rate of capital spending among 
companies which had issued high yield securities (junk' bonds) was more than twice the industry 
total while Pound and Gordon (1989) found that high yield issues increased capital spending 
generally and by more than was expected at the time these debt securities were issued. More 
generally, it is unlikely that any reduction in research spending will be substantial since American 
LBO activity is overwhelmingly concentrated in low R&D intensity industries (Hall 1989). 
However Hill and Snell (1988) showed that research intensity increases in firms where an owner's 
perspective dominates. Welch and Bolster (1992) note that in hostile takeovers long term 
spending on R&D riscs significantly in the post merger environment. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) in comparing the effect of total factor productivity of buy-outs with 
over 12,000 manufacturing plants concluded that LBO's and particularly MBO's completed in the 
period 1983-86 had a strong positive effect on Total Factor Productivity in the first three post 
buy-out years: plant productivity increased from 2.0 percent above industry mean in the three pre 
buy-out years to 8.3 percent above industry mean in the three post buy-out years. However, buy- 
outs completed in 1981 and 1982 had no significant productivity effect. 
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Bull (1989) came to a similar conclusion Finding that the financial performance of 25 sample 
companies for two years after buy-out was superior to that during the two years before buy-out 
in terms of both their own performance and in comparison with industry averages. Bull considered 
that although there was some support for the agency cost reduction argument for improved buy- 
out performance, the evidence was convincing that major improvements came from the changeý 
to management focus, apparently from minimising variability in reported profits to maximising cash 
flow. 'Me improvement was greater than for income tax savings alone. Malone (1989) examining 
early characteristics of 56 smaller company leveraged buy-outs as well as the characteristics of the 
individuals undertaking the buy-outs, noted that they did not seem to rely heavily on selling off 
assets or laying off employees. Instead the dominant changes lay in the area of increased 
marketing and revenue enhancement. 
The possibility has also been examined that a substantial proportion of gains may have been 
derived from tax savings resulting from interest payment deductibility and higher depreciation 
allowances when assets are stepped up (Lowenstein 1985, Kaplan 1989, Bull 1989, Leland 1989, 
Schipper and Smith 1992). While a positive correlation between premium and potential tax savings 
has also been established (Kaplan 1989, Marais, Schipper and Smith 1989) Kaplan maintained that 
the tax benefits largely went to the pre-LBO stockholders, the post LBO equity holders only 
getting the benefits of efficiency improvement and it does not appear that tax benefits are the 
sole driving force of buy-out opportunities. Newbould, Chatfield and Anderson (1992) in 
examining 23 of the largest buy-outs since the 1986 Tax Reform Act concluded that appropriately 
structured leveraged buy-outs still create significant tax incentives. However, on average, since 
1986 less than half the buy-out premium can be attributed to reduction in taxes. However the role 
which taxes play in'the buy-out process are likely to be highly complex (cg'Long and Ravenscraft 
1989, Wright, Normand and Robbie 1990) while the US tax system provides substantial incentives 
for the excessive use of debt in the context of corporate restructurings (Summers 1989) With firms 
likely to pay less taxes in'the first years after going private (Opler 1992). Haynes'(1989) shows 
90 
that the use of tax shields, that would not be fully utilised in the absence of an acquisition, is 
significant in explaining the gains to target firms' shareholders as well as to the acquiring firms. 
However tax saving in a buy-out must be seen in the overall fiscal context. Jensen, Kaplan and 
Stiglin (1989) argue that the net effect of buy-outs is to increase the present value of (US) 
Treasury tax revenues by 61 percent after taking account of taxes on capital gains realised by the 
pre-buy-out shareholders; taxes on operating cash flow increases from buy-out; taxes on interest 
income received by buy-out lenders; and taxes on the capital gains from post buy-out asset sales. 
(b) UK and European Performance Studies 
Given the relatively small number of going private buy-outs in the UK compared to the US 
(Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992), research in the UK has had a different focus to that in the US. 
Additionally the more recent time period has meant that most published research has been carried 
out during a period of favourable economic growth with little opportunity for long-run accounting 
and financial data analysis. 
Across all buy-out in the UK, a study of the initial consequences of buy-out for 111 private sector 
cases up to mid-1983, a period largely characterised by recession, showed improvements in 
profitability, trading relationships, customer bases, cash and credit control systems and evidence 
of new product development. The sample showed considerable changes in employment and 
management structure (Wright and Coyne 1985). These findings are supported by a second 
survey of 57 buy-outs over the same period undertaken by Hanney (1986) which noted that in 
terms on initial performance (as measured by pre tax profits) 80.7 percent of the sample surveyed 
showed improvements in the first year compared to pre-buy-out levels. A subsequent survey by 
CMBOR of 182 UK buy-outs completed between mid-1983 and early 1986, a period of industrial 
recovery, lent support to these earlier studies, but also found certain differences. For the majority 
of respondents, trading profits and turnover were found to be "better" or "substantially better" 
than before the buy-out and in excess of expectations contained in the business plan (Thompson, 
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Wright and Robbie, 1989). However the lack of accounting data in these surveys clearly influences 
the worth that can be derived from these findings. 
Jones (1992) noted that improvements in operating cfficicncy in the first two years following buy- 
out were achieved by modifying organisational structures and the attitudes of participants, these 
modifications being interrelated with the adoption of more appropriate accounting control 
systems. 
While the above UK studies confirm short term improvements in corporate performance, there 
are major questions to be resolved as to the long term nature of these improvements (Houlden 
and Brookes 1989, Bannock 1990a, Jones 1992). Analysis is clearly complicated by the effects of 
exits among the high performers/ fast growers on the average performance of those which remain 
with their original buy-out structure (Wright, Thompson, Robbie, Wong 1993). 
A study of the longer term performance of buy-outs in the UK using operating performance data, 
confirmed that in the short-term buy-outs outperformed averages in terms of return on capital 
employed and returns on sales but found that after three years there was a reversal of the better- 
than-industry performance but with considerable variation between sectors (Houlden and Brookes 
1989). However, this study has to be treated with care as the longer-term results are based on 
samples in single figures and in some cases with incomplete accounting records, the ratio of non- 
exiting to exiting buy-outs within the sample was a serious distortion compared to the 
characteristics of the overall population of UK buy-outs. 
A later survey by Bannock (1990a) using accounting information provided by 3i on their buy-out 
investments concluded that average rates of return on assets for all 3i MBOs was above that for 
3i investee companies as a whole and both groups had shown better returns than average for all 
large UK companies. When measured over several years from buy-out, average rates of return on 
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assets of 3i buy-outs fell initially and then fluctuate about a rising trend which continues until at 
least Year 4. The available data did not allow firm conclusions beyond this period. In a 
complementary questionnaire survey of 366 3i buy-out managers, 37 percent reported substantially 
increased profits since the buy-out, 29 percent moderate increases and 16 percent a 
-fall in 
profitability. 'Ibis improved performance had not generally been achieved by cutting back on 
investment, R and D spending or marketing. Clearly these results have to be tempered by the bias 
which may exist in the use of data which was drawn from only one venture capital firm and reflect 
performance at a relatively favourable point of the economic cycle. 
Kitching (1989) in a survey of 110 US and UK buy-outs noted that while buy-outs made 
impressive efficiency gains, US buy-outs often failed to meet forecasts made to investors and 
lenders. 71bc average US LBO delivered 80 percent of forecast EBIT in year one, 98 percent in 
year two, 92 percent in year three and 75 percent in year four. The average UK buy-out in 
contrast exceeded forecast EBIT in year one and then delivered between 95 and 100 percent of 
the forecast in later years. Kaplan (1989) similarly noted that post buy-out operating performance 
in the first two years after buy-out was below the projections provided by managers in the buy-out 
proxy statement. Kitching also rcmarked on major changes in capital management. Inventories 
went down significantly in more than 50 percent of the buy-outs, while creditors payable went up 
in more than 40 percent of the sample. 70 percent did a sale and Icascback of some fixed assets 
while 30 percent of the UK buy-outs in the sample acquired new companies or divisions. 
Continental European evidence on the performance effects of buy-outs is as yet limited as the 
markets have until recently been undeveloped. In the Netherlands, evidence suggests that for buy- 
outs completed up to 1985,53% increased market share with a similar. proportion achieving 
growth in return on assets. In only one tenth of cases were falls in profitability recorded. About 
two thirds claimed to be much more viable, mainly because of increased flexibility to act in the 
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market place, and greater internal flexibility and control (Dutch National Investment Bank, 1985). 
Another study of Dutch buy-outs shows an encouraging picture, even in the longer term 
(Bruining, 1992)., Tbe main financial ratios of medium sized and large management buy-outs 
relating to cash flow, sales and return on investment were significantly better than the average 
financial ratios of the industries involved over periods of up to seven years during 1980-90 with 
strong indications that total agency costs had been reduced. 
In France, a study of the initial performance of fifty buy-outs completed under the government 
sponsored scheme to encourage this form of ownership transfer, provided indications that growth 
rates and profitability were significantly above the levels prevailing prior to the management 
takeover (Binz, et. al., 1985). A subsequent survey by CEGOS (1990) of publicly reported buy-outs 
in France recorded substantial post buy-out improvements in turnover (an average of thirteen per 
cent per annum), net profit (an average twenty one per cent increase) and employment (an 
average five per cent increase). In relying on publicly reported transactions, this study possibly 
included a much greater proportion of divestment buy-outs than is believed to be the case for the 
French market as a whole and may therefore not portray a comprehensive picture of post buy-out 
performance changes. , 
Studies of UK buy-outs which have exited by flotation on a stock market show that performance 
as measured by increases in company value exceeds market 
-indices both prior to flotation 
(Tbompson, Wright, Robbie, 1992) and afterwards (Lloyd et al, 1987; Parker, 1988; Wright, 
Robbie and Coync, 1987), although post flotation performance tended to slow down. Attwood, 
Donald and Eagles (1992) in examining management buy-outs which had floated on the London 
Stock Market whose market capitalisation exceeded L40 mn , at flotation subsequently 
outperformed the FTA All Share Index for the first three years despite the first day of issue 
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premium being only 4.7 percent relative to the Index. Longer term performance also showed 
outperformance, although at a more moderate pace. 
(c) Management Equity Stakes 
Ile crucial question as to whether greater managerial equity stakes lead to higher levels of 
performance has attracted a great deal of general attention beyond management buy-outs. A 
major study of chief executive incentives and company performance concluded that "what really 
matters is the percentage of the company's outstanding shares the Chief Executive Officer owns" 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In the case of management buy-outs, because management owns a 
substantial part of the firm, the separation between ownership and control has been reduced (Fox 
and Marcus 1992). The larger the managers' ownership position the more control they have 
(Frederickson & Iaquinto 1989, Stultz 1988) while the more they tended to identify their interests 
with the interests of the owners (Morck, Shliefer and Vishny 1988b). 
Whilst, as reviewed above, evidence concerning performance improvements in buy-outs appears 
strongly positive, it has not been clear what has contributed most to the changes which occur. It 
can be argued that the size of the management equity stake is the most important factor in 
explaining improvements in performance after buy-out (Thompson, Wright and Robbie, 1992). 
From an examination of twenty eight buy-outs which had floated on the stock market, it was 
found that the amount by which the uplift in the value of the bought out company between buy- 
out and flotation exceeded the risk adjusted market return over the same period (the "excess 
return") was greater the larger was management's equity stake, after controlling for size, industry, 
etc. The control devices such as equity ratchets and high levels of debt, were generally 
insignificantly related to increases in company value. The results of this study imply that a ten per 
cent increase in management equity ownership for firms in the sample, would increase the excess 
returns to total capital by approximately 25 per cent. 
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(d) Employment Considerations 
A more controversial performance issue concerns the impact of buy-outs on labour. In the USA, 
where the highly leveraged deals might be expected to create redundancy, the evidence is unclear. 
Jensen (1989) reports that employment increased 4.9% among a sample of LBOS, but fell 6.2% 
after adjustment for industry factors. (Although making such an adjustment is itself problematical 
when many LBOs are conglomerates and job losses are frequently concentrated at their corporate 
headquarters). Both KKR and Forstmann Little, two leading LBO specialists, suggest that overall 
employment has increased among their clients. Yago (1989a) examined profiles for the cohorts 
of LBOs occurring in each of the years 1984,1985 and 1986. In the first two cases there was an 
overall improvement in employment performance and in the latter year a worsening. Yago 
suggests that there is an initial shake-out, associated with reorganisation, followed by subsequent 
repositioning of the firm and new recruitment. Kaplan (1989), found a positive median change 
in employment of 0.9 percent with an employment increase in half the companies. Adjusting for 
post buy-out acquisitions and divestiture produced a more positive result. 61.5 percent of these 
companies increased employment with a median increase of 4.9 percent. Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989) found a slight decline. After adjusting for industry factors, Kaplan found that 
relative employment declined sharply. A clearer picture is provided by Smith (1990), who after 
allowing for the decline which may result from asset sales, found that although sample firms did 
not tend to reduce the number of employees after buy-out, they tended to hire fewer new 
employees than other firms in the same industry. Yago (1989b) reports that LBO firms have a 
slightly lower incidence of closure than other manufacturing plants. This result supports the 
finding of substantial productivity improvements following LBOs. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) 
report no significant post buy-out reduction in the number of blue collar employees although 
there was a decline in non-production employment. In addition they report a significant increase 
in the average annual compensation levels of production workers from one year before the buy- 
out to two years afterwards. 
. 
r, 
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Analysis has also been carried out of trends in employee majority owned firms including those 
with ESOPs (Robinson and Wilson 1992) although there arc doubts as to the statistical 
significance of certain studies. Roscn & Klein (1983) found employment growing 2.78 percent 
faster in 'employee owned than in conventional firms and by 3.87 percent for ESO Ps alone. 
Trachman (1985) noted that companies that had share ownership with over 51 percent of 
employees, had employment growth 2.4 times higher than non-employcc ownership companies. 
Quarrcy (1986) deduced that generally ESOPs improve employment growth by 3.8 percent per 
annum. 
In the UK there appears to have been a marked reduction in the 1980s in the proportion of buy- 
outs shedding labour, which is related to a shift away from distress sales to management and to 
the general recovery in profitability. In the earlier survey by Wright and Coyne (1985), 44% of 
firms reduced employment whereas in the later CMBOR study this had fallen to 25% (Wright, 
Chiplin, Thompson and Robbie, 1990a). The CMBOR survey also showed an improved position 
in terms of job losses, 18% of pre buy-out jobs in the earlier survey having been found to have 
been lost on the transfer of ownership, but only 6% in the later study. The Wright and Coyne 
survey also found, however, that after buy-out there had been some recovery in employment 
levels, but not to the levels prevailing prior to the transfer of ownership. At the time of the 
CMBOR survey, total employment was some 4.5% below pre buy-outs levels, and 2% above the 
level immediately after buy-out. 78 percent of Bannock's (1990a) survey of 3i backed buy-outs 
maintained or increased employment after buy-out. The UK firms, being generally smaller than 
their US counterparts, are clearly less affected by sell-offs of assets. 
2.6.3 Turnaround, Action and Problem Areas 
Discussion of performance studies has implied- that management buy-outs frequently involve 
companies where there may have been some relative under performance in the past; the 
implications of the new ownership structure have allowed Tcams to produce at least in the short 
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and medium term meaningful performance improvements. However in some cases and especially 
in management buy-ins a more fundamental turnaround may be required. Turnaround once 
triggered will involve identification of the underlying problems of the company followed by 
specific actions to reverse these. Issues relate to. the identification of problems (see 2.2.6), the 
phases of action required and the type which is relevant. There may be considerable variations 
between individual transactions with particular problem areas emerging in some cases. 
While Gopinath (1991), Robbins and Pearce (1992), Hoffman (1989) and Zimmermann (1991) 
have all referred to the stages required in turnarounds, their application can be broadly seen as 
follows. After the identification of need for turnaround and action two phases can be broadly 
established, the first involving immediate retrenchment and stabilisation which will then be 
followed by a period of recovery. During these two phases necessary actions will differ: in the first 
concentration is on survival, stopping performance decline and ensuring a significant improvement 
in cash flow. This may involve asset reductions, and cost reductions including liquidation, 
divestment, product rationalisation and employment reductions. Upon stabilisation the recovery 
phase involves a recovery strategy which matches the blend of causes of the decline with 
entrepreneurial dominant strategies. Ibis will aim for the long term profitability of the company 
and growth in the market and strategically will involve market penetration, 
reconcentration/segmentation, ew markets, acquisitions and new products. Consequently over the 
two periods a mixture of both defensive (ie halt deterioration) and offensive (improve 
performance) activities are likely to be employed. 
Turnaround may also be seen as either operating or strategic (see eg Schendcl, Patten & Riggs 
1975, Hofer 1980, Robbins and Pearce 1992) with operating reasons prompting, operating 
remedies and strategic ills resulting in strategic remedies. In operating turnaround the financially 
troubled firm pursues its current strategy more efficiently, typically controlling costs more 
effectively, more efficient utilisation (including some reduction) of assets, increasing revenue 
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(through regaining lost position rather than increased market penetration) and improvements to 
production processes and their associated managerial and structural changes. Strategic turnaround 
in which emphasis on strategic change is sought, sometimes referred to as entrepreneurial 
turnround, involves the financially troubled firm pursuing a return-to-growth strategy and consists 
of manipulating strategy components, such as reposturing the firm's product or services, its 
primary markets, principal technologies, distinctive competencies, competitive advantages, and 
strategic alliances. 
Classification into these categories may however be misleading given the practical and political 
factors present in seeking to reorganisc companies and variations in both causes of decline and 
characteristics of the company. Reality may be that strategies have to be adopted which combine 
both operating and strategic aspects, sometimes depending on how widespread the problem areas 
arc within the overall firm. Such possibilities arc only given limited significance in some of the 
literature, cg Hofer (1980), although there are some, eg Hambrick and Schecter (1983), suggesting 
that strategic turnarounds are unrealistic for most mature businesses and illustrate three main 
types of successful turnarounds: those involving asset/cost surgery (associated with companies with 
low levels of capacity utilisation); selective product/market pruning (companies with high levels 
of capacity utilisation) and piecemeal (companies with high market share). 
Factors which will facilitate turnaround require to be aimed at the underlying causes of the need 
for turnaround described in 2.2.6 and have been examined in a variety of studies (eg Slatter 1984, 
Grinyer et al 1988, Zimmermann 1989,1991) and can be categorised into similar groups. 
Illustration of the possible types of actions are shown in Figure 2.3. Management and especially 
CEO 
-change, the most important element in analytical studies, is described in more detail in 5.3. 
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FIGURE 2.3: TYPICAL TURNAROUND ACTIONS 
Factor Type of Action 
Management New Chief Executive and or Chairman; changes in Executive 
Directors; improvements to quality of management; new values 
and vision; improvements to motivation and incentives; 
encouragement of entrepreneurial behaviour; improved 
communications 
Financial (internal) Stronger controls especially of cash flow, working capital, 
capital expenditure, budget variances; tightening of credit, 
debtor, stock and other financial ratios; overhead control; 
improvements to internal reporting systems and better quality 
of information circulated to relevant personnel; changes to 
budgetary and longer term financial planning 
Financial (external) Action to limit damage from external events, eg capping, 
hedging. May be helped by currency depreciation or unexpected 
favourable movement in interest rates 
Cost Structure Re-organisation of production systems to reduce cost; tighter 
control of overheads including head office related staff; 
reduction in working capital costs; material and energy cost 
reduced; introduction of cost saving technology-, efforts to take 
advantage of economies of scale 
Market Demand Windfall, effects of cyclical, secular upturn in demand; positive 
effects of government actions; exit of competitor 
Production and Labour Reduction of production costs; investment in new plant; 
programme to improve employee morale; improved utilisation 
of existing capacity-, changes to production and stock control; 
introduction of wage inventive systems; use of work study-, 
Improvements in labour productivity 
Marketing Efforts to get closer to the customer; changes to distribution 
channels; rationalisation of product range; possible extension or 
diversification within product range; improved market research; 
more cost effective advertising; more appropriate pricing 
structure-discounts; identification of new, eg export, markets; 
improvements to after sales service 
Competitors Use of marketing, cost and pricing measures to be significantly 
more competitive than before 
Acquisitions, Divestment and Closure or sale of heavily loss making subsidiaries; sale of 
Big Projects weaker companies with no long term position in the group; 
avoidance of large prestige projects which may increase risk 
profile of company excessively-, possible use of funds raised 
through disposals to re-invest in areas to secure diversification, 
supplies and distribution channels 
Internal financial measures will include significantly tighter controls of areas such as inventories 
and debtors, the exercising of longer periods of credit to reduce working capital requirements, 
more emphasis on cash flow, control of overhead and variable costs, greater scrutiny of Exed 
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capital expenditure, new budgeting procedures, the use of new financial ratios and an 
improvement in' the quality of financial information available to management. Preventative 
measures may be taken to reduce exposure to financial movements which'may be external to the 
company- eg interest rate'and currency hedging. As part of the emphasis on cash generation non- 
core subsidiaries and other surplus assets may be sold with others which are being retained subject 
to sale and Icaseback arrangements. 
A more detailed, although small sample, study of the short term changes in accounting control 
systems following a buy-out provides evidence that the remarriage of ownership and control 
involved enables more appropriate systems to be introduced, especially at the more strategic level 
(Jones, 1992). There is also evidence of a perpetuation of standard performance reports, 
influenced to a great extent by the requirements of financial backers who wished to ensure that 
buy-outs were effectively controlled in order to meet their finance servicing costs. In addition, 
there was a weak association between environmental factors and changes to accounting systems 
after the buy-out. Rather, there was a strong influence of managerial 'choice as to the most 
appropriate techniques to make best use of the human and capital resources available. There was 
clear evidence that whilst management were freed from group constraints, and had the ownership 
incentive to make improvements, the bonding to meet financial targets was also a key influence 
on the action they took. 
Efforts will be made to reduce the cost structure of the company. This will include tight control 
of overheads, the cutting of head office wastage and staff, the spin-offs from the interest cost 
effects of the reduction in working capital requirements, stricter control of energy, material and 
production costs, the introduction of cost saving technology and efforts to improve economies of 
scale. 
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Considerable attention will also be placed on marketing. 'Ibis will include not only areas such as 
revision of advertising arrangements, distribution channels, but examination of new markets, 
including exports. Pricing levels and discount structures will be analysed. Market research may be 
increased and the level of marketing information within the firm increased. The firm may be 
affected beneficially by external factors such as cyclical and sectoral upturns in demand, 
government action or the exit of a competitor. 
Allied to this emphasis on marketing, the product range will be examined, perhaps rationalised. 
but it could also be subject to diversification or extension. New designs may be introduced and 
efforts made to increase quality, availability and after sales service. 
Major changes will also be implemented in production and labour as part of the action to reduce 
production costs and improve build quality. Efforts will be made to improve employcc morale, 
increase the utilisation of existing capacity and raise labour productivity. Wage incentive systems 
may be introduced and work study schemes examined. Production and stock control systems will 
be updated. I 
Depending on the extent of the turnaround crisis and the success of cash generation activities the 
firm may engage in acquisition activity although this is likely to be financed by disposal of non 
core and peripheral activities. Profitable core businesses may be expanded while weaker ones may 
be sold. Product diversification may also be engaged in subject to maintaining a moderate risk 
stance 
Case study evidence from the US (Scherer, 1986), shows benefits from the removal of delays and 
distortions in decision-making and the draining away of resources to other parts of a larger 
organisation. However while the primary motivation behind such divestitures may be to improve 
competitive position, enhance managerial efficiency and enhance the firm's economic value in IIII- 
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capital markets, improvements may not always be so apparent in the performance of the unit or 
division being divested (Woo, Willard and Beckstead 1989). ' 
Attention also will be paid to the relationship with the vendor. While the purchase agreement will 
have included a legalistic arrangement to cover elements of the sale (eg warranties), important 
continuing trading relationships may also have been covered making the separation between 
parent and subsidiary neither immediate nor complete. These may involve sales or purchases of 
goods and services or both and include minimum purchase elements. Attempts are made to spread 
the base of trading partners and reduce parental dependence soon after buy-out (Wright and 
Coyne 1985, Wright, Chiplin, Thompson, Robbie 1990b). Additionally the vendor may in certain 
circumstances retain an equity stake. Group structure constraints may require rapid changes to 
enhance product ranges to meet market conditions, more appropriate managerial control systems 
and organisational structures and enhanced investment while important changes may be necessary 
to develop products and customer bases. 
In management buy-ins a major issue also relates to the distortion which may occur through the 
discovery of problems which were not identified in due diligence procedures. 
2.6.4 The Role of New Management 
Through the introduction of new management, the backers of buy-ins are hoping to inject new 
vision and strategy for the target company which will be superior to that in the pre-acquisition 
structure. Issues emerge as to the role of management in any decline'prior to the buy-in, the 
comparative abilities of new top management and Chief Executives and the contribution which 
new management can make. 
Agency theory has shown that over time the separation of management and control may lead to 
lack of control of managers and hence poor performance, relatively weak share prices and 
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increasing the probability of agreed or hostile takeover. The eventual reaction by shareholders 
and sometimes banks may include either a decision to sell the company or parts of it at this stage 
or alternatively to replace incumbent management. Evidence for the former reaction has been 
shown in 2.3.4 and for the latter in studies such as Grinyer et al, 1988, McEachran 1977, 
Coughlan and Schmidt 1985 and Warner, Watts and Wruck 1988 with high rates of executive 
turnover also being noted in the extreme cases of companies going into bankruptcy (Ang and 
Chua (1981), Schwartz and Menon (1985) and Gilson (1989)). There is evidence that the type of 
functional managerial experience may make it possible to differentiate between companies which 
went bankrupt and those which did not in the same sector (Hambrick and D'Aveni 1985). At the 
same time executives who feel that under-performance is not related to their own abilities and 
actions within the firm may leave for reasons such as to protect their reputation. In so doing they 
may further worsen the performance of the company but also enter into the realm of the 
effectively displaced manager who could seek a more entrepreneurial role through a buy-in. 
Replacement of management may be by internal appointments or external recruitment although 
in practice both forms are used (eg Slatter 1984 Grinyer et al 1988). A major issue is whether 
external recruitment will result in superior performance. Strong arguments can be made, eg 
Bibeault (1982) and Hofer (1980), that it is very difficult for internal management to produce 
turnaround as successfully as those recruited from outside. These are based on current 
management having such a strong set of beliefs about how to run the business that many must 
be wrong for the company's problems to have occurred in the first place. Replacing management 
stimulates change through unfreezing existing attitudes, removing concentrations of power, 
providing new values and vision for the company, introducing new methods for solving particular 
problems, and creating the levels of stress or tension needed to stimulate organiýational change 
and more innovative and entrepreneurial behaviour throughout management, (eg Iýqffman 1989). 
Nevertheless some US studies (eg Dalton and Kesner 1985, Warner, Watts and Wruck 1988, and 
Furtado and Karan 1989) have not been able to support this view. One reason may be the danger 
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that the introduction of new management may in the short term produce resentment from 
remaining management which depresses performance. 
Ibc issue can be seen as critical in the success profile of management buy-ins where external 
management are clearly assumed to be able to be more capable than an incumbent management 
team. The latter may have been in possession of insider information of both upwards and 
downwards potential. Knowledge of this, which may be denied to the external management team, 
may have major implications for the type of skills which are required to effect turnaround and 
performance improvement. 
Once problems have been identified Hofer (1980) has seen the strategistlentrepreneur as suitable 
for high growth-strategic turnarounds. The hard nosed experienced cost cutter would be more 
appropriate for operating turnaround with a major cost reduction effort to be pursued. 
Zimmermann (1991) notes the importance of coming from the same industry with the executive 
needing to know the particular processes, competition, suppliers, customers or individual people 
within the industry while the new Chief Executive needs to articulate ideas, purposes and 
procedures using unambiguous language, honesty and trustworthiness and have the ability to share 
success with the rest of a team which is well rounded in terms of overall experience and 
knowledge. Hambrick and Mason (1984) have noted that it is potentially possible to explain 
significant performance in terms of the 'upper echelon'- age related, functional experience, 
corporate influences, education, socio-economic background and group heterogeneity. Norburn 
(1986) in examining Top Managers in the large UK companies remarked that top management 
characteristics differ significantly within industry sectors of growth, turbulence and decline. 
Norburn and Birley (1988) also noted top management eams who demonstrate multiple company 
employment and wider education training will out perform those who do not, whether this be 
based upon criterion of inter or intra industry productivity. 'ý 
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Developing the reasons seen for need for turnaround and identified in 2.6.3, management are 
therefore likely, depending on the severity of the crisis facing the target company, to introduce 
a series of measures which will cover the areas outlined in Figure 2.3: further changes to 
management who will be made fully aware of the new vision and strategy being applied; financial 
actions aimed at both internal and external considerations; pruning of the cost structure; 
production re-organisation and labour; marketing action; competition and a programme of 
disposals possibly followed by selective acquisitions. External management and new ownership of 
the company are likely to result in a more radical restructuring than other combination such as 
new management but existing ownership. 
2.6.5 The New Type of Governance 
To ensure that performance is achieved and associated with the new financial structures implied 
in buy-outs and buy-ins are improved governance systems involving new methods of monitoring 
and control by the financial investors in the target company. In the UK venture capital firms are 
distinctive in the way they make and control investments; similarly in the US LBO Associations 
have been seen by Jensen (1989a) as representing a new organisational form which may offer 
greater efficiency than conglomerate organisations, and introduce a further means by which the 
performance of large under-performing companies can be improved. 
Typically LBO associations and venture capital firms are generally run by partnerships with small 
staff levels instead of the headquarters office in the typical large, multi-business diversified 
corporation where staffing may be in the hundreds or thousands (see eg Sahlman 1990). They 
take an important role in the strategic direction of each LBO in which they are involved and hold 
significant amounts of its debt and equity. The partnership's executives as well as the heads of 
each business unit also have substantial equity interests which are in general far larger than might 
be expected for executives in a large corporation. Additionally the control functions of debt places 
pressure on managers to consider carefully the spread of, activities 
-in which they should 
be 
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engaged. Unlike the diversified firm where cross subsidisation of subsidiaries is possible, the LBO 
partnership is unable to transfer resources from one LBO business to another. 
The typical UK quoted company can be seen as consisting of several layers of control with 
shareholders possessing only indirect control; management are likely only to have minimal 
shareholdings, perhaps only as part of a long term executive share ownership plan. There is likely 
to be a group headquarters as well as divisional boards having their own HQ although these may 
be located at operational units. Beneath these there will be operating companies within the 
Division usually with their own Board. With local board meetings being held perhaps only on a 
bimonthly basis, there can be a significant time lag between a problem developing and action 
being taken by the parent board. In contrast Buy-out and Venture Capital partnerships will have 
raised funds through a limited partnership agreement (Figure 2.4). The Partnership HQ will be 
a small unit which will hold weekly investment meetings which will also discuss problems which 
may have arisen through their monitoring control processes. The Partners will themselves be 
motivated to perform through incentive arrangements in the Limited Partnership Fund agreement 
and direct and indirect holdings in the equity of the investee companies. 
The degree to which a venture capital partner becomes an active or 'hands on' participant in the 
invested business (van Wakeren et al. 1990, Sapienza 1992), is a function of the importance of 
the investment, the existing management capabilities of the'investce firm's team and the 'style' 
of the venture capitalist. MacMillan, Kuwlow and Khoylian (1988) identified three layers of 
involvement: 'laissez-faire'; moderate; and 'close tracker', although they are frequently categorised 
as either 'hands ofr or 'hands on'. 'Hands-off' investors may be content to remain relatively 
remote from the operation of the investment requiring only period reporting of key financial and 
operational data and not necessarily taking up directorship e*ntitlcmcnts. Others adopt a much 
more proactive, 'hands on' role appointing their own executives or nominee external managers as 
non-exccutivc directors' to the boards of the invcstec businesses. They become involved in 
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operational details including strategy formulation, future finance raising, new customer and 
supplier contact, recruitment of key staff and realisation strategy (Sapienza and Timmons 1989). 
In particularly difficult circumstances, eg when a serious skills gap has developed or where there 
I 
have been unexpected and adverse trading conditions, the venture capitalist may become intrusive 
in the running of investcc companies irrespective of strategy preferences (Murray 1991a) including 
seconding their own staff for an extended period to the investee company. 
2.6.6 The Life Cycle and Methods of Realisation 
The need for this style of governance structure has to be seen in the context of planning and 
controlling for the longer term aspirations for the firm by both investors and Team. Yenture 
capitalists need to achieve investment goals set by, the providers of their funds. This will differ 
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significantly between different investors, some preferring to realise relatively early capital gain 
others emphasising a running yield on their investments through dividend payments (Robbie and 
Wright 1992c, Ascott and Chotai 1992). Management may also be motivated by financial gain or 
be happy to remain independent but require to plan succession to younger- colleagues or family. 
The firm itself may require more diversified funding for expansion either through an IPO or as 
part of a larger group. Consequently a series of changes involving whole or partial realisation of 
buy-outs can be expected, occurring over different time periods. 
Ibc large variety of venture capital institutions allows for a significant variety in approach to the 
financing arrangements for buy-out terms. Clear differences can be expected between those 
institutions seeking short to medium term capital gain compared with others structuring deals to 
obtain a significant yield on their investments but prepared to take a capital gain in the long term, 
see Dixon (1991). Additionally the whole relationship with venture capitalists and to some extent 
banks involve a series of mechanistic devices (eg covenants based on financial ratios, board 
representation, production of regular accounts, approvals for capital expenditure above particular 
levels as well as ratchet mechanisms to vary management's equity stake dependent on pre-defined 
targets including exit) thereby providing a range of flexible techniques for adapting the buy-out 
to differing circumstances (eg Robbie and Wright, 1990a, Green and Berry 1991 and Campbell, 
Beckhhofer and McCrone, 1992). 'Such structures reflect those of venture capital investments 
generally (Sweeting 1991, MacMillan et al 1989 and Sahlman 1990), the last comparing and 
contrasting the control mechanisms in LBO organisations and venture capital funds. Case study 
interview evidence suggests that in achieving exit, institutions extensively utilise flexible control 
processes which enable them to be both proactive and respond to changing circumstances (Wright, 
Robbie, Romanet et al 1992) e 
Management clearly will also be a very important influence' given 1 that they have generally 
perceived the entrepreneurial activity in the first place (Bull 1989, 'Wright 'Ibompson Robbie 
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1994). However the actual size of initial equity stake especially in the larger buy-outs may limit 
the control which management may have over the form of rcalisation with institutions more able 
to control the exit. With a work force which is relatively stable in size and with little staff 
turnover, there is also the possibility that the internal share market of an employee buy-out may 
run out of sufficient liquidity to operate effectively (Ben-Ner 1988). 
Differences in motivation of managers (cg reacting to a one-off opportunity va more proactivc 
recognition of a chance to implement one's own growth strategy (Wright, Robbie, Thompson, 
Starkey 1992) may also influence longevity. If management have highly specific non-transferable 
skills, they may have little option to remain with the financiers into the long term; evidence from 
buy-outs suggests widespread long term commitment to the firm (Wright and Coyne 1985). 
Several important factors have to be recognised. These include the overwhelming importance of 
the buy-in or buy-out'in the management's personal asset portfolio compared to the less 
significant importance in that of the backing financial institution(s); desire by management to 
remain independent which may be at variance with an institution's wish to realise capital gain; 
emotive ties to the business by management (especially in a buy-out) as opposed to a more 
detached view of the financier; and the asymmetry of information between the parties as a result 
of which management may have a better idea of the actual and potential performance of the 
business than a financier although financiers will have greater experience in financial markets and 
may be better placed to have a fuller picture of the range of financial and strategic options 
available to the firm (Wright, Thompson, Chiplin, Robbie 1991). 
The initial financial structure of a buy-out will attempt to reconcile these differences and prepare 
for the eventual realisation of the interests of both managers and venture capital investors. Whilst 
realisation is necessary to enable'the interested parties to meet their objectives, it is also linked 
to the different financial and ownership needs of the firm itself at different points in its life-cycle. 
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This point is not unique to buy-outs; all venture capital investments as well as other firms 
experience a lifc-cyclc in which different ownership and financial structures are appropriate 
(Mueller, 1988, Jones and Butler 1992). Discussion of exit and rcalisation may concentrate on the 
methods of realisation which are available, the governance of the buy-out or buy-in (see 2.6.5) 
and the life cycle of the company. 
(b) The Life Cycle 
Although there are various forms which realisation may take, a considerable debate has emerged 
concerning the longevity of the buy-out form and the relative extent to which these exits options 
are utiliscd. While management buy-outs have been seen to be only a 'honeymoon period' 
(Wright and Coyne 1985) or a transitory form (Rappaport 1990, Green and Berry 1991) and there 
have been concerns as to the longer term nature of buy-out control systems (Jones 1992), others 
have seen buy-outs as a longer term organisational form which may eclipse the public corporation 
(Jensen 1989). Indeed a large rump of venture capital investments do not manage to exit but 
remain in investors' portfolios beyond the original realisation target date (Ruhnka et al 1992). 
Jensen (1989) argues that the advantages of LBO transactions from the point of the incentives 
to pay out free cash flow, the large equity stakes held by managers and the monitoring by the 
LBO sponsor imply that the public corporation is inferior as an organisational form to the LBO 
in low growth, mature businesses generating substantial free cash flow. Jensen feels that the 
superiority of this ownership form means that the LBO form is likely to last for a significant 
period. The need to retain a buy-out form for a significant period is also highlighted in terms of 
the advantages of the source of value which derives from the tax deductibility of interest payments 
(Kaplan 1989, Schipper and Smith, 1988). To maintain these benefits would imply the maintaining 
of the buy-out debt load or indeed re-leveraging the transaction when debt levels had become low. 
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Rappaport (1990) however disagrees seeing buy-outs as a transitory form arguing that the high 
levels of debt and concentrated ownership impose costs of inflexibility to competition and change. 
The need for investors to realise their investments to external suppliers of funds, the absence of 
a daily stock price to act as an objective measure of corporate value and restricted market 
applicability all restrict the long term nature of buy-outs. Shleiffer and Vishny (1991b) see many 
LBO controlled firms as temporary organisations designed to last only as long as it takes to sell 
off the pieces of the acquired firms to other public corporations: remaining pieces often offered 
to the public especially when their value has been enhanced by some operating changes. Green 
and Berry (1991) see management buy-outs as essentially a transitional state suited to recovery 
in shareholder value but not to long term strategic redirection or significant growth. 
Kaplan (1991) notes that this argument could have included the need for managers, as their equity 
investment increases in value over the years, to reduce or diversify an otherwise increasing amount 
of undiversificd risk by seeking some form of at least partial exit, eg through an IPO. Kaplan saw 
the Rappaport view as consistent with buy-outs being seen as 'shock therapy'- allowing 
management to focus on cash flow, foregoing unprofitable investment opportunities and selling 
unproductive assets, generally one-time events. In time the costs of inflexibility, illiquidity and risk- 
bearing will result in there being no advantage in the company retaining its unquoted status. 
Kaplan's examination of 183 large LBOs completed between 1979 and 1986 as at 1990 showed 
the majority (62 percent) still being privately owned with an unconditional estimate of the median 
time private of 6.8 years. Consequently Kaplan (1991) concludes that buy-outs are neither a 
transitory or permanent form, some following the Rappaport theory but a substantial proportion 
remaining independent for a long period as implied by Jensen (1989). Additionally those that 
remain independent retain debt levels similar to those at the LBO, ic the benefits of debt bonding 
remain. Wright, Thompson, Robbie and Wong (1993) noted in a UK sample that the majority of 
buy-outs (70.6 percent) remained privately owned seven years after buy-outs but that the greatest 
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increase in exit occurs in years 3 to 5 after buy-out. Nevertheless a significant minority do return 
to public ownership. 
Major differences have been identified in UK buy-out exit patterns reflecting size distributions, 
the larger the buy-out the greater the probability of exit. Longevity may also be related to the 
original source of buy-out, those from privatisation or an overseas divestor having significantly 
different exit patterns than all buy-outs (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie, 1992). However this disparity 
may reflect the non-homogeneity of buy-out types and the identification of the specific elements 
of available governance structures and the differing contingent factors affecting buy-outs may 
provide some further explanation (Wright, Robbie, Starkey, Thompson 1994). This may involve 
differences of managerial, and financial and competitive and other market forces. 
It may be that buy-outs have such different individual characteristics that varying patterns of 
realisation and longevity can be expected. For instance Williamson (1988) in providing an initial 
contingency approach argues that buy-outs with high leverage are most suitable for firms in 
mature sectors with significant free cash flow and or non-spccific assets which can be sold off to 
pay down debt if necessary. In contrast buy-outs with lower amounts of leverage, higher 
incumbent management stakes and greater venture capital involvement in the provision of quasi- 
equity will be most suitable for buy-outs where free cash flow is relatively low, investment needs 
are relatively high, and assets are more specific. Lehn, Netter and Poulson (1990) rind that LBOs 
occur in industries that are faced with slower growth prospects and R and D expense. Easterwood 
et al (1989) note that firm-levcl factors as well as industry factors are important. This is supported 
by Ambrose and Winters (1992) who found only statistically weak non parametric tests supporting 
an industry effect, concluding that there is a need to address firm specific factors (such as 
management or operating inefficiencies) in analysing buy-outs. 
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Furthermore the life cycle of buy-outs must be seen in relation to more general theories of the 
firm life cycle. The most important company related characteristics which are likely to influence 
the longevity of a given organsiational form concern rapidly changing markets, a fast growing 
company concentrating markets where it is necessary to have sufficiently large critical mass to 
survive and relatively high rates of merger activity (see eg Mueller 1988 for a review of the 
literature). The length and nature of life cycle stages varies considerably both between industries 
and between firms in different industries (cg Gort and Kepplcr 1982). While U. S. literature (eg 
Jensen 1991, Easterwood et al 1989, Hall 1989) has stressed the advantages of buy-outs in mature 
stable industries, UK and European experience (eg Chiplin et al 1992, Initiative Europe/CMBOR 
1992) has been more varied allowing buy-outs to occur in less stable circumstances. 
Even however when the particular circumstances of the sector and the firms within the industry 
have been considered, the initial buy-out structure may not be necessarily the best for medium 
and long term health of the company. For instance benefits from the buy-out may come quickly 
from removal of constraints on investment policies, new product developments, appropriate 
managerial structures imposed by private sector parents (Jones 1992, Wright and Coyne 1985, 
Singh 1990) and the greater degrees of such constraints in the case of former public sector 
divisions (Wright et al 1992). In the medium term new constraints may arise under the new 
ownership and some form of exit may be required to allow the company to develop and in some 
cases to survive (Green and Berry 1991). Additional funds required for expansion may involve 
renegotiation of the overall buy-out equity structure producing new tensions between management 
and the venture capitalists. 
0i) Methods of Realisation 
Longevity must also be seen in terms of the main exit options available: sale to a third party; sale 
to the management and/or employees; public quotation on the Stock Exchange; and liquidation 
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although various forms of financial restructuring may be possible to ensure management remain 
independent but capital gain is realised (Table 2.4). 
TABLE 2.4: FORMS OF EXIT FROM A BUY-OUT 
Forms of Exit Investors Affected Extent 
Liquidation Management, financiers Full 
Trade sale (Acquisition by an 
external group) 
Management, financiers Generally 
full 
Repayment of debt Financiers Full/partial 
Repurchase or redemption of 
shares 
Financiers Full/partial 
Private placing of shares Financiers Full/partial 
Internal share market (used in 
larger employee buy-out) 
Difficult for management or financiers 
to make substantial disposals 
Partial 
Stock market flotation Management, financiers Full/partial 
Management Buy-in Management, financiers Full/partial 
Second buy-out Management, financiers Full/partial 
-ý; 
Dital restructuring pit  Management, financiers Full/parti 
Ibus the latter may include the repurchase or redemption of shares; capital restructuring or 
releveraging; repayment of debt; or a second buy-out. Shares traded on an internal share market i 
in an employee buy-out additionally enable independence to be retained while a management buy- 
in will ensure the company remains private. Liquidation may be on a voluntary basis and reflect 
a satisfactory exit but, more commonly, will be forced. 
A major problem may exist where management do not want to exit or are unable to because of 
poor performance or lack of willing buyers. Indeed a significant minority do not express an I exit 
intention at all (cg Taylor and Hooper 1989), implying a preferred'mode of e3dt through 
succession while several studies have shown a high percentage of buy-outs'not'exiting- eg 70 to 
75 percent after six years in Houlden (1990). Indeed such behaviour may imply that the motives 
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of those responding in surveys such as Taylor and Hooper and Wright, Thompson, Robbie (1992) 
do not match those of the venture capitalists. 
Prospects for rcalisation may, of course, not conform to original expectations by producing 
subsequent performance which falls between the successful exit and the receivership exit. Ruhnka, 
Feldman and Dean (1992) have described the phenomenon of the 'living dead' investments, 
typically mid to later stage venture capital investments that are economically self sustaining but 
fail to achieve levels of sales growth or profitability necessary to produce attractive final rates of 
return or exit opportunities for their venture capital investors, ic a failure of investor expectations 
rather than outright economic failure of the venture. 
Flotation (IPO) normally allows the equity backers to realise some of their investment, managers 
to reduce their personal indebtedness, encourages the introduction of employee stock option 
schemes, enhances the status of the company, avoids possible conflict from locked in minority 
shareholders and raises more equity to fund investment or acquisitions (Bradley-Jones and Hussey 
1985, Wright, Robbie and Coyne 1987, Green and Berry 1991). Flotation provides an opportunity 
to significantly alter the governance of privately held firms (Singh 1990) and also enables 
managers to retain some form of independence which may be lost on sale to a third party. For 
large successful LBOs, the firm's investors, particularly managers who own large amounts of the 
firm's equity, gain access to public capital markets which offer liquidity and diversification of assets 
(Palepu 1990). 
Since 1987 trade sales (sale to another corporate entity) have increasingly outstripped flotations 
as the principle exit route for buy-out investors (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992) coming to 
prominence because of high merger and acquisition activity generally (Hughes, 1989; Benzie, 
1989), as well as offering managers and investors the possibility of total realization of equity 
holdings frequently at a higher P/E ratio than could be achieved through flotation. It may also 
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allow managers to sever connections with the firm, pursue a further entrepreneurial activity (for 
instance a buy-in) or retire. They may not wish to enter into equity partnerships or management 
contract with other unknown parties. If management wish to remain, they may be able to obtain 
some cash, an equity stake in the new parent and an attractive service contract. The trade sale 
may thereby represent a beneficial career move to a bigger company although the idea of this may 
not have been immediately acceptable to management at the time of buy-out which would in 
retrospect have been a brief entrepreneurial diversion in a long-term pattern of working for 
someone else. 
Receivership is an extreme form of realisation but important in periods of high interest rates and 
recessionary conditions (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). The issues of bankruptcy have to be seen 
within both business failure generally and buy-outs in particular and may be linked to both 
internal and external factors. Research into small business failure indicate the relative importance 
of internal issues such as quality and structure of management, behavioural aspects, inadequacy 
of accounting information systems, manipulation of published financial statements and gearing as 
opposed to external factors such as high interest rates, recession, inflation and unemployment (see 
eg Peterson, Kozmetsky and Ridgway (1983), Argenti (1976), Berryman (1983), Storey, Keasey, 
Watson and Wynarczyk (1987) with reviews of the evidence provided by Keasey and Watson 
(1991) and Hall and Young (1990). 
In the case of buy-outs, the superior forms of control devices and the extensive due diligence 
carried out prior to the. transaction could, be expected to reduce the chances of failure. In 
particular the majority of internal reasons for failure could expected to have a much lower level 
of influence. However reviews of UK buy-out experience cited above and others in the US (eg 
Jensen (1991) and Kaplan and Stein (1990), show a higher rate of bankruptcies at the end of the 
1980s than during the early and rhid 1980s raising questions as to whether the buy-out form itself 
is flawed or whether there were particular circumstances uch as deal over pricing during the late 
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1980s which brought this about. This in itself raises questions as to the quality of analysis and 
judgment used by the buy-out investors who are supposed to be bringing superior quality of 
control to the target company and whether deals were driven more by the high fees generated 
by the lead investors and service contracts negotiated rather than rational financial analysis. 
Indeed Bruner and Eades (1992) demonstrated that tests of capital adequacy would only have 
predicted, under extremely optimistic expectations, that the Revco buy-out's financial obligations 
would have been manageable. Issues may also be raised as to whether the initial drive for 
efficiency after a buy-out reduces the amount of slack so much that when adverse conditions 
arrive there is little downwards protection available. In some cases expected improvements in 
operating efficiency and management may not materialise and short term gains may have been 
at the expense of long term efficiency. Such arguments must clearly not obscure the practical 
difficulties which are experienced generally in period of economic recession and high interest rates 
which may have a disproportionately high impact on more highly leveraged companies and the 
ability of well controlled companies, as described in Jensen (1986), to be re-organised earlier than 
other companies, consequently being more likely to preserve significant elements of value. 
In practice many buy-outs lie between the highly successful and the failures, where the venture 
capitalist is unable to engineer realisation at a sufficiently attractive multiple of original equity. 
In such cases, invcstee companies can be seen normally to be fulfilling their debt contracts but 
failing in the equity contract as would be expected under Agency Theory. In such cases major 
issues arise as to how what may be differing aims of management and investors can be met (see 
cg Ruhnka ct al 1992 in terms of venture capital). 
2.7 Conclusions 
Ibis Chapter has examined key issues which arise in the management buy-in process with 
particular reference to corporate restructuring, entrepreneurial issues, identification of a target 
company, deal completion and post transaction issues including performance, turnaround and the 
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life cycle. A wide range of restructuring opportunities has been seen to exist including divestments 
from quoted companies and the sale of private companies. The vendor's motivation for sale can 
vary but frequently reflects lack of profitability of the company, a change in group core activities 
or succession issues. Management in the buy-out has been able to engineer an opportunity to 
purchase, and in so doing has become much more entrepreneurially minded. The review of buy- 
out performance illustrated how the benefits to be expected from corporate restructuring (agency 
cost reductions, equity incentives, debt bonding) when combined with more entrepreneurial 
actions result in major operating efficiency benefits, at least in the short to medium term. Key 
long term issues concerning the buy-out's life cycle show contrasting view points. 
Much of the discussion, however, has been in terms of the management buy-out, given the lack 
of previous specific management buy-in studies although many issues raised in the critical analysis 
of the literature can also be applied in different ways to buy-ins. Such aspects include the type 
of entrepreneur, the T6am's previous entrepreneurial experience, the search and identification 
of target companies, the role of the incubator and the way in which a turnaround can be achieved. 
This raises further issues as to whether different performance and life cycle characteristics can be 
expected in buy-ins. Chapter 3 develops this further by contrasting management buy-outs and buy- 
ins in the light of the discussion in this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MANAGEMENT BUY-INS IN RELATION TO BUY-OUTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has raised issues relating to management buy-ins in five main areas: the restructuring 
opportunity (2.2), the Team Leader and his Team (2.3), infrastructure aspects of deal search and 
completion (2.4), deal completion (2.5) and post transaction issues (2.6). The recent nature of 
management buy-ins, as shown in the absence of any previous major buy-in studies, has meant that 
by necessity examination of literature in Chapter 2 has only rarely been able to refer specifically 
to management buy-ins. Instead reference has been made to studies in fields where issues are 
considered to have been relevant as well as to specific studies of management and leveraged buy- 
outs and venture formation. 
However the crux of this thesis is the distinctiveness of the management buy-in as a separate 
corporate restructuring device and in particular the identification of characteristics which are 
significantly different from those of management buy-outs. Ibis Chapter extends the discussion 
and evidence presented in Chapter 2 through further examination of the management buy-in 
process to show areas of possible difference. These are placed within a framework covering 
entrepreneurial, personal and motivational backgrounds, target company characteristics, search 
and identification, deal completion and post transaction issues. Propositions and hypotheses 
concerning these differences are derived. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates important influences in the overall buy-in process. Ibc Team Leader can be 
expected to display entrepreneurial characteristics (3.2); he may also have had entrepreneurial 
rather than just managerial experience through the ownership of a venture (such as a buy-out). 
His motivation will reflect the so'cio-demographic and psychological factors described in Chapter 
2.3, the latter including need for achievement as well as push and pull factors. The vendor's 
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motivation and willingness to sell (3.3) may derive from several reasons and will have an impact 
on how long the process takes and the final completion price. Target identification will involve 
consideration of the characteristics of the target company (3.4) as well as search for the company 
including the use of networks and the role of incubators. Deal completion (3.6) will involve 
critical elements of financial structuring including equity incentives and debt bonding. Following 
the buy-in, management may introduce changes which reflect efficiency arguments of corporate 
restructuring, the strategic and operating considerations of turnaround and the entrepreneur's 
innovative behaviour (3.7). Actions will influence performance which may be affected by newly 
developing or unforeseen problem areas as well as other specific factors including Agency Cost 
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reductions. In the longer term consideration is given to the Life Cycle of the target company. 
Differences between management buy-outs and buy-ins are shown in Figure 3.2 
3.2 Entrepreneurial Influences on Management Buy-outs and Buy-ins 
(a) General Considerations 
Buy-out transactions have been seen to blend the features of corporate restructuring with an 
emerging degree of general entrepreneurial skills which are required when management take 
control of a company, are no longer responsible to normally distant shareholders who had been 
prepared to accept the risk of management actions on a more remote basis and have to introduce 
innovative actions to further the business. 
At the same time management must be seen in an entrepreneurial setting. Entrepreneurship 
literature, eg Carland et al (1984), Webster (1977), has differentiated entrepreneurs from small 
business persons. As a capable executive the entrepreneur must possess the psychological and 
sociological characteristics combined with the technical and managerial skills to effectively manage 
the organisation, to provide an adequate return to the stock holders and provide a future 
direction for the firm (Sexton and Bowman 1985, p 138). Leibenstein (1968) discriminated 
between routine entrepreneurship (really a type of management) operating in well established and 
clearly dcrined markets and N-entrepreneurship where not all markets may exist or operate 
perfectly, the entrepreneur filling in for market deficiency. Litzinger (1965) sees entrepreneurs 
as being goal and action orientated compared to managers who carry out policies and procedures 
in achieving their goals and that entrepreneurship is a phenomenon which comes under the wider 
aspects of leadership. Schumpeter (1934) saw the entrepreneur as being expert in the use of 
intuition and strategy. Table 2.3 illustrated entrepreneurial characteristics which had been 
identified as assuming risk associated with uncertainty, supplying financial capital, acting as 
innovator, decision maker, industrial leader, -manager or superintendent, org'aniser and'co- 
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ordinator of economic resources, owner of enterprise, employer of factors of production, 
contractor, arbitrageur and allocator of resources among alternative uses. 
Such qualities may first be seen in the Team Leader of the management buy-out who creates a 
new organisational and ownership form within Schumpeter's wider definition of entrepreneurship 
(1943) which includes "new forms of industrial organisation that capitalist enterprise creates". The 
buy-out process in itself involves the formation of a new company to take over some, but not 
necessarily all, the assets of a company or division and does so most probably in a new 
combination. In a 'classical'view of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs notice opportunities, act, and 
create new hierarchies or ventures to organise transactions and, if successful, reap profits from 
their transactions (Jones and Butler 1992). Indeed the actual act of carrying out a management 
buy-out rather than subsequent actions has been seen to be entrepreneurial (Green and Berry 
1991). 
In transferring to the role of buy-out manager, the former executive will move from a managerial 
function which he has been performing under divisional or central organisational control to one 
where as a principal he has a totally different level of strategic control as well as responsibilities 
for creating initiatives to develop the company. Previously the company's organisation structure 
may not have allowed for significant internal corporate entrepreneurship. The Team Leader 
identifies new opportunities, co-ordinates the necessary inputs, organises the raising of capital and 
accepts a high degree of personal, social and financial risk should the venture prove to be 
unsuccessful. In some buy-outs, the entrepreneurial edge may need to come from a 'leading light' 
(Wright and Coyne 1985). 
Examination of the perceived nature of management buy-outs and buy-ins suggests that different 
levels of entrepreneurial functions may be required in the two forms. Tbrough leaving his previous 
employment, the buy-in Team Leader has assumed a break in the more traditional entrepreneurial 
sense. He is to cope with an entirely new combination of factors whereas the buy-out Team 
Leader is still operating with a lot of familiar factors. The Buy-in Team Leader is not just reacting 
to corporate restructuring opportunities but helping to create them. Both risk and uncertainty may 
be seen as being higher given the nature of the move and the asymmetric information available 
on the company. The management buy-in Team Leader, in contrast to the buy-out, is divorced 
from the previous structure of the company and the inhibitions and set ways that may have existed 
before. He brings in a fresh approach with a vision for the future. He shows his entrepreneurial 
qualities through introducing innovation to the main functions of the target company and re- 
organising the major factors of production within it to produce new combinations. Ibis behaviour 
can be seen as producing a special entrepreneurial profit which did not exist under previous 
ownership. Additionally the innovations required to achieve a turnaround (should that be 
required) and produce profitable growth are likely to be considerably greater. As in McLelland's 
scheme the buy-in Team Leader is the person who organises the firm and or increases its 
productive potential. 
(b) The Team 
As described in 3.2 major differences can be expected in any ranking of relative entrepreneurial 
strengths between buy-out and buy-in Team Leaders with the buy-out Team Leader being 
relatively less entrepreneurial in motivation and outlook, that of the buy-out Team Leader 
probably having been latent before. In the management buy-out the core Team will have been 
in existence for some time with normally all the executive directors of the board and senior 
management remaining. Consequently buy-out teams can be expected to be reasonably large. In 
contrast the buy-in team is smaller, partially relying on skills which there may be in the target 
company. The cohesiveness of a buy-in team may be threatened if there are too many members. 
Consequently there are likely to be skills gap within the team itself. 
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FIGURE 12: POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
Factor Management Buy-outs Management Buy-ins 
1. The Team 
*Entrepreneurial Nature of Managers Previously latent Relatively high 
*Team's Experience of Working together Yes Majority will have at some time 
, 
oManagerial skills gap Unlikely, but could be weak members Highly possible- cg Finance 
oSize On average 4-6 Small relative to company size 
eManagerial Experience Existing MD/GM plus team General plus specialist 
2. Personal Background 
*Previous ownership of business Unlikely Minority- eg mbo experience 
*Relocation Unlikely unless drastic cost saving Minority 
*Minority groups In line with population distributions Possible 
*Education Mixed University/professional, a few self starters 
*Age Average age distributions Mid career break 
*Parental Business Ownership Possible Significant minority 
3. Ttam Motivation 
*Desire to realise perceived opportunity Once in a lifetime opportunity Various options available 
*Financial gain Moderate Moderate-High 
*Build successful organisation Moderate Highly important 
*Develop own strategy Moderate-High Highly important 
*Need for Achievement Low to medium High 
eOpportunist Minority Majority 
*Craftsman Majority Significant minority 
*Displaced Significant influence Insignificant Influence 
4. Vendor Motivation 
eChange In Core Activities High High 
*Succession Issues High High, question of calibre of incumbent 
Mgt 
*Lack of Profitability Moderate High 
S. Target Company 
*Maturity of sector High Moderate-high 
*Growth prospects Low-moderate Good 
*New product development Low-moderate Moderatc-high 
,, 
Technology LOW Low-moderatc 
*Cash Flow Strongly positive Moderate- expansion, acquisition needs 
*Turnaround potential LAyw-moderate Modcratc-high 
6. Starch and Identification 
*Use of formal networks Yes Informal extensive until target identified 
eLong Period of Search None assumed Yes 
*Failed bid attempts No Highly likely 
*Problems of Information Assymetcry No Considerable 
7. Deal Completion 
oEntry Price High PE ratio Moderate PE ratio 
*Initial Leverage High Moderate, reflecting risk factors 
oHigh Management Contribution Moderate Yes 
elnoentive of Equity Ownership High High 
oUse of Ratchets Significant minority Extensive 
*Debt Bonding Yes High 
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L Post Transaction Issues 
(a) Performance 
*Pcrformance Improvcmcnts 
oProblcm Areas 
(b) Actions 
*Working Capital controls 
*Rxed assct changcs 
*Acquisition Activity 
*Marketing and Product Changes 
*Recruitment of Specialists 
eResignation of Team Members 
(c) Governance 
*Monitoring 
*Board Composition 
(d) Llfe Cycle 
olife cycle period 
*Ukelihood of failure 
Significant in short term, questionable Significant in medium and long term, but 
in longer term may not be immediate 
General economic, financial Asymmetric information, higher degree of 
influences, possible over-leverage; risk may make cqx)sed to economic and 
insider information reduces risk of financial uncertainties, over-leverage, 
over payment 
. 
overpaying 
General moderate Improvement 
Moderate changes, some unbundling, 
more cost effective investment 
Moderate, but increases after float 
General changes 
Frequently not necessary 
Low probability 
Monthly reporting 
Shareholders board rights implies 
hands-on approach but hands-off in 
practice in many cases 
Significant changes 
Sell-off surplus assets, but also 
investment for efficiency 
Significant 
Significant 
Needed to fill skill gaps 
Reasonable probability depending on 
extent of having worked together 
Extensive 
"Hands-oh" approach, direct board 
representation 
Mixed depending on product, size, 
source, venture capitalist, etc 
Low, proven company and 
management 
Relatively long to take advantage of 
result of turnaround, potential growth 
and innovative actions 
High, depending on suitability of 
management, asymmetric information, 
due diligence 
The longer term stability of any team will depend on the working relationships which have 
developed and the recognition and ability to cope with a different range of strengths and 
weaknesses of individual members. In the buy-out such individual recognition and the ability to 
work together coherently and purposefully is acknowledged and proven. In the buy-in risks would 
appear to be reduced if members have worked together currently or recently. Nevertheless this 
1 
may not be feasible and there may be a significant number of cases where Teams have not worked 
together before but have had some other type of relationship. 
Buy-ins present different problems in that the formation of an appropriate team may be difficult 
in the first place: following completion gaps may bccostly to fill because of the costs involved in 
injecting these new skills, a position which may be aggravated by voluntary or forced resignations 
of incumbent management. The risk is further increased should the team not have had experience 
of working together before; this contrasts with the management buy-out . where the . team is in situ. 
Incubators provide'thc setting which teams can be formed (Cooper and Dunkelburg 1986) with 
126 ý 
many founding teams frequently meeting in the incubator (Cooper 1985). This gives rise to the 
first proposition: 
(Pl) Teams will be smaller than in buy-outs with Team Leaders having a typically well 
rounded General Management background with the Number Two adding specialist skills 
but the small number in the Team resulting in initial skills gaps. Most Team members will 
have known each other before. 
(c) Personal Background 
While features of the personal characteristics of buy-out Teams are likely to reflect general 
executive demographics, management buy-in Teams may be different, given the influence of 
entrepreneurial factors discussed in 2.3. In particular Management buy-in opportunities may be 
seen to be attractive to both successful mid career executives and to entrepreneurs who have sold 
their first venture or buy-out. Particular issues have been seen to concern the age at which the 
entrepreneurial decision is taken, previous entrepreneurial experience, location, and educational 
and parental background. 
As Wright and Coyne (1985) indicate, buy-outs would be expected at a later stage (reflecting 
normal career patterns periods) and be catalysed by a special set of circumstances which results 
in the owner deciding to sell and thereby enabling the buy-out to take place. In the case of the 
buy-in, the move by the Team Leader may occur before he has been Chief Executive or General 
Manager of a company or Division (subject to his ability to succeed in the venture capital 
screening process) but, given the smaller team, managers may have to provide a proportionately 
higher personal equity contribution; the necessary accumulation of personal wealth to be able to 
do this could mean that the Team's finance is not available until a comparatively later age. 
Liles (1974) referred to the free-choice age period when employees may be most likely to seek 
to establish a new venture. Hunt and Colins (1983) saw many becoming entrepreneurs in their 
127 
mid 30's, the period from the age of 25 to 40 years old being one of rethinking for many managers 
in larger companies. Management buy-ins and new ventures are therefore likely to be different 
from buy-outs. A further proposition can be raised: 
P2 Many buy-in Team Leaders will be attempting the buy-in as part of a mid-career 
change in what has been a relatively stable employment background; 
Chapters 2.3.3 illustrated that entrepreneurs have a high likelihood of starting several ventures 
during their life and hence are most likely to have previous experience of business ownership. 
Having engaged in an entrepreneurial act, many will seek another entrepreneurial activity 
(Ronstadt 1988) even should the earlier venture may have failed. Buy-in managers may have had 
such experience through having participated in an earlier buy-out which had been realised or 
(perhaps less likely) through having started an enterprise and harvested it at a later stage. With 
many new enterprises being essentially small in size during the early stages, there is a greater 
likelihood that they took place while the entrepreneur was relatively young, ie at an early stage 
of the managerial career. Thus 
(P3) A significant minority of Team Leaders will be involved in at least their second major 
entrepreneurial experience of business ownership or will have tried to arrange a 
management buy-out which did not take place; 
Many entrepreneurs start businesses near their incubators and homes (Cooper and Dunkelberg 
1986). Doing so enables them to draw upon personal contacts and market knowledge, start part 
time and results also in less family disruption. Such views are supported by eg Birley (1985) and 
Hakim (1988). Clearly in management buy-outs changes in locations are unlikely unless necessary 
to reduce the company's cost base. The supply of appropriate target company for a buy-in may 
however be limited in the near locality and a move to another region may be necessary. However 
this will not in itself result in an overall change in regional industrial distributions. Consequently 
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P4 Unlike buy-outs a minority of buy-ins will involve Team relocation to another region; 
and 
HI The regional distribution of buy-ins will not be significantly different from those of 
buy-outs. 
Certain minority groups have been seen to have an important influence on the development of 
entrepreneurship. Low and MacMillan (1988) noted the congruence between ideological 
constraints and economic behaviour if entrepreneurship is to flourish. Hagen (1960) referred to 
the disadvantaged minorities seeking to redress social grievances. Existing minority groupings will 
remain in buy-outs while buy-ins may give more opportunities for minority groupings. 
Educational background may also influence entrepreneurship and the type of venture established. 
Brockhaus (1982) noted that different stages of development requires different mixes of 
entrepreneurial and administrative abilities and hence different levels of educational background. 
However the influence of education has produced research with quite varying implications (see 
4.5) although it is likely that the education influences on buy-ins and new ventures are likely to 
be similar. It may be that the venture capital screening process favours entrepreneurs with 
particular backgrounds. Thus 
(P5) Buy-in managers will typically be well qualified in terms of professional qualifications 
and university education ýýI"t -ýý "ýýI". .I 
Parental background has ý also been seen to be an important contributory factor towards the 
development of entrepreneurs, providing a role model from early age for budding entrepreneurs 
to focus on. Buy-in Team Leaders are more likely to reflect this than buy-out Team Leaders. 
- 
(P6) A significant minority of buy-in Team Leaders have parents who were small business 
owners. C% 
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(d) Team Motivation 
Management's motivation is clearly a highly significant factor in both buy-out and buy-in 
processes. McLelland (1962) in explaining the Need for Achievement (n-Ach) theory stressed the 
personal responsibility for finding solutions to problems, moderately challenging achievement 
goals, taking calculated risks, and wanting concrete feedback concerning performance. The desire 
to do the kind of work which the entrepreneur has always wanted to is likely to be greater in the 
management buy-in than buy-out. The buy-in manager is likely to have seen an existing 
opportunity (perhaps with a specific market or product) which can be more fully exploited while 
the buy-out manager will take advantage of what may be a once in a lifetime opportunity; this 
is more likely to be made known to him rather than creating the opportunity himself, In the case 
of the management buy-in, the Team Leader will have taken the original initiative although this 
will have to coincide with a decision by the vendor to sell or subsequent persuasion to do so. 
In some cases the buy-out manager may be seen to have been essentially defensive in his attitude, 
responding to an initiative made by the former owner of the company or sometimes initiating the 
buy-out but only after threat of receivership, redundancy or a new owner had become evident 
(Wright and Coyne 1985). Storey and Jones (1987) and Hamilton (1989) have noted that 
employment loss and redundancies and plant closures leads to self employment and new firm 
formation. Cooper and Dunkelberg (1986) expected more entrepreneurial owners, notably starters 
and to some extent purchasers of businesses to be from organisations where there had been 
strong negative pushes. Buy-ins may thus be subject to 'push' factors but these are hypothcsised 
as being of comparatively low" importance, the entrepreneur/manager actively looking for a 
suitable opportunity. While buy-outs may give rise to incumbent managers being able to develop 
their own strategy (rather than being influenced 
- 
by 
-1 existing corporate guidelines) buy-in 
entrepreneurs may be expected to be more proactive in their desire to develop their own strategy 
and to build a successful organisation. Financial motivation will be a significant influence but may 
be seen to be higher in the case of buy-ins. Tbc following propositions are raised: 
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(P7) Management buy-in Team Leaders can be seen as being more pro-active than MBO 
Chief Executives and have a relatively high Need for Achievement. In particular MBI 
motivation can be expected to be little influenced by push factors. Buy-in managers are 
likely to be seeking to develop their personal long term goals rather than showing 
dissatisfaction with their previous employment; 
(P8) Buy-in implies a considerable personal financial risk which will be reflected in 
relatively high pecuniary influences in the Team Leader's motivation; and 
(P9) Given the basic characteristics of Team Leaders hypothesised earlier, they can be 
seen as being mainly 'opportunist' in nature although there are likely to be some 
'craftsmen'. The presence of buy-in managers principally representing 'push' factors is seen 
as unlikely. In contrast buy-out managers are seen as less opportunist and more likely to 
be influenced by 'push' factors. 
3.3 Vendor Motivation 
Corporate restructuring may arise'as a result of an internal decision by a parent to divest 
reflecting varying degrees of necessity such as an unwanted part of a recent acquisition, change 
in corporate strategy, lack of profitability, need of parent to raise cash- or a hostile set of 
circumstances such as an unwanted external bid for the company (see Chapters 2.3,2.4). For 
companies in private ownership further reasons for restructuring could be that no family successor 
is available. Political changes have brought major restructuring to the public sector involving theý 
sale of activities and the opening up of competition to others. Additionally under performing 
quoted companies were subject to action by predators who saw the potential for improvement by 
reforming the company, reducing overheads and using more leveraged financing structures 
(Chapter 2.5). 
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In the subsequent rc-organisation, the vendor may not wish to sell to incumbent management who 
may be considered too weak in terms of managerial skills and hence ability to attract. 
Management may not meet price expectations raising suspicions that they are using available 
information to artificially depress the price but possess inside information of. more positive factors. 
Buy-ins may be a more favourable outcome providing stronger management, more attractive 
pricing and bypassing dangers of manipulation of inside information. 
Additional considerations may apply in the sale of privately owned companies. A highly 
entrepreneurial vendor may be keen to retain the company in private ownership but may not have 
created a strong entrepreneurial succession. Vendor hopes for the longer term independence may 
rely upon the introduction of new management of the correct calibre from outside who can 
replicate the leadership and entrepreneurial characteristics of the founder or retiring private 
owner. He may also want a continuing relationship. Consequently 
(H2) Sources of private buy-ins are significantly different from buy-outs; and 
(P10) The vendor's motivation to sell the business will be strongly related to change in 
core activities and in the case of private vendors succession issues with poor profitability 
being important in both privately owned sales and divestments. 
3.4 The Target Company 
Buy-outs especially in the United States have been seen as coming from mature sectors of the 
economy against a stable low growth background in industries which have substantial and 
predictable cash generative characteristics frequently associated with low levels of R&D 
requirements (eg Easterwood at al 1989, Lehn et al 1.990) and where previous financial 
performance may not have been inspiring. As the reasons for such characteristics can be 
ascertained, a limited degree of post buy-out reorganisation would be necessary to achieve more 
organisational efficiency by way of cost saving and improved cash flow and the probability of 
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unexpected problems emerging to threaten the future existing profitability of the new company 
seen as low. Consequently buy-outs may not be appropriate for industries with rapidly changing 
technology, fast growing industries where there is the threat of new entrants, high supplier or 
buyer powers, risk of technological obsolescence or overcapacity resulting from industry level 
factors not under managerial control. 
Management buy-in motivation (3.2) has been seen to be more orientated towards. building a 
successful business, achieving growth and applying skills in a more innovative manner. Buy-ins may 
therefore be in a less mature industrial sector than the buy-out, have better growth prospects but 
may probably involve more new product development. I'liere may be significant cash requirements 
to allow for both organic growth and acquisitions. Consequently 
(M) Industrial activities of private buy-ins are significantly different from buy-outs; and 
(P11) Company characteristics will differ from those of buy-outs by having potentially 
significant cash requirements, being in a less mature but more growth orientated sector 
and involving products where there is higher technology risk. 
A further aspect concerns the turnaround potential of the two types of transaction with diverging 
degrees of action being taken in post transaction management. While buy-outs may take place in 
a significant number of loss making and undcr-performing companies (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie, 
1992) the problems giving rise to this unsatisfactory position can be carefully assessed by 
management and their backers and the turnround potential effectively underwritten. In the case 
of management buy-ins, the need to add value to the company and benefit from the superior 
management skills seen in the new management team imply a high turnaround probability factor. 
In many cases the causes of the target's previous under-performance may be the result of previous 
weak management (Batchelor 1987). Thus 
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P12 A major motivation for purchase of a particular target is the possibility for achieving 
a turnaround. 
3.5 Search and Identirication 
Entrepreneurship theory suggests that existing industrial knowledge, proximity to home and the 
use of informal networks are important considerations in the search for a venture. Entrepreneurs 
may be particularly influenced by their previous employer- eg in terms of wanting to start up in 
a similar (and competitive) capacity or formulating an idea as a result of this work. Buy-out and 
buy-in teams may be expected to have different search and identification processes. In a buy-out 
there is essentially only one buy-out opportunity which will be identified depending on the 
vendor's motivation for selling. As soon as this is known the Team may then progress directly to 
formal advice networks. Buy-ins are different in that a target company has to be identified and 
its availability for sale ascertained. Completion success is not guaranteed given that hit is followed 
by detailed negotiations and due diligence; this may raise further problems including pricing 
resulting in non completion and the start of the process again, the potential costs of search being 
high. 
While sophisticated search methods are available nowadays, Team Leaders may not be able to 
take advantage of these. It is possible that informal and casual methods will be used in the initial 
identification methods, implying a relatively long period of search. The chances of selecting a 
company using personal identification methods will be higher when the company is in the same 
sector and a member of the team has some knowledge of it (eg competitor, customer). At this 
point more formal advice will be taken, professional advisers appointed and a venture capitalist 
sought. The failure to access information concerning availability of target companies may result 
in major search inefficiencies. A large problem may exits in matching Teams with appropriate 
target companies. 
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The following propositions may be raised: 
(P13) Ile period required to complete a buy-in will be significantly longer than in buy- 
outs and may well involve failed attempts for other targets; 
(P14) The target company is likely to be in the same sector as the Team Leader's existing 
company; consequently personal knowledge and the use of informal rather than formal 
networks will prove more important elements in target identification than more 
sophisticated methods of company search; and 
(P15) Unlike many US LBOs the Team will be expected by institutions to identify the 
target. 
3.6 Deal Completion 
In both buy-outs and buy-ins management can be expected to have a high incentive of equity 
ownership enhancing entrepreneurial actions, failure to perform resulting in the possibility of 
substantial personal financial loss. The fortunes of the individual are aligned with those of the 
company. However differences in financial structuring can be postulated. 
The overall stability of the buy-out company (market position, established profitability and cash 
flow record, full disclosure of information, low probability of "skeleton in the cupboard" problems) 
implies a lower degree of risk and higher level of initial leverage. Despite this higher proportion 
of institutional equity in the management buy-in financing structure (in. 
-terms of both the 
institutional equity share and the overall debt: equity ratio), the effect of debt on managerial 
incentive will be planned by the financial backers to be at least as high to management in the buy- 
in. There will remain a high commitment to servicing significant levels of external debt and quasi- 
equity finance. 
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This apparently higher degree of risk will also be reflected in the price which the buy-in team is 
prepared to pay com[pared to a buy-out. With higher uncertainties, despite the buy-in Team's 
view that they can significantly improve performance, the venture capital backers will want to 
decrease the risk factors by paying as low a price as possible and not being prepared to bid on 
the same scale as incumbent management. The following hypothesis can therefore be raised: 
(H4) Management buy-ins will have lower leverage, lower entry PE ratios and prices than 
management buy-outs. 
Given the different nature of the financial projections which can be made during the deal 
appraisal period and the probability of management being more optimistic than their financial 
backer, venture capitalists will seek equity incentive devices which give management set targets 
and limit their own downwards risk. The following proposition is suggested: 
(P16) The need to provide incentives to management will lead to extensive use of ratchets 
to enhance the Team's equity position. 
3.7 Post Transaction Issues 
(a) Performance Improvements 
The development of extensive corporate restructuring was justified on the grounds of subsequent 
performance improvements from Agency Cost reduction. Replacement of distant shareholders by 
a combination of management and buy-out organisations or venture capital 
- 
firms aligned 
managerial and shareholder interests. New non-management principals had direct access to 
monitoring and control functions and were able to input to the company in a way which had not 
been possible before. Shorter distance'between ownership and control reduced agency costs and 
hence improved performance (eg Fama and Jensen 1982) although Sahlman (1990) has pointed 
out the significant agency costs involved in the providers of funds to Yenture capital partnerships 
in monitoring the investments made by the venture capitalists on their behalf. Agency cost 
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reductions were particularly high for companies which de-listed from the stock market and were 
thus not subject to costly information and regulatory provisions. 
In both buy-outs and buy-ins the incentive of personal equitj ownership can be expected to make 
management introduce measures to improve corporate efficiency while the need to repay debt 
puts'pressure on management to run the company efficiently with particular emphasis on 
significant cash generation. Investment plans with negative net free cash flow would be abandoned 
and excessive administrative, managerial and operating costs eradicated. The resultant 
improvement in efficiency would wipe out organisational slack. 
In the short term'buy-out managers are able to quickly-improve efficiency but may not be able 
to provide a continuing rate of improvement beyond in the medium term when initial ideas have 
been thoroughly tried. In the longer term dangers exist in that as the company grows larger and 
the initial entrepreneurial impetus is left behind, 'managemea benefits from the initial 
improvement in performance. A different behavioural pattern may then set in where innovation 
is not so pronounced and inefficiencies allowed to develop. Additionally few individuals are able 
to sustain the entrepreneurial attitude across their careers (Schumpeter 1934). 
Such considerations apply generally to both buy-outs and buy-ins but in the latter there may be 
higher monitoring costs involved given the higher uncertainties and risks hypothesised. 'In the case 
of buy-ins of privately owned companies there is also the danger that the agency costs would be 
higher than in previous total ownership by an entrepreneurial founder., However while the Agency 
Cost argument can be seen to be important, the high costs of information asymmetry encountered 
by both management and the venture capital sponsor's may not lead to the speed of initial 
improvements which could be expected in management buy-outs; indicating that the phasing of 
performance improvements may be different. 
; -. \; y 
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At the same time buy-in performance must be seen to be related to a combination of factors 
described in Chapter 2, some of which may apply generally to buy-ins while others will be distinct 
from buy-outs. Key factors include the knowledge which entrepreneurs have of the sector which 
they target, their own personal relationship including work. experience and knowledge of the 
actual target company. Furthermore, as discussed above, different sectoral distributions which have 
been hypothesised may lead to different growth patterns. 
It should also be noted that while the main reason for selecting a target may often be its under- 
performance (Shaw 1987), the purchaser may not only misread the upside potential but also 
underestimate the company's problems. Managers involved in a buy-in are frequently looking for 
a target with considerable turnround and or growth potential increasing the expected extent of 
post buy-in changes. In comparison the buy-out manager, having excellent internal knowledge of 
the company, will have formulated in advance of the transaction the types of changes which will 
be required when the' company is independent of its former parent. Although information 
asymmetry is most acute where the long term funding of high risk new ventures is concerned 
(Dixon 1991), the management buy-in team and their financial backers in contrast are having to 
cope with problems of asymmetric information about the firm which may be compounded by the 
parlous state of the target company (Hutchings 1987). They do not possess the detailed 
information held by incumbent management and will be further disadvantaged when due diligence 
procedures have been difficult to perform. However within, the buy-in sample the following 
hypotheses can be raised: 
(P17) Buy-in performance is likely to be related to a combination of factors encompassing 
entrepreneurship, corporate restructuring, turnaround and company specific influences. 
Better performers are likely to be associatedwith 
(a) Entrepreneurs who have a high level of education; have been business owners 
themselves; entrepreneurs who have specifically had earlier experience of being in a 
management buy-out or buy-in Team; those with a high need for achievement; Teams who 
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have a high degree of working experience together; and teams which move within the 
same industry; 
(b) Financial structuring which includes a relatively high level of debt bonding, ratcheted 
equity incentives, a high level of management ownership and are backed by venture 
capital firms with a hands-on approach; and 
(c) Target companies which are medium sized, have been subsidiaries of significant 
parents and are at least profitable. 
The period of the survey coincided with the first sharp fall of economic activity and financial 
uncertainties of the 1990-1993 UK recession. The level of business confidence fell markedly from 
August 1989. Such developments are likely to have brought particular problems to companies 
which have been financed on the basis of relatively high leverage as well as to Teams in term of 
personal lending taken out to complete the equity of the buy-in. As a result differences may be 
found in terms of performance of the buy-ins in this period but also in the level of financial 
actions and capital control required to mitigate the effects of such high financing costs. Such 
actions may of course not have been enough to rectify deterioration and combined with the 
assumptions that the risk factors in buy-ins are higher than in management buy-outs, have led to 
a significantly higher degree of failure. Such considerations give rise to further propositions: 
(P18) Like many new ventures the most serious problems are likely to be of a financial 
nature particularly the availability and cost of credit and finance; and 
(P19) A particularly serious problem is likely to derive from information asymmetry when 
completing the transaction which results in major problems emerging after completion 
which were not revealed in due diligence procedures. I I. - 
(b) Actions 
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Management buy-ins are also more likely to be planning to achieve a major turnaround which 
previous management may not have been able to achieve. The methods for accomplishing this 
performance improvement are also going to rely on the adoption by the incoming manager of an 
entrepreneurial role- taking innovative actions to create the turnaround. Such developments may 
be triggered by a series of actions (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan 1990) and may include change 
in top management and ownership. Reasons for need for turnaround have been seen in Chapter 
2.2.6 to have been caused by management, financial factors, high cost structures, under-utilisation 
of Exed assets, unwise acquisition strategies, poor marketing, competition, production and labour 
problems. 
Bibeault (1982) and Hofer (1980) have stressed that external management are, necessary for 
successful corporate turnaround. Hofer (1980) notes that incumbent management have a strong 
set of beliefs about how to run the company many of which must be wrong for the current 
problems to have occurred. Hoffman (1989) notes that change of Chief Executive stimulates 
change, unfreezes existing assets, provides new views of the situation and creates the levels of 
stress or tension required to stimulate organisational change. It will result in new strategic 
orientation and stimulate innovative, entrepreneurial behaviour through new management. The 
types of different action which are then possible were detailed in Chapter 2.6.3 above. 
Need for turnaround will mean a higher degree of trading risk. However, following the buy-in 
there is also a high chance of unexpected problems developing and even when this does not 
happen it will normally have been assumed that there will be considerable restructuring required. 
Consequently different degrees of action can be expected after the buy-in than is typically seen 
in a management buy-out. Ile following propositions and Hypothesis can be raised: 
(P20) Managcmcnt buy-ins are, followcd by a! pcriod of, a high ratc of changc in a 
company which is. especially pronounced in the areas of finance and product, and 
marketing; 
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(P21) The level of financial actions taken after buy-ins will be high in relation to 
improving working and total capital ratios reflecting the need to service debt. Fixed asset 
change (acquisition, sell-offs, unbundling) will be carried out to a lesser extent than 
working capital action; 
(P22) Major marketing changes will be implemented including a high degree of 
rationalisation. of product ranges and the introduction of new advertising and promotion 
arrangements; 
(P23) Managerial re-organisation will be a particular feature involving a high degree of 
change relative to buy-out and including the recruitment of both senior specialists and 
former colleagues as Directors; and 
(H5) Comparison of actions with other types of transaction- management buy-outs, new 
ventures and turnround/sharpbenders- will reflect some significant differences in the 
extent of financial and marketing changes. 
(c) Governance 
Emphasis has been placed in 2.6.5 on the different governance systems which apply in the case 
of venture capital investments. The role of investors is also likely to vary between the stages of 
finance. Many buy-outs with their backgrounds of mature businesses in stable sectors and with__ 
known performance influences should require the minimum of investor involvement: in contrast, 
the problems in buy-ins and the need to guide the company through possible high growth 
strategies will require a more hands-on approach by investors. In the case of investments by some 
LBO Associations this approach will extend not just to regular monitoring but also through the 
use of directors and, in some cases to installing their own Association management. Investor 
control issues are likely to be highly focused for buy-ins with higher levels of monitoring required. 
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Ibis leads to the proposition: 
(P24) Venture capitalists can be expected to monitor and control management buy-ins in 
a "hands-on" rather than "hands-off' manner, with greater intervention used than in 
management buy-outs. 
(d) The Life Cycle 
The buy-in has also to be seen in the longer term, Differences have been seen in attitudes to the 
longevity of the buy-out, some seeing it as a permanent form (eg Jensen 1989), others as a purely 
transitory form (Rappaport 1990) while others have referred to the short term 'honeymoon' 
period (Wright and Coyne 1985). Chapter 2.6 has shown the different factors which bear upon 
the'company in traditional life cycle theory and the relevance of contingency theories. In 
particular the role of venture capital institutions and the factors which bear upon their investment 
time scale can be expected to be a major determining factor as well as the performance of the 
buy-out (Wright et al 1993). 
However after the buy-out the initiator (ie Team Leader) may assume over time a more 
managerial role reducing although not totally relinquishing the role of entrepreneur. Nevertheless 
Team members will still be risking their personal wealth and in some cases a high degree of 
subsequent innovation will continue. Many buy-out companies had been relatively efficiently run 
under the previous ownership structure although some innovative action previously not considered 
possible may now be introduced. In larger transactions the small initial nucleus of entrepreneurs 
who have established the buy-out may in the longer term effectively delegate the entrepreneurial 
process to other members of management, returning themselves to a more managerial and 
monitoring function. 
However buy-ins may be liable to different patterns of life cycle from management buy-outs. The 
initial aspect of turnaround may result in performance improvements being subject to considerably 
142 
more variation than in the case of management buy-outs. The act of turnaround will in itself take 
time. For instance Zimmerman (1991) has noted that in the early years of turnaround there may 
be an even more pronounced decline in the company's relative performance before the action 
taken starts to help. Venture capitalists may be expected to monitor the buy-in more carefully, 
given the risk factors actively guiding the company's growth strategy. This in itself will have further 
implications for the buy-in life cycle, allowing action to be taken at earlier stages. 
In the case of buy-outs the entrepreneurial act of buy-out may be followed by a return to more 
managerially rather than entrepreneurial directed efforts. There is traditionally an inability to 
maintain innovation and high degrees of entrepreneurship as a company becomes older and larger 
(eg Kanter 1983, Mintzberg and Waters 1982) and is subject to more complex hierarchies. In buy- 
ins, certainly for a prolonged initial period, the Team will be behaving in an entrepreneurial 
fashion as they can be seen to be introducing new innovations, co-ordinating factors of production 
in new combinations and identifying and acting on new opportunities. The consequent pattern of 
growth may therefore allow the buy-in form to last longer. There would appear to be a case that 
buy-ins involve a longer term form of company than buy-outs but one in which the potential 
returns may be higher. Some will want to remain independent for a considerable period. Although 
Schumpetcr (19* *) noted that people could not be expected to be entrepreneurial for their whole 
lives, the buy-in leader has been shown as having a higher degree of entrepreneurship than the 
buy-out leader. 
Exit may be dependent on turnaround and creation of a larger group which could be achieved 
through further entrepreneurial combinations such as a merger or reverse-in as a means to 
retaining independence. The higher risks and uncertainties may also lead to earlier failure in 
companies which are not seen as viable. This may even result in the comparatively early 
termination of the buy-in's life cycle through being placed in bankruptcy should the venture 
capitalists not see a long term future for the company. Ile last hypothesis raised is: 
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(H6) Buy-ins represent a higher risk structure than buy-outs and are aimed for longer life: 
consequently they will have different exit patterns and be especially prone to receivership. 
3.8 Conclusions 
Ibis Chapter has discussed the management buy-in in terms of the overall issues of the buy-in 
process and compared important areas of these with management buy-outs. This analysis has 
shown the impact of corporate restructuring, agency cost and entrepreneurship theories, 
turnaround and longer term re-organisation and strategy and the role of venture capital on the 
understanding of management buy-ins. It has been possible to hypothesise that management buy- 
ins are a distinct organisational form despite its obvious similarities to the management buy-out. 
They can be seen as an extension to the options in corporate restructuring and one which 
establishes new ground between the traditional view of the entrepreneur and the more 
managerially orientated buy-out while reinforcing the potential gains to be made through the 
process of corporate restructuring. The management buy-in involves management with relevant 
experience, applying skills in a different environment, initiating and seizing an opportunity, 
accepting a high degree of personal, social and financial risk and in many cases doing it against 
a risk of a much higher degree of asymmetric information than in buy-outs. Additionally such skills 
and characteristics may frequently be considered to be applicable to situations where a financial 
turnaround is necessary and in the opinion of the venture capitalists cannot be engineered by the 
incumbent management. 
The following Chapter describes the methodology which will be used to test the Hypothesis and 
confirm the propositions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH MMIODOLOGY 
4.1 Intr6duction 
In order to test the hypotheses set out in Chapter 3, an empirical approach was used which was 
divided into four parts. First buy-ins were identified and their basic characteristics entered onto 
a database to allow analysis of their general characteristics (4.2). Secondly a mailed questionnaire 
survey of management buy-in companies was undertaken in 1990 (43). Thirdly the hypotheses 
requiring more detailed information were'dealt with by means of detailed case studies of a sub- 
sample of buy-in companies selected from the sample used for the mailed questionnaire survey 
(4.4). This Chapter examines the research methodology employed in these three main areas. 
4.2 Basic Data on Management Buy-ins 
Until 1987 there had been little institutional, adviser and academic interest in the separation of 
information on management buy-ins from the general statistics on management buy-outs 
maintained at the Centre for Management Buy-out Research following its founding in March 
1986. This source of information on management buy-outs, which by April 1993 covered 7,000 UK 
and European transactions, was collected by the author from 1986 as an addition to the initial 
information on 111 buy-out -companies gathered by Wright and Coyne (Wright and Coyne, 1985). 
Initial research in this area made no distinction between various types of transaction within the 
generic buy-out category. By 1987, however, it was becoming clear that the management buy-in 
was emerging as a distinct category. Consequently methods for retrospective identification of buy- 
in transactions from earlier in the 1980's were established allowing a database to be constructed 
with basic characteristics of buy-ins: this was then extended to identify new transactions on a 
regular basis. The sources of information used to Obtain this information were principally 
financing institutions (the author surveys 150 of these on a confidential basis every six months); 
145 
press cuttings (supplemented by quarterly Textline searches); Extel and MacCarthy cards; 
specialist periodicals such as Acquisitions Monthly and Mergers and Acquisitions International; 
examination of Annual Reports and Accounts of major companies; Extel summaries of 
announcements made to the Stock Exchange; liaison with professional advisers; and managers who 
made direct contact with the Centre for Management Buy-out Research. The various sources of 
information allow a considerable amount of cross reference of information to be done with the 
associated verification procedures increasing the overall accuracy of the database. This database 
represents the only comprehensive source of listings of management buy-ins and has the unique 
advantage of containing information normally classified as confidential by financiers. Results of 
the data analysis were originally published in Robbie (1988) with updates provided in Chiplin, 
Wright, Robbie (1988,1989a, 199o, 1991 and 1992). 
Initially starting with collecting information concerning the type of buy-in, value, activity, location 
and name of Chief Executive this set of variables was expanded in late 1988 to cover the source 
and, where possible, financing structure, institutional backers and professional advisers. Data is 
returned from financiers and advisers on Institutional Investment Return Forms (Appendix Al) 
or alternatively completed by the author. 
Supplementary information on progress and ultimate realisation is also obtained from the same 
sources and placed on Institutional Realisation Return Forms (Appendix A2). Additionally for 
realisation through administrative receivership, lists of buy-out and buy-in companies are checked 
against lists of names of companies compiled by Touche Ross from The London Gazette. 
Data is initially coded, verified and entered onto the Centre for. Management Buy-out Research's 
SIR Database systems using the Forms system (SIR, 1987) and is held on the University of 
Nottingham's VME ICL computer system. Information is retrieved either through SIR/SQL+, an 
interactive relational query processor, or through SIR/DBMS for more advanced applications. 
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43 Management Buy-in Survey Questionnaire 
Having posed the research questions and the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3, it was necessary 
to determine the methods by which these could be answered or tested. These processes were seen 
to include determination of the source of data; designing the data collection forms; designing the 
sample; collecting the data; processing the data; analysing it; and presenting the results (Kinnear 
and Taylor, 1983). 
To ensure as large and representative a sample as possible, it was decided to contact all public 
and private management buy-ins completed in the period 1985 to 1989 inclusive for which a 
contact name and full postal address could be established. It was felt that inclusion of the 
relatively small number of buy-ins completed earlier than this would be likely to distort the overall 
sample. Through the use of the database described in Chapter 4.2 above and the author's personal 
contacts with institutions, a significant number of buy-ins whose names were not publicly known 
could therefore be accessed providing a uniquely comprehensive sampling frame for the survey. 
Consideration had to be given as to how the data could be collected, there being three main 
methods: personal, telephone and mail interviews (Kinnear and Taylor, 1983). The financial and 
human resource cost of personal interviews for a sample of this size ruled out this method while 
cost considerations and the dangers of 'top of the head' and inaccurate responses made telephone 
interviews inappropriate. It was therefore felt that the survey should be based on a postal survey 
questionnaire form, but supplemented by personal interviews in a limited number of cases to 
supplement background information and test hypotheses which may not have been satisfactorily 
answered through the main data collection process (see 4.4). This method could be expected to 
provide satisfactory geographical spread at a low level of financial cost, be completed speedily 
(although giving respondents adequate time to reply), eliminate interview bias and help to 
conserve confidentiality and anonymity which were thought to be particularly important aspects. 
Nevertheless it was recognised that the cost of such a survey is frontloaded in terms of the 
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necessary planning, piloting, printing, * sampling, mailing and follow-up (Oppenheim, 1966). The 
major risks were seen to be the chances of a low response rate which would affect the reliability 
of the survey results through producing a non-response bias (although later testing did confirm 
the reliability of the sample), the possibility of lack of control over forms not being filled up by 
the Team Leader and respondents reading questions in advance of those they were answering; 
and questions being misunderstood. 
Considerable attention was therefore paid to the questionnaire design so that each question was 
relevant and objective (Crouch, 1985) and the overall questionnaire appeared well structured, 
logical, straightforward and easy to complete. Care was also taken on the wording of questions 
to ensure that they were unambiguous, not misleading, did not have loaded words and did not 
have double negatives. 
The questionnaire was designed to obtain information principally on a fixed response basis. A 
significant number of questions were on a multiple choice basis considered by Crouch (1985) to 
be the most difficult to design as one need to know what to ask as well as all the possible answers. 
Possible responses need to be collectively exhaustive but mutually exclusive. To cover cases where 
it was felt impossible to include all options to answers, space was left for the respondent to specify 
an 'other' factor which he felt was important. These responses were later categorised and coded 
to provide additional fullness of response. For ease of response respondents were asked to circle 
'yes' or 'no' answers to many of the fixed response questions. Both the multi choice and 
dichotomous questions had the advantage of easy coding for later data analysis. 
Completely open ended questions were kept to a minimum principally reflecting sensitive areas 
such as attitudes towards advisers where it was felt that respondents could be unduly influenced 
by a predetermined set of response alternatives. In such cases responses were analyzed manually 
before determining if suitable categorisations could be made for coding purposes. Space was 
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additionally left at the end of the questionnaire (Question 48) for the respondent to add'any 
further observations about the buy-in process. 
A limited amount of 'hard data' was sought, for instance in the form of financial structuring 
information, turnover and operating profit at the time of buy-in, employment levels and the sums 
involved in subsequent acquisitions and divestment. Reliability of this data may however depend 
on the functional background of the person completing the form, eg a person with financial or 
accounting experience being most likely to provide accurate financial information. While it was 
felt that this information would prove useful, care was taken to cross check accuracy where 
feasible against information held at the Centre from other sources and from Companies House 
microfiches of Annual Report & Accounts and other statutory information. 
Ibe content of the Questionnaire (see Appendix A-3) was designed to provide information about 
the company, the buy-in process, the managers and subsequent progress and actions in logical 
order with managers not being discouraged by unfriendly questions near the start. After initially 
requesting details about the Company, the first section of the questionnaire (Questions 1-10) 
requested information about the transaction itself including aspects of the negotiations, finance, 
professional advice and financing structure and limitations. Section 2 (Questions 11-19) asked 
about the new owners with specific questions on the social, educational, career, managerial and 
financial backgrounds of the Team Leader and 'Number Two' as well as motivational and 
initiation factors. Section 3 (Questions 20-27) sought information about the, target company 
including search criteria, identification, methods of search, previous knowledge of the company 
and failed attempts at buying other targets. Section 4 (Questions 28-36) examined actions which 
had been taken by the new management eam after the buy-in including operating, strategic and 
managerial changes, acquisitions and divestments, incentive systems and employment. Section 5 
(Questions 37-42) asked about performance post buy-in with an emphasis on problems which may 
have developed, requirements for further finance and exit intentions and realisation. Section 6 
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(Questions 43-47) covered aspects of public buy-ins but because of the low sample (see below) 
has not been used. Question 48 asked for any further comments the managers might have and was 
followed by a request for the manager to be allowed to be contacted in the future to discuss the 
progress of the buy-in. 
To ensure that a questionnaire had been designed which could elicit an acceptable response, two 
major external screening processes were undertaken: the seeking of comments from advisers and 
a limited testing of a prototype questionnaire. Following comments by institutions, professional 
advisers and directors and some associates of the Centre for Management Buy-out Research on 
an initial version, certain modifications were made to the questionnaire. A pilot questionnaire was 
then sent on the author's behalf by Barclays Development Capital Limited and 3i plc to certain 
of their clients in November 1989. Following return of the questionnaires, telephone interviews 
with the respondents were held concerning comprehensiveness of the questions, ease of response 
and the possibilities of inaccurate information being supplied on certain questions before the final 
design was made. 
At this point considerable attention was paid to physical aspects of the questionnaire to design 
it to ensure positive feeling was generated and maintained (Oppenheim, 1966). To help response 
rates by making the questionnaire look attractive, the layout was improved and quality of paper 
and print ascertained. The front cover was designed with the Centre for Management Buy-out's 
logo, the name of the survey obvious and the confidentiality emphasised by a large Confidential 
Block. 
Contact was made with individual equity institutions which accounted for almost 90 percent of the 
institutionally backed private buy-ins as to the method of approach which would be most likely 
to result in the questionnaire being completed. In general this was done through the provision 
of introductory letters signed by an Executive Director of the relevant institution to be sent out 
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through the Centre or for letters on the Centre's headed notepapcr referring to the support for 
the survey given by the institution (Appendix M). The letters were word processed to a standard 
format and signed individually by the author. In ten cases questionnaires were sent out directly 
by institutions for confidentiality reasons. (Confidentiality undertakings were given to both 
management and institutions for all targeted buy-ins). For private management buy-ins not 
covered in this way, a letter was sent directly to a named director. 
The letters were carefully constructed to gain the interest of the potential respondent by 
establishing the purpose of the study, identifying by whom it was being undertaken and the 
sponsorship of the project, an explanation of what was required of the respondents, explanation 
of the benefits of the survey both to them and future buy-in teams and emphasising the 
independence and confidentiality of the survey. Respondents were also promised a copy of the 
published results of the survey'. To further emphasise the credibility of the survey, details about 
the activities of the Centre for Management Buy-out Research were also enclosed. The letter and 
questionnaire were sent out at the end of February 1990 to private management buy-ins. A 
stamped addressed envelope was enclosed for their ease of reply, both the outgoing and return 
envelopes being stamped with first class stamps. 
Questionnaires were sent out one week later to both partial and complete public management 
buy-ins for the same period. Mailing was arranged directly by the Centre to the company using 
addresses obtained through the Stock Exchange Year Book. For both groups of buy-ins, one 
month following the initial mailing of the questionnaire a follow-up letter was sent enclosing an 
identical questionnaire (Appendix A5). 
' Each respondent was sent a letter thanking them for their, participation on receipt of the 
completed questionnaire. This was followed by a copy of the summarised results as published in 
Robbie, Wright, Chiplin (1991) on its publication in May 1991 with a covering letter. 
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Of the 208 questionnaires sent to private buy-ins, 62 were returned completed, a response rate 
of 29.8 percent, and a further 11 (5.3 percent) with reasons for not completing stated such as lack 
of time, confidentiality or in one case bereavement of the Team Leader. Of the 118 sent to public 
buy-ins, 7 were returned completed (5.9 percent), 10 (8.5 percent) were not completed for reasons 
such as lack of time or confidentiality and a further 8 (6.8 percent) were returned by the Post 
Office as having moved. The low rate of response for this element of the sample was felt to be 
due to the restrictions on time availability of Team Leaders in quoted companies and the 
considerable degree of restructuring which has followed many of these deals sometimes involving 
the instigating managers leaving the company within a period of two or three years. 
Comparison was made with response rates obtained in previous Centre for Management Buy-out 
Research buy-out surveys. The original Wright/Coyne survey had a response rate of 58.1 percent- 
111 out of 191 questionnaires sent out (Wright and Coyne, 1985). Given problems both of 
identification and confidentiality at the time, the questionnaire in this earlier survey had been 
mailed only to Buy-out Team Leaders who had initially been approached by their venture capital 
backer and had personally indicated their willingness to participate in the survey to the institution. 
More relevant comparison can be made between the buy-in survey and that of 1983/85 buy-outs 
(Wright, I'liompson, Robbie 1992) in which survey sample targeting and administration was 
executed similarly to the buy-in survey. The 1983-85 buy-out survey achieved a response rate of 
29.8 percent, identical to that for private buy-ins with 182 usable questionnaires returned out of 
610 sent. 
Two main problems were noted in the response rate. First the response rate for public buy-ins 
was unacceptably low and meaningful statistical interpretation would not be possible as a result. 
Consequently it was decided not to proceed with an analysis of public buy-ins. Secondly there 
were three private buy-in returns which were irregular. Two involved companies which were 
effectively located outside mainland Britain (one in the Channel Islands and the other in Norway) 
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and the third was the only response from a 1985 buy-in. These were therefore also discarded from 
the main sample leaving 59 private buy-ins to be anlalysed. 
To check that the 1986-1989 private buy-in respondent companies were a representative sample 
of buy-ins of this period, statistical testing of some basic characteristics was carried out to identify 
any significant differences between these 59 companies and the overall population of 1996-89 
private buy-ins as held by the author on the main database at the Centre for Management Buy- 
out Research. A Chi-square goodness of fit test was used against distributions predicted from the 
main database for variables such as year of buy-in, region, industrial classification and value range. 
TABLE 4.1: GOODNESS OF FIT TEST OF SURVEY SAMPLE 
BUY-INS WITH OVE RALL CMBOR POPULATION OF BUY-INS 
Variable Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square 
Year 3 0.46 
Region 4 2.06 
Industrial Activity 4 0.51 
Value Range 3 0.16 
Note: at the 5% level results for both private and private and public-buy- 
ins showed no significant difference with the overall population of buy- 
ins 
Results are shown in Table 4.1. At the 5 percent critical level, the actual survey sample 
distributions for private buy-ins were not significantly different from the overall population of 
private buy-ins held on the CMBOR database; consequently the survey sample was considered 
applicable. 
While the actual sample of private buy-ins thus appeared to be satisfactory, there is in any survey 
questionnaire the possiblility that there may be a lack of robustness due to speed and quality of 
response. For instance later respondents who had been sent follow-up letters may demonstrate 
different characteristics from those who replied promptly at the time of the original request (see 
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eg Boyd and Westfall 1972). To test that this was not the case a series of average sample runs 
tests (using F-tcsts) were carried out on major variables used later, eg in the cluster and factor 
analysis (Table 4.2) 
TABLE 4.2: RESPONSE TIME DIFFERENTIALS 
Variable F-Value Significance Variable F-Value Significance 
Whybuyl 0.0318 0.8592 Source 0.4779 0.4924 
Whybuy2 2.1745 0.1463 Mexhow 0.7051 0.4049 
Whybuy3 4.7528 0.0338 Mceoed 0.7454 0.3919 
Whybuy4 0.0269 0.8704 Mceoage 0.0599 0.8076 
Whybuy5 0.4911 0.4866 Mknow 0.7548 0.3889 
Whybuy6 0.0122 0.9201 Mceosig 0.0461 0.8309 
Whybuy7 0.0084 0.9274 Mindknow 0.000 1.0000 
WhybuyS 0.000 1.0000 Moptrend 0.0835 0.7739 
Whybuy9 0.0695 0.7931 Mtotrend 0.9115 0.3443 
Whybuy10 0.7697 0.3843 Mempfut 0.0044 0.9475 
L)! tybuyll 0.2473 
1 
0.6211 
1 1 
Categorising cases into those which had replied within the median response time and those that 
had not, these showed except in the case of one motivational factor (WIIYBUY3, lack of 
opportunity within the company) that there had not been significant differences between the 
means of the selected variables. The sample could therefore be considered reasonably robust in 
terms of this particular consideration. 
The questionnaire was designed to obtain as much qualitative and quantitative information about 
the buy-in managers and their companies as possible. To make the questionnaire appear more 
user friendlY, coding columns and codes were not printed on the forms, but a wide enough space 
left for the author to insert codes after the questionnaire had been returned. 353 variables for 
each buy-in were used, the author entering the data into SIR/FORMS. Analysis was initially 
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carried out using SIR/SQL+ AND, SIR/DBMS packages (Chapters 6-11). ln addition to 
information gathered from the survey, other variables relating to the companies which were 
already held on the database, such as financial structuring, were accessed inter-actively. 
For statistical testing and interpretation of the Survey results including factor and cluster (Chapter 
12) and discriminant analysis (Chapter 13), the data were transferred to SPSS-X, the Social 
Science Statistical Package (SPSS 1985). 
In analysing the management buy-in results, comparisons are also made with data collected in a 
survey carried out in 1987 of buy-outs completed in 1983-85 (see eg, Wright, Normand, Robbie 
1990, Wright, Thompson, Robbie, 1992). The questionnaire for that survey had been designed by 
the author under the supervision of Wright and Coyne; survey administration and data entry was 
carried out by the author. Further comparisons are made with other published surveys in areas 
which were considered relevant, eg sharpbenders (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988), 
turnarounds (Slatter, 1984) and new ventures (Cooper, Woo and Dunkelburg, 1989). 
4.4 The Buy-in Case Studies 
While the quantitative results contained in the survey are considered to be of considerable 
importance, the large number of changes taking place in a company as the result of a buy-in (eg 
the new change in ownership, the equity incentives for managers, the leverage effect, the 
influence of the venture capitalist, new advisers and changing external economic factors) makes 
it difficult to assess the impact of individual variables and in particular the direction of causation. 
To gain further insight a series of case studies was examined. Although case studies can be used 
in themselves to build theory which may be likely to have important strengths such as novelty, 
testability and empirical validity which arise from the intimate linkage with empirical evidence 
(Eisenhardt 1989) this Thesis follows the more usual approach of using case studies to test the 
validity of theory. As such it is important to recognise (Scapens 1990) that case studies are 
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concerned with explanation rather than prediction (see Llewellyn 1992 and Scapens 1992 for 
further debate on the role of case studies). 
Green and Berry (1991) have warned of the dangers of applying quantitative techniques in the 
complex situations of management buy-outs and note that economic models commonly used to 
delineate the pre-conditions for a buy-out seem deficient in their behavioural assumptions and 
unable to account fully for what was observed in practice. Much US analysis of buy-outs appears 
to have been carried out using quantitative statistical techniques on large samples without specific 
reference to the individual companies forming the dataset (eg Kaplan 1991, Smith 1990). On the 
other hand there have been studies involving case studies of individual companies (eg Magowan 
1989, Bruner and Eades 1992) which provide little quantitative background. In the UK various 
books have included illustrative groups of buy-out case studies (eg Kreiger 1990, Clutterbuck and 
Devine 1987, Wright, Ibompson, Chiplin, Robbie 1991, Wright and Robbie (ed) 1991). Important 
elements of research on turnaround have relied heavily on an approach which has had a high case 
study element, eg Zimmermann (1991). Baker and Wruck (1989) note that large sample 
performance studies do not actually document any organisational changes resulting from a buy-out 
and cannot therefore explore the organisational links between buy-outs and improved economic 
performance. Documenting these organisational links is essential to understand the mechanisms 
by which changes in a firm's financial structure affect organisational performance. 
This thesis attempts to provide a blend of the advantages of a mixture of quantitative research 
with the case study approach. The use of case studies involving in-depth interviews was therefore 
employed to provide a necessary qualitative clement to the research for the thesis and to test 
initial hypotheses which had emerged from the frequency distribution analysis of the survey. After 
careful examination of the representativeness of individual respondents, a series of case study 
interviews was held in the period November 1990 to January 1991 with selected respondents. A 
sequence of selecting suitable cases, preparation, collecting evidence, assessing evidence, 
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identifying and explaining patterns, theory development and report writing was followed (Scapens 
1990). These cases were selected from the respondents on the basis of illustrating problems and 
issues which had been identified as well as representing the diversity of sources from which buy- 
ins may emerge. Thus cases from privately owned companies (including a previous buy-out), 
divestment from both a UK and overseas controlled company and a buy-in by a dedicated 
Management Buy-in fund of a quoted company leading to a 'going private' transaction were 
included. Additionally emphasis was placed in selection on exit characteristics. 
Semi structured interviews lasting 2-3 hours were held on site with the Team Leader (and where 
appropriate other Team Members) to discuss issues relating to the buy-ins in more detail and 
were followed up, where necessary, by further telephone interviews to check new issues which had 
emerged. Performance of the cases was subsequently monitored allowing for instance for 
subsequent financial restructuring to be included. Case study issues are summarised in Chapter 
14 with detailed cases shown in Appendices 7-12. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NtANAGEMENT BUY-INS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 illustrated the various forms which corporate restructuring may take and showed the 
relevance of management buy-outs and buy-ins. In the UK these two components since the early 
1980's have become an important elements of the overall market for corporate control. By the 
First Half of 1992 they accounted, together, for over half the number of transactions in the market 
for corporate control (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). Within the buy-out sector management buy- 
ins developed rapidly from the mid 1980's and by 1989 when accounted for over half the buy-out 
market value. While their value has subsequently fallen, the number of transactions still remains 
significant. Importantly the development of buy-ins followed that of buy-outs and it was not until 
the latter were themselves well established that interest became shown in buy-ins. 
71bis chapter follows the development of both the public and private management buy-in in the 
UK, examines the reasons for their growth and assesses the general characteristics of the 
population of buy-ins compiled by the author and held on the CMBOR database (Chapter 5.2). 
Comparisons are then made with management buy-outs (Chapter 5.3) to test the hypotheses 
concerning differences in terms of sources, sizes, regional and industrial distributions, financing 
structuring, pricing and realisation hypothesised in Chapter 3. 
5.2 Development of the UK Market for Management Buy-ins 
During the 1980's the UK management buy-in market showed more erratic patterns of growth 
than management buy-outs (Table 5.1), significant numerical growth happening each year from 
1985 onwards but values fluctuating; a peak in terms of both volume and value (148 and L3,614mn 
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respectively) was reached in 1989, also the peak year for management buy-outs and the total 
market for corporate control. 
A major reason for this unsteady pattern of value growth has been distortion caused, by the 
presence of a few very large public buy-ins, for instance the Paternoster bid for Woolworths (010 
mn) creating a total buy-in value for 1982 which was not to be exceeded until 1988 despite the 
growth in volume of deals (Table 5.2). 
TABLE 5.2: NUMBERS AND VALUES OF MANAGEMENT BUY-INS 
Týpe 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Private 
No. 4 8 5 23 25 47 85 119 96 112 126 
Value (1m) 2.8 8.2 4.2 20.3 80.5 193.8 606.9 495.8 559.9 639.6 679.2 
Ave Value 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.9 3.2 4.1 7.1 4.2 5.8 5.7 5.4 
Public 
No. 5 2 1 7 26 43 28 29 14 7 8 
Value (1m) 313.8 1.2 0.8 20.2 235.7 111.8 609.2 3118.3 94.0 33.9 31.1 
Ave Value 62.8 0.6 0.8 2.9 9.1 2.6 21.8 107.5 6.7 4.8 3.9 
(1m) 
Total 
No. 9 10 6 30 51 90 113 148 110 119 134 
Value (1m) 316.7 9.4 4.9 40.5 316.2 305.7 1216.2 3614.2 653.9 673.6 710.3 
Ave Value 35.2 0.9 0.8 1.4 6.2 3.4 10.9 24.4 5.9 5.7 5.3 
(Lin) 
The broader based private management buy-in has shown a steadier trend. 
The development of the market for management buy-ins during the 1980's can be seen within a 
larger framework of influences covering the generation of opportunities, the infrastructure to 
complete deals and the possibilities for the realisation of gains (see eg Wright, Thompson, Robbie 
1992). The generation of opportunities will be heavily influenced by attitudes to entrepreneurial 
risk (and hcncc the willingness of managers to leave their existing jobs and buy equity in another), 
the ownership structure of industry (and hence the availability of entities which arc for sale) and 
the state of development of mergers and acquisitions markets. The infrastructure to complete 
transactions (Chapter 2.4) includes the suitability of legal and taxation frameworks, the availability 
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of both venture capital and banking finance and the development of a professional adviser and 
intermediary infrastructure to identify, negotiate and provide general advice on buy-ins. 
Consideration for the possibilities of realisation of gains includes the existence of suitable exit 
routes such as stock market flotation, trade sales, secondary buy-out or buy-in and other forms 
of restructuring (see Chapter 2.6.6). As will be shown below the U. K. in the mid to late 1980's 
provided these necessary conditions. 
The buy-in market in the early 1980's was characterised (excluding the exceptional 
Paternoster/Woolworths buy-in) by an annual volume of less than ten management buy-ins, low 
values and more private than public buy-ins. Only a handful of venture/development capital 
institutions such as ECI Ventures and 3i appeared interested in this market. Nevertheless several 
important buy-ins were completed involving venture capitalists. Among partial public buy-ins of 
this period, two outstanding examples of companies which were to expand with great success in 
the later 1980's were Albert Fisher and Williams Holdings (Lorenz and Wansborough, 1987). 
In terms of the framework described above, the early 1980's were a period of severe economic 
and political adjustment after the 1970's and with the growth and stability of the late 1980's far 
from apparent. The vcnture/dcvclopmcnt capital industry was still relatively small, there was 
continuing concern as to the availability of finance for small companies and what was to be seen 
as the Enterprise Culture was still underdeveloped. The role of external new management in 
restructuring companies at the beginning of the 1980s was neither a common occurrence nor was 
accompanied by the management (in a still relatively highly taxed environment) taking an equity 
participation. Companies were still only slowly coming to terms with divestment opportunities 
(Chiplin and Wright 1987). Stock Market prices were low and there were severe limits on the 
ability of companies to raise new finance through rights issues or other methods of placing. 
Interest rates were high. Coupled with low PE ratios, there was a severe limit on companies being 
able to divest at satisfactory prices. However recession in itself produced a need for groups to be 
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restructured as well as producing a series of significant bankruptcies. Under-performing 
subsidiaries were frequently retained rather than sold or occasionally sold quietly to incumbent 
management and the external management brought in was usually in the form of the 'company 
doctor'. Increasingly as the 1980s developed these specialists were being offered the advantages 
of share option schemes in quoted companies as a result of legislation passed in the late 1970's 
and refined in the 1980's. Management buy-outs from 1982/83 onwards raised the profile of the 
trained manager who felt he had entrepreneurial abilities and illustrated the benefits to be had 
for institutions in backing companies where management had the incentive of equity ownership. 
By the mid 1980's however the country's economic and financial circumstances had changed very 
significantly; strong growth was following the severe recession, there was a rising stock market, 
managerial remuneration packages were becoming more performance orientated, there had been 
major changes to personal income and capital gains taxation systems and the increasing incidence 
of employee share ownership schemes made management more attuned to the advantages of 
equity stakes in a general context. Tlicre was also a need for certain conglomerates to reverse 
earlier diversification policies. At the same time the evolution of the management buy-out 
marketplace was successfully resulting in significant funds becoming available for investment in 
companies where management were seen as key in establishing a successful independent company. 
A clear take-off point for management buy-ins can be seen occuring in 1985/86. While 1985 
brought significant volume expansion and also further examples of institutionally backed public 
buy-ins (eg Cullens), in 1986 there was considerable deepening of the market for both public and 
private buy-ins. Reflecting the rapidly changing nature of the London stock market as the run-up 
to regulatory moves got underway, executive teams were becoming more active in identifying 
target companies, frequently as a means to enter a turn-around situation where new management 
would be so welcomed that major capital raising exercises in a rapidly rising stock market could 
quickly transform the company and create rapid growth through acquisition. On a more substantial 
basis were the 1986 buy-ins of Gestetner (by Australian entrepreneurs, L140 mn market 
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capitalisation) and Macarthy (06.6 mn). The value of private buy-ins rose sharply and included 
such key deals as Haleworth (M mn) led by Philip Ling, a key person behind the 1985 Haden 
buy-out, the first UK 'going private' buy-out, a case of the buy-out manager subsequently going 
on to lead a buy-in. 
Growth by now reflected the different stages of the economic cycle and the increasing 
entrepreneurial nature of management. Changes in banking focus also helped as banks sought 
emerging corporate clients -and changed lending emphasis. Rapid rises in the stock market 
heightened interest by both management and financiers to the potential capital gains which could 
be obtained by the successful injection of new management into under-performing companies. For 
private buy-ins, development capital companies were enjoying a highly profitable and growing mbo 
market and were keen to extend their interests into relatively similar areas sensing signs that the 
management buy-out market was showing signs of maturity (Hutchings 1987). Despite the 
increasing attention being given to the possibilities for buy-ins, considerable practical difficulties 
were still being encountered in some of the more ambitious public buy-ins. Indeed comparison 
can be made with the issues facing hostile LBO attempts in the United States. 71bis was 
particularly seen in the failure by institutions and a new management team to acquire Simon 
Engineering. 
Despite the well publicised failure of this bid and the problems raised at the time about this style 
of transaction, 1985 and 1986 had provided the vital turning point in the development of the UK 
management buy-in market. In 1987 there was a very significant increase in volume of buy-ins to 
90, of which almost half was accounted for by public buy-ins the majority of these being partial 
bids rather than taking the company private from the stock market. Despite an almost doubling 
of volume in a year to 90 transactions, the actual value of buy-ins in 1987 declined marginally to 
; E306 mn. As stock markets reached a peak during 1987, the psychology of managers in seeking 
to acquire effective management control of quoted companies as well as the financing possibilities 
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given entry Price Earnings ratios in their 20's'began to falter. While many private buy-ins 
continued to be relatively small and from privately owned sources, a significant development at 
the end of the year was the buy-in of the bearings division of RHP (United Precision Industries, 
L73.5 mn). This was the first private buy-in of a major division of a quoted company. The size and 
publicity given to this tranactions highlighted the opportunities available for successful divestment 
by quoted companies of subsidiaries and divisions to external management. Despite the economic 
and financial uncertainties which arose in the immediate aftermath of the October 1987 stock 
market crisis, early 1988 buy-ins included Cope Allman/Quoteplan, L265 mn financing and the 
largest private management buy-in to date and Lewis's Department Stores from Sears, L74 mn; 
these emphasiscd the changing nature in corporate restructuring of the private buy-in as it 
developed from relatively small companies where the vendor was predominantly an individual 
faced with family succession problems to divestment of subsidiaries of major quoted companies. 
1988 also marked the first year when volume exceeded the 100 transactions and L1,000 mn value 
barriers. As well as the two large private buy-ins referred to earlier, several took place in the L10- 
20 mn value range. Additionally in some others initial financin'cr requirement were lower but 0 
significant additional funds were committed at the time of buy-in to future expansion. 
Furthermore public buy-ins, although themselves down in volume reflecting the changing 
opportunities on the stock market, were at a record value, principally influenced by the buy-in of 
the Harris Quecnsway chain of furniture retailers. At L446.8 mn the Lowndes Queensway buy-in 
was then a record size (in current values) for a buy-in and was made against management efforts 
to launch a rival management buy-out going private bid. 
In 1989 buy-in values virtually trebled to 0,614 mn, significantly increasing their relative position 
to buy-outs, accounting for 28.4 percent of all buy-out and buy-in transactions (Table 5.3) 
compared to 23.2 percent in 1988 and almost half of the value of all deals (48.2 percent) virtually 
double that of the previous year. This however should be seen against the record levels reached 
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TABLE 53: BUY-INS RELATIVE TO THE BUY-OUT AND OVERALL MARKET 
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
Buy-ins as a proportion of 
total buy-out markets 
Buy-ins as a proportion of 
market for corporate 
control (%) 
Buy-outs and buy-ins as 
proportion of market for 
corporate control 
Year Number Value Number Value Number Value 
1982 3.7 47.7 1.3 11.0 34.7 23.1 
1983 4.1 2.4 1.4 0.0 35.4 13.8 
1984 2.5 1.3 0.7 0.0 30.0 6.9 
1985 10.2 3.5 3.9 0.0 38.2 14.3 
1986 13.9 21.2 4.2 1.9 30.3 8.8 
1987 20.7 8.7 4.6 1.5 22.1 17.6 
1988 23.2 24.7 5.7 4.4 24.6 17.7 
1989 28.4 48.2 7.9 10.4 28.0 21.6 
1990 18.5 21.0 8.0 5.7 43.3 27.2 
1991 21.1 23.8 11.1 5.1 52.6 21.3 
1992 
-- 
23.1 21.8 13.2 7.7 57.2 35.4 
I 
for the value of all mergers and acquisitions in the UK in 1989 when all types of acquisitions 
except sales of subsidiaries to other groups reached a peak. Buy-ins accounted for 10.4 percent 
of the total value of the UK market for corporate control, a level only exceeded in 1982 (11.0 
percent) in the unusual circumstances of the Paternoster bid. 
Sources of buy-ins became much more varied, extending beyond public buy-ins of quoted 
companies and buy-ins of family owned businesses which characterised early growth in the market. 
In particular the trend seen in early 1988 continued into 1989 with subsidiaries of larger groups 
becoming more evident as sources for transactions. While the number of public buy-ins was little 
changed in 1989 from 1988, their value increased more than rive times to 0,118.3 mn as a result 
of a small number of exceptionally large transactions. 
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TABLE 5.4: MAJOR MANAGEMENT BUY-INS 
(TO JUNE 1992 IN CONSTANT (JUNE 1992) PRICES) 
Buy-in Source Year Current Price Constant 
Price 
Isosceles/Gateway quoted 1989 Z157 2,262.9 
Y, ingrishcr/Woolworths quoted 1982 310.0 1,131.0 
Pembridge Inv/DRG quoted 1989 697 757.8 
Lowndes Queensway quoted 1988 446.8 557.8 
Quoteplan/Cope Allman divestment 1988 265 354.2 
Gestctner partial; quoted 1986 140 207.6 
Jarvis Hotels divestment 1990 186.0 192.9 
Utd. Precision Instruments divestment 1987 73.5 104.9 
Brunner Mond divestment 1991 101.5 101.2 
Brightreasons 11 divestment 1991 94.5 98.4 
Lewis's Dept. Store divestment 1998 74.0 96.9 
James Neill quoted 1989 78.0 84.6 
Square Grip divestment 1989 68.0 83.9 
Libbey-St Clair/Ravenhead divestment 1990 75.2 83.2 
Mountleigh partial; quoted 1989 70.4 76.5 
Crockfords Clubs divestment 1989 61.5 68.8 
Macarthy partial; quoted 1986 36.6 65.0 
Enterprise Inns divestment 1991 62.0 59.0 
Financial Insurance divestment 1988 40.0 503 
Salt Union divestment 1992 48.5 - 48.5 
Needwood Holdings divestment 1988 38.5 48.1 
David Brown Corporation family 1990 45.2 46.0 
Spotlaunch quoted 1990 42.0 45.4 
Unicorn Abrasives divestment 1992 44.0 44.2 
First Corporate Shipping privatisation 1991 4Z2 42.0 
The largest buy-out/buy-in transaction in 1989 and to date (Table 5.4) was the hostile buy-in of 
Gateway through Isosceles (L2,157 mn) which highlighted some of the major changes affecting 
the buy-out market at that point: the increasing aggressiveness of deals as shown in pricing and 
financial leverage and the need to sell down/unbundle assets within a relatively short time to 
reduce banking facilities to more acceptable levels The contrasting bids for Isosceles showed the 
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growing influence of US leveraged buy-out techniques. Later in the year the Pembridge 
Investments bid for the printing group DRG (L697 mn) involving equity participation from various 
US and European specialist financiers and accompanied by a proposed large unbundling 
programme brought further likenesses to the US style LBO. A contrasting type of public buy-in 
but again reflecting the type of deal illustrated by Jensen in his description of the LBO 
Association was James Neill (08 mn) where the MMG Patricof European Buy-in Fund took the 
company private, installed some of its own senior management and added others as well as 
intending to significantly expand the business into a major European company. 1989 also saw the 
launching of what would have been the largest LBO/buy-in or takeover transaction ever carried 
out in Europe with the Hoylake bid for BAT Industries; this L13,419 mn bid was highly dependent 
on the unbundling of assets and subsequent demergers, a process which the incumbent 
management reactively then set about to do as a takeover defence resulting in the lapsing of the 
bid in 1990. 
In contrast private buy-ins however declined in value in 1989 to 1495.8 mn despite a further 
significant volume increase to 119, the largest transaction being Square Grip (L68 mn). Despite 
this decrease in value, the interest in private buy-ins was high and there was evidence of a further 
widening of sources away from family succession to divestments from UK quoted companies 
(Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1990). Many venture and development capitalists were now actively 
promoting the management buy-in as an alternative form of corporate restructuring (cg the 3i 
management buy-in programme received much publicity and support from managers who were 
interested in this type of venture) and MMG Patricof had launched a European orientated fund 
exclusively aimed at large management buy-ins. Institutions faced with an increasingly competitive 
management buy-'Out market were also attracted to the buy-in as an investment form. Although 
buy-ins were perceived to have a greater degree of risk than management buy-outs, this was felt 
to be adequately compensated for the institution through higher projected internal rates of return 
(De Quervain 1989). Early realisation rates appeared to support this view. 
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Five years' rapid growth came to an abrupt halt in 1990. Changing economic and financial 
circumstances, concerns over high leverage, over pricing and an increasing number of receiverships 
a different attitude towards buy-outs as a whole by debt providers, and the risk element within 
buy-ins pushed the value for the year down to only L653.9 mn with volume declining to 110 buy- 
ins. The public management buy-in market collapsed with only two major transactions (Spotlaunch 
and Aircall, both of which were at the time only traded through stock market Section 535 
provisions rather than having a quote on one of the three London markets) while the value of 
private management buy-ins actually increased. However a significant element of this value was 
accounted for by two deals, the buy-in of Jarvis Hotels, a divestment from Allied-Lyons, L186 mn 
and David Brown Corporation, then the largest privately owned company to be sold through a 
buy-in, L45.2 mn. 
This decline in activity levels contrasts with the buoyant volume of management buy-outs although 
it follows the sharp decline in the overall UK mergers and acquisitions market. While 1989 had 
represented a peak level of activity for buy-ins, it also symboliscd a major break in the 
development of the market. After the rapid economic growth of the 1980's, a major detcrioration 
in economic and financial background was evident. Assumptions behind business projections were 
not so clear cut especially for transactions which necessitated major improvements in performance. 
The malaise of some large buy-out deals in the US and UK bore heavily on the health of the 
market; concern was felt at leverage levels as the period of high interest rates became longer and 
companies began to struggle in the face of these and declining levels of economic activity. Some 
buy-ins had clearly been completed at prices which in retrospect seemed too high. It was also 
apparent that while there had been significant success for a substantial proportion of early buy-ins, 
some completed in the late 1980's appeared not to be faring so well; in particular those (such as 
Isosceles, DRG, Lowndes Queensway) which involved the subsequent unbundling of a significant 
proportion of the target's assets found disposal projections difficult to achieve. By 1990 
receiverships of buy-ins were comfortably exceeding trade sales on a cumulative basis (Chiplin, 
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Wright, Robbie 1991). The Lowndes Queensway buy-in entered receivership after refinancings 
and at the end of 1990 Isosceles announced details of a major refinancing; both buy-ins had failed 
to achieve the degree of turnround anticipated or the divestitures which had been in their original 
Business Plans. 
The year 1991 was one of contrasts for UK buy-ins. Activity levels in the early months were 
extremely depressed reflecting growing concern as to the health of existing buy-ins, declines in 
commercial bank senior debt availability and the poor econonic and financial outlook. As the year 
progressed opportunities began to re-emerge as company prices remained low, corporate 
performance was felt to be nearing the bottom of the cycle and opportunitues arose to buy 
companies at more realistic levels. These included the purchase of assets from receivers. A further 
opportunity arose through certain brewery groups being forced to divest public houses as a result 
of the MMC Commision Report on the Brewing Industry. These were felt to be attractive for 
management buy-ins involving the creation of new groupings and resulted in some large 
transactions in the second half of the year. Consequently for the year 1991 private management 
buy-ins rose to a record value of L639.6 mn with volume recovering to 112, only seven short of 
that in 1989. Public management buy-ins, - with PE ratios of quoted companies remaining very 
high, were relatively insignificant resulting in a total of 120 public and private buy-in transactions 
worth L676.1 mn for the year. In 1992 further volume growth was seen with value increased 
compared to 1991. 
Putting the growth of management buy-ins into the context of the overall buy-out and corporate 
control markets, different patterns emerge in terms of volume and value. The proportion of buy- 
ins in the overall market for corporate control as measured by number of deals identified has 
increased every year since 1984; reaching its highest level in 1992 at 13.2 percent of the total 
(Table 5.3). By Value, however, the market peaked in 1989 with the large buy-ins of Isosceles and 
DRG, although it did not return to 1988 levels. This trend is partially reflected in an examination 
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of buy-ins as a proportion of the total buy-out market. This shows a significant reduction in the 
relative importance of buy-ins occurring in 1990 although there has subsequently been some 
recovery, especially in volume (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). 
Putting the UK buy-in experience into a European perspective, the UK remains the largest single 
market for management buy-ins although there are signs of the development of this type of 
transaction in several continental countries (see eg Clutterbuck, Snow, Robbie, Wright, 
- 
1990; 
Robbie, Wright, 1991). In France there have now been several significant buy-ins including La 
Cotes Desfosses and the public buy-in of Pier Import in 1988. Significantly several UK 
development capital institutions have been involved in leading the funding of some of these 
transactions. Although these buy-ins have come from several types of source, the need to create 
opportunities to facilitate the transfer of ownership held by families and founders of private firms 
is seen as a major element in the future development of buy-ins in France and some other 
continental countries. In Italy the overall buy-out market is small but the proportion of deals 
represented by buy-ins is high (about 40 percent) as external management takes advantage of 
succession or restructuring problems in the SME sector and in particular rills the managerial 
vacuum caused by the strong entrepreneurial owner (Carulli, Robbie 1992). Management buy-ins 
have emerged as one of the forms for restructuring in the former GDR and may provide an 
effective way for the transfer of management experienced in western markets into units where 
incumbent management were not exposed to market economies (Robbie, Wright 1991). 
5.3 Basic Differences in Characteristics between Buy-outs and Buy-ins 
In view of the basic differences hypothesised to exist between buy-outs and buy-ins, statistical 
comparisons have been made between the two types to identify both basic demographic 
backgrounds. to transactions but also the existence of expected differences and to test for 
statistical significance. The sample for this discussion is derived from the basic database developed 
for the Centre for Management Buy-out Research; in view of the small numbers of buy-ins 
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completed in the early 1980's, the period taken for the comparisons in this Section is 1986 to 1991 
(except where otherwise stated), providing a total sample of 487 private buy-ins and 2,374 buy- 
outs. Public buy-ins are excluded. 
Identication of differences between management buy-outs and management buy-ins in terms of 
size and pricing, source, industrial sectors, regional location, financial structuring and exit routes 
is made. Where appropriate Chi-Square tests are carried out between the sample of management 
buy-outs and buy-ins to determine whether statistical differences exist between management buy- 
outs and private management buy-ins (Table 5.6). 
(i) Size Distribution and Pricing 
Management buy-ins have tended to be smaller in size than management buy-outs (Table 5.5). 
Of the three categories into which size distributions have been made for buy-ins over i5mn, only 
that for the size range L10 to 25 mn showed a higher proportion of buy-ins than buy-outs. Less 
than 5 percent of buy-in were for over 125 mn compared to 6.7 percent for buy-outs. 
TABLE 5.5: SIZE OF BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
Value Range Buy-out 
(%) 
Private 
Buy-in (%) 
Total 
(%) 
Total 
(Number) 
Less than 11m 41.5 42.9 41.8 913 
Elm 
- 
12m 17.1 20.5 17.7 387 
f2m 
- 
15m 18.8 18.3 18.7 409 
0m 
- 
110m 9.1 5.5 8.4 184 
ElOrn, 
- 
125m 6.8 8.0 7.0 154 
More than 125m 6.7 4.8 6.3 138 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 2185 
Sample 1770 415 2185 
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The Chi-Square test used to identify statistically significant differences between buy-outs and buy- 
ins (Table 5.6) failed to produce statistically significant results for value range distributions (Chi- 
Square=9.867, p=0.08). 
TABLE 5.6: DIFFERENCES BETWE EN MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND PRIVATE BUY-INS 
Region Activity Source Size Exit 
Chi-Square 
Chi-Square 12.30 124.27 153.73 9.867 41.51 
Significance 0.197 0.000 
1 
0.000 
1 0.079 1 
0.000 
The lower values of private buy-ins may reflect buy-ins being priced at lower levels than buy-outs 
to take account of perceived differences in risk factors, eg the problems of asymmetry of 
information when negotiating with the vendor. Additionally whereas in a management buy-out 
three critical elements- proven market, proven product and proven management- are being 
acquired, in a buy-in the proven elements are confined to the products and market (Shaw, 1987). 
It can also be hypothesised that following the emergence of large refinancings and indeed failures 
from 1989, buy-in pricing would decrease. 
TABLE 5.7: PRICING OF BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
- 
Year Deal Value/Operating Profit 
Buy-outs Buy-ins 
Average STD Sample Average STI) Sample 
1989 10.63 19.29 46 8.14 4.22 24 
7.24 S. S2 81 7.38 6.60 23 
1991 6. S1 4.19 60 5.70 4.40 24 
Table 5.7 shows Price Earnings ratios for buy-outs and buy-ins in the period 1989 to 1991 
(operating data for earlier periods was not collected by CMBOR). Earnings have been based on 
operating profit before interest and taxation while the value is the deal rather than financing 
value. The Table shows a steady fall over the three years and with (apart from 1990) the PEs of 
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buy-ins being below those for buy-outs. Overall figures for PE ratios have been difficult to identify 
although 3i have confirmed recent falls for buy-out investments, eg the post tax historic PE being 
an average of 7.5 in 1989-91 for buy-outs, but 6.1 in 1991 (3i 1992b). 
(ii) Source Distribution 
As described in the earlier sections on corporate restructuring, buy-outs and buy-ins may come 
from six major sources, divestment, privately owned companies, receivership, privatc/family 
ownership privatisation and going private. In view of the non inclusion of public buy-ins in this 
analysis, going privates are excluded from this statistical examination. 
TABLE 5-8: TYPE OF SOURCE OF BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
Source Buy-out 
M 
Private 
Buy-in (%) 
Total 
(%) 
Total 
(Number) 
Receiver 7.4 7.8 7.5 193 
UK Divestment 50.7 29.8 47.7 1230 
Non-UK Divestment 9.5 4.0 8.7 225 
Private 26.8 57.8 31.3 807 
Privatisation 5.4 0.5 4.7 122 
ta 100.0 100.0 100.0 2577 
Sample 2205 372 2577 
Source distribution of private management buy-ins shows a heavy bias towards previous 
family/private ownership (Table 5.8), although this proportion has been declining for some years 
(Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). However buy-ins of private/family companies have generally been 
relatively small. Consequently while divestments have accounted for a minority of buy-in volume, 
they have accounted for the majority of the value since the late 1980's, with family and privately 
owned source accounting for only 16.4 percent of value in 1991. The largest buy-in of a privately 
or family owned company was David Brown Corporation in 1990 but this was the 22nd largest 
buy-in of all time with 13 divestment buy-outs greater in size (Table 5.4). Until 1991 receivership 
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as a source had been relatively insignificant; incumbent management has a significant advantage 
in this type of situation and the need to be able to complete a deal quickly before the business 
starts to wind down causes serious due diligence problems for the buy-in team and its backers. 
Despite such considerations, this source grew significantly in 1991 to account for 193 percent of 
private buy-ins, although on a cumulative basis the proportion for buy-ins was little different than 
for buy-outs. 
Privatisation as a buy-in source has been relatively less important than for buy-outs, the two most 
important being Gicneagles Hotel from British Transport Hotels and in 1991, First Corporate 
Shipping Scrviccs, the buy-in of the Port of Bristol. 
Statistical testing of the source of buy-ins compared to buy'Outs produced significant differences 
(Chi-Square=153.7, p=0.000 and Table 5.6) and help to confirm buy-ins as a means of achieving 
succession in privately owned companies rather than a method of divestment of divisions or 
subsidiaries of quoted companies. 
(iii) Industrial Classification 
Almost one quarter (24.4 percent) of private management buy-ins are in retail and wholesale 
distribution compared to 14.8 percent for buy-outs (Table'5.9). 
Ile most important single sector is retail distribution (eýpccially motor distribution) followed by 
business services, mechanical engineering and wholesale distribution. The attractiveness of 
management buy-ins for the motor distribution industry reflects the homogeneity of the industry 
whereby, say, a Managing Director of a Ford dealership can be placed in a dealership elsewhere 
with low risk. Sectors with a notably higher incidence for private buy-ins than buy-outs are retail 
distribution and hotels and. catering. Smaller differences were noted for mechanical engineering, 
paper, printing and packaging. Sectors where buy-ins appear very under-represented are Business 
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TABLE 5.9: ACTIVITY OF BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
Activity Buy-out 
(%) 
Private 
Buy-in 
Total 
(%) 
Total 
(Number) 
Agriculture, energy 0.8 1.5 0.9 25 
Food 3.4 3.6 3.4 96 
Chemicals 2.3 2.1 2.2 63 
Metals 3.6 4.4 3.7 105 
Mechanical engineering 8.9 10.1 9.1 257 
Electrical engineering 9.8 6.7 9.3 261 
Shipbuilding, vehicles 2.6 3.2 2.7 77 
Textiles 2.3 1.1 2.1 60 
Leather, footwear 2.4 2.7 2.5 70 
Non-mctallic mineral 
manufacturing 
1.5 1.7 1.5 43 
Timber, furniture 3.2 3.2 3.2 90 
Paper, printing 6.5 7.6 6.7 189 
Other manufacturing 3.8 4.2 3.9 109 
Construction 4.4 1.5 3.9 109 
Transport 5.7 3.4 5.3 149 
Wholesale distribution 9.4 9.9 9.5 268 
Retail distribution 5.4 14.5 7.0 196 
Business services 18.1 12.6 17.2 484 
Hotels & Catering 1.2 5.3 1.9 57 
Banking, insurance, finance 4.6 1.1 4.0 113 
ta 100.0 100.0 100.0 2818 
Sample 1 2342 1 476 1 2818 1 
Services and banking, insurance and finance. These two sectors account for only 13.7 percent of 
buy-in activity compared to 22.7 percent for buy-outs. 
Private buy-ins appear also considerably less likely to occur in electrical'and electronic industries, 
tcxtiles, construction and transport and communication. 
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Differences between activities of buy-outs and buy-ins appeared significant (Chi-Squarc=124.37, 
p=0.00, Table 5.6). 
Despite these apparent differences, the distribution of buy-in industries was spread through all 
major economic and industrial sectors like buy-outs. This gives further credence to the notion that 
buy-ins in the UK arc different in nature from LBOs in the US where there are large 
concentrations in a small group of mature and cash generative industries (eg Easterwood et al. 
1989). 
(iv) Regional Distribution 
The regional distribution of private buy-ins appears to closely follow that of buy-outs (Table 5.10) 
with the South East of England being the dominant region, as it is in the overall stock of UK 
companies. 
TABLE, 5.10: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
Region Buy-out 
(%) 
Private 
Buy-in (%) 
Total 
(%) 
Total 
(Number) 
South East 37.5 36.3 37.3 1047 
East Anglia 3.4 3.3 3.4 95 
South West 6.1 6.8 6.2 175 
West Midlands 10.7 9.1 10.5 294 
East Midlands 6.7 9.3 7.1 200 
Yorks-Humberside 9.5 8.9 9.4 263 
North West 9.2 12.2 9.7 272 
North 3.6 3.1 3.5 99 
Wales 3.6 3.3 3.5 99 
Scotland 9.8 7.5 9.4 265 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 2809 
Sample 2327 1 509 2809 1 
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The order of regions does differ from that of buy-outs, with the North West and East Midlands 
being the next most important, accounting for higher proportions of buy-ins than buy-outs. 
Scotland, a region with a particularly active buy-out market, has markedly lower shares of buy-ins 
than buy-outs and the West Midlands to a lesser extent. 
Despite the different orderings significant differences in the regional composition of buy-ins and 
buy-outs could not be confirmed (Chi-Sqaure=12.3, p=0.197, Table 5.6). 
(v) Financial Structuring 
As outlined in Chapter 2.5, buy-ins arc structured through the use of equity subscribed by both 
management and specialist financing institutions, senior debt, mezzanine debt and other forms of 
finance such as loan notes and deferred payments. Vendors may be involved in providing these 
forms as well as taking participation in the equity of the new company. Agency Cost theory would 
imply that structuring in corporate restructuring should provide management with significant 
equity incentives while high level of leverage will provide debt bonding effects. Different 
transactions are also unlikely to have identical financing structures, even when finance has been 
provided by the same institutions, given the unique cash flow, profit forecasts and asset backing 
of individual target companies. Nevcrthlcss general patterns of structuring may be expected to 
emerge. 
As well as identifying the overall deal structuring, size of transactions is seen as an important 
influence in determining the type of financing package agreed with the venture capitalist and 
banks. Consequently overall deal structures have been separated into two size ranges- financing 
value of less than 110 mn and those of at least 110 mn. 
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Examining deal structures over the period 1989 to 1991 several important features can be 
identified (Table 5.11). The average proportion of equity has increased while the share of senior 
debt has reduced reflecting the need to adopt more conservative gearing policies. However there 
has been a significant variation between individual years, a sharp reaction in gearing levels 
occurring in 1990. The proportion of senior debt and mezzanine fell and was accompanied initially 
by a sharp rise in the use of other forms of finance and especially loan notes. The use of these 
declined in 1991 but that of mezzanine and senior debt increased. Comparison with leverage rates 
shown for U. S. buy-out transactions (eg Marais et al 1989, Singh 1990) shows a much lower rate 
in British buy-ins. 
Smaller buy-ins appear to have a different form of financing structure from the large ones. Equity 
accounts for a larger proportion of finance for the smaller deals, ic they are more conservatively 
structured, and the use of specialist mezzanine finance is more limited. In particular the increased 
use of debt and mezzanine finance has been limited to the larger deals and smaller management 
buy-ins have become comparatively conservatively geared. Management are also likely to have a 
majority of the equity voting rights in the smaller buy-ins. 
Comparison can also be made with management buy-otits (Table 5.12). Here the differences 
between small and large transactions are also evident, the larger deals using more mezzanine and 
senior debt than smaller transactions. Overall comparison with management buy-ins also shows 
buy-outs requiring less equity, confirming the relative risk factors felt to apply. 
To gauge the significance of the difference between buy-out and buy-in structures, a series of z- 
tests were made to identify significant statistical differences. The proportion of debt, equity and 
mezzanine and other forms of finance were compared for several categories of transactions (Table 
5.13). No significant statistical differences were found between buy-outs and buy-ins of less than 
L10 mn financing; between buy-ins and buy-outs of more than L10 mn financing; between all buy- 
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TABLE 5.13: Z-TEST DIFFERENCES BE`rWE EN FINANCING STRUCTURES, 1989-91 
MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
Equity Debt Mezzanine & 
other finance 
Less than 110m financing mbi v. 
Less than 110m financing mbo 0.74 1.56 0.96 
At least 110m financing mbi v. 
At least 110m financing mbo 0.50 0.83 0.48 
All mbis v mbos 1.18 1.88 0.45 
Less than flOm financing mbi v. 
At least L10m financing mbo 1.45 1.23 0.25 
Note: none of the z-test produced values with a statistical significance difference of 5 percent or 
less. 
ins and buy-outs (although differences in the proportion of debt, z=1.88, were almost at the 5 
percent significant level); or between buy-ins of less of L10 mn financing and those of at least LIO 
mn financing. Ilius while the average proportions of the major financing instruments points to 
differences between buy-ins and buy-outs, these are not at a statistically significant level. This 
would seem to imply that venture capitalists in structuring buy-ins do assume that they require a 
more conservative financing structure than buy-outs, but do not adjust the structure enough to 
ensure that they are significantly different. 
(vi) Exit 
A buy-in's exit will depend on a variety of factors and the governance structure adopted will have 
a clear bearing on institutional attitudes as to when a desired realisation takes place (Chapter 
2.6.5-6). However the achievement of the venture capitalist's returns is dependent on achievement 
of planned objectives. This may be more difficult than in management buy-outs because of 
difficulty in carrying out due diligence procedures during the buy-in appraisal and the risk factors 
involved in assessing management in a different environment- perhaps not even in the same 
sector, or in a sharply different size of company or in a different region. Attitudes to acceptable 
levels of risk are dependent on individual assessment by institutions of specific industrial 
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opportunities and management capabilities. Furthermore despite intentions, buy-in managers may 
not exit as they originally had intended (cf the case of buy-outs, Wright, Thompson, Robbie 1992). 
TABIE, 5.14: EXITS OF BUY-OUTS AND BUY-INS 
Exit Type Buy-out 
M 
Private 
Buy-in (%) 
Total 
M 
Total 
(Number) 
None 80.5 74.3 79.4 2273 
Stock Exchange 1.9 2.3 2.0 57 
Trade sale 6.7 3.9 6.2 177 
MB0: MBl 0.8 
- 
0.7 19 
2nd stage finance 2.4 4.7 2.8 79 
Receivership 7.8 14.8 8.9 256 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 2861 
Sample 2374 487 2861 
The proportion of buy-outs remaining in the original buy-out ownership form on a cumulative 
basis (80.5 percent) is higher then for private management buy-ins (74.3 percent) (Table 5.14). 
These percentages mark major differences in type of exit, that of receivership showing a 
particularly marked variation. Thus 14.8 percent of buy-ins end up in receivership, almost double 
that for management buy-outs (7.8 percent). The reasons for this high proportion refer to the 
higher risk profile, the under estimation of the problems of righting the problems inherited in a 
buy-in at a time of recession, a price which in retrospect may have been excessive and too high 
a gearing ratio (Robbie, Wright 1992a). 
The rapid rise in buy-in activity occurred towards the height of the economic cycle when Mergers 
and Acquisitions activity was high and companies were selling at historically high Price Earnings 
ratios. Additionally buy-outs were being financed using high degrees of leverage. Combination 
with economic recession and high interest rates could be expected to result in severe financial 
problems for the more marginal companies. 
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TABLE S. 15: UK PRIVATE MBI EXITS 
Year 
of 
MBI 
Float* Trade Sale MBOIMBI Receivership" No Total 
No % No % No % No % No % No % 
1995 0 0 1 43 1 43 3 13.1 18 78.3 23 100.0 
1986 5 20.0 2 8.0 00 2 8.0 16 64.0 25 100.0 
1987 1 0 0 7 14.9 00 4 8.5 36 76.6 47 100.0 
1988 2 2.4 5 5.9 00 25 29.4 53 62.3 85 100.0 
1989 2 1.7 5 4.2 00 26 21.8 86 72-3 119 100.0 
1990 0 0 1.0 100 10 10.4 85 88.6 96 100.0 
ILI!!, 
_j 1 
0-9 0 
- 
0 F 00 4 3.6 107 95.5 112 100.0 - 
Includes USM, Third and OTC markets, reverse-ins and floats which were subject to trade sale etc. 
Includes re-financing 
Analysis showing exits of buy-ins by year of Buy-in (Table 5.15) confirms this, with virtually 30 
percent of buy-ins which were completed in 1988 going into receivership. 
The probability of a successful exit through a Stock Market listing was marginally more for buy-ins 
than buy-outs. However only ten buy-ins in this period did exit in this way, although some did so 
highly successfully. Since the end of 1989, flotation activity has increased substantially against the 
record of management buy-outs. Although in the period 1985-89 only 6 buy-ins were floated (143 
buy-outs in the same period), in 1990-92 8 buy-ins were floated compared to 12 buy-outs. Highly 
successful flotations have included Burn Stewart (M. 5 mn buy-in 1988, capitalisation on listing 
in 1991 of E83 mn), British Data Management (L15.3 mn buy-in 1989, capitalisation on listing in 
1992 L18.3 mn) and National Express (L10.5 mn buy-in 1991, capitalisation on listing in 1992 of 
159.4 mn). Another floated buy-in, Pickwick, originally bought for Z4.7 mn in 1986, was sold to 
Carlton Communications for L68.5mn in 1992. 
_ 
The reverse-in technique has also been used 
relatively frequently compared with buy-outs, eg Haleworth,, Kembrey Group, and Hollybush 
Holdings. 
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Buy-outs were almost twice as likely to have exited through a trade sale than buy-ins (Table 5.14). 
Highly successful trade sale exits were however obtained by buy-ins such as UPI Industries (03.5 
ran buy-in in 1987, sold to Nippon Seiko for 1203 mn in 1990), Schreiber (bought for 16.8 mn in 
1987 and sold to MFI for 141.3 mn in 1989) and Coopcr Bcarings (E13.5 mn in 1987, sold to 
Kaydon Corporation for 124 mn in 1991). 
Management buy-ins appear to show a greater rate of edt than buy-outs in the short term after 
which the rate of exit levels off so that after Year 5a lower proportion of buy-ins have cicited 
than buy-outs (Wright, Robbie, Thompson, Wong 1993). This is consistent with evidence that the 
failure rate for buy-ins is much higher than for buy-outs. It should, though, be borne in mind that 
the recessionary conditions of the early 1990's and its impact on both product and acquisitions 
markets, taken together with the later development of the buy-in market, may have reduced the 
buy-in exit rate. 
TA13LE S. 16: OWNERSHIP STATUS OF PARENT COMPANY BY AGE OF MANAGEMENT BUY-IN FOR 
S29 PRIVATE MANAGEMENT BUY-INS COMPLETED IN THE PERIOD 1981. 
-91, 
Age of MBI Total LBO status 
known at year end 
Percentage publicly 
ownedt 
Percentage Privately 
Ownedz 
Year 1 514 0.2 99.8 
Year 2 487 2.3 97.7 
Year 3 348 5.7 94-3 
Year 4 260 10.4 89.6 
Year 5 169 14.8 85.2 
Year 6 105 
. 
19.0 81.0 
Year 7 62 19.4 80.6 
Year 8 1 39 1 17.9 82.1 
Year 9 
1 
18 
1 
38.9 61.1 
A buy-in is considered a public entity if it has 
(a) been purchased by and is still owned by any public company, domestic or foreign 
(b) it has issued equity to the public and is still a public company as at 31.12.92 or 
(c) if it has issued equity to the public and subsequently been acquired by a public company. 
2A buy-in is considered a private entity if the buy-in company is still privately owned, either by the buy-out company or 
subsequent private buyer. 
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To understand more fully buy-in longevity, the ownership status of management buy-ins (as at 
end-1992) completed in the period 1981-91 (Table 5.16) was put into a similar format to that 
adopted by Kaplan (1991). 
This showed a series of small annual falls in those privately owned for the first six years of the 
MBI ownership form, confirming that buy-ins at this stage of development have yet to achieve 
rapid realisation for their financial backers, except in a minority of cases. Beyond that a much 
slower rate applies in years 7 and 8 before a large reduction in Year 9, a result however distorted 
by a low sample base. Making comparisons with the Kaplan survey and the 1983/85 survey of 
management buy-outs (Thompson, Wright, Robbie, Wong 1993) shows a much lower rate for buy- 
ins than buy-outs or the US LBOs used in the Kaplan survey. For example, after year 7,80.6 
percent of buy-ins were still privately owned compared to 71 percent of buy-outs and 56.4 percent 
of the Kaplan sample. 
Statistical tests were carried out between the sample of 1986/91 management buy-outs and buy-ins 
to determine whether statistical differences exist between exit patterns (Table 5.5). The Chi- 
Square test confirmed significant differences between the exit patterns of buy-outs and buy-ins 
(Chi-Square=41.51, p=0.000). 
5.4 Conclusions 
This Chapter has described the development of management buy-ins in the UK and the 
contrasting pattern of development between public and private buy-ins. It has shown the growing 
importance of management buy-ins as a proportion of the overall number of transactions in the 
market for corporate control. Consideration of the development of buy-ins shows this form of 
corporate restructuring becoming important some time after that of buy-outs. By the mid 1980's 
conditions may be seen to have been particularly favourable for this type of transaction. Not only 
were factors which had helped the development of buy-outs been well established- legal, taxation, 
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institutional finance, development of appropriate exit routes- but the key element of attitudes 
towards entrepreneurship had gained more credibility while original participants in the buy-out 
market were themselves seeking product innovation to counter the growing maturity of the 
market. Despite this certain characteristics have remained different from buy-outs. 
Consideration of differing characteristics between buy-outs and buy-ins has confirmed the 
hypothesis outlined earlier that significant differences do exist in basic demographic factors 
between buy-outs and buy-ins in certain, but not all, areas and that the market for buy-ins is 
heterogeneous. It also has shown that exit patterns of buy-ins have not been satisfactory with a 
high rate of receivership. This in itself may reflect the particular circumstances of the period 
1987/89 when competition among instituitions for'deals as the Mergers and Acquisitions market 
reached a peak and resulted in deals which in retrospect seem over priced and over leveraged 
(see comparisons with the US, eg Jensen 1991). In particular support was found for two of the 
hypotheses in Chapter 4: 
(a) The regional distribution of private buy-ins is not significantly different from those of buy-outs 
(HI); 
(b) Sources of private buy-ins are significantly different from buy-outs (H2); 
(c) Industrial activities of private buy-ins are significantly different from Buy-outs (H3) 
(d) Management Buy-ins have lower leverage, lower entry PE ratios and prices than management 
buy-outs (H4); and 
(e) Buy-ins represent a higher risk structure than buy-outs and are aimed for longer life: 
consequently they will have different exit patterns and be especially prone to receivership (M). 
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CHAPTER 6 
BACKGROUND OF THE TEAM 
6.1 Introduction 
The composition, ability and cohesiveness of the team will have a considerable bearing on the 
success of a new venture (Timmons 1990) or a buy-in. Given that the management, in a buy-in, 
are new to the company and have quickly to establish control over it, there is a need to ensure 
that they have the capabilities to do so. Chapter 2.3 has illustrated the many social, cultural; 
parental, educational and career background factors which influence the entrepreneurial decision 
(and hence the acceptability of the entrepreneur to the financial backer) while Chapter 2.6.4 has 
described the importance of the new Manager in turnaround conditions. 
The relationship between a manager's entrepreneurial abilities and the experience and 
professionalism of his management skills are critical to the success of the management buy-in 
which may result in the buy-in Team Leader coming from a mixture of large companies and more 
entrepreneurial ventures. As hypothesised in Chapter 3, buy-in Team Leaders may be different 
in background characteristics to management involved in some other types of venture and 
development capital transactions and private company owners. Degrees of risk taking by the Team 
Leader are different ranging from the highly entrepreneurial act of starting a business to the 
lower degree involved in existing management urning an already established company into a 
viable independent entity as in a buy-out. The management buy-in may be seen as an intermediate 
form; the purchase of a company by an outside group of managers involves considerable personal 
risk taking as well as the initiative in finding the business and the finance in the first place. This 
will be further supplemented by skills required to develop, the business and make radical changes 
to its operations. 
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Chapter 2.3 described key factors which illustrate typical entrepreneurial backgrounds: age, wealth, 
parental occupation, education, managerial experience and previous venture ownership. This 
Chapter tests propositions concerning the extent of parental business ownership, previous 
experience of entrepreneurship, level of professional and educational achievement of the Team, 
the relationship within the Team between General Management and specialist backgrounds. 
The Chapter proceeds with its examination as follows: 
(a) Personal and Educational background (6.2); 
(b) Managerial and Employment Background (6.3); 
(c) Business ownership (6.4); and 
(d) Composition of the Team (6.5). 
6.2 Personal and Educational Background 
Managers buying-in cover a wider range of ages with 40 percent of team leaders aged 40 or lower 
and 31 percent aged between 41 and 45 (Table 6.1). 
The need to have been able to create enough wealth to be able to'fund personal equity or 
provide the necessary loan or mortgage collateral makes it more likely that people approaching 
the 40 year old bracket will have the necessary financial strength. The 60 percent of team leaders 
of at least 40 years old, however, implies an older age distribution than is normally expected for 
the founding of new ventures, typically seen as between 25 and 40, the 'free choice'l period, 
(Shapero 1971, Mayer and Goldstein 1961, Cooper 1973 and Howell 1972), alsol older than the 
entrepreneurial turning points seen in the careers of USM Chief Executives (Slatter, Ransley and 
Woods 1988). While the average age in this survey appears around the upper levels of these 
venture related studies, it is however lower than seen in the analysis of managers applying for the 
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TABLE 6.1: PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF TEAM 
(Private MBI's) 
Chief Executive "Number Two" 
Age 
26-35(%) 13.8 26.7 
3640(%) 27.6 24.4 
4145(%) 31.0 24.4 
46-55(%) 24.1 20.0 
Over 55 (%) 3.5 4.5 
(Sample size 58 42) 
Sex 
Female (%) 1.7 7.1 
Male (%) 98.3 92.9 
(Sample size 59 42) 
Educational Achievement 
MBA (%) 10.7 11.6 
University degree (%) 30.4 27.9 
Other higher education (%) 16.1 11.6 
Professional qualification (%) 19.6 23.3 
W Levels (%) 10.7 9.3 
'0' Levels (%) 7.1 2.3 
No formal qualifications (%) 5.4 14.0 
(Sample size 56 43) 
Nationality 
UK (%) 93.1 97.7 
Other (%) 6.9 2.3 
(Sample size 58 44) 
Occupations of parents* 
Manual (%) 5.8 4.5 
Scmi-skilled (%) 14.0 20.5 
Skilled (%) 12.3 15.9 
Professional (%) 47.4 45.5 
Small business owner (%) 24.6 15.9 
Other (%) 3.5 0 
(Sample size 57 44) 
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3i Management Buy-in Programme, where the average age was 45.33 years with 75 percent being 
at least forty years old (3i 1992a). Given the weighting of 3i investee companies within the sample, 
this implies that Buy-in managers financed by other venture capitalists are likely to have been 
younger. Not surprisingly in view of the lower degree of experience expected 'Number Two's were 
younger, 51.1 percent aged under 40. In contrast buy-in managers tend to be younger than buy- 
out managers, the average age of Chief Executives in the survey of pre-1983 buy-outs being 47.6 
years (Wright and Coyne 1985) although this age appears to have decreased in the 1980's, the 
average in the CMBOR 1983-85 survey being 41 years while the average age of directors in 3i 
financed management in the majority buy-outs in 1988/91 was 42 (3i 1992b), little different from 
buy-ins. Comparison with purchasers of businesses in Cooper and Dunkelburg (1986) shows only 
a third of US managers being 41 years or older. Buy-in ages appear to be younger than 
hypothesised in Chapter 4, where it was felt that the greater need to raise capital may mean that 
Buy-in Managers were older. 
The importance of parental background in encouraging entrepreneurship was expected to produce 
a large number of white collar parents including a significant element who owned businesses. The 
latter characteristic is seen as important in determining entrepreneurial attitudes (cg Shapero and 
Sokol (1982), Pickles and O'Farrell (1987). In their youth these future buy-in managers are likely 
to have seen what is involved in owning and managing a company and the type of initiative which 
their parents had to use to keep their business successful. In contrast those with professional 
backgrounds would be unlikely to have such naturally strong entrepreneurial talents although they 
may be more aware of the problems of such transactions than non white collar backgrounds. The 
majority of buy-in managers indeed came from a white collar background. Virtually half the 
sample had professional parents and a quarter were small business owners. This latter proportion 
of Team Leaders with parents who were small business owners is lower than in most studies 
concerned with US new ventures where typically over half will have parents or close relatives who 
owned a business (eg Shapero and Sokol 1982, Cooper and Dunkelburg 1986) or indeed the over 
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40 percent recorded in European new ventures (eg Donckcls and Dupont 1987 on Belgium and 
O'Farrell 1986 on Ireland). It is however in line with the 22 percent recorded in Slater, Ranslcy 
and Woods (1988) survey of USM Chief Executives. This proportion can be expected to be lower 
than for managers buying into a company than for those setting up a company, cg 43 % compared 
to 50 % in Cooper and Dunkelburg 1986. In contrast only 5.8 percent of the sample claimed to 
have parents who were manual workers., In comparison Number Twos had a lesser element of 
small business owner but more semi-skilled parents. 
The role of education is also seen as being significant in determining future entrepreneurial 
actions through reducing the venture funding constraints imposed by personal wealth (Casson 
1982) although there is considerable variation as to exactly how significant this is in terms of 
performance direction (eg Storey (1982) noting that educational qualifications are a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for entrepreneurial success). As Management buy-ins are relatively large 
transactions involving managers in extensive negotiations and future working relationships with 
highly qualified and demanding advisers and venture capitalists, it is possible that the more highly 
qualified the potential buy-in manager is, the more likely he is to be able to pass the stringent 
venture screening processes. Good accounting advisers and proven track records can of course 
mitigate to some extent the disadvantages which a person with few qualifications may feel. 
Additionally the educational background is going to reflect to some extent the background of the 
parents and the encouragement given to the pursuit of academic goals. 
Over half the sample achieved some form of higher education and over 40 percent either a 
university degree or MBA (Table 6.1). A major element of those who had not gone on to higher 
education had achieved professional qualifications (19.6 percent of all Team Leaders and 23.3 
percent of Number Two's) and only 12.5 percent of Team Leaders had obtained '0' levels or had 
no educational achievements at all. In comparison half of applicants for the 3i Buy-in Programme 
(3i 1992a) had no formal management or technical qualifications, 11 percent had a MBA degree, 
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13 percent were members of the British Institute of Management, 12 percent were accountants 
and 14 percent engineers. Clearly the level of education may be related to the type of business, 
eg the majority of Team Leaders in a high tech venture can be expected to have at least a first 
degree (eg Cooper 1973 and Mancusco, 1975) although the majority of Team Leaders in more 
general new ventures may not have attained college education (Cooper and Dunkelberg 1986). 
Entrepreneurial literature also suggests important roles for females as well as minority groups such 
as immigrants (eg Hagen 1960, Brockhaus 1982). This survey, however, indicated very low levels 
of involvement for either: only one team leader was female and only four had a non-UK 
nationality. 3i note that in their 1989/91 management in the majority buy-outs, 16 % of the teams 
included one or more women, compared to under 5% of UK companies (3i 1992b). 
In addition to the Team Leader questions were also asked as to the background of the person 
he considered to be his 'Number Two'. In general he followed basically similar background 
patterns but tended to be slightly younger (51 percent being no more than forty), while there 
were several female Number Two's (7.1 percent). The Number Two's parental background was 
slightly more diverse with fewer parents having been small business owners (15.9 percent) and 
more semi-skilled (20.5 percent). While the proportion obtaining a university degree or MBA was 
very similar, the Number Two had a higher likelihood of having a professional qualification 
(his/her specific professional skill for the buy-in) and more' interestingly having no formal 
qualification at all (14 percent)., 
63 Managerial and Employment Background 
The background of the Team Leader in an entrepreneurial venture may frequently reflect an 
ability to cover many general areas but with other members of the Team filling skill voids. In some 
cases where the Team Leader's abilities are technical, other Team members will supplement the 
Leader with other types of skills background (Timmons 1990). 
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TABLE 6.2: MANAGERIAL BACKGROUND OF TEAMS 
(Private MBI's) 
Chief Executive "Number Two" 
Managerial Background+ 
General Management 81.0 30.2 
Sales/Marketing 44.8 25.6 
Production (%) 173 25.6 
Finance/Administration 21.1 48.8 
Other (%) 8.8 11.6 
(Sample size 57 43) 
Immediately previous employer 
Top 500 UK Company 33.9 27.5 
Other UK plc (%) 19.7 30.0 
UK Private (%) 393 32.5 
UK Public Sector 0 2.5 
Overseas Company 7.1 7.5 
(Sample size 56 40) 
In same sector as buy-in company 
Yes 74.5 85.7 
No 25.5 143 
(Sample size 47 35) 
Period of employment with previous employer 
Mean (years) 7.7 8.3 
Median (years) 5.0 7.0 
(Sample size 56 40) 
Number of previous management jobs 
Mean 3.4 2.6 
Median 3 2.5 
(Sample size 58 42) 
Note may add up to more than 100% because of more than one background, eg. general management & sales/markcting. 
Survey questions concerning the managerial and employment background of the Team Leader 
indicated a person with General Management experience working before the buy-in in a relatively 
large company where he had been employed for a considerable period and had held several 
previous management jobs (Table 6.2). Again this indicates further bias towards the professional 
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manager rather than the traditional entrepreneur, the latter frequently being associated with 
moving jobs relatively frequently. Team Leaders often had more than one background indicating 
a move during career progression from a specialist function to general management. Although 
overall a- large majority of Team Leaders (81 percent) had a General Management background, 
within specific managerial skills 44.8 percent had Sales and Marketing experience, more than twice 
the level for Finance/Administration (21.1 percent). 
In contrast and as might be expected, Number Two's were more likely to possess pecific skills 
rather than general management expertise. Almost a half had a Finance or Administration 
background. Sales or Marketing and Production each accounted for a quarter of the Number 
Two's backgrounds. From an examination of the skills of the buy-in managers, the impression 
emerges, as might be expected, of a complementary team with a leader with extensive general 
management experience being supported by a Finance/ Administration specialist. 
Over half the Chief Executives and Number Two's came from a UK p1c, and a third of the Chief 
Executives from a Top 500 UK company implying that Teams came from parts of relatively large 
companies; Number Two's tended to work for a lower level p1c. This supports the view that many 
Managers in large companies go through a mid-carcer crisis in which they rethink their goals and 
ways of life which may result in the impetus to move from the big company to a more 
entrepreneurial existence (Scott 1976). Almost two fifths of Chief Executives had been working 
for a privately owned company. Inevitably there must be difficulties for managers who are moving 
from a subsidiary or division of a large company where they may have been relying more than they 
realised on the advantages of large company support. The range of management skills required 
may have excluded certain which will be necessary in a new private company existence. On the 
other hand the advantage which a manager in a. private company of a similar size to the target 
company has might be lost depending on the strength of character of the owner and his 
willingness to delegate management and decision making. With entrepreneurial factors being 
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lower in the public sector, it is not surprising that in the total sample only one (a Number Two) 
had been working in this segment. 
Background employment stability was indicated through the relatively few number of management 
jobs which had been held previously and a reasonably long period with the previous employer. As 
was to be expected from their generally lower ages, the Number Two tended to have had fewer 
management jobs (a median of 2.5) than the Chief Executive who had typically had three. The 
period of employment with the previous employer averaged around eight years for both, although 
the median for team leaders was five years compared to seven years for Number Two's. As is to 
be expected this is considerably shorter than for management buy-outs: the average period of 
employment for buy-out Chief Executives with the buy-out company being 12.27 years in the 
Wright/Coyne (1985) study. This contrasts with experience of new venture start-ups where much 
shorter periods with preceding employers are common. 
6.4 Previous Entrepreneurial Experience 
As described in Chapter 2.3.3, entrepreneurs are likely to create several businesses in their 
lifetime, selling one off and starting another or in some cases re-starting after an initial business 
has failed (eg Mayer and Goldstein 1961, Ronstadt 1988). Additionally the performance of the 
company may be expected to benefit from this earlier entrepreneurial experience (Lamont 1972). 
It can also be postulated that the learning experience of attempting to set-up a buy-out which did 
not take place may help the process of forming a buy-in. Consequently it is not surprising that a 
major source of buy-in managers has been suggested as either people who have owned a company 
(perhaps through a buy-out) and subsequently sold out but want to repeat the process or 
alternatively who may have been part of a buy-out attempt which was not successfully completed 
(eg 3i 1992a, Hutchings 1987). 
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The survey supported the view that a sizeable element of buy-in managers possessed previous 
experience of business ownership. 28.1 percent of Chief Executives had previously owned a 
significant share of a company for which they worked and 16.7 percent of Number Two's (Table 
TABLE 63: PREVIOUS EXPERI1[,; NCE OF OWNERSHIP OF 
SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF A COMPANY 
(Private MBI's) 
Chief Executive 'Number Two* 
Owning at least a significant share 
% of sample 28.1 16.7 
(Sample size 57 42) 
Participation in earlier buy-in 
% of sample 3.7 7.5 
(Sample size 54 40) 
Participation in earlier buy-out 
% of sample 11.5 10.3 
(Sample size 52 39) 
Participation in earlier unsuccessful 
buy-out attempt 
% of sample 16.7 16.7 
(Sample size 54 42) 
6.3). Such characteristics appear to confirm more general new venture studies, eg the percentage 
of small business founders in Carland, Carland and Aby (1988) being marginally lower, 27 percent, 
although considerably more than the 15 percent in Turok and Richardson's (1991) West Lothian 
survey. I (1992a) confirm that a significant source of managers for buy-ins is the second time 
entrepreneur. Venture capitalists in screening the new proposal could be expected to find this 
track record in independent business attractive (Shaw 1988) while the Team Leaders themselves 
would be well aware of the problems involved in running a private company. As indicated above 
major sources of such Team Leaders could be expected to be managers who had completed buy- 
outs before or others who had attempted a buy-out, failed but who had impressed their potential 
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backers. This was confirmed in that 11.5 percent of Chief Executives had participated in an earlier 
buy-out, and a further 16.7 percent had tried unsuccessfully to complete a buy-out (Table 6.3). 
A small number of Chief Executives (3.7 percent) and a larger number of Number Two's (7.5 
percent) were taking part in their second management buy-in. 
6.5 Composition of the Team 
Successful entrepreneurs search out people and form and build a team based on what the 
opportunities require. The lead entrepreneur will be supplemented by a Team which fills any 
major voids in marketing, technical aspects and finance. While there may be overlapping and 
sharing of responsibilities, team members need to complement, not duplicate, the lead 
entrepreneur's capabilities and those of other Team members (Timmons 1990). The size of the 
team is also clearly a matter where major differences may emerge in buy-in practice: some target 
companies are likely to be too small initially to be able to support a large team or even a 
relatively small non-opdrating team (although expansion plans agreed at the time of buy-in may 
indicate that reserves of people should be carried) while others may be able to do so. However 
the flexibility of approach to management re-organisation may indicate that a small team which 
can be supplemented by others once the management problems of the target company have been 
properly identified could be preferable. Incumbent management have also to be properly assessed. 
Additionally consideration has to be made as to whether it is best to have a team who have 
worked together before or alternatively have been brought together because of their skills. 
The survey indicated that teams when initially approaching financing institutions were reasonably 
small (Table 6.4) normally consisting of two people. By the time of the buy-in the average size 
had risen to 2.4 as attempts were made to reduce initial skills gaps. Ibis was considerably less than 
in buy-out surveys, eg 4 in the earlier survey (Wright an Id Coyne 1985) or 5.5 in the later survey 
(Wright et al 1992) and between'an average 3 or 4 in 1989/91 management in the majority buy- 
outs (3i 1992b); this is unlikely to be fully accounted for just by size differences between the deals 
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TABLE 6.4: COMPOSITION OF TEAM AND BOARD 
(Private MBI's) 
Mean Median Standard Sample 
Deviation Size 
Number in buy-in team when orginally 1.9 2 P. 995 59 
approaching financier 
Final number in buy-in team at time of 2.4 2 1.585 59 
purchase 
Number of existing senior managers taking 1.2 0 2.048 57 
voting equity 
Number of other employees taking voting 0.6 0 3.973 57 
equity 
ta number of directors 3.4 13 1 1.520 1 58 
Number of non-executive directors 0.8 
11 1 0.869 1 55 
although this is important. Although, on average, at least one incumbent senior manager took 
voting equity, there was a median of zero implying that the extension of equity to existing 
managers may be more a feature of the larger private buy-in. The final board typically comprised 
three directors, which included the appointment of one non-executive director. This implies a 
higher degree of involvement of non-executives than in buy-outs. For instance in the 1983/85 
CMBOR survey only 14.8 percent of the sample had a nominated Chairman and 40.1 percent 
nominated non-executive directors while 35 % of the 3i sample of management in the majority 
buy-outs had agreed on a non-Executive director from the outset (3i 1992b). Given the 
importance of monitoring to ensure performance gains, these percentages may be seen as low. 
A relatively small size of team may result in there being significant skills gaps (Timmons 1990, 
Chatterjee 1988). Should there not be incumbent management with suitable abilities and skills, 
additional new management may need to be recruited to fill any gaps shortly after buy-in or be 
covered in another way until the size and profitability of the company can justify the expense 
(Table 6.5). Virtually a third of buy-in Chief Executives recognised that there was a gap in the 
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financial expertise of the original team with there being other signiricant shortfalls in terms of 
production and marketing skills in about a third of the cases. 
TABLE 6.5: PROFESSIONAIýSKILLS GAP IN THE ORGINAL 
BUY-IN TEAM 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Finance 31.0 
Marketing 19.0 
Production 22.4 
Other 8.6 
L- 
(Sample size 58) 
A key role for the institution in initial screening and early post-investment monitoring is in 
assessing when additions should be made to the team and whether they should be picked at an 
early stage by the team leader or later through a more general selection process. Other issues 
concern the method by which the team was picked and whether the members had worked 
together before or had some previous form of contact. Considerable dangers may be expected to 
e)dst where members of teams did not know each other well. The team's ability to work together 
and act cohesively as a team in the early stages after completion of a buy-in, when they may be 
in an unfriendly environment and subject to pressures which may be new to them, may be a 
necessary, but not sufficient reason, for the success of the buy-in. 
In this context 96.4 percent of a base sample of 44 responding to this question declared that they 
had actually known each other before (Table 6.6). Of those that had and responded to a sub- 
question (a base sample of 37) over three quarters had worked in the same organisation, almost 
half had known each other through professional contact and a third through social contact. 
I 1ý 
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TABLE 6-6: TEAMS PREVIOUS CONNECTIONS 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Teams who had known each other before 86.4 
(Base for sample 44) 
Type of previous contact 
" 
Had worked in same organisation 75.7, 
" 
Professional contact 45.9 
" 
Social contact 32.4 
(Base for sample 37) 
6.6 Conclusions 
This Chapter has analyzed the background characteristics of the Buy-in Team and supported 
various propositions raised in Chapter 4. In particular: 
(a) Teams were smaller than in buy-outs with Team Leaders tending to have generally well 
rounded General Management backgrounds with Number Two's adding specialist skills but the 
small number in the Team resulting in initial skills gaps. Management Teams had known each 
other before (Pl); 
(b) Many Team Leaders were attempting the buy-in as part of a mid career change in what had 
been a relatively stable employment record (P2) 
(c) A minority of Team Leaders were involved in at least their second major entrepreneurial 
experience of business ownership or had tried to arrange a management buy-out which had not 
bccn complctcd (P3); 
(d) Team Leaders were typically well qualified in terms of professional qualifications and 
university education (P5); and 
(e) A significant minority of Team Leaders had parents who were small business owners (P6). 
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CHAPTER 7 
MOTIVATION FOR THE BUY-IN 
7.1 Introduction 
Motivation to carry out a buy-in may derive from a combination of factors including a Team 
Leader's need to achieve, life aims, position within eidsting firm, fears for redundancy and 
financial considerations. His desire to realise a perceived opportunity, develop his own strategy 
and build a successful organisation may make him appear relatively pro-active compared to buy- 
out Team Leaders with 'Push' factors unimportant (Chapter 3.2 (d)). At the same time for the 
transaction to actually take place the vendor of the business will be motivated by considerations 
such as prospects for the company, poor profitability, change in direction of core activities or in 
the case of privately owned companies succession problems (Chapter 2.2.4). 
'Ibis Chapter tests specific hypotheses concerning both Team Leader (7.2) and vendor motivation 
(7.3) outlined in Chapter 3. These concern the degree to which buy-in managers may be 
considered to be more proactive than buy-out managers, the lack of influence of push factors in 
buy-ins, the effect of the degree of personal financial risk on pecuniary motivations and the 
relationship between the vendor's view of the prospects for the company and his motivation to 
sell the business 
7.2 Managerial Motivation for a Buy-in 
While managers who buy-in may be expected to have been relatively successful in previous careers 
and to be seeking this type of transaction for positive reasons rather than being pushed through' 
the threat of (or actual) redundancy (Shaw 1987, Hutchings 1987), entrepreneurs are in particular 
seen to be motivated, by a need for achievement (McClelland 1961). In contrast many buy-outs 
have been for defensive reasons especially in times of recession (eg Wright, Thompson, Chiplin, 
' 
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Robbie 1991, Blcackley and Hay 1992). There may however be considerable dissatisfaction with 
aspects of the previous employment which encourage the manager to seek a move elsewhere and 
acts as a catalyst in the process towards business ownership (Shapero 1975, Boswell 1972, 
Brockhaus and Horwitz 1986). 
To determine the motivation behind buy-in managers, eleven factors identified as potentially 
important motivational elements were ranked by respondents on a scale one to five, one being 
considered very unimportant and rive the most important. 
TABLE 7.1: MAIN PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS FOR BUY-INS 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Very Important Very 
Unimportant 
S4321 Mean Median Standard Sample 
I, Deviation size 
To do kind of work you 41.5 22.6 17.0 7.6 11.3 3.76 4.0 1.371 53 
wanted to 
Frustrated by head office 28.6 10.2 12.2 12.2 36.8 2.82 3.0 1.692 49 
control 
Lack of opportunity in 31.9 8.5 12.8 14.9 31.9 2.94 3.0 1.686 47 
existing company 
Avoid working for others 44.2 23.1 9.6 7.7 15.4 3.73 4.0 1.483 52 
Develop own strategy 65.5 20.0 10.9 1 0 3.6 4.44 5.0 0.958 55 
Recognition of a specific 35.2 35.2 14.8 11.1 3.7 3.97 4.0 1.133 54 
commercial opportunity I 
Vehicle for future 41.8 21.8 20.0 7.3 9.1 3.80 4.0 1.311 55 
acquisitions programme 
To build a successful 60.7 30.3 3.6 0 5.4 4.41 5.0 0.987 56 
organisation 
Earn significantly more 24.6 22.6, 22.6 113 
I 
18.9 3.23 3.0 1.436 53 
money I 
Personal capital gain 44.6 17.9 19.7 8.9 8.9 3.80 4.0 1.341 56 
Made redundant 12.1 0 3.0 6.1 78.8 1.61 1.0 1.345 33 
Allowing for the possibility that'managers m- ay not opchly declare that they undchake a buy-in 
primarily for personal gain, the two most important factors (Table 7.1) were reported as the ability 
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to develop one's own strategy and to build a successful organisation, both having mean scores of 
over 4.40. The highest 'five' rating was for development of own strategy with 65.5 percent of 
responses. Also highly rated was the recognition of a specific commercial opportunity. 
Few managers appeared to be motivated by factors related to negative aspects of their previous 
employment. Redundancy which accounted for 12.1 percent of the sample was as expected lower 
than in most other surveys of new business ventures and compares with 21 % for purchasers of 
businesses in Cooper and Dunkelburg (1986). Other elements linked to previous employment- 
frustration with head office control and lack of opportunity with the existing company- were the 
lowest rated of the factors suggested. Somewhat surprisingly avoiding working for others which 
would to a large extent symbolisc the transition from being an employee to being a business 
owner came only seventh in the ranking, reflecting the relatively stable employment background 
of the Team Leaders (6.3). 
Pecuniary aspects in the form of both personal capital gain and the ability to earn significantly 
more money were surprisingly lowly rated; the emphasis on long term capital gain being shown 
in the difference in their individual rankings. While it may be difficult to obtain unbiased answers 
to questions on personal pecuniary influences, the responses do confirm statements made by some 
venture capitalists in subsequent interviews that buy-in managers frequently develop grand designs 
for the future of their business to satisfy their business and strategic ambitions which may not 
necessarily converge with the financial aims of the venture capitalist. The accumulation of wealth 
may best be seen as the means to the greatly desired independence and freedom from control 
from others (Ronen 1980). 
These findings have some similarities to buy-out survey results despite their different character. 
In response to seven major factors respondents to the CMBOR survey of 1983-85 buy-outs 
(Wright, Thompson, Robbie 1992) ranked desire to control one's business as the most important 
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followed by long term faith in the company, the latter being interpretable as a defensive 
motivation. As in the buy-in survey, purely push factors such as fear of redundancy and fear of 
new owner had low ratings. Lack of head office restraints and the opportunity to develop one's 
own talents were close to the mid-point of the scale. Buy-out managers as well were motivated 
by the prospect of better financial rewards but again this was an above average but not a 
predominant factor. 
A major motivational difference arises from management in buy-ins taking the initiative in 
pursuing a buy-in strategy. In 67.4 percent of the buy-out cases, the initiative for buy-out was 
taken by the management alone and with outside initiators being observed in only 5.7 percent of 
the sample (Wright, Thompson, Robbie 1992). The importance of management initiatives in the 
UK appears to be substantially above levels recorded in the U. S. for similar transactions, eg 42 
percent in Taylor and Hooper (1989). 
73 The Vendor's Motivation for Selling 
While the management team may have been successful in identifying a target, its owner may not 
always be a willing vendor. Where there is a willing sclier, the reasons why he is prepared to sell 
are important and need to be taken into account by the management team to ensure that the 
terms of the deal are attractive to the vendor. Chapter 2.2.3 has described the sources from which 
a private buy-in may come- a privately owned company, a quoted group, an overseas group, the 
public sector and receivership of a company or group. Reasons for sale which apply to both buy- 
outs and buy-ins have been seen as family succession in the case of privately owned companies 
(eg Birley and Westhead 1990) and for groups redefinition of core activities and financial distress 
(Bleackley and Hay 1992). 
Respondents were asked to rank seven key factors likely to be behind the previous owner's wish 
to sell on a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important). A score of 0 was assigned if 
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TABLE 7.2: REASONS WHY PREVIOUS OWNERS'WISIIED TO SELL 
(Private MBrs) 
% of Sample 
Very Very 
Important Unimportant 
54321 n/a + Mean Median Standard Sample 
I 
I Deviation Sin 
Poor growth 12. S 14.6 29.2 6.2 16.7 20.9 2.38 3.0 1.709 48 
prospects of 
company 
Lack of 26.0 8.0 16.0 14.0 14.0 22.0 2.52 2. S 1.909 50 
profitability of 
company 
Redefinition 30. S 17.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 32.6 2.61 3.0 Z14S 46 
of group core 
activities 
Parent needed 4.6 11.6 0 7.0 16.3 60.5 1.00 0.0 I. S89 43 
to raise cash 
quickly 
Vendorfound 19.1 29.8 14.9 6.4 12.8 17.0 Z85 3.0 1.793 47 
"difficulty" 
controlling 
company 
Vendor 6.4 6.4 8. S 10.6 17.0 51.1 1.21 0.0 1.601 47 
required 
finance for 
acquisitions 
Retirement of 42.8 4.1 12.2 4.1 8.2 28.6 2.84 3.0 2.183 49 
e 
Not known to be relevant 
the factor was not known to be relevant. The three most important were classic reasons for sale 
(Table 7.2) reflecting succession problems (for privately owned companies) and key control and 
core activity reasons for divestment by Groups (eg Green and Berry 1991). 
Reflecting the domipance of family owned firms as sources of buy-ins, 42.8 percent of the sample 
stated that the retirement of the owner was very important. In almost a half of the cases (48.9 
percent) vendor 'difficulty' in controlling the company was scored at 4 or 5. In almost as many 
cases (47.9 percent) a re-dcfinition of core activities, both key factors behind plc or overseas 
owned companies seeking to divest subsidiaries, was seen as of above average importance. 
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Lack of profitability of the company was seen as the next most important factor (compare below, 
8.4, with the Team Leader's relatively high ranking of seeking a company with a turnround factor) 
with poor growth prospects of the company fifth. Cash requirements of the vendor were 
considered unimportant; 60.5 percent of respondents reported that a need for the parent to raise 
a cash quickly was not relevant and over a half (51.1 percent) that a vendor requirement for finance 
to make acquisitions was also not relevant. 
Respondents were also asked to state any other factors as reasons for sale. Tbese included family 
pressures in privately owned companies and disagreements with partners. Another relatively 
common reason concerned franchise policy. A significant number of buy-ins have taken place 
within the motor distribution industry. The motor manufacturer's dealer agreement gives 
considerable power to replace under performing franchisees by managers from elsewhere in their 
network whom they believe would make good dealer principals (Menzies and Welton 1991). 
As is to be expected given buy-outs and buy-ins in their roles as alternative methods of corporate 
restructuring, the main reasons for sale appear to closely parallel vendor motivations for sale 
through buy-out. Respondents to the 1983-83 survey of buy-outs (Wright, Thompson, Robbie 
1992) gave the most important reasons for sale of the company as strategic restructuring, poor 
profits prospects and retirement of the main shareholder in a privately owned company. 39 
percent of respondents named strategic restructuring as the vendor's most important motive, 
followed by poor profits (17.0 percent) and retirement (9.9 percent). 
Respondents to the buy-in survey were also asked why the previous owner was prepared to sell 
to a management buy-in team. Responses were then classified and the most important factors 
(Table 7.3) seen to be to provide continuity of the business and employment and, related to this, 
prospects with the right owner. The third most important factor was that the team leader was 
personally known to the vendor. Other major reasons were the price the buy-in team were 
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TABLE 73: REASONS FOR SELLING TO A MANAGEMENT BUY-IN TEAM 
(Private MBIls) 
Continuity of employment/business 22.0 
Prospects with right owner 20.0 
Personally known to vendor 14.0 
Price 12.0 
Timing/speed 10.0 
Franchise agreement 6.0 
Confidentiality 6.0 
Other 34.0 
(Base for sample 50) 
prepared to offer, the timing or speed of the transaction, franchise implications and confidentiality 
factors. Vendor tax implications, no suitable incumbent management to make a management buy- 
out feasible, institutional pressure for a sale and no other offer on the table were also mentioned. 
7.4 Conclusions 
Ibis Chapter has reviewed the results of the statistical analysis of the buy-in questionnaire in the 
area of motivation of both the Team Leader and the vendor. It has confirmed part of Proposition 
P7 that buy-in motivation is little influenced by 'push' factors with Team Leaders seeking to 
develop personal long term goals rather than showing dissatisfaction with their previous 
employment. It has also provided some initial support to the rest of Proposition 7 that 
Management Buy-in Team Leaders are more pro-active than MBO Chief Executives and have 
a relatively high Need for Achievement. As in McClelland's characterisation of individuals with 
high nAch scores (see eg Brockhaus and Horwitz 1986) buy-in Team Leaders clearly show among 
other influences a high preference for personal rcsponsibilty for decisions (the high scores for 
developing own strategy, avoiding working for others and building a successful organisation). 
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However, contrary to Proposition P8, pecuniary influences do not appear to be particularly high 
in the Team Leader's motivation despite the considerable personal financial risk factors involved. 
There is support for Proposition PIO that the vendor's motivation to sell the business is strongly 
related to change in core activities and in the case of private vendors succession issues with poor 
profitability being important in both private sales and divestments. As noted in Chapter 5, there 
are significant differences between the source distribution of management buy'-outi and buy-ins. 
This Chaptcr has cxamincd on a univariate analysis basis motivational aspccts; of buy-ins and 
compared them with buy-outs. Chapter 12 will later develop these motivational factors to identify 
typologies of buy-in and buy-out Team Leaders and assesses differences between the two. 
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CHAPTER 8 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE TARGET9 THE ROLE OF NETWORKS AND 
TYPES OF INCUBATORS 
8.1 Introduction 
Though a large number of managers express a desire to effect a management buy-in and may find 
an institution willing in principle to back them, the buy-in cannot proceed without an appropriate 
target company. In successfully identifying the target company, issues arise which are quite 
different to buy-outs where the target is always in place even if the venture capitalist's financial 
projections show that the proposed transaction is not viable. The process of search to find a 
suitable target can take a considerable period of time and may be complicated by team members 
continuing existing employment. Issues are raised concerning'the way in which the target search 
is initiated, incubator organisations, the role of formal and informal networks in the process, the 
type of target sought and the methods used to find it. 
Ibis Chapter tests propositions outlined in Chapter 4 concerning the period taken to complete 
a buy-in including failed attempts for other targets, the use of informal rather than formal 
networks and the type of research methods used, the characteristics of the companies being 
sought and the role of institutions and the contribution of professional advisers in the search 
proccss. 
It examines: 
(a) The Buy-in process (8.2); 
(b) The role of networks (8.3); and 
(c) The characteristics of the Target Company (8.4). 
209 
8.2 The Buy-in Process 
In a buy-in the target may not necessarily be immediately apparent and key factors which might 
make it attractive (or vice versa) for the purchaser may be difficult to discover. The Team have 
to go through a necessary search and analysis process. Additionally many contemplating a buy-in 
may have little personal experience of the process of company acquisition or of raising equity and 
loan funds for a company. 
TABLE 8.1: PERIOD OF SEARCH FOR A TARGET COMPANY 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Less than 6 months 50.0 
6-12 months 22.4 
1-2 years 13.8 
2-3 years 5.2 
More than 3 years 8.6 
(Sample size 58) 
As a result the total time required to initiate, progress and complete a buy-in can be expected to 
be significantly longer than a buy-out and more like that of a new venture project. Half the 
sample of private buy-ins took longer than six months to identify the target company (Table 8.1) 
and a quarter longer than one year. This compares with a minimum of three months from a buy- 
out Team's initial contact with an adviser, or four to rive months for a larger transaction (Wright, 
Normand, Robbie 1990). 
TABLE, 8.2: BIDDING COMPMTION 
(Private NIBI's) 
% Sample 
Size 
Other serious bidders 
-56.9 58 
- 
Of which buy-out team 16.1 31 
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The identification of a target company which is for sale and acceptable to management and their 
financiers may in itself not lead to completion of a buy-in. In 56.9 percent of the cases (Table 8.2) 
other serious bidders were present, of which 16.1 percent were management buy-out teams. 
TABLE 8.3: BIDS MADE FOR OTHER COMPANIES 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Bids made or other companies 31.0 
(Sample size 58) 
Number of unsuccessful bids 
" 
Mean 1.7 
" 
Median 1.0 
" 
Standard Deviation 1.337 
(Sample size 10) 
Reasons for unsuccessful bids 
Offer price bettered by trade buyer 47.1 
Offer price bettered by MBO team 0 
Vendor decided not to sell 35.3 
MBI team withdrew offer 0 
Other 17.6 
(Sample size 17) 
Most buy-in teams were successful with their first bid. 'However, almost one third of buy-in teams 
had formally made bids for one or more other companies (Table 8.3). Where previous bids had 
been unsuccessful, the major reasons were due to their offer price being bettered by a trade buyer 
in almost half the cases whilst in over a third of cases the vendor decided not to sell. 
The above highlights the problems which can be encountered in buy-ins or any form of corporate 
acquisition negotiations. To discover any particular problems which might relate to buy-ins, 
respondents to the survey were asked to state major difficulties which they had experienced during 
the negotiations. Some thirty seven companies (62.7 percent of the total sample) reported one 
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or more major difficulty. There was considerable variety in the type of difficulty identified, with 
no one problem being especially outstanding (Table 8.4). 
TABLE 8.4: NWOR DIFFICULTIES SPECIFIED BY MANAGEMENT 
AND ENCOUNTERED DURING NEGOTIATIONS 
(Private Mrs) 
Number of Companies 
Specifying Problems 
Target co information 5 
Fund raising 2 
Valuation 3 
Institutional time wasting 2 
Vendor change of mind 2 
Adviser miscalculations 2 
Price; final terms; structure 6 
Paperwork; too many advisers 6 
Bank security 3 
Tax; Inland Revenue 1 
Warranties 1 
Change of Advisers 2 
Speed 4 
Other 12 
Total companies specifying difficulties 
IL- 
-- - ---- 
37 
I 
---- 
I 
The most important difficulties related to pricing, final terms, and structuring of the deal; the 
paperwork generated aI nd the number of advisers; and inadequate information on the target 
company. 
In some cases management reported prob. lems in getting the vendor to either make a decision on 
the terms of the proposed deal or alternatively seeking to change what had already been agreed. 
A creative and flexible approach to the deal making was required and in some cases, especially 
when buying from a private source, the way the deal was structured was particularly important. 
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Excessive paperwork generated by the transaction, a common problem relating to buy-out and 
buy-in transactions, was reported. Some appeared to query the need for so many advisers (and 
their fees) and to whether this led to virtual self generation of paperwork which disrupted the 
managers' time. The third most important point, the lack of information which was available on 
the target, was stressed by managers during subsequent case study interviews. None of the 
managers interviewed in the private buy-in case studies (Chapter 14) felt that they had been able 
to accurately gauge certain individual problems of the firm which were subsequently to dominate 
their initial efforts to attain planned projections. Types of problem could range from the 
datedness of audited accounts with management accounts not being made available, to efforts to 
restrain the new management from carrying out due diligence procedures such as contacting 
customers or suppliers. The ability of accounting advisers to identify such problem areas is crucial 
with one of the case companies (The Maids) taking legal action against the company's previous 
auditors (Appendix A7) and European Brands against their accounting adviser (Appendix All). 
Another area which caused concern was the speed at which the transaction proceeded. This 
problem, usually vendor but sometimes adviser related, exacerbating problems of accounting 
information not being up to date and could be associated with possibilities of the business being 
allowed to decline once the vendor was reasonably satisfied that there was a committed buyer. 
Fixed asset and stock valuation also gave concern. 
One of the key decisions in, the buy-in process is when the team leader should leave his 
employment. The -median'in the I survey, was 3 months before buy-in completion with an average 
of six months (Table 8.5). Given that half the searches took over six months, many managers 
actively searching for a company were still working for their existing employer. This both raises 
serious legal issues and may ind_icat, e important personal problems as individuals try to commit 
themselves to their present employer as well as trying to find time to do the necessary research 
to ident4 appropriate target companies. Confidentiality factors in doing this can be critical. 
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TABLE 8.5: THE PERSONAL SEARCH FOR A TARGET COMPANY 
(Private MBI's) 
Period between leaving employment and mbi completion 
" 
Mean (months) 6.0 
" 
Median (months) 3.0 
" 
Standard Deviation 9.13 
(Sample size 54) 
Consultancy set up between employment and mbi 
" 
Yes (%) 25.0 
" 
No 75.0 
(Sample size 56) 
Financial help offered by financing institution 
- 
Yes 3.9 
00 96.1 
(Sample size 51) 
Employers who discover that an employee is conducting such a search may take a harsh view. 
However if the employee leaves his present employment at an early stage, he may find himself 
without any income for a long period. Some institutions may provide forms of research and 
secretarial support to speed the search, but in only two cases in our sample was institutional 
financial help in this period made available. An alternative possibility (used by a quarter of the 
sample) is to leave one's present employment and establish a consultancy. The income generated 
may help to offset costs and perhaps create useful tax losses. 
83 The Role of Networks in Target Identification and Deal Completion 
The ability of the Team to draw upon the knowledge and skills learnt in their incubator 
employment and apply them in a new environment is likely to be a key factor governing the 
search for a target company. As described in Chapter 2.4.3, there is a close relationship in activity 
between previous employment and the new enterprise. Likewise with buy-ins, both managers and 
the backing institutions are likely to feel happier in looking for target firms which have similar 
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characteristics or associations with previous employment (De Quervain 1989). Well rounded 
management experience in non-technical sectors may however result in these circumstances in less 
compelling reasons to seek such similarities. The availability of key members of the team actually 
to carry out. the appropriate research, negotiate and purchase what may be competing companies 
in the same sector may however depend on the previous employer: managers may have service 
contracts, for instance, which expressly forbid them to take equity or even work for companies 
which could be seen as being competitors. 
Just over a quarter of Chief Executives had in fact changed industrial sector showing this wider 
approach to the problem of target search and the institution being prepared to accept that they 
were backing the ability of the manager to apply his skills in a more general context. For Number 
Two's'the proportion of those changing sectors was lower (14.3 percent). Research into sector 
changes in US new ventures show more entrepreneurs changing sectors, typically a small majority 
(50-55 %) staying in the same sector for manufacturing and service companies (Cooper 1970, 
Hoad and Rosko 1964 and Mayer and Goldstein 1965). Cooper and Dunkelburg (1986) noted 
that 59 % of managers purchasing business had the same or similar customers and 62% had 
products or services which were the same or similar. 
A major problem in the development of management buy-ins may be the ability to match 
significant numbers of highly competent managers wishing to complete a deal with appropriate 
target companies. Tbe, balance of applications to join the 3i management buy-in programme to 
the actual number of investments made highlights the problem (3i, 1992a). The method by which 
targets have been identified and the way a deal has been initiated are therefore crucial to the 
process. 
Deals may be initiated in various ways: by the management team approaching an institution in 
relation to a specific project; by a general approach by the management team to an institution; 
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by an approach by management to an intermediary such as a company broker; the use of 
newspaper Business for Sale columns; by the employment of accountants or management 
consultants to search out a suitable target; and by the identification of a target by an institution 
which attempts to rind appropriate management, eg the approach taken by US LBO partnerships. 
TABLE 8.6: SOURCE OF INITIATION OF BUY-IN 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Own general approach to a financing institution 56.9 
A specific company proposal made to a financing institution 43.1 
An institutional approach for an existing project 1.7 
An institutional approach for a potential project 5.2 
'Head hunters' acting for an institution 0 
Other 3.5 
(Sample size 58) 
The survey indicates that institutions themselves play only a minor role in initiating the buy-in 
process (Table 8.6); only 6.9 percent of respondents stated that an institution had approached 
them for either an existing or potential project. In over half of cases the buy-in had been initiated 
by management's own general approach to a financing institution which would then be followed 
by more detailed target identification and help from the institution. Over two fifths (43.1 percent) 
of management however made a specific company proposal to the institution. 
Methods of identification of the target can be expected to involve the use of both formal and 
informal networks. Research on new venture creation generally suggests that informal networks 
play a key role in the founding of new ventures (Birley et al 1991) although experienced managers 
could be expected to use the formal networks more extensively given the development of links 
with professional advisers as their careers progressed. Despite the lattcr influence, management's 
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own knowledge and effort emerged clearly as the most important method for identifying the target 
company (Table 8.7). 
TABLE 8.7: IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET COMPANY 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Buy-in team's industry knowledge 67.2 
Suggestion by your financial Institution 17.2 
Suggestion by your accountants 5.2 
Suggestion by your bankers 1.7 
Suggestion by personal Contact/friends 19.0 
Suggestion by customer/suppliers in your previous 
employment 
1.7 
Personal Research 41.4 
Other 8.6 
(Sample size 58) 
In over two thirds (67.2 percent) of cases the target had been originally identified through the 
team's industry knowledge. Almost a fifth (19 percent) had been identified through the use of 
friends and or personal contacts. The team's own research was seen also as being very important, 
41.4 percent of targets having been identified in this way. 
The use of own and informal networks was thus high: the target was suggested by the institution 
in only 17.2 percent of cases despite the institution's latter role in the transaction. It was unusual 
to use other intermediaries such as accountants, who might have been expected to be in a good 
position to help identify targets. In only one case had bankers identified a target. 
As well as their possible role in the identification of targets, the formal network as represented 
by accounting and legal advisers and financiers will have a crucial role in completing the deal 
process. Others may be involved to provide more specialist advice- for instance on behalf of the 
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financing institutions as a reporting accountant, special consultants to check industrial market 
projections and additional solicitors. The Team may employ other specialist advisers on corporate 
and personal taxation matters, property, plant and equipment valuation, insurance and pensions. 
In some cases there will be overlapping of interests between management and institutional 
advisers (Wright, Normand, Robbie 1990). Houlden (1990) points out the need to distinguish 
between good and bad advisers. 
TABLE 8.8: PERFORMANCE OF PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Very Very 
Satisfied Dissatisfied 
5 4 321 Mean Median Standard Sample 
Deviation Size 
Accounting Advisers 36.8 21.0 28.1 8.8 5.3 3.75 4 1.199 57 
Legal Advisers 49.1 1 28.8 1 8.5 8.5 5.1 4.09 4 1.179 59 
Financiers 46.6 
1 
34.5 
1 
17.2 0 1.7 4.24 4 1 0.865 58 
Respondents were asked to score the performance of three main types of advisers on a scale from 
one (very dissatisfied) to five (very satisfied). All three sets of advisers were rated on a median 
of four on this basis (Table 8.8). The mean score for accounting advisers was below the other two 
with just over half (57.8 percent) claiming that they were more than averagely satisfied with their 
performance. The best result, that of financiers, showed only one respondent actually dissatisfied 
with their performance while 81.5 percent were more than averagely satisfied. 
Respondents were then asked to state any areas of their advisers' performance with which they 
had been expressly impressed or dissatisfied. Ibc responses were then catcgoriscd as shown in 
Table 8.9). 
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Respondents were most impressed by the following aspects of advisers' services. Accountants 
impressed most in respect of their professionalism and quality of advice (but little else); legal 
advisers in respect of their accuracy and technical competence, with their professionalism and 
speed and efficiency also scoring highly; and financiers for their speed and efficiency as well as 
their professionalism, quality of advice, understanding and flexibility, and personal relationships. 
Although many respondents had been impressed by accountants' professionalism this was also the 
area in which others were most dissatisfied, together with accuracy and technical competence. 
Respondents were less dissatisfied with aspects of the other advisers' services, with only lawyers' 
expense, accuracy and speed being particularly notable. No respondents said that they were 
impressed by the experience or cheapness of any of the advisers. The case study interviews also 
produced many adverse comments about excessive fees by legal and accounting advisers 
(particularly for services by other departments in the firm in respect of accountants). The 
responses in general seem to be consistent with Taylor and Hooper (1989) who saw 72.8 percent 
of advisers being helpful. Their buy-out Team Leaders appreciated advisers' financial help, 
strategic input, involvement and advice and counsel. 
A further indication of the strength of the respondents' concern about the performance of 
advisers is given by the extent to which advisers were retained after the buy-in was completed. 
This point is most relevant for accountants and lawyers as financiers are effectively locked in until 
the structure can be changed in the medium term. 
Almost a quarter of the sample (Table 8.10) had decided not to retain one of the advisers, the 
accounting adviser being the one most likely to be dropped. 
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TABLE 8.10: RETENTION OF PROFESSIONAL ADVISER FOR FUTURE WORK 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample Base for Sample 
Adviser retained 76.5 51 
Adviser not retained 23.5 51 
Type of Adviser not retained 
Accountant 50 10 
gal A viser 40 10 
None 10 10 
Ibc importance of the incubator organisation and the role of networks can be seen also in the 
team's preference to stay within the same industrial sector and an analysis of the edsting 
knowledge they had about the target company. 
TABLE 8.11: SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OF TARGET COMPANY 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Those with special knowledge 59.3 
(Sample size 59) 
Of which 
- 
" 
Professional contact 54.3 
" 
Earlier employment 22.9 
" 
Relationship with previous company 37.1 
" 
Competitor 34.3 
" 
Supplier 11.4 
" 
Other contact 14.2 
(Sample size 35) 
The majority (59.3 percent) of the sample had a special knowledge of the target company (Table 
8.11). Of those teams which had a special knowledge of the target,, over half had this from 
professional contact. The target was three times more likely to have been a competitor rather 
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than supplier in a previous job. Over one third had a relationship with the team leader's previous 
company while some had been in earlier employment (though more likely on a group or sister 
subsidiary basis). 
Such special knowledge can be useful in decreasing the risk factors involved in a buy-in: it may 
allow a closer look at the position of the target in the market and permit a more thorough 
analysis of the target's strengths and weaknesses. These reasons clearly also have implications for 
the search for suitable targets: teams are going to have more success in identifying companies 
where private owners are nearing retirement or in looking for subsidiaries of a plc where the 
parent is changing direction and a potential target does not fit nicely into the group. 
Another aspect of the ways in which the target company was identified is through an examination 
of the research method used by the buy-in manager. Given their considerable management 
experience much of it gained in large companies, it could be expected that relatively sophisticated 
research methods would be used to help identify the target and provide essential background 
information prior to the more detailed due diligence work which would be necessary at the later 
stage. 
Responses to the types of research methods used (Table 8.12) showed that while a wide variety 
of research methods for company identification were used, they were not as extensive nor as 
sophisticated as could have been expected. The most common research method for helping to 
identify targets was through the use of newspaper/media reports/searches, just over a quarter of 
the sample using this method. Some use of trade directory and reference books was made (19.3 
percent) and others made use of trade associations (12.3 percent). Relatively little use was made 
of more advanced research methods such as 'On-line' company data searches (also 12.3 percent). 
Few managers used courses, seminars or conferences to find out about the buy-in process. Despite 
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TABLE 8.12: TYPES OF RESEARCH METHOD 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Specialist courses/seminars/conferences 3.5 
The I MBI programme 7.0 
'On Line' company data searches 12.3 
Trade directories/reference books 19.3 
Newspapcr/media reports/searches 26.3 
Trade Associations 12.3 
Government programmes 7.0 
Specialist consultant/company broker 10.5 
Other 5.3 
(Sample size 57) 
the large number of buy-ins financed by 3i in the sample, only 7 percent had been on the 3i 
management buy-in programme, the most publicised programme for potential buy-in managers. 
8.4 Characteristics of the Target Company 
Thcrc is inevitably a wide range of company attributes and industrial sector characteristics which 
guide managers' search processes. Team leaders were asked to score the importance of ten 
different search criteria on a scale of 1 to 5,1 being the least important and 5 the most 
important. 
The most important considerations (Table 8.13) were the industry (60 percent ranking this the 
most important), potential market growth and turnround potential. 'Ibe last underlines the notion 
that target companies are being sold because of their under-performance with incumbent 
management unable to perform the necessary turnaround. Customer base was also important. 
Incoming management therefore could be seen to believe that they were buying into companies 
which were probably under-performing in a sector which they knew. In contrast the shell potential 
of a target, ie buying a company which has few assets but could act as a medium for rapid 
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expansion, was seen as the least important factor. The actual size of the company in terms of 
turnover was not so important underlining the preparedness of managers to accept a 
TABLE 3.13: IMPORTANCE OF CRITERIA IN SEARCH FOR SUITABLE TARGET COMPANIES 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Very Important Very Unimportant 
14321 Mean Median Standard Sample 
Deviation size 
Location 23.6 20.0 23.6 7.3 25.5 3.09 3.0 1.506 55 
Industry 60.0 10.9 18.2 3.6 7.3 4.13 5.0 1.263 55 
Particular 11.8 7.8 37.2 11.8 31.4 2.57 3.0 1.330 51 
technology I I 
Sales turnover 7.6 22.6 41.5 15.1 13.4 2.96 3.0 1.109 53 
Potential market 48.2 41.1 7.1 3.6 0 4.34 4.0 0.769 56 
growth 
Competitive 27.8 33.3 25.9 7.4 5.6 3.71 4.0 1.127 54 
strength I I 
Customer base 29.6 33.3 29.7 3.7 3.7 3.82 4.0 1.029 54 
Asset value 12.9 14.8 38.9 24.1 9.3 2.98 3.0 1.141 54 
'Shell' potential 8.0 10.0 16.0 52.0 2.06 1 1.0 1.346 1 50 
Turnround 46.3 24.0 9.3 3.7 16.7 3.80 4.0 1.484 54 
potential 
target which could be significantly smaller than the company for which they were previously 
working. Despite new venture research findings that new businesses are founded close to the 
founder's home and previous employment (Chapter 2.4.3), the actual location for buy-in managers 
did not emerge as being so significant. A fifth of Team Leaders had moved house to another 
region and almost three tenths of Number Twos. The location of the company was seen as slightly 
more important than the size although less than a quarter of respondents rated it as very 
important. There was a large gap between this in terms of importance and the next highest rated 
aspect- the competitive strength of the company. 
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In analysing the future prospects for the target, characteristics of the overall industrial sector will 
be important in the decision making process for both the financing institutions and managers. 
Financing institutions arc likely to be most interested in investment opportunities which conform 
to classic LBO characteristics uch as predictability of demand and positive cash flow, low threats 
from new technology and import competition and where a rapidly growing industry is not going 
to cause high development expenses or result in sharp increases in working capital (eg 
Easterwood et al 1989). Their risk and financing instrument redemption/repayment will be best 
served through a more conservative application of these factors given their less detailed 
knowledge of the company. 
TABLE 8.14: PERCEPTION OF CHARACTERISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
54321 Mean Median Standard Sample 
I 
Deviation Size 
Very Stable 30.4 42.8 26.8 0 0 Very unstable 4.04 4.0 0.762 56 
demand demand 
Industry size 53 21.4 30.4 30.4 12.5 Rapidly 2.77 3.0 1.095 56 
declining growing 
industry 
Very stable 26.9 28.8 36.5 3.9 3.9 Very unstable 3.71 4.0 1.035 52 
technology technology 
LOW 27.8 31.5 24.1 11.1 5.5 High 3.65 4.0 1.168 54 
exposure to exposure to 
import import 
competition competition 
Highly cash 21.4 21.4 26.8 19.7 10.7 Significant 3.23 3.0 1.293 56 
flow positive cash 
requirements 
Managers were asked to rank various factors concerning their perception of the underlying 
characteristics of the target company's industry (Table 8.14). Industries were clearly perceived to 
have a very stable level of demand as the main characteristic, none of the respondents noting 
anything more unstable than a middle ranking. Relative stability was seen in terms of technology 
and low exposure to import competition. Only 7.8 percent felt that their industry technology was 
unstable and 16.6 percent that there was an above average exposure to import competition. 
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Malone (1989) in asking similar questions of smaller US LBOs (those less than $50 mn) also 
notcd stability of dcmand and low cxposurc to forcign compctition. 
While such results are also similaý to what could be expected for buy-outs (eg Seth. and 
Easterwood 1992), two other factors do imply some difference. First 42.5 percent of the sample 
felt that the industry was rapidly growing (even if demand was stable). Secondly cash flow 
characteristics were surprisingly not as positive as could have been expected although to some 
extent this may have been influenced by the plans of some managers to expand rapidly through 
acquisitions. 30.4 percent of the sample indicated significant cash requirements as opposed to 
neutral or positive cash flow characteristics. These two factors do suggest a variation from the 
normal buy-out concept. 
8.5 Conclusions 
This Chapter has examined the methods by which targets have been identified, the role of 
networks and the relationship with previous incubators. While formal networks have been used 
to ensure the buy-in proposal moves to completion, the key area of target identification appears 
to lie with informal contacts and especially with the personal (and frequently existing) knowledge 
of the Team Leader. Indeed search methods used appeared surprisingly unsophisticated, as these 
informal methods were employed. In almost three quarters of cases this was facilitated by the 
target company being in the same sector as that of theTeam Leader's immediately previous 
employment. The subsequent use of formal networks involving accountants, legal and advisers and 
providers of venture capital appears to work satisfactorily, with the majority of Team Leaders 
referring positively to the level of service provided despite concerns over the costs involved. The 
type of company sought only conformed partially to the typical buy-out norm- involving stability 
in terms of both market and technology with cash flow and overall industry size characteristics 
implying a more growth orientated strategy than seen in US LBO studies. 
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In particular support was found for the following propositions: 
(a) The period required to complete a buy-in was significantly longer than in buy-outs and 
frequently involved failed attempts for other targets (P13); 
(b) With the target company likely to be in the same sector as the Team Leader's existing 
company, personal knowledge and the use of informal rather than formal networks were more 
important elements in target identification than more sophisticated methods of company search 
(P14); 
(c) Unlike many U. S. LBOs The Team were expected by institutions to identify the target (P15); 
(d) Company characteristics differed from those of buy-outs having potentially significant cash 
flow requirements, being in a less mature but more growth orientated sector and involving 
products where there is a higher technology risk (P11); 
(e) A major motivation for purchase of a particular target was the possibility for achieving a 
turnaround; and 
(f) Unlike buy-outs a minority of buy-ins involved Team relocation to another region (N). 
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CIIAI'rER 9 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURING AND EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
9.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 2.2 the benefits of corporate restructuring are'partially derived from the 
use of more highly leveraged financial structuring and the incentives of equity ownership for 
managers. In the case of management buy-ins the higher risk factors (eg lack of insider knowledge 
of the company, the problems inherent in the use of external management) may result in 
structures being more conservatively geared than in buy-outs; venture capitalists will still expect 
some of the performance benefits to be derived from the bonding effect of debt although some 
structures may need to reflect a 'war chest' for future acquisitions. Part of the incentive for 
management will come from the use of equity ratchets. The benefits to be derived from this form 
of corporate restructuring will also involve more direct monitoring and control by investors than 
in the conventional public corporation. While designed to enhance the prospects for the company, 
some Team Leaders may feel that this control is restrictive. 
This Chapter tests hypotheses and propositions advanced in Chapter 4 concerning leverage ratios, 
the provision of incentives to management through the use of equity ratchets and Governance 
issues including the possibility of management finding monitoring and control devices imposed by 
venture capitalists too restrictive. It proceeds by examining: 
(a) Financing Structures (9.2); 
(b) The level of Equity held by Management and Employees (9.3); and 
(c) Financial conditions and relationships with institutions (9.4). 
-- 
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9.2 Financing Structures 
General discussion of Corporate Restructuring in Chapter 2 has indicated the importance of 
financial structuring in ensuring that the performance benefits are obtained. The use of high levels 
of leverage will create debt bonding condition effects which will increase efficiency and while 
equity incentives will also motivate managers to improve efficiency (eg Jensen (1986)). Although 
the same financing instruments as in a buy-out can be expected to be used, their relative 
proportions will reflect the difference in perceived risk, structuring variations between institutions 
and the possibility of a lower degree of leverage. 
TABLE 9.1: FINANCING STRUCTURES OF MBI 
(Private MBIls) 
Equity Mezzanine Senior Debt Other Average 
(%) (%) (%) (%) Size (Lmn) 
1986 31.5 0 66.4 2.1 4.35 
1987 28.0 20.3 47.9 3.8 2.36 
1988 45.1 5.1 42.8 7.0 2-15 
1989 21.9 9.1 S4.0 15.0 4.94 
1±! LY-call 28.5 8.6 52.3 10.6 3.48 
Responses to financial structuring questions were cross checked against information contained in 
Companies House returns where possible. The overall financing structure of the buy-in sample 
(Table 9.1) revealed substantial variations between years. The buy-ins included in the survey which 
were completed in 1988 and 1989 appeared to have less highly geared financing structures than 
the buy-outs completed in the same years contained on the Centre's main database. The average 
equity in the buy-outs completed in 1988 and 1989 was 26.2 percent and 18.7 percent respectively, 
compared to 45.1 percent and 21.9 percent for buy-ins in the survey. As with buy-outs there was 
a clear trend towards higher degrees of leverage in the late 1980's. Leverage, compared to US 
rates (eg Marais, Schipper and Smith 1989, Kaplan, 1989, ý Malone 1989) remained low. 
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Comparison with Companies House records for most of the companies confirmed that significant 
variations to these basic structures were principally among the smaller deals. These included 
management in some cases providing a major contribution to preference share capital and at times 
secured or subordinated debt. Although venture and development capital institutions traditionally 
subscribe only ordinary and preference share capital and leave debt instruments for clearing banks, 
there was a large number of cases where such institutions provided ordinary share capital and then 
substituted loans for what normally would have been a preference share capital subscription. The 
terms of such loans also showed significant variances- some for instance clearly having a marked 
degree of subordination and bordered on mezzanine debt while others were at terms and margins 
which would be quite close to those obtainable from clearing banks. Almost a third (32.2 percent) 
of survey respondents had loans which were provided by the equity leader, and were classed as 
debt; a further 6.8 percent had facilities which were considered to be mezzanine after analysis. 
A major contribution to other finance in several cases arose in the motor trade sector where 
stocking plans financed by the motor manufacturers' credit company, eg Ford Motor Credit, were 
a key element in financing. A large number of buy-ins also made extensive use of leasing and hire 
purchase facilities. 
9.3 Managerial and Employee Equity 
An important issue concerns the use of managerial equity to give an incentive to perform and for 
institutions to be able to more closely monitor the performance of the company (Chapter 2.5). 
This may be achieved by some institutions through the setting of the initial percentage of equity 
on a fLxcd basis while others may use ratchets to provide a longer term incentive (or disincentive) 
if plans are not realised (Thompson and Wright 1991). 
The structuring of the deals in general resulted in management obtaining a majority of the voting 
equity (Table 9.2) with a, median equity share of 60 percent. Although in 23.2 percent of cases 
there was some vendor retention of shares, the actual effective level of this was extremely small 
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TABLE 9.2: EQUITY STRUCTURE 
(Privale MBI's) 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Buy-in team 54.0 60.0 22.545 
Usting managemcnt/cmployces 4.4 0 9.651 
Institutions 36.4 333 19.605 
Vendor 1.5 0 6.075 
Other 3.7 01 17321 
Cost of buy4n team shares (L'OOO) 135 100 128 521ýý 
amounting overall to 1.5 percent. In a few cases existing management were offered participation; 
this was low reflecting the exclusion of cases from the survey where a hybrid MBI/MBO took 
place. Managers provided a median level of finance of 1100,000 for the transaction although the 
average was higher at 1135,000. This is not too dissimilar from amounts in management buy-outs 
(see Table 5.12). 3i have noted in their survey of management in the majority buy-outs that the 
average team investment was between L100,000 and E150,000 excluding cases where individuals 
rolled over existing shareholdings; the actual cash invested per director averaged L40,000 with the 
range 120,000 to E120,000 (3i 1992b). 
This also compares with the management buy-out survey where in 77.3 percent of cases the 
incumbent management team had at least half of the equity and in 16 percent of cases 
management held all the equity (Wright, Thompson, Robbie 1992). In the US even in smaller 
transactions management may not have a majority stake; for instance in one survey (Malone 1989) 
of LBOs with a transaction price of less than $50 mn, management held an equity stake of 50 
percent or more in only 39.3 percent of transactions. 
Management may use several means of raising their contribution of finance. Given the high 
element of housing in the composition of the personal wealth in the UK, it was not surprising that 
the main source was the re-mortgage of a house (Table 9.3), 58.9 percent of both Chief 
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TABLE 9.3: SOURCE OF PERSONAL FINANCE 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Chief Executive "Number Two" 
Golden handshake from previous employer 16.1 13.9 
Re-mortgage of house 58.9 58.3 
Sale of other personal financial assets 17.9 8.3 
Loans from friends/family 10.9 11.4 
Other cash resources 26.8 13.9 
Other 9.1 13.9 
(Sample size 56 36) 
Note: % may add to more than 100 because of multiple responses. 
Executives and Number Two's using this as the main source. Golden handshakes from previous 
employers despite the relatively low incidence of redundancy among our sample was also a 
significant source. Chief Executives who probably would have had more opportunity for 
accumulating wealth engaged in a significant element of selling other personal financial assets. 
Loans from friends and family also emerged as a major source, being used over 10 percent of 
cascs. 
As described above ratchets can be used to increase or decrease management's hare of the equity 
according to certain prc-set criteria. Almost two fifths of the sample had ratchets (Table 9.4) 
compared to 30 percent in the earlier CMBOR survey of 1983/85 buy-outs (Thompson and 
Wright 1991) and 8 percent of 3i management owned buy-outs (3i 1992b). The average size of 
the initial equity stake was much lower in cases with ratchets than for the overall sample, 
confirming that ratchets tended to apply to the larger deals. The minimum median equity stake 
in those deals with ratchets was 25 percent and the maximum was 51 percent. Ibc ratchets 
operated over a median time of 3 years. 
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TABLE 9.4: EQUITY RATCHETS 
(Private MBI's) 
Buy-ins with ratchets (%) 1 39.0 
(Sample size 59) 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Base for 
Sample 
Ratchet minimum 30.52 25.0 19.378 19 
Ratchet maximum 48.21 51.0 1 15.696 1 19 
Ratchet trigger period (years) 3.75 3.0 1.517 20 
Ratchet Trigger Criteria 
% of those with ratchets 
Proflts only 42.9 
Capitalisation 
- 
on flotation or on sale to another 
company 
14.3 
Cash flow/redemption of financial instruments 14.3 
Profits/capitalisation 23.8 
Cash flow/capitalisation 4.8 
Prianciers internal rate. of return 9.5 
Other 9.5 
(Base for sample 21) 
The most important criterion triggering the ratchet mechanism was some profit related element 
(Table 9.4). 42.9 percent depended exclusively on profits over a set period with a further 23.8 
percent being related to a mixture of profits and capitalization/valuation targets. Only 14.3 percent 
of ratchets were dependent on the capitalization of the company on flotation or sale to another 
company. Cash flow and financial instrument redemption factors were not extensively used. 
A further aspect of the financing structuring is the level of incentive to existing employees 
including senior management through direct initial equity involvement or through the use of share 
option schemes. In only a few cases were existing management invited to take small levels of 
equity participation or new senior specialist management recruited following buy-in given equity 
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participation. The more general incentive effect however has been through earnings incentives 
which have been profits orientated. 
TABLE 9.5: SHARE OPTION SCHEMES 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Existence of share option scheme 15.5 
(Sample size 58) 
Applicable to 
" 
Only buy-in team 33.3 
" 
Senior Management 66.7 
" 
Employees 22.2 
(Base for sample 9) 
Intention to introduce a share option scheme 27.8 
(Base for sample 18) 
Only 15.5 percent of the sample (Table 9.5) had existing share option schemes which would be 
a major way of providing equity incentives to managers. Of those with option schemes two thirds 
were applicable to senior management but one third were restricted to the buy-in team only. 
There appeared to be little intention to introduce a scheme in the future: just five companies 
replied that they would be doing so. This contrasts with buy-outs where over a quarter of 
companies (26.9 percent) indicated an intention to introduce a scheme (Wright, Thompson, 
Robbie 1992). 
None of the sample had an ESOP scheme in existence (Table 9.6). Nevertheless the possibility 
of introducing such a scheme in the future did elicit more encouraging replies than for the more 
convcntional sharc option schcmes- ninc of the samplc did rcport intcntions to introducc such 
a scheme within a median period of two years. 
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TABLE 9.6: ESOP SCHEME 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Existence of ESOP scheme 0 
(Sample size 58) 
Intention to introduce an ESOP scheme 34.6 
(Base for sample 26) 
Period to introduction of an ESOP Scheme 
" 
Mean (years) 2.89 
" 
Median (years) 2 
" 
Standard Deviation 2.088 
(Base for sample 9) 
9.4 Financing Conditions and Governance 
Considerable stress was placed by managers on the selection of appropriate institutions and 
financing structures. Accounting advisers recommend teams should approach a selection of 
potential financiers. On average teams approached three institutions, the maximum recorded in 
the survey being seven. 27.6 percent of the sample, however, only approached one institution. 
A key issue in both buy-outs and buy-ins is the control which equity and debt financiers have over 
the company: it is this direct control which can be expected to provide significant efficiency 
improyements (eg Jensen 1989). As part of the structuring Of a buy-in, financiers will therefore 
introduce a variety of mechanisms to monitor the performance of the company to help ensure that 
the objectives of the existing parties are met (eg Lorenz 1989, Wright, Robbie et al 1992). 
Respondents were asked to score eleven conditions commonly required by institutions in 
management buy-in transactions on a scale from five being Nery restrictive' to 1 being 'found to 
be useful' and 0 'not required'. Excluding inevitable aspects such as the financiers' equity stake, 
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type of financial structure advised and banking covenants, the most commonly used conditions 
were regular financial reports and restrictions on capital expenditure. 
TABLE 9.7: CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY FINANCIERS 
(Private mDrs) 
% of Sample 
Very Found Not Mean Median Standard Sample 
Restrictive to be Useful Req. Deviation size 
5432101 
Regular (monthly) 3.5 0 12.1 13.8 60.3 10.3 1.41 1.0 i. 060 58 
financial reports 
Board 0 1.7 5.3 12.3 29.8 50.9 0.77 0.0 0.982 57 
representation 
Change of auditor 0 0 3.5 7.0 12.3 77.2 0.37 0.0 0.771 57 
"requirement" 
Change of banker 0 1.8 3.5 7.0 10.5 77.2 0.42 0.0 0.905 57 
"requirement" 
Restrictions on 5.3 5.3 14.0 24.6 21.0 29.8 1.60 1.0 1.450 57 
capital 
expenditure/ 
acquisitions/di- 
versification etc 
Purchase of other 3.6 3.6 5.4 8.9 7.1 71.4 0.73 0.0 1.368 56 
financial services 
"requirement" 
Type of financial 5.3 12.3 10.5 14.0 26.3, 31.6 1.61 1.0 1.578 57 
structure advised I I I 
Size of equity 5.3 17.5 15.8 7.5 31.6 12.3 2.11 2.0 1.472 57 
stake of 
financier(s) 
Requirement not 1.8 3.6 9.1 3.6 7.3- 74.6 0.66 1.294 55 
to approach other ' 
advisers/financiers 
after buy-in 
Banking cove 10.9 25.5 12.7 18.2 20.0 2.27 2.0 1 1.672 1 55 
Personal 10.9 10.9 0 5.5 61.8 1.36 0.0 1.928 55 
None of the rcstrictions'suggestcd in the questionnaire was felt to be more than averagely 
restrictive (Table 9.7) although concerns seemed to be orientated towards the initial financial 
structuring of the buy-in rather than future institutional monitoring and control devices. There 
was also evidence that the controls imposed by banks were felt to be more restrictive than some 
demanded by equity providers. Banking covenants were emphasised as the' most important 
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constraint, followed some way behind by the size of the institution's equity stake and the type of 
financing structure. Where personal guarantees were required these were generally found to be 
restrictive, probably because managers disliked giving them rather than a direct problem for the 
business, but the requirement only applied to less than two fifths of the sample. 
Post buy-in monitoring of the company by institutions will effectively be carried out through a 
requirement for regular financial reports and representation on the board of directors. 90 percent 
of the companies in the survey required to submit financial reports on a monthly basis to their 
financing institutions. Ihis was found to be the most frequently used and most useful condition. 
Managers during case study interviews also emphasised the benefits of being forced to provide 
regular financial reports. The requirement put pressure on managers to update antiquated internal 
reporting and accounting procedures and meant that more relevant information was available. The 
survey of buy-outs also noted that this was the most frequently imposed condition, with 80.2 
percent of respondents 'being required to do this. 
Representation on the board of directors was required in a half of the cases and was also found 
to be highly useful. While it may have been expected that the level of institutional board 
representation was low, it does reflect the low size of many of the buy-in companies: the cost of 
monitoring them in this way being high in relation to the original investment. It was clear in the 
case study interviews of companies where a non-executive director had not been appointed by the 
main financing institution, managers appreciated the significant, benefits to be gained from 
maintaining close links with financial backers through regular informal meetings, both to win 
support for any future capital requirements but also to gain help should the business start to show 
signs of faltering. A more positive attitude from institutions was expected if they had been kept 
well informed. Those, buy-ins with non-executive directors considered they were helpful and 
constructive as long as they had been carefully selected and could effect introductions to contacts 
who might be potential customers. Again the use of non-executive directors appears higher than 
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in the case of buy-outs, where 40.1 percent of respondents noted the institution's right to appoint 
non-executive directors. This is more in line with 3i, where about 35% of their management buy- 
outs had a non-executive director (3i 1992b). 
In over three quarters of cases (77 percent) there was no requirement to change auditor or 
banker (Table 9.7). There was also no evidence of great pressure being applied to encourage 
management to purchase other types of financial services within a financing group, eg Keyman 
insurance policies through an insurance subsidiary. 
9.5 Conclusions 
This Chapter has analyzed financial structuring and equity arrangements in buy-ins and has in 
general found evidence that buy-ins are structured to reflect corporate restructuring equity 
incentive and control theory with the proviso that the degree of monitoring by equity providers 
through board membership is lower than might have been expected. In contrast control by the 
debt providers (through covenants and personal guarantees) was felt to be more restrictive. Equity 
incentives were particularly enhanced through the ratchet mechanism. 
Specifically support is found for Management Buy-ins having lower leverage than buy-outs (part 
of Hypothesis H4). Additionally the following propositions can be confirmed: 
(a) The need to provide incentives to management has led to extensive use of ratchets to enhance 
the Team's equity position (P16); and 
(b) Venture capitalists appeared to monitor and control their investments in a "hands on" rather 
than "hands-off" manner, with greater. intervention used than in management buy-outs (P24). 
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CHAPTE, R 10 
MANAGEMENT ACTION POST BUY-IN 
10.1 Introduction 
Examination of Agency Cost Theory and the nature of Corporate Restructuring in Chapter 2 and 
their implications for performance of a buy-out company (Chapter 2.6.1) indicated that the period 
after a buy-out would be followed by significant actions to ensure that the, company was run in 
a more efficient manner with particular efforts to introduce measures to improve operating profit 
and cash flow. Additionally the break in previous managerial systems caused by the appointment 
of a new Chief Executive and other senior management (as in a buy-in) may be expected to 
produce different actions of both strategic and operating natures than are usually observed in 
management buy-outs or new ventures (Chapter 3). The requirement for these changes will be 
increased when the company is in need of considerable turnaround (Chapter 2.6.3). Such actions 
will be important in ensuring achievement of the targets set by the venture capitalist and other 
financial backers when originally appraising the investment proposal (Chapter 2.4.4,2.5-1). 
Chapters 6 and 8.3 have also confirmed that the majority of managers buying-in have had 
substantial general and specialist managerial experience in the same sector (and consequently 
should be well aware of the types of action which may be considered relevant within the sector) 
and are frequently looking for a target with considerable turnround and growth potential (Chapter 
8.4). 
The Chapter tests one hypothesis and four propositions cited in Chapter 3 and proceeds by 
examining the following: 
(a) The overall extent and nature of actions taken by management (10.2); 
(b) The extent and nature of administrative and financial actions (10.3); 
(c) Product and Marketing actions (10.4); and 
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(d) Management and employment changes and incentive systems (10.5). 
Additionally comparisons are made with other relevant surveys of management buy-outs; 
companies which have gone through 'sharpbender' and 'turnaround' phases; and new ventures to 
determine whether management buy-ins result in a particularly high level of restructuring activity 
(Chapter 10.6). 
10.2 Overall Extent of Management Action 
71be changes which are required to strengthen the operation of the business may cover several 
general areas, the most important of which are likely to be management, administration and 
finance and product and marketing (see eg Chapter 2.6.3). Administration and finance may be 
sub-divided into pure administrative and secretarial matters, working capital finance and fixed 
asset finance. The changes which are implemented may relate to control systems as well as direct 
one-off forms of action. 
The skills brought by incoming management will be of both general and specialist natures 
(Chapter 6). Despite the leadership and entrepreneurial attributes brought in by the team leader, 
certain skills gaps may remain; these will need to be filled to help in the management 
transformation and regeneration of the company (Chapter 6.5). Typically poor managerial skills 
may have resulted in the systems inherited from the previous owners being too rigid and no longer 
appropriate to the current context; they may have involved poor lines of communication both 
within the company and with the owner; there may have been a lack of long term management 
interest or motivation; incentives for reform may have been absent; procedures may have been 
slackly managed; and important management information may not have been produced (see eg 
case study of Slingsby, 'Appcndix A9). 
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In a management buy-out the incumbent management should be expected to have a clear idea 
of the types of changes which need to be implemented to prepare for the new independence 
although some may suffer from a degree of inertia and lack of vision because of a low level of 
external experience. However, the immediate post buy-out period may be seen 
. 
as one of 
consolidation when attention is paid to the key business areas of management, employees, trading 
partners, product range, cash flow and debtor management and investment. It is a period when 
the ability of management to effect change is much easier than normal (Wright, Normand, Robbie 
1990, Chapter 8). 
In contrast a management buy-in team may be in a more difficult position. Coming from outside, 
they will undoubtedly have ideas as to changes they would like to implement but new management 
does not have the detailed internal knowledge of incumbent management and may be unaware 
of serious problems within the target, particularly where it has been difficult to carry out due 
diligence procedures thoroughly. To some extent the effects of these factors may be mitigated 
through the majority of Team Leaders (Chapter 8.3) having experience of the same sector as the 
target: Zimmermann (1991) stresses the importance to performance of the new Chief Executive 
having experience of the sector. In the short term the I new Team are also going to pay particular 
attention to the motivation of existing staff and the reliability'of information which has been 
given. ")- 
It should be remembered that`ýcertain chan&s are virtuallý f inevitable throt I igh the actual fact of 
ownership transfer. If the target was part of a Group, the severance of previous group 
arrangements, eg group purchase arrangements for insurance, motor vehicles, raw material inputs 
or administrative arrangements uch as payroll administration will produce changes in certain areas 
ýýh' ei in both buy-outs and buy-ins. Institutions will'also ave'id ntified areas for improvement from 
their due diligence procedures, no matter'whether it is a buy-out or buy-in, and the achievement 
of the Business Plan will depend on rapidly implementing such change. 
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TABLE 10.1: ACTIONS POST BUY-IN 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Sample Size 
Identified new markets 91.1 56 
Added new products/services 83.9 56 
Dropped existing products/services 47.3 55 
Increased prices relative to competitors 58.5 53 
Reduced prices relative to competitors 17.3 52 
Changed advertising/promotion arrangements 77.2 57 
Increased customer base 96.5 57 
Changed a significant number of su ppliers 48.2 56 
Moved main company location 12.7 55 
Changed the namd of the company 47.4 57 
Re-organised administrative/financial systems 94.7 57 
Reduced stock level 58.9 56 
Reduced average period of credit for debtors 73.2 56 
SignificantlY increased capital expenditure 57.9 57 
Sold surplus assets 35.7 56 
Respondents to the questionnaire were asked whether they had engaged in various types of 
management action after the buy-in covering some fifteen areas (Table 10.1). The overall 
direction of response (60 percent of the possible actions had been implemented by more than half 
the respondents) indicated extremely thorough management analysis and action after buy-in and 
a much greater level of change than found in earlier surveys of buy-outs (see eg Wright, 
Thompson, Robbie 1992). 
Types of action were then grouped (Table 10.2) to see if there were areas where new 
management appeared to have a high level of action, ic concentrating their efforts on actions 
which they believed were essential to performance improvement. Variables used in the analysis 
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TABLE 10.2: TYPES OF MBI ACTION 
Management Product/ 
Marketing 
Admin Finance 
(Working 
capital) 
Finance 
(Fixed 
Assets) 
All 
Number of 
variables 
7 7 3 3 6 26 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Maximum 7 7 3 3 6 22 
Mean 2.86 4.46 1.03 2.17 1.78 12.31 
Median 3 5 1 2 2 13 
Mean as % 
all variables 
40.9 63.7 34.3 72.3 29.7 47.3 
were re-categorised into managerial changes, product and marketing, administration, finance 
(working capital) and finance (Exed assets). 
On average buy-in Team Leaders did take action on about half the possible actions suggested 
(mean 47.3 % of total, median 50 % of total) which is a high degree of action taken in 
comparison with other surveys (see 10.6 below). Amongst individual categories particularly high 
levels of action were seen in control of working capital and marketing and product areas. Changes 
in fixed assets, which imply a longer time frame, were inevitably lower. 
103 Administrative and Financial Action 
Almost all respondents (94.7 percent) had re-organised administrative and financial systems 
reflecting the changed needs of the company in its new ownership form (Table 10.1). Some 
respondents had to transfer from the systems appropriate to a subsidiary of a larger group while 
some privately owned companies needed to upgrade the level of their financial information and 
control mechanisms to provide information to enable financial backers to monitor their 
investment. 
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Ibe changes to administrative and financial systems were accompanied by specific actions to 
improve working capital management: almost three fifths (58.9 percent) reduced stock levels and 
almost three quarters the average period of credit for debtors (73.2 percent). Financial resource 
management was also improved through selling surplus assets (35.7 percent). Differences appear 
to exist with financial management in US LBOs. US evidence (eg Muscarella and Vctsuypens 
1990) indicates a higher degree of unbundling of fixed assets but lower rates of improvement in 
working capital areas such as debtor and stock control. 
Evidence from the earlier research survey of management buy-out performance again suggests 
more major changes occur in buy-ins than in buy-outs. In the survey of 1983-86 buy-outs only 43.2 
percent of companies had experienced a reduction in debtor days while 20.8 percent had sold 
surplus equipment and 17.5 percent surplus land or buildings. Such actions can be seen to support 
theories which expect significant cash flow advantages to occur from buy-out (see Chapter 2.6) 
There was also evidence of both increases in the overall capital base of the company through 
greater capital investment and /or acquisition of new subsidiaries. Tbc responses to the survey 
indicated considerable attempts to restructure through increased investment, with a lower but still 
significant proportion making acquisitions. 
Some 57.9 percent of the sample significantly increased capital expenditure (Table 10.1). Part of 
this increase may have been to enable replacement of assets which had been run down under the 
previous owners in addition to the straightforward expansion of capacity. This increasing level of 
capital expenditure would help to re-enforce the added efficiency being sought by the company 
and back up the growth being sought from new markets, the expanded customer base and the 
introduction of new products (see 10.3 below). The increase is greater than found in the buy-out 
survey, where only 43.7 percent of respondents had engaged in equipment purchases as a result 
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of the buy-out. The proportion of the sample making acquisitions was almost half that for 
increased capital expenditure at 29.3 percent (Table 10.3). 
TABLE 10.3: CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS & DISPOSALS POST BUY-IN 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample Sample Size 
New companies acquired 29.3 58 
Intention to make purchase(s) 
over next 12 months 
46.3 54 
Activities closed down 12.7 55 
Activities sold 6.0 50 
Virtually half the sample (46.3 percent) also intended making purchases of companies over the 
following twelve months. This also allays criticisms of buy-outs resulting in significant reductions 
in capital expenditure (see 2.6) 
In addition to the sale of assets noted above, a number of buy-ins had also rationalised their 
activities through closing down operations or selling subsidiaries. 12.7 percent of the sample had 
rationalised activities through closure but only 6 percent through sale. 
As well as these basic finance and administrative actions after the buy-in, other fundamental 
operating changes were undertaken. Almost half the respondents had changed a significant 
number of suppliers. Surprisingly almost half had changed the name of the company despite the 
confusion, cost and temporary marketing problem that this might cause. A relatively small number 
had also moved the main company location- , in some cases to a totally different region. 
10.4 Product and Marketing Actions' 
Major changes were also noted in terms of Marketing and Pr6duct areas, which would be seen 
as essential for the generation of targeted turnover. More'than 90 percent of respondents (Table 
10.1) had identified new markets and made efforts to increase the customer base. Over four fifths, 
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of the sample (83.9 percent) had added new products or services. However the need to rationalise 
or totally revise product lines was also strongly in evidence. Almost half the respondents dropped 
some existing products and services. The extent of both these changes was greatly above that 
recorded in earlier management buy-out surveys (Robbie, Wright, Thompson 1992) and above 
that is some US surveys (eg Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1990). Only 62.3 percent of buy-outs had 
introduced new products as a result of the buy-out and only 16.0 percent had ceased production 
of some of their range., 
Position within the market was also altered through adjustments to advertising and pricing policy. 
Over three quarters had changed advertising arrangements and 58.5 percent of the sample had 
increased prices relative to their competitors. A small number 17.3 percent had however done the 
reverse pricing; case study interviews sh owed that this was for instance possible when too rigid 
a pricing policy had been pursued by the previous owner which resulted in sales being lost 
through lack of pricing flexibility ( eg the case of Slingsby, Appendix A9) 
10.5 Managerial and Employment Change and Incentive Systems 
As well as the injection into the company of the team itself, other considerable managerial 
changes may be involved in a buy-in. The widespread restructuring that ihe survey has identified 
may need to be accompanied by the recruitment of specialist staff to fill a skills gap: indeed such 
gaps were recognised above (6.5). Furthermore against a background of considerable restructuring 
going on within the firm the actual practical strains of the first year of a buy-in may lead to 
existing management not being able to cope with the new types of demand, the actual recruitment 
of the additional staff and even members of the original buy-in team not being able to take the 
strain of their ne1w position-' particularly where'the team ha .s not worked tog-e , ther before. As 
explained by TimMons (1990) for new ventures, - management buY-ins . must be seen as part of a 
dynamic process and their initial o'-rg'anisation'an'd'a'greements between Team members may not 
III 
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reflect actual contributions of individual Team members over time. Considerable managerial 
change is therefore to be expected. 
TABLE 10.4: MANAGERIAL CHANGES POST BUY-IN 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Buy-ins with managerial changes 74.1 
(Sample size 58) 
Of which 
- 
- 
Member(s) of the buy-in team leaving 16.3 
- 
Recruitment of specialist senior staff 79.1 
0 Resignation of previous senior management 48.8 
- 
Recruitment of own previous colleagues/contacts 41.9 
New senior managers taking equity 25.6 
(Base for sample 43=1 
Virtually three quarters of buy-ins in the sample had experienced managerial change (Table 10.4) 
after the transfer of ownership compared to a half in the earlier survey of buy-out managers., As 
seen in the case of mergers and acquisitions (eg Walsh 1988, Martin & McConnell 1989) change 
of control initiated from outside in itself might be expected to indicate a high rate of management 
change. In contrast Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) saw relatively little managerial change in 
the period between a company going private and being re-listed. 
The largest single change in both surveys was the recruitment of specialist senior staff although 
there was a marked difference between buy-ins and buy-outs. In a management buy-out the team 
usually already exists with proven skills in the environment, of the particular firm. There may be 
a need to recruit specialist staff to fill functions previously carried out by Head Office or areas 
of weakness in existing management: such problems are however expected in the main to be 
assessed before the actual transaction takes place. In the buy-out survey, 24.0 percent of firms had 
recruited senior specialist staff. In contrast a much higher level of recruitment of senior specialist 
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staff may be required in a management buy-in to fill skills gaps in the generally small management 
teams. In addition some of the incumbent management in senior positions may not have the 
overall skills required to carry on tasks in the new independent era- for instance in a privately 
owned company, the owner Chief Executive may not necessarily welcome the resolute Finance 
Director who might be necessary in a buy-in or in the case of a subsidiary of a major p1c, the local 
Finance Director may be responding more to instructions from a central finance department and 
not have the negotiating strengths which are necessary when dealing with institutions. 
Nevertheless the 79.1 percent of buy-ins which required to recruit specialist senior staff can be 
considered to be extremely high. 
Such behaviour in management buy-ins also ties in with 'sharpbenders'. Grinyer, Mayes and 
McKiernan (1988, p 67) saw the change of Chief Executive being associated with the introduction 
of new functional executives who would manage effectively, share the new Chief Executive's 
vision and whom he could trust. Additionally fresh management introduces a new concept or 
definition of the business which provides a different strategic orientation for the firm (Hoffman 
1989). 
Technical and other weaknesses which may emerge in the incumbent team, the difficult personal 
relationships between the old and new management, and the pressures from the restructuring 
noted earlier are also likely to provoke tensions in buy-ins. In almost half (48.8 percent) of the 
survey buy-ins senior management who had been with the company before the transfer of 
ownership had resigned, a level seven times that recorded in buy-outs. The considerable reforms 
to existing practice described above are also likely to have put intense pressure on existing senior 
management who may have been responsible for supporting such operational policies for many 
years. 
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Buy-in team leaders can also be expected to recruit extensively from former colleagues and 
contacts whose abilities are personally known, ie could also trust (Grinyer et al 1988). Over two 
fifths of buy-ins with managerial changes recruited managers already known to the team. In a 
quarter of the sample with managerial changes, the new senior managers also took an equity 
stake. 
As has been seen in the earlier surveys of buy-outs, changes may be expected in the composition 
of the team. In 16.3 percent of buy-ins where there had been managerial change, at least one 
member of the original team had departed. Perhaps surprisingly this was in fact slightly smaller 
than in the buy-out survey where 19.1 percent of respondents reported a change in composition 
of the team. Given the work, professional and personal relationships which the members of the 
team originally had this may seem surprising. In most cases the Team Leader would have been 
able to test the team in a working environment in his previous employment. However the reality 
of working in a new independent environment may be quite different from the family dominated 
private company or the large subsidiary of a p1c. The ability to rely on a large back-up team may 
not be there or perhaps the Sales Director has actually to go out into the field to generate new 
business rather than just administer other sales staff. The team leader may thus feel that not all 
the team is performing to expectations or indeed in some cases it may be the reverse that the 
leader while capable in a divisional command structure cannot lead a company effectively when 
it is independent. It is not just the presence of a skills gap which may be important. Hofer (1980) 
notes the appropriateness of the hard noscd experienced cost cutter for, operating turnround while 
the strategist/entrepreneur may be more suitable for high growth strategic turnarounds. 
The new management team will be seeking to improve the efficiency of the company from the 
start and may have identified over staffing before the deal is completed. As in some buy-outs, part 
of the deal may involve a staffing re-organisation including redundancy which has been agreed 
with the vendor who may be bearing the costs in the transaction package. With a high level of 
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private buy-in sources being private individuals or privately owned companies, there may be the 
added problem of dealing with members of the family who are employed more on the basis of 
family retainer rather than viable employees and would not be welcomed by the new owners. 
TABLE 10.5: EMPLOYMENT CHANGES 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample Base for 
Sample 
Job losses effected on buy-in 37.9 58 
Job losses on buy-in 
0 Mean 16.4 21 
* 
Median 5.0 21 
* 
Standard Deviation 23.75 21 
Job losses effected after buy-in 31.0 18 
Job losses after buy-in 
" 
Mean 10.5 13 
" 
Median 5.0 13 
" 
Standard Deviation 13.43 13 
Likely 3 year employment trend 
" 
Increase 77.6 58 
" emain the same 20.7 58 
" 
Decrease 1.7 58 
It is therefore not surprising to note that a high proportion of respondents (37.9 percent) 
reported that job losses had been effectcd on buy-in (Table 10.5) with an average loss of sixteen. 
Additionally further job losses in 31 percent of the sample were seen as necessary after buy-in 
although the mean loss was smaller. 
Buy-ins appear more likely than buy-outs to effect job losses, both at the time of transfer of 
ownership and afterwards. However, over three quarters of buy-in leaders (77.6 percent) expected 
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employment levels to increase over the following three years (Table 10.3); only one respondent 
expected a decrease. 
A further important aspect about the internal restructuring after buy-in is the level to which new 
and existing management and other employees are incentivised, so that the company can best 
achieve the Business Plan. The Team itself and especially its Leader will be seen to be working 
under the incentives of equity ownership while also having to meet the requirements of the debt 
providers (Chapter 2.5.1). The possibility of increasing incentives to the wider body of employees 
through the extension of equity holdings may be one important method. Surprisingly, and unlike 
buy-outs, no firm in the sample had spread equity ownership to this extent. 
TABLE 10.6: MAJOR CHANGES TO INCENTIVE SYSTEMS POST MBI 
(Private MBI's) 
% or Sample 
Buy-ins making major changes to incentive systems 61.4 
(Sample Size 57) 
or which 
" 
All employees 42.9 
" 
Direct labour 42.9 
" 
Sales 51.4 
" 
Admin/finance 20.0 
" 
Senior management only 37.1 
" 
Directors only 11.4 
Based on 
" 
Productivity 57.1 
" 
Sales turnover 48.6 
" 
Profits 85.7 
*Return on capital 5.7 
If 
(Base for sample 35) 
::: '' 
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The majority of the sample, 61.4 percent, had though made major changes to other incentive 
systems (Table 10.6). The changes may apply to different groups of employees. In a little over half 
of these cases (51.4 percent) the change had applied to Sales staff. This overhaul of sales 
incentives be seen in the context of the major sales and marketing changes in the company noted 
above. Over two fifths (42.9 percent) of the companies changing incentives did so for all 
employees with the same percentage improving incentives for direct labour. Over a third had 
schemes which were applicable to senior management only but 11.4 percent solely to directors. 
Administrative and Finance personnel did not feature to the same extent as Senior Management 
overall, with only 20 percent of schemes applying to them. 
The new incentive schemes were dependent on a number of factors often related to the relevant 
circumstances for each group of personnel, such as sales turnover and productivity. Ibe 
overwhelming majority of schemes (85.7 percent), though, were dependent to some extent on 
profits. The need to achieve levels of profits agreed with institutions in the Business Plan or 
indeed to trigger a ratchet which was profit determined was clearly an important background 
factor to this. The second most important was productivity (57.1 percent), part of the overall 
strategy towards a more efficient and profitable organisation. Sales turnover was the next most 
important (48.6 percent) again illustrating the new methods being applied to sales generation. 
10.6 Differences In Post Buy-in Actions with Management Buy-outs, Sharpbenders, Turnarounds 
and New Ventures 
This Section extends the discussion of the descriptive statistics on management buy-in actions to 
determine the existence of statistically valid differences between buy-ins and buy-outs and other 
relevant studies such as sha'rpbenders, turnarounds and new ventures. Statistical distributions 
published in other surveys are examined in, comparison with buy-ins using z-tests to compare areas 
of difference. Clearly comparisons have to be seen in the context of different time frames and 
variations which may exist in the exact wording of questions. Opler (1992) for instance has noted 
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the difficulties of comparing surveys of early and late 1980's LBOs because of differing economic 
conditions, pricing and interest rates. Tbe survey of management buy-outs completed in 1983-85 
covered a period when the economy was recovering from recession, many firms having had 
important cost cutting programmes during the recession and were now embarking into a more 
expansionary economic phase. In contrast the buy-ins were completed once expansion had started 
and up to the high point of the economic cycle. By the time of the survey they had been faced 
with high interest rates and declining demand and were having to implement relevant action. 
Analysis of problems faced by the buy-in companies (as opposed to the type of actions taken) is 
discussed in Chapter 11. 
(a) Buy-outs 
To idcntify the significant differenccs in post dcal charactcristics bctwcen buy-outs and buy-ins, 
Z-Tests were carried out on the results of this buy-in survey and the earlier 1983-85 CMBOR 
buy-out survey for certain leading changes which could be expected in both buy-outs and buy-ins 
(Table 10.7). 
TABLE 10.7: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BUY-INS AND BUY-OUTS 
Buy-ins Buy-outs 
Type of Action % Sample % Sample 
size Size 
Z-test 
Added new products 84 56 62 182 3.0* 
Dropped existing products 47 55 17 182 4.6* 
Increase in capital expenditure 58 59 44 182 1.9 
Job losses at time of transaction 38 58 25 182 2.0** 
Member(s) of team leaving afterwards 16 43 19 182 0.4 
Recruitment of specialist staff 79 43 24 182 1 6.8* 
Reduced average period of credit for debtors 73 56 43 182 4.0* 
Notes: *Significant at the 1% level; "Significant at the 5% level 
Sources: Buy-outs derived from CMBOR 1983-85 buy-out survey, see Robbie, 'Wright, 'nompson (1992)' 
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71bese confirmed that significant differences do exist between buy-outs and buy-ins in terms of 
certain aspects of post transaction re-organisation. The addition of new products, dropping of 
products, recruitment of specialist staff and reduction in the average period of credit for debtors 
all produced Z-Test significance levels of I percent or better; job losses produced a significance 
level of 5 percent. 
The lower level of change in buy-outs can be seen to be attributable to the retention in the main 
of all the previous management, most of them in the same functions as before. The assessment 
process by the venture capitalist (Chapter 2.4.4) will also have closely examined the performance 
of management in their existing positions; it will be assumed that they would not have been 
capable of managing a buy-out successfully if they had not been performing a satisfactory 
managerial function before- implying that there may be a limit to changes which are feasible in 
the short term. While the need to increase operating efficiency, generate cash flow to repay debt, 
the freeing of group restrictions (eg in the area of capital expenditure or marketing initiatives) 
and reduction in costs of compliance especially in the case of going privates does result in major 
changes, these are at a very lower level than buy-ins. The influence of the new debt and equity 
holders in buy-outs should result in both buy-outs and buy-ins having much improved cash 
management. Many buy-outs do appear to behave in this way, but the additional pressures in a 
buy-in including a potentially higher degree of existing under-performance results in a significantly 
higher degree of change. In terms of fixed assets, no significant statistical difference was noted 
in capital expenditure. Hofer (1980) and Hoffman (1988) both stress the necessity of changing 
the senior management to derive major improvements in performance. 
Various differences were noted terms of management themselves and employees. Initial job losses 
were significantly lower (5 percent level) than in buy-ins, although it is possible that in some the 
vendor may be more likely to have engaged in employment restructuring before completion of 
a buy-out. The buy-in was significantly more likely to recruit specialist staff, reflecting the skills 
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gaps identified in the team. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there was little difference in team 
stability. Ibis suggests not only that the team has been well chosen by the Leader but that the 
qualities required in introducing new management have the desired effect in terms of effecting 
other necessary management changes. 
(b) Turnarounds 
Comparisons are made with Slatter's survey of forty UK public company turnaround situations, 
ten of which were classified as unsuccessful in that they finally became insolvent (Slattcr 1984). 
Comparisons are show between buy-ins and both the successful and the failed recovery companies. 
The date of turnaround was some years earlier than the buy-in survey, companies were in general 
larger and category headings may not necessarily have been identical between the two surveys. 
TABLE 10.8: COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT BUY-INS WITH SLATTER 
TYPE OF ACTION Slatter 
successful 
recovery 
Slatter 
failed 
recovery 
Buy- 
ins 
Z-Test 
mbi v 
Successful 
Z-Test mbi 
v 
unsuccessful 
Asset Reduction 93 50 36173 2.34** 1.46 
Change in Management 87 60 74 1.40 0.91 
Financial Control 70 50 95 3.21* 3.91* 
Cost Reduction 63 90 n/a 
- - 
Debt 
restructuring/rinancial 
53 20 n/a 
Improved marketing 50, 50 77/91 4.27* 3.33* 
Organisational Changes 47 20, 95 5.05* 5.91* 
Product Market Changes 40 30 84 4.15* 3.67* 
Growth via Acquisitions 30 10 29 0.10 1.34 
Investment 30 10 58 2.48** 2.79* 
Sample Size 30 10 52/57 
Significant at the I percent level 
Significant at the 5 percent level 
Note: Derived from Slatter (1984) 
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Despite the need for change in corporate turnround as identified by Slatter and in management 
buy-ins as hypothesised in this thesis, in only two out of a possible eight areas could significant 
differences between management buy-ins and successful turnarounds not be identified (Table 
10.8). In two of these, * asset reduction and investment, differences were noted at the 5 percent 
level. 
Significant differences were seen in a wide area of administrative, financial and marketing/product 
areas despite some of the areas of action noted by Slatter having a very high take-up rate. For 
instance, while 70 percent of the successful Slatter companies had improved financial control the 
rate of action in buy-ins, (95 percent) produced a difference which was significant at the 1 percent 
level. Organisational change, marketing and product market changes also returned differences at 
this level. 
Less robust changes were noted in terms of financial changes involving Exed assets. Investment, 
although producing a difference with unsuccessful recoveries at the 1 percent level, produced one 
of 5 percent for the successful companies. There was no statistical difference in terms of growth 
via acquisitions. Overall asset reduction produced a difference at the 5 percent level with recovery 
companies. 
No difference was found in the area of management change, the element of buy-ins undergoing 
management change being midway between the successful and failed recovery cases. 
Overall management buy-ins can be seen to have involved more overall management change than 
in the turnaround companies examined by Slatter. Management buy-ins appear to involve a higher 
degree of financial, organisational, product and marketing change although actions on investment 
and acquisitions show less significant differences. Both types. of transaction involVe high degrees 
of management change. 
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(c) Sharpbenders 
Comparison was made with Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan's survey of 25 sharpbender companies 
as described earlier (Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988). As outlined in the analysis of the 
Slatter survey, important differences do exist in the size of companies involved and the timing of 
the survey. 
TABLE 10.9: COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT BUY-IN ACTIONS 
WITH ISIIARPBENDERS' 
Type of action Sharpbenders Buy-ins Z-Test 
% Sample 
Size 
% Sample 
Size 
Major Changes in Management 85 25 1 74 58 1.40 
Stronger Financial Controls 80 25 91 57 2.11** 
Reduced Stock Levels 10 25 59 56 4.12* 
Reduced Debtor Period 10 25 73 56 5.25* 
Significantly Increased Capital Expenditure 65 25 58 57 0.74 
Sale of Surplus Assets 20 25 36 56 1.44 
Activities Sold 35 25 6 50 3.26* 
Acquisitions Made 50 25 29 58 1.84 
New Product Market Focus 80 25 91 56 1.39 
Rationalisation of Product Ranges 15 25 47 55 2.74* 
More cost Effective Advertising 15 25 77 57 3.97* 
Increased prices 15 25 59 53 3.64* 
Moved main Location 10 25 13 55 0.38 
Significant at the I percent level 
Significant at the 5 percent level 
Note: All figures rounded to nearest 5 percent 
Note: Derived from Grinyer, Mayer & McKiernan (1988) 
Financial control especially of current assets and liabilities again showed up major differences 
between buy-in actions and the comparator (Table 10.9). Stock and debtor control both showed 
differences at the 1 percent level although stronger overall financial controls was significant only 
at the 5 percent level, in all three areas buy-in action being higher. In contrast (and like Slatter, 
above) financial areas covering fixed assets and investment produce more similarities of action 
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between the two types of transaction. Sharpbenders were more active in making acquisitions and 
increasing capital expenditure, although neither was at the 5 percent level. Buy-ins were more 
active in selling assets although again the statistical difference was not significant. However 
sharpbenders were significantly more active in selling activities, over a third doing so compared 
to 6 percent of buy-ins. This may reflect the ability of a Buy-in Team to acquire assets which they 
wanted rather than having to acquire activities which they did not want; in the sharpbender case 
the company has the assets or activities anyway and has to design the appropriate restructuring 
activity, one of which might be the buy-in. 
Important differences were also noted in the areas of product and marketing. Areas where no 
differences could be detected were major changes in management, the sale of surplus assets, 
acquisitions and new product market focus (Table 10.9). Buy-ins managers appeared to be more 
active in the areas of financial control, especially stock and debtor control, the rationalisation of 
product ranges, price changes and more cost effective advertising. 
(d) Smaller Company Leveraged Buy-outs 
Comparisons were also made with Malone's study of 56 US firms that experienced an LBO 
between 1981 and 1987 where the purchase price was less than $50 mn (Malone, 1989). Analysis 
again showed major differences emerging in both financial and marketing and product areas with 
UK management buy-ins showing for every management area identified a higher rate of post 
completion action (Table 10.10). 
Although in the area of advertising and promotion arrangements no statistically significant 
difference emerged despite buy-in Teams being more active, highly significant differences emerged 
in increases in the customer base, identification of new markets and the addition of new products 
and services. 
': , 
258 
TABLE, 10.10: COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT BUY-IN ACTIONS WITH BUY-OUT 
AND VE NTURE CAPITAL SURVEYS 
Type of Action Buy-ins Malone Z-Test 
Increased customer base 96.5 50 5.66* 
Re-organised admin/rinancial systems 94.7 41 6.09* 
Identified new Markets 91.1 41 5.67* 
Added new products or services 83.9 50 3.82* 
Changed advertising, promotion 
arrangements 
77.2 64 1.53 
Reduced average Debtor Period 73.2 32 4.32* 
Reduced stock levels 58.9 55 0.43 
Changed significant number of suppliers 48.2 11 4.25* 
Sold surplus assets 35.7 34 0.11 
Changes in Incentive Systems 61.4 43 1.94 
SAMPLE SIZE 55/57 56 
Significant at the 1 percent level 
Note: Derived from Malone (1989) 
There was also far more attention paid in management buy-ins to the overall re-organisation of 
administrative and financial systems with over twice the percentage following this action compared 
to the US LBOs. While buy-ins also took significantly more action to control debtors, there was 
little difference in other forms of financial action such as the sale of surplus assets and the 
reduction of stock levels. 
In the case of UK management buy-ins the rc-organisation included a much higher level of 
supplier change (four times the US level) highlighting the ability of new management to change 
well entrenched patterns of purchase behaviour. 
While changes to incentive systems in the UK management buy-ins were higher, they fell outwith 
the 5 percent significance level. 
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(e) Small And Large New Ventures 
Comparison was also made with another US survey. Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1989) 
surveyed 2845 members of the National Federation of Independent Business who had become 
business owners in 1984 or 1985. Comparison was made between 1202 smaller ventures (3 or less 
employees) and 201 larger ventures (8 or more employees). Widespread significant differences 
were noted in the majority of areas between the UK management buy-ins and the two categories 
of US new ventures (Table 10.11). Given the newness of the ventures, areas surveyed essentially 
covered marketing and product, early management changes and change of location. 
TABLE 10.11: COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT BUY-IN ACTIONS WITH 
COOPER, WOO & DUNKELBERG VENTURE CAPITAL SURVEYS 
Type of Action Buy-ins C, WD 
Small 
(%) 
C, WD 
Small 
Z_Test 
CýWD 
Large 
(%) 
CýW, D 
Large 
Z-Test 
Added new products or services 83.9 50 1 8.12* 46 4.58* 
Changed advertising, promotion 
arrangements 
77.2 52 3.57* 45 3.86* 
Increased prices relative to 
competitors 
58.5 16 7.12* 22 4.51* 
Changed Name of Company 47.4 6 9.11* 5 6.09* 
Dropped existing products or 
services 
47.3 20 4.43* 12 4.73* 
Reduced prices relative to 
competitors 
17.3 15 0.38 11 1.02 
Moved main company location 12.7 16 0.73 19 0.95 
Lost Part of Team 16.1 53 4.63* 30 1.52 
SAMPLE SIZE 52/57 
- ------------ 
405 (av) 
L_ - 
92(av) 
I 
Significant at the I percent level 
Note: Derived from Cooper, Woo & Dunkelberg (1989) 
In the area of product and marketing, the UK management buy-ins exhibited a higher degree of 
change than the US new ventures., The addition of new products and services, change in 
advertising, promotion arrangements, price increases relative to competitors and the dropping of 
existing products all produced differences at the 1 percent level with both the large and small US 
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new ventures. Ilere was however little difference in the area of reduction of prices relative to 
competitors. Given the youth of the latter companies, and the need for them to adapt quickly to 
changing market circumstances to establish and rapidly consolidate their position, the extent of 
management buy-in action is notable. 
In terms of the composition of the Team and senior management, both small and large US new 
ventures were more likely to lose part of the team than UK management buy-ins, although there 
was no significant difference in terms of management buy-ins and the larger companies in the US 
survey. Ilcre was little difference between the two surveys in the area of change of main 
company location. 
TABLE 10.12: PROBLE NIS ENCOUNTERED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS- 
COMPARISON OF MBI'S WITH COOPER, WOO & DUNKELBERG SURVEY 
Type of Problem Buy-ins CW, D Z-Test CWD Z-Test 
(%) Small Large 
Decline in Market 
" no serious problem 9 9 0 10 0.28 
" serious problem 36 60 5.76* 48 1.44 
Competitive Pressures 
" no serious problem 6 4 0.69 8 0.33 
" serious problem 20 45 3.50* 31 1.46 
Family Demands, Health problems 
" no serious problem 4 3 0.40 2 0.73 
" serious problem 59 60 0.14 69 1.24 
Availability of credit or finance - 
" no serious problem 11 9 0.47 17 0.90 
" serious problem 36 60 3.32* 53 1.97** 
Sample Size 53/56 418(av) 98(av) 
Significant at the I% level 
Significant at the 5% level 
Note both surveys based on responses on 5 point scales ranging from 'no serious problems' to 'serious 
problems'. In the case of Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1989) figures, sample size refers to the average 
number of usable responses across all variables. 
Cooper, Woo and Dunkclburg also described problems which may be found in the de'velopmcnt 
of a business, grading the degree of problem on a5 point scale. Comparisons can be made with 
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some virtually identical questions in the management buy-in survey (Table 10.12). Little relative 
change in terms of statistical difference was seen between the problems encountered by the larger 
new ventures and management buy-ins in the areas of decline in market, competitive pressures, 
family demands or health problems and the availability of credit, or finance although the 
proportion of those in the US survey citing the last as a serious problem was, just, significantly 
different at the 5 percent level from the UK management buy-in respondents. Differences were 
however noted with US small venture respondents encountering serious problems in decline of 
market, competitive pressures and availability of credit or finance. 
10.7 Conclusions 
Chapter 10 has supported the view that following buy-in there is a period of considerable and 
intense managerial activity during which many key procedures are analyzed and changes made to 
established practices especially in the areas of sales and marketing and administration and finance. 
Changes implemented to enhance operating efficiency as well as to control financial exposure 
(revision of overall financial systems, stock and debtor reduction) imply the influence of Agency 
Cost Tbeory and debt bonding considerations. Despite the need to re-organise, buy-ins, in general, 
do not appear to belong to the 'unbundling' of assets school of thought. The entrepreneurial 
aspects involved in searching for new opportunities especially in the area of marketing and 
product development support the entrepreneurial element of the buy-in. Overall theories 
concerning the influence of new management in under-performing and turnround companies can 
be seen in the overall high level of action. 
While high degrees of action were to be expected in management buy-ins, they are also assumed 
in other areas such as management buy-outs,, early stage ventures and companies requiring 
turnround. Chapter 15.6 examined the extent of buy-in re-organisation compared to these other 
forms to assess whether buy-ins do represent a particularly active form of re-organisation. 
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Ibis examination showed buy-in Team Leaders being, - in general, extremely active in comparison 
with these other types of change, despite their own need for implementing reýorganisation and 
new systems. In particular buy-ins can be seen to be particularly innovative in the addition of new 
products and services (significantly different at the 1 percent area compared with all the other 
surveys) and in overall changes to administrative and financial systems and especially working 
capital management. The extent of the higher degree of action compared with management buy- 
outs was considerable helping to confirm that major differences do exist between the two types 
of transaction. 
It was also notable that significant differences did not exist in some of the areas. The managerial 
re-organisation in turnaround and sharpbender cases did not appear significantly different 
(reflecting the new ideas coming from outside) while no significant differences appeared in terms 
of acquisitions of new companies and only week differences in the area of capital expenditure and 
the sale of surplus assets. 
For management buy-ins this, greater overhaul of methods may be expected to lead to more 
efficient operation and help the long term profitability of the company although short term costs 
may be incurred. The sample appeared to be relatively expansionary in their changes to capital 
expenditure programmes, limited acquisitions of new businesses and their expected employment 
trends. As part of this overall restructuring and positioning of the firm, the majority of firms 
introduced new incentive systems which were reasonably spread throughout the company and had 
a strong profits bias. The implications of these for profit trends will be discussed in Chapter 16. 
In terms of the hypotheses and propositions outlined in Chapter 3, support is found for the 
following: 
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(a) Management buy-ins are followed by a period of a high rate of change in a company which 
is especially pronounced in the areas of finance and product and marketing (P20); 
(b) The level of financial actions taken after buy-ins is high id relation to improving working and 
total capital ratios reflecting the need to service debt. Fixed asset change (acquisitions, sell-offs, 
unbundling) was carried out to a lesser extent than working capital action (P21); 
(c) Major marketing changes are implemented including a high degree of rationalisation of 
product ranges and the introduction of new advertising and promotion arrangements (P22); 
(d) Managerial re-organisation is a particular feature involving a high degree of change relative 
to buy-outs and including the recruitment of both senior specialists and former colleagues as 
Directors (P23); and 
(e) Comparison of actions with other types of transaction- management buy-outs, new ventures 
and turnround/sharpbenders- reflect some significant differences in the extent of financial and 
marketing changes (H5). 
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CHAPTER 11 
POST BUY-IN PERFORMANCE AND REALISATION 
11.1 Introduction 
Key to the future of the company is the actual performance of the company in relation to the 
original Business Plan agreed with institutions. Chapter 2 reviewed both the theoretical reasons 
for expecting changes in profitability which may derive from both Agency and Entrepreneurship 
lbeory as well as the results of major US, UK and European performance studies of management 
and leveraged buy-outs. Significant operating efficiencies, better cash management and overall 
asset management are to be expected. In the case of management buy-ins these may be enhanced 
through turnaround strategies being employed as well as the effects of the introduction of new 
management (Chapter 2.6.4). Expected high rates of action to improve performance have been 
confirmed in Chapter 10. Entrepreneurship theory would also imply that buy-in managers may 
wish to seize new marketing and product opportunities and through innovative behaviour to 
increase the turnover of the target company. Additionally factors such as education, family 
background and entrepreneurship experience may also affect performance. The need to exit and 
to control for exit was seen as an essential part of the buy-out life cycle theory (Chapter 2.6.6). 
UK surveys of management buy-outs (eg Wright and Coyne 1985, Hanney 1986, Houlden and 
Brookes 1989, Bannock, 1990a and Wright, Thompson and Robbie 1992) have all confirmed the 
short term improvements in profitability although longer term implications remain unclear. This 
survey is of companies which are still too young to produce long term evidence. Results may also 
be distorted by general economic, financial and business effects (eg Opler 1992) while rectifying 
reasons for earlier under-performance may take considerable time (eg Zimmermann 1991) and 
actual improvement may take longer than in buy-outs where under-performance issues may not 
be so pronounced. 
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Through the use of descriptive statistics concerning performance, Chapter 11 provides an 
introduction to the factors which are influential in buy-in performance. Factor, cluster and 
discriminant analysis are used in the two following Chapters to provide more statistically robust 
links between Team Leader and buy-in'characteristics and performance. Chapter 11 uses the 
survey to assess: 
(a) Performance indicators including differences in performance between companies and Team 
Leader characteristics (11.2); 
(b) Identification of major problem areas (11.3); 
(c) Evidence of further finance requirements (11.4); and 
(d) Exit intentions and evidence of actual realisýtion (11.5). 
11.2 Performance Indicators 
I'lie survey sought the general direction of performance within relatively broad parameters which 
were consistent with the earlier buy-out surveys conducted by Wright and Coyne (1985) and 
CMBOR. As such limitations have to be noted. First, as the population of buy-ins is still relatively 
small and only a few of the sample had completed two years trading and some had not even 
completed their first accounting year as an independent entity at the time of the survey, the 
results must be seen as indicative and an area for more detailed research in several years., 
'ý I Ij 'o 'ý! I; - ,I- -11 
Secondly the interpretation of initial ýcrformance may havc, varicd, given the unequal lengths of 
period for which the sample buy-ins had been in existence. Thirdly as the questions related to 
performance ranges andwerc filled out by Team Leaders there may have been a subjective 
element rather than reliance on accounting data. Fourthly the results may also reflect general 
trends within the economy as a whole rather than just the underlying performance characteristics, 
of management buy-iln 
' 
s. 
Survey participants were asked how post buy-in performance of their company as measured by, 
turnover and operating profit compared to the original targets of the Business Plan (Table: 11.1). 
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There was considerable variation in the performance of the companies in the sample and major 
differences between performance as measured by operating profit and turnover. Despite 
deteriorating economic and financiýl conditions which were starting to affect the level of demand 
in the economy, management had more success in expanding their business in rclation to their 
TABLE 11.1: TURNOVER AND OPERATING PROFIT TRENDS POST MBI 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Turnover Operating Prorit+ 
More than 25% worse 1.8 12.7 
10-25% worse 21.1 20.0 
0-10% worse 14.0 20.0 
0-10% better 29.8 23.6 
10-25% better 15.8 7.3 
25-50% better 7.0, 3.6 
Over 50% better 10.5 12.7 
IL (Sample Size 57 55) 
+ Before interest 
Note: Figures are actual compared with forecast/budget at the time of buy-in. 
turnover plan than they had in achieving operating profit targets. Some 63.1 percent of 
respondents achieved turnover better than planned and one third were more than 10 percent 
ahead. The extensive markctingand sales changes noted earlier may thus have had a 
demonstrable effect in growing the company. 
T 
The trend in operating profit was however less satisfactory with over half the companies (52.7 
percent) reporting operating profits worse than in the original Business Plan; for almost a third 
of companies operating profits were more than 10 percent below target. Expansion would appear 
to have been obtained at the initial expense of profit, but the effects of "skeleton in the cupboard" 
problems and the recruitment of specialist staff may also have increased costs and reduced profits. 
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TABLE 11.2: MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1998 Q1-A991 Q2 
Period Consumer 
Expenditure 
% Change 
GDP 
(Factor Cost) 
% Change 
Industrial 
Production 
% Change 
Bank Prime 
Lending Rate 
% 
1988 Q1 8.6 5.1 '4.1 8.67 
1988 Q2 7.3 4.4 4.5 8.33 
1988 Q3 7.2 3.6 3.4 11.50 
1988 Q4 6.7 3.6 2.4 12.67 
1989 Q1 4.3 3.1 1.6 13.00* 
1989 Q2 4.9 2.3 
-0.4 13.67 
1989 Q3 2.6 1.9 0.2 14.00 
1989 Q4 2.4 1.6 0 15.00 
1990 Q1 1.9 1.7 0.2 15.00 
1990 Q2 1.6 2.4 2.5 15.00 
1990 Q3 0.9 0.5 
-1.6 15.00 
1990 Q4 
-0.6 -0.7 -3.3 14.00 
1991 1 
-0.9 -2.3 -3.0 13.17 
1991 Q2 
___-3.1 
-3.6 -5.8 11.67 
Note: % Changes arc on the same, Quartcr of the previous year 
Sourccs: Economic Trcnds, Intunational Financial Statistics 
The period at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1? 90s was clearly one of considerable 
economic and financial change. As shown in Table 11.2, the earlier buy-ins in the survey benefited 
from a rapidly growing economy until mid 1988. Following interest rate rises which started in the 
Ilird, Quarter of 1988 the economy became considerably, weaker and by the time of the survey 
in February 1990 industrial production was effectively stagnant, GDP growth a third of that of two 
years earlier and borrowing rates for prime companies (most buy-ins would not be counted as 
such) 15 percent. These developments would clearly have had a major impact on both the profit 
and turnover trends of the companies and the actual performance achieved appears more 
creditable given the poor background. 
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It should be noted that the overall profitability trend may be considered even worse as the 
question was phrased in terms of operating profit. High interest rates would have resulted in net 
profits levels falling further short of targets than operating profits. Given the relevance of profit 
based ratchets to many Teams, this must be a cause of considerable concern. 
The 1983/85 management buy-out survey revealed a significantly more favourable operating profit 
performance than shown for buy-ins with only 31.4 percent of respondents reporting trading profit 
worse than in the Business Plan and 39.5 percent substantially better (Wright, Thompson, Robbie 
1992). Hanney (1986) in an earlier survey noted that 60.8 percent of her sample had increased 
turnover post buy-out and 80.7 percent profit. Comparisons need to be treated with caution as 
these buy-out surveys were carried out at a time of more favourable economic conditions. Since 
the buy-in survey was completed, there has also been a worsening in economic activity which 
could imply a further deterioration in the performance results of this survey. 
Deviations in the performance of buy-ins may be related to several factors (Table 11.3) but it 
must be noted that causality is likely to represent a combination of factors rather than any single 
factor (see Chapter 13). 
The year in which the buy-in was completed may be important because of the influence of varying 
economic, business and financial conditions., Buy , ins completed in 1986 and 1987 appeared to 
have more success in exceeding their targets than the later ones in the sample. There was some 
gap between 1987 and 1988 buy-ini but little difference between 1988 and 1989 buy-ins. 
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TABLE 113: DIRECrION OF TREND IN OPERATING PROFIT COMPARED WM-I 
YEAR, SOURCE, SIZE, PREVIOUS PROFITABILITY AND CEO'S BACKGROUND 
(Private MBI's) 
Over 10-25% 0-10% 0-10% 10-25% Over 25% Base for 
25% Worse Worse Better Better Better Sample 
Worse 
Year of Buy-in 
91986 
- 
25.0 25.0 
- 
50.0 4 
* 1987 12.5 12.5 25.0 12.5 25.0 12.5 8 
01998 20.0 25.0 10.0 20.0 5.0 20.0 20 
1989 1 8.7 1 21.7 1 26.1 30.5 4.3 1 8.7 22 
Source of Buy-in 
" Private 18.9 18.9 21.7 18.9 8.1 13.5 37 
" UK Divestment 18.2 18.2 36.3 9.1 18.2 11 
- 
Other 28.6 14.2 28.6 
- 
29.6 7 
Type of Sector 
" CEO-same sector 15.2 15.2 24.2 21.2 6.1 12.1 33 
" CEO-other sector 9.1 45.5 9.1 9.1 - 27.2 11 
CEO's Type of Education 
" MBA 20.0 40.0 20.0 20.0 5 
" University degree 5.9 29.4 35.2 11.8 11.8 5.9 17 
" Other higher education 28.6 14.3 14.3 14.3 28.5 7 
" Professional 
qualifications 
18.2 9.1 9.1 27.3 9.1 27.3 11 
d evels 20.0 20.0 40.0- 20.0 5 
101 levels/ none 14.3 28.5 14.3 
_228U6 
14.3 7 
CEO Previously In 
* Top UK 500 company 5.9 23.5 23.5 41.2 5.9 17 
9 Other UK pIc 30.0 10.0 20.0 10.0 30.0 10 
* Private company 14.3 23.8 14.3 14.3 14.3 19.0 21 
* Overseas company 1 50.0 1 50.0 1 1- 4 
Size of Buy-in 
" Less than 11m, 6.7 26.7 26.6 20.0 6.7 13.3 15 
" 11-2m 11.1 11.1 11.1 22.2 22.2 22.3 9 
" 12-5m 9.1 27.3 9.1 45.4 9.1 11 
" 5-10m 33.3 33.3 1 33.4 13 
" Over L10m 16.7 33.3 16.7 33.3 6 
Profitability of Target at Buy-in 
*Loss maker 33.3 0 33.4 33.3 0 0 12 
oAt least breaking 
even 
7.7 23.1 15.4 20.5 10.3 23.0 39 
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A further possible influence on performance could arise from the source of buy. in. Companies 
which have been part of a quoted group may have had more sophisticated control systems than 
in privately owned firms making it more difficult to conceal skeleton in the cupboard problems 
and providing more up to date management accounting information. In contrast privately owned 
companies may not have the same necessity to be subject to external control, the owner being 
able to take decisions without external interference. The results of the survey provide tentative 
evidence that performance post buy-in is better in companies which had previously been part of 
publicly owned groups rather than privately owned. While 59.5 percent of buy-ins from private 
sources had operating profits worse than plan, this was true of only 36.4 percent of divestments 
from UK quoted companies. 
Failure to perform seemed to be considerably higher in smaller companies than large. Three fifths 
(60.1 percent) of buy-ins with initial value of less than LI mn failed to reach planned levels of 
operating profit whereas over half (55.6 percent) of those greater than E5 mn had achieved 
operating profits at least 10 percent greater than planned. This may reflect unwillingness of 
venture capitalists to spend time and costs in monitoring smaller companies effectively as well as 
the higher probability of inadequate accounting systems resulting in hidden problems after 
completion (see Chapter 14). 
Venture capitalists have stressed the role of new management to turn round poorly performing 
companies in a management buy-in (eg De Quervain 1989). However, the difficulties involved are 
reflected in the number of companies which were making losses before the buy-in failing to meet 
targets. Two thirds of companies which were showing an operating loss before the buy-in failed 
to meet operating profit expectations after buy-in and none achieved operating profit more than 
10 percent better than target, compared to one third of companies which had 
-been at least 
breaking even before buy-in. 
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The type and experience of team leader is also likely to be an important background factor 
although the size and kind of the previous company he worked for may be more important. Three 
factors were examined: educational background, the type of company the CEO had been working 
for immediately previous to ýthe buy-in and whether this had been in the same industrial sector. 
Well educated managers, ie those with a university degree and or an MBA seemed to be 
associated with companies which were most likely to have missed target. 80 percent of the MBA's 
and 70.5 percent of those with university degrees failed to achieve targeted operating profit, worse 
than the results for those who left school with only '0' levels or no formal qualiflications at all. 
Those whose highest educational level was the obtaining of professional qualifications had the 
best record of any of the education groupings. 
The type of company which the CEO worked for immediately previous to the buy-in could also 
be considered to be significant given the different types of problems, systems and controls in such 
companies. Post buy-in under-performance was virtually identical for both those who had been 
in a Top 500 company and those who had been working in a private company. Managers who had 
been working in a private company however were more likely to significantly outperform than 
those in a Top 500 company: 33.3 percent of those with a private company background had 
exceeded the Business Plan by at least 10 percent whereas only 5.9 percent of those from a Top 
500 company had. The best performance however came from managers who had come from a 
non-Top 500 p1c: 60 percent of these had out-performed the Business Plan operating profit and 
40 percent had done so by more than 10 percent. In contrast all of the small sample of four 
CEO's who had worked previously in an overseas owned company failed to achieve the Business 
Plan levels of operating profits. 
A further factor which was considered, a move by the Team Leader to a different industrial 
sector, produced tentative evidence to confirm that the chances of failing to achieve operating 
profit levels are greater when moving to a different sector.. Nevertheless ý there was also some 
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incidence of very good performance also being achieved by managers who had moved sectors- 27.2 
percent had achieved an operating profit improvement of over 25 percent. 
While this section has examined the performance of various factors in univariate analysis, further 
aspects are analyzed through discriminant analysis in Chapter 13. 
113 Major Problem Areas 
Management were asked to score eight major factors which were thought likely to cause serious 
problems after buy-in, with serious ranking 5 and no problem 1 (Table 11.4). 
TABLE 11.4: SERIOUSNESS OF POST-MBI PROBLEMS 
(Private mBrs) 
By % of Sample 
Serious No Problem 
54321 Mean Sample Median Standard 
Size Deviation 
Decline in overall market 8.9 23.2 16.1 16.1 35.7 2.54 56 2.0 1.414 
Competitive pressures 5.5 1 13.0 33.3 1 27.8 20.4 2.56 54 3.0 1.127 
Attitudes of employees 7.1 3.6 14.3 23.2 51.8 1.91 56 1.0 1 1.210 
Availability of credit/finance 11.3 9.4 18.9 24.5 35.9 2.36 53 2.0 1 
-W 
Cost of credit/finance 40.0 30.9 12.7 10.9 5.5 3.89 55 4.0 1212 
Family/pcrsonal demands 3.7 1 9.3 13.0 1 14.8 59.2 1.83 54 1.0 1.192 
Discovery of "skeletons in the 19.6 12.6 25.0 19.6 23.2 2.86 56 3.0 1.432 
cup r of problems 
1 
11 
Exchange rate fluctuations 0 9.6 7.7 17.3 65.4 1.62 52 1.0 0.993- 
By far the most serious problem to emerge was the cost of credit and finance with 70.9 percent 
of the sample scoring it at the highest degrees of seriousness. The extent to which credit and 
finance was perceived as a serious problem inevitably reflects the period of high interest rates at 
the time of the survey in 1990. Some companies in the sample would have experienced a 
doubling in interest charges since completion of the buy-in making it more difficult to achieve 
their forecast profits. This reflects the over-leveraging and over pricing of buy-in transactions in 
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the late 1980's (see eg Dunne 1993). While there was a serious problem over the cost of credit 
and finance, there was less concern over their availability, only 20.7 percent of the sample rating 
it a serious problem (ie a score of 4 to 5). This to some extent allays fears that in an economic 
downturn how liquid and dependable firms supplying capital will prove to be (Palcpu 1990). 
The next most important category was the discovery of 'skeleton in the cupboard' types of 
problem. These cover a large body of problems which were not identified in the due diligence 
procedures and may be expected to arise as management frequently do not have the intimate 
knowledge of the target possessed by a management buy-out team; case study interviews also 
revealed that frequently they have inadequate access to the company during negotiations. These 
problems include such factors as: the presentation (knowingly or unknowingly by the vendor) of 
misleading or inaccurate accounting information; major changes in the operating and business 
environment since the last audited accounts; and the condition of stock, plant and equipment. 
Dealing with these problems diverts management time and effort and may incur greatly increased 
expenses. Theoretically the costs of skeleton in the cupboard types of problem can be limited 
through the use of warranties issued by the vendor; however in practice obtaining compensation 
under such arrangements may involve excessive costs particularly for the smaller buy-in. 
Obvious problems exist in designing control systems to encourage management to be truthful 
about revealing information when observability of their actions is not possible (eg Chow, Cooper, 
Walker 1988). This may lead to the under valuation of the purchase price in the case of 
management buy-outs while leaving managers buying-in from outside with the possibility of being 
over charged through a reverse type of manipulation. In many ways this shows a reverse of the 
position in a management buy-out where managers themselves may be in a position to manipulate 
accounting and other information to depress prices. While in the 'Going Private' case, evidence 
casts doubt on the manipulation argument (eg De Angelo 1986), case study evidence has hinted 
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at the concealment or rescheduling of major new orders or the effects of restructuring as a 
measure of reducing the buy-out price (eg Wright and Coyne 1985). 
Two other factors relating to the sector and the state of the overall economy were ranked equally 
seriously as problem areas: competitive pressures (mean 2.56) and decline in the overall market 
(2.54). These problems to some extent reflect the fact that many of the companies in the sample 
had already begun to experience the effects of the economic downturn at the time of the survey. 
These responses hould also be seen in the context of the earlier questions on the characteristics 
of the industrial sector at the time of the buy-in where no respondents had felt that demand was 
unstable. Exchange rate fluctuations, which could be seen as another indicator of economic and 
financial pressures for some companies, were the least serious problem. 
Human and personal aspects which could be considered to cause the management team problems 
had very low scoring. While the attitudes of employees to the new management may cause some 
uncertainty following the introduction of significant changes, over half the respondents (51.8 
percent) reported no problem at all and only 10.7 percent an above average problem. This result 
bears out the impression obtained during case study interviews that in many cases the arrival of 
new management which is focused on solving problems and returning the target to health ends 
a period of uncertainty and is generally welcomed by the majority of employees (see eg the case 
of AGK, Appendix A8). 
The management buy-in also places considerable family and personal demands on the team: apart 
from the financial burden of the loans which are required to be taken out to finance the 
managerial equity contribution in many cases, the time commitments required both during the 
negotiation of the buy-in and following when intense management effort is required as well as the 
need to move to a different region results in considerable pýrsonal/family demands. The scoring 
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on this issue showed that these problems were not widespread- only 13 percent claiming that they 
had more than an average degree of seriousness. 
11.4 Finance Requirements 
Survey results discussed above have shown that management found the cost of finance and credit 
a serious problem although constraints on its actual availability were not so great. Management 
buying-in frequently intend to expand their companies within a short time period. Such plans are 
likely to result in a significant requirement for further finance, either for capital expcnditure, 
acquisitions or working capital for higher than budgeted sales growth. On a more pessimistic basis, 
further finance may be necessary to fund requirements through failure to meet original profit 
targets. 
TABLE 11.5: REQUIREMENT FOR FURTHER FINANCE POST BUY-IN 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Companies requiring further finance 55.9 
(Sample size 59) 
Reasons for further finance 
" 
Greater Sales volumes 37.5 
" 
Higher capital expenditure 37.5 
" 
To make an acquisition 34.4 
" 
Failure to meet original targets 40.6 
" 
Other 15.6' 
(Base for sample 32) 
Over half the sample (55.9 percent) had needed to raise additional finance since buy-in (Table 
11.5), a much higher element than in the earlier buy-out surveys where one third of respondents 
had reported cash flow problems. Of those seeking further finance the most important element 
(40.6 percent) was failure to meet the original targets of the Business Plan. Case studý interviews 
highlighted causes for this type of cash flow shortfall- the failure of working capital management 
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controls, under-estimation of the period required to run down excessive levels of over-age stock, 
costs associated with warranty claims, inadequate sales and the high cost of finance. Ibc influence 
of this last factor is also implied from Table 11.2 
However three other more positive aspects relating to expansion were almost as, important: 
greater sales volumes, higher levels of capital expenditure and acquisition finance all emerged as 
significant factors backing up earlier comments as to the importance of the teams' expansion 
strategy. 
TABLE 11.6: TYPES OF FURTHER FUNDING 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Retained earnings 25.8 
Personal equity subscription by MBI team 19.4 
Institutional equity subscription 19.4 
Introduction of new investors 12.9 
Mezzanine debt 6.5 
Overdraft 80.6 
Other bank loan 38.7 
Better working capital management 48.4 
(Base for sample 31) 
Further funding requirements were met from various sources (Table 11.6), by far the main one 
being bank overdraft (80.6 percent). Clearly there could be dangers if this method of short term 
finance was used in cases -where longer term types were required. 'Better working capital 
management emerged as the second most important factor in further funding- the result of the 
improvements noted earlier in aspects such as debtor control. Other bank loans (ie, medium and 
long term facilities) were used by almost half those requiring further funding, in many cases clearly 
accompanied by an overdraft facility. Retained earnings were important in a quarter of cases. The 
role of mezzanine debt in additional funding was used by only two companies'in the survey. 
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Additional amounts of equity finance played a relatively minor role. Less than a fifth of those 
requiring further finance had obtained further equity from either personal or institutional sources 
(19.4 percent each). Nevertheless the terms of the refinancing which had been agreed had led 
to a dilution in the equity stakes of management in a quarter of the cases. For major expansion 
schemes there was limited evidence of the introduction of new investors (12.9 percent). It is, of 
course, arguable that some measure of interest protection should have been incorporated in the 
buy-in financing structure, which would have helped to offset the effects of increasing interest 
costs. 
11.5 Exit Intentions and Realisation 
In the longer term, as discussed in Chapter 3.4, financial backers and management will seek full 
or partial realisation of their investment. In the short term it has been noted that the financial 
commitment to the buy-in company has in a significant number of cases been increased through 
further equity subscription or extension of bank facilities. 
TABLE 11.7: EXIT INTENTIONS AT TIME OF BUY-IN 
(Private MBI's) 
% of Sample 
Stock market flotation 43.6 
Sale to a third party 52.7 
Re-structuring/second buy-out/releverage 14.7 
Family'succession 7.3 
No particular exit method favoured 18.2 
No exit intention at all 14.5 
(Sample size 55) 
Note: Because of multiple responses, exit intentions add up to more than 100%. 
Buy-in teams may consider several possible exit routes. Participants were asked to state their 
original favoured exit intentions (Table 11.7). The most favourccl routes were a trade sale (52.7 
percent) or a Stock Market flotation (43.6 percent). This order is in contrast to the earlier survey 
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of buy-outs when flotation (with particular emphasis on the USM) was the most preferred exit 
route. To some extent the difference between the two surveys reflects changing financial 
circumstances- since 1988 few buy-outs and buy-ins have floated on the Stock Market and trade 
sales have become considerably more frequent (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). 
Ibcrc is also the question of the long term motivation of the buy-in manager. Responses to the 
survey indicated that a number of buy-in managers were kccn to maintain the company as an 
independent entity for as long as possible. Some 14.5 percent claimed that they had no exit 
intention at all while 7.3 percent were looking to family succession. One option which emerged 
in the late 1980's, restructuring involving re-lcvcragc or a buy-out under which gearing levels arc 
increased and major distributions made to equity investors with perhaps the equity investors being 
replaced by others, was favoured by 14.7 percent of the survey participants. 
Since buy-in some teams had changed their intentions as to exit in the light of actual plan 
achievement and changes in financial market circumstances. The attractiveness of a Stock Market 
float for the earlier companies in our sample had declined significantly. Eleven buy-ins in the 
sample reported a change, the most major shift being towards a trade sale. Five of the sample who 
had originally intended to either float the company or engineer a trade sale had narrowed this 
down to a trade sale, one had changed from a float to a trade sale and one who originally 
favoured no particular method had later selected a trade sale. One each of the sample had shifted 
to a stock market flotation, a reverse-in to a quoted company, a break-up sale and family 
succession. 
This change in intentions among buy-in managers is matched by experience in buy-outs. Few of 
the buy-outs in the survey of 1983-85 buy-outs who had originally expressed the intention to float 
actually did so, the majority of exits occurring within three years of the survey being by trade sale. 
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At the time of survey four buy-ins in the sample had actually achieved an exit, two through a 
stock market quotation/ reverse-in to a quoted company and two through a trade sale. By 
September 1991 one other has completed a trade sale which was under discussion at the time of 
the survey and nine others had gone into receivership. By September 1992 the total numbers 
cdting through trade sale had risen to 4 (6.8 %) and a further 3 through a float or reverse-in 
(5.1%). However 13 (22.0 %) had been placed in receivership. In the following 12 months to 
September 1993 a more encouraging pattern emerged reflecting improved economic and financial 
conditions following the withdrawal of the UK from the ERM: there had been no further 
receiverships while the number of flotations had risen to 4 and trade sales to 6. 
TABLE 11.8: BUY-IN EXITS, BY YE AR OF BUY-IN 
Buy-in Year Float Trade Sale Receivership No Exit Sample Size 
1986 20.0 
- 
20.0 60.0 5 
1987 
- 
20.0 
- 
80.0 10 
1988 5.0 40.0 20.0 55.0 20 
1989 8.3 
- 
33.3 58.4 24 
1986-1989 6.8 
1 
10.2 
1 
22.0 
1 
61.0 59 
Analysis of exit patterns by year (table 11.8) show the poorest exit performance being for those 
buy-ins completed in 1989, ie at the point where the economy was clearly heading into recession, 
interest rates were high but entry PE ratios were also excessive. The short period to receivership 
for these companies does however give some strength to the Jensen (1991) argument that buy-out 
governance arrangements allow the more active investor to assess the position quicker than in 
more conventional structures and preserve something of value in the company before all value 
is lost. 
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11.6 Conclusions 
Despite the limitations noted concerning the relevant survey questions, the initial performance 
characteristics of buy-ins have proved disappointing compared to buy-out surveys which asked 
similar performance direction questions (eg Hanney 1986, Wright, Thompson, Robbie 1992) and 
investigations based on accounting data in both the UK (eg Bannock 1990a, Houlden and 
Brookes 1989) and the US (Kaplan 1989, Smith 1990, Singh 1990, Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
1990, Bull 1989), all of which have indicated positive overall profit effects even if in some cases 
longer term aspects may be more mixed (Houlden and Brookes 1989). Results need however to 
be seen in the particular circumstances of deal completion in the late 1980s (see eg Jensen 1991, 
Opler 1992) when mergers and acquisition markets may have been overheated leading to high 
degrees of leverage in transactions where pricing in retrospect may have been too high. As can 
be implied from the economic and financial data in Table 11.2, the sharp economic downturn 
accompanied by sharp increases in interest rates in the short period between completion of some 
of the later survey companies and the actual survey is likely to have further affected performance 
with Teams remarking on the problems caused by the cost of bank finance. It has also been a 
major cause behind the high level of receiverships indicating the considerable risk factors involved 
in buy-ins. Significant refinancing has also been required (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992). Despite 
these negative features, a minority of buy-ins did manage to outperform and several successful 
realisations were achieved. There is also evidence that buy-in failure was achieved at a relatively 
early stage showing venture capitalists pursuing an active role and trying to preserve something 
of value in the company. 
Propositions concerning management buy-in performance, problem areas and realisation contained 
in Chapter 3 can be supported as follows: 
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(a) Better performers arc likely to be associated with entrepreneurs who are working in the same 
sector (P17a) although contrary to part of the same proposition those with better educational 
qualifications did not appear to be associated with better performance; 
(b) Better performers appeared to be associated with medium rather than small sized companies 
which had been subsidiaries of significant parents and had been profitable at the time of the buy- 
in; 
(c) Like many new ventures the most serious problems were of a financial nature particularly the 
availability and cost of credit and finance (P16); and 
(d) A particularly serious problem derived from information asymmetry when completing the 
transaction which resulted in major problems emerging after completion which were not revealed 
in due diligence procedures (P19). 
Further support is also given to Hypothesis H6 that buy-ins have a higher risk structure than buy- 
outs and are especially prone to receiverships. 
These initial findings will be developed further in Chapter 13 where discriminant analysis will be 
used to predict failure using some of the important variables which have been identified. 
Iý-, ý 
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CHAPTE, R 12 
A TYPOLOGY OF BUY-IN TEAM LEADERS 
12.1 Introduction 
Chapter 12 has illustrated the relative importance of various motivational factors of the Team 
Leader while Chapter 6 described their demographic characteristics such as age and 
entrepreneurial background. The Entrepreneurship literature survey included the development 
of studies into typologics of entrepreneurs (Chapter 2.3.5), which indicate the existence of at least 
two main types of entrepreneurs- 'craftsmen' and 'opportunists'. II 
Ibis Chapter develops data from the questionnaire survey to investigate the e3dstence of possible 
types of management buy-in Team Leaders. An R-Mode Principal Components Analysis is used 
to determine a group of underlying factors (12.2); this is followed by cluster analysis to identify 
the distinct Team Leader types (12.3). Statistical differences between types of Team Leaders are 
tested and the possibility of significant differences between Team Lcaders in terms of subsequent 
target performance and managerial action are assessed (12.4). Similar techniques are then applied 
to data from an earlier survey of management buy-outs (12.5) to illustrate perceived differences 
between the types of Managers undertaking these two different forms of corporate restructuring 
(12.6). 
12.2 Standardisation of Buy-in Team Leader Characteristics using Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis enables a relatively small number of factors to be identified which can then be 
used to represent relationships among sets of many interrelated variables allowing underlying, but 
not directly observable, constructs to be identified from a set of observable variables (Norusis, 
1985, Alt 1990). Each variable is expressed as a linear combination of a small number of common 
factors which are shared by all variables and a unique factor that is, specific to that variable. As 
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a first stage the Team Leader characteristics were standardised using Principal Components 
Analysis. The purpose of this was to produce new combinations of the original data, which may 
then be used as new independent and orthogonal reference axes (or variables) in a typology of 
Team Leaders using Cluster Analysis, reduce the number of variables under investigation and for 
the exploratory purpose of detailing and identifying groups of inter-related variables. 
Previous empirical work has used a variety of approaches in identifying the dimensions of 
entrepreneurs. Socio-demographic data have been extensively used (see eg Westhead, 1990) as 
a surrogate for motivations, although it should be recognised that such data may provide a weak 
proxy for true motivational data. Following detailed examination of the data set, it was considered 
appropriate to focus primarily on the data which provided direct measures of motivation (as 
shown in Table 7.1) supplemented by variables relating to managerial experience, financial 
commitment, entrepreneurial experience and age% The motivational factors employed were based 
on previous survey qucs tions carried out on management buy-outs (eg Wright, Thompson, Robbie 
1992) and therefore could be considered to represent a tested and consistent approach. Care had 
been taken in framing the questions to ensure as far as possible reliable answers to questions 
which would show uniformity of interpretation by respondents (Chapter 4.5). The reliability of the 
motivational variables was then tested using Cronbach's Alpha and standardised item Alpha (SPSS 
1998). This process produced an Alpha of 0.6316 and Standardised Item Alpha of 0.6104. 
To facilitate the use of factor analysis, certain of the categorical variables reported earlier were 
re-coded to represent interval data. Thus managerial background was measured in terms of 
breadth of experience on a range from specific functional and general management experience 
'An alternative approach would have been to rely on variables describing entrepreneurial and 
or company characteristics thereby excluding motivational aspects. Factor and subsequent cluster 
analysis was carried out using a selection of such variables as an alternative, but did not produce 
results which appeared to be statistically superior. Consequently discussion in this Chapter refers 
to the combination of motivational and a few basic variables reflecting the entrepreneurs 
background. 
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through to only general management experience and finally only specific functional experience. 
Financial commitment to a buy-in was measured on a scale based on lower risk/personal wealth 
to higher risk/personal debt. Similarly entrepreneurial experience was measured on a scale from 
none at all, through to share ownership of a previous entrepreneurial venture and MBO/MBI 
ownership experience. Additional re-coding was carried out to reduce undue influence of missing 
values and given the relatively small numbers in some response categories to provide more 
meaningful intervals, eg educational background was reduced to those with a degree, other further 
education or professional qualifications, and school leavers. 
This data set was subject to a factor analysis using principal components analysis and an oblique 
rotation. This method in comparison to orthogonal rotation, while similarly preserving the 
commutabilities of the variables, does not produce identical factor loadings and factor variable 
coefficients. Oblique rotation has been perceived to yield substantively meaningful factors (Norusis 
1985). Initially the correlation matrix for all variables used was computed. Bartlett's test of 
sphericity was used to test the hypothesis that the correlation matrix was an identity matrix. This 
produced a value of 202.8, with a significance of 
. 
00000. Additionally the Keyser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy was examined as a measure for comparing the magnitudes of the 
observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients; the 
value of 0.57 was considered adequate for proceeding further. To assess the significance of 
individual variables which had been used, the communality ratings were examined. The extracted 
factors, after the oblimim converged in 79 iterations, resulted in six factors being extracted 
accounting for 69.2 percent of the original variance (Table 12.1). Interpretation of the individual 
factors is given below and is seen to have 'Similarities with other studies of entrepreneurship, 
particularly in terms of opportunist-craftsman chaiacterisations (Woo, ct al, 1991). 
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TABLE 12.1: MANAGEMENT BUY-IN CIIARACTERISTICS: FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Description Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
Commercial 
. 
77177 
Opportunity 
Develop Own 
. 
60012 
. 
50179 
Strategy 
Do Own Work 
. 
51867 
. 
39307 
Build Successful 
. 
50447 
-. 
32994 
. 
41268 
-. 
33224 
Organisation 
Lack of 
. 
72772 
Opportunity 
Avoid Working for 
. 
71768 
Others 
Previous 
-. 
59613 
. 
42488 
-35503 
Ownership 
Experience 
Frustrated by 
. 
59613 
-. 
40871 
. 
39193 
Head Office 
Capital Gain 
. 
87835 
Attitude to Risk 
-. 
33527 
-. 
62741 
Acquisitive 
. 
57309 
. 
32073 
-. 
30681 
Breadth of 
. 
85084 
Managerial 
Background 
Age 
-. 
80015 
More Money 
. 
37048 
-. 
41663 
Made Redundant 
. 
93752 
Eigen Value 3.16691 2.13315 1.65792 1.32419 1.08481 1.01450 
% Variance 21.1 14.2 11.1 8.8 7.2 6.8 
Cum. % Var. 21.1 35.3 46.4 '55.2 62.4 69.2 
Factor 1 involved people who were motivated by a desire to do their own kind of work developing 
their own strategy and building a successful organisation and also having spotted a specific 
commercial opportunity. This factor could be labelled 'commercial ambition'. 
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Factor 2 involved people who felt frustrated in their existing employment- the effects of Head 
Office control and lack of opportunity- and who were keen to develop their own strategy and 
avoid working for others. They had little entrepreneurial experience. This factor could be labelled 
'independence'. 
Factor 3 included Team Leaders who were not so influenced by frustrations of their current 
employment, but were interested in financial gain, had some previous entrepreneurial experience 
and were acquisitive. They were also more reliant on their own wealth than having to borrow 
funds. This factor was labelled 'investment'. 
Factor 4 included Team Leaders who had also had significant previous entrepreneurial experience 
but were now not so motivated by financial gain and were not concerned about the need for 
independence. They had high familiarity with specific management functions. This factor was 
labelled 'Practicality'. 
Factor 5 reflected younger entrepreneurs who were not influenced by pecuniary influences 
although there was a small redundancy element. This group were seeking to build a successful 
organisation and were reasonably acquisitive. This factor was labelled 'personal ambition'. 
Factor 6 was highly motivated by redundancy with some desire to be rid of Head Office control 
and to avoid working 
-for 
others. They showed little concern as to building a successful 
organisation. This factorwas, labelled 'push'. 
12.3 Determination of Team Leader Clusters 
Having determined six basic factor types from the ori inal 59 Team Leaders, cluster analysis was 
used to identify. distinct Team Leader types which had maximum between group variance and 
Fp variance. minimum within gro This, method effectively groups the, Team Leaders based on 
287 
similar emphasis in each of these six background dimensions and produces clusters of Team 
Leaders who have similar entrepreneurial backgrounds (see eg Alt (1990) Chapter 5 for, an 
explanation of the use of cluster analysis). 
In order to establish whether distinct homogenous groupings of entrepreneurs exist among buy-in 
Team Leaders, the factor scores for each respondent were subject to a cluster analysis using both 
iterative partitioning and hierarchial clustering methods. Both approaches produced a high degree 
of similarity in the classification of individual cases suggesting that the resulting cluster solutions 
were reasonably robust. 
TABLE 12.2: CLUSTER CHARACTERISTICS (ITERATIVE PARTITIONING) 
ANOVA Differences 
Mean Scores Whole Cluster 1 ', 
_, 
Cluster 2 Cluster 3 F-test between 
Sample (Sig) clusters 
2-sample T- 
test 
Commercial 0.02 0.33 
-0.51 0.21- 0.062 1,2 
ambition 2,3 
Independence 0.01 0.43 0.40 
-0.17 0.115 2,3 
Investment 
-0.01 -1.25 -0.34 0.24 0.008 1,2 
2,3 
Practicality 
-0.04 - -0.07 -0.13 0.00 0.912 
- 
Personal 
-0.02 0.48 -0.77 0.24 0.002 1,2 
ambition 2,3 
Push 0.00 3.21 
. 
0.48 
-0.05 0.000 1,2 
2,3 
3,1 
Number 56 3 
- 
15 38 
L 
Percentage 5.4 26.8 67.8 
The characteristics of the individual clusters produced by the iterative partitioning method are 
outlined in Table 12.2 and show the presence of three main'cluster'- groupings. A notable feature 
was the presence of a vcry'small group representing three members only. Careful examination was 
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made of this grouping through efforts at clustering at different levels; nevertheless this small 
grouping was present consistently throughout these variations. Differences between mean scores 
across the cluster are indicated in the table based on the F-statistic from a one-way analysis of 
variance and a series of individual two sample T-tests. Only Factor 4 (practicality), and to a lesser 
extent, Factor 2 (independence) show no differences across the clusters. 
T"LE 12.3: CIIARACTERIMCS OF MBI CLUSTERS 
VARIABLE GLOBAL 
MEAN 
STD CLUSTERI CLUSTER 
2 
CLUSTER 3 
Own kind of work 3.4643 1.53 4.333* 3.600 3.3421 
Head Office Control 2.5536 1.70 4.00000 Z3333 2.5263 
Lack of Opportunity 2.5536 1.74 2.3333 Z8667 2.4474 
Avoid working for Others 3.3929 1.64 5.0000* 3.6000 3.1842 
Develop own Strategy 4.2321 1.22 4.0000 3.9333 4-3684 
Specific Commercial Opportunity 3.6429 1.33 3.6667 2.73330 4.0000 
Acquisitions vehicle 3.6607 1.42 1.6667* 3.2000 4.0000 
Successful organisation 4.2679 1.17 3.0000* 3.8667 4.5263 
Earn More Money 3.0893 1.50 1.66670 3.2667 3.1316 
Capital Gain 3,6607 1.42 1.6667* 3.4667 3.8947 
Made Redundant 1.3571 1.07 5.00000 1.0667 1.1842 
Chief Executive's Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
1.4821 0.91 1.00000 1.0667 1.6842 
CEO's Financial Resources 3.5000 1.39 4.3333* 4.3333* 3.1053 
CEO's Background '1.6964 0.74 ZOWO 1.60W 1.7015 
CEO's Age Z7679 1.06 3.0000 3.46670 Z4737 
Each Cluster can be seen as representing a particular type'of entrepreneur and can be interpreted 
using both the characteristics shown in the relative cluster mean scores for each Factor earlier 
identified but also through examining the cluster means for each of the variables which were used 
(Table 12.3). Cases where cluster means deviate by more than half a standard deviation from the 
respective global mean are underlined to highlight the distinguishing characteristics of each of the 
clusters (Openshaw 1983). 
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The first and the smallest Cluster with only three members showed a very high rating of Factor 
6 (the 'push' factor), although there is also relatively high evidence of Factor 5 (personal 
ambition) and Factor 1 (commercial ambition). Ibey could thus be expected as well as acting 
defensively because of the redundancy factor to have a high independence element (in terms of 
wanting to do their own kind of work and avoid working for others) while not being motivated 
by financial income or gain considerations, the desire to build a successful organisation or being 
acquisitive. Examination of this Cluster's variable means showed deviations by more than half a 
standard deviation from the respective global means on ten out of the fifteen variables used. They 
had maximum (ie'most important') ratings for motivation through avoiding working for others and 
being made redundant. "Ibey had not had previous experience of company ownership, were older 
than average and were more reliant on finance through borrowing and tended to have specialist 
rather than purely general management backgrounds. They can best be described as belonging to 
a group of 'push' entrepreneurs. 
Cluster 2, the second largest group with 15 members, showed high influence of Factors 2 
('Independence') but high negative ratings for Factors 1 ('commercial ambition'), 5 ('personal 
ambition') and 6 ('pushed'). While there was a strong desire to do their own kind of work and 
they felt a lack of opportunity in their previous environment, this did not result in strong 
monetary influences or a desire to build a successful organisation. They could therefore be 
expected to want independence. They were also likely to be significantly older. Analysis of 
variable means (Table 12.3) showed them also to have low redundancy ratings, to be reliant on 
borrowed funds and to have a low rating for specific commercial opportunity. In most respects 
they typically represent the 'craftsman' type of entrepreneur. 
Cluster 3, the largest cluster with 38 (67.8 percent) of the sample, was dominated by individuals 
reflecting Factor 1 (commercial ambition), Factor 3 (investment) and Factor 5 (personal 
ambition). Factor ratings were relatively low only showing a relatively high rating for Factor 2 
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(implying financial risk, lack of cxisting opportunity and frustration at Hcad Officc control). Thcy 
also appeared to have earlier entrepreneurial experience and were more reliant on their own 
personal wealth rather than borrowed funds. None of the variable averages deviated by more than 
half the global standard deviation from the global means, reflecting the relative size of this group. 
Further analysis from the variable means confirmed them to be younger but also the most likely 
to have had some earlier entrepreneurial experience and to be seeking specific commercial 
opportunity, to have had average General Management background, to be looking for financial 
gain and to be acquisitive. With the exception of the age characteristic, they fall most 
appropriately into the 'opportunist' classification of entrepreneur. 
TABLE 12.4: SIZE OF MBI CLUSTER TARGET FIRMS 
VARIABLE (MEAN) GLOBAL 
MEAN 
CLUSTER 
1 
CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 3 
Employees (number) 125.7 17.3 116.9 138.7 
Operating Proflt (L'OOO) 196 
-3 -312 397 
Turnover (L'OOO) 6,949 650 7,335 7,324 
Price Paid (L'OOO) 2,859 471 3,080 2,962 
Examining characterises of the target companies selected by the members of the individual 
clusters, it was noted that Cluster 1, the 'push' group, were associated with small companies in 
terms of employment, turnover and price; they were marginally loss-making (Table 12.4). Cluster 
2, the 'craftsmen' and Cluster 3, the 'opportunists', were associated with medium sized companies 
which were close to each other in terms of average turnover, price and to a lesser extent number 
of employees. However the'Cluster 2 target companies'were on ave rage loss I 
-making'while those 
in duster 3 were profitable. 
A one-way analysis of variance suggests ignificant differenc: eson 4o ut of the , six characteristics 
used to identify the clusters while a 2-sample T-test suggests that clusters 2 and 3 differ on 5 out 
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of the 6 characteristics. In addition to showing some consistency with entrepreneurial types as 
identified in the existing literature, these clusters also correspond with what might be expected 
given the approaches adopted by venture capitalists (3i, 1992a). 
12.4 Other Differences Between Buy-in Team Leader Clusters 
Given that significant differences have been identified across these clusters, the possibility of other 
differences which might arise in the management buy-in process were investigated. These reflected 
areas where earlier discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 had shown that differences may mist in 
ventures managed by different types of entrepreneurs reflecting not only personal and 
entrepreneurial background but also factors relating to the target company. These included 
performance, team factors, control mechanisms, management actions, team and management re- 
organisation, further financial requirements and realisation objectives and achievements, and the 
type of company. It should however be noted that the small size of the 'push' cluster may distort 
tests of statistical significance. To reduce the effects of excessive 'empty' cells in cross tabulation 
Chi-Square tests, further re-coding was done to certain variables to produce more compact 
interval data whilst retaining the direction of effect. Consideration was given to limiting the 
analysis to differences between the opportunist and craftsman types and excluding the very small 
'push' factor. Trial analysis with certain variables did not however appear to bring major 
improvements to the outcome. Results are shown in Table 12.5. 
(1) Performance 
Operating profit and turnover were recodcd so that they were measured on a better or worse 
basis compared to Plan. Neither operating profit nor turnover produced significant differences 
between the cluster types. While Cluster 2 were 53.8 percent better than operating profit Plan 
as opposed to 50 percent for Cluster 3 and 66.5 percent for Cluster 1, the level of significance 
was p=0.85. Turnover produced a more interesting result although the level of significance 
(p=0.24) remained unacceptable. 
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TABLE 12.5: MANAGEMENT BUY-INS: SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN CLUSTERS 
VARIABLE 3 CLUSTER 
CHI-SQUARE 
3 CLUSTER 
CHI-SQUARE 
SIG 
COMMENTS 
Profit Compared to Plan (BetterAvorse) 0.33 0M Cl 66.5% worse, C2 53.8 C3 
50150 
Turnover Compared to Plan (BetterMorse) 0.11 All C1 better, C2 50150,0 
65/35 
THE TEAM 
Knew each other before 6.80 0.03 Cl 0%, C2 80.0, C3 90.3 
Marketing Skills Gap 9.31 0.01 All Cl, C2 6.7%, C3 23.5% 
CONTROL MECHANISMS 
Bank Covenants 13. OS 
. 
01 C3 32.4% restrictive, C2 
13.3%, Cl 0% 
Personal Guarantees 10.34 0.04 Cl 33.3% useful, C3 70.6% 
MANAGEMENT ACTIONS 
Increased customer base 5.40 0.07 13.3 % C2 did not 
Changed significant number suppliers 6.96 0.03 73.3 % C2 did not, 42.9%, 
C3 did not, All C1 did 
Re-organised admin and financial systems 4.98 
. 
08 66.7% C1,93.3% C2,97.2% 
C3 did 
Subsequent acquisitions 6.94 0.03 C3 39.5% did but only 6.7 % 
C2, nil Cl 
TEAM/MANAGEMENT RE-ORGANISATION 
Incentives for Directors only 5.32 0.07 C2 more likely, 60%; Cl nil, 
C3 10% 
Incentives for All Sales 9.42 0.01 None CI, All C2 
FINANCLAL REQUIREMENTS 
Further Finance Required 4.65 0.09 Cl. none, C2 53.3%, C3 
63.2% 
REALISATION OBJECTIVES & ACHIEVEMENT'S 
Exit by Stock Market Float 6.47 0.04 C1 nil, C2 100%. C3 643% 
Actually exited 3.60 0.17 Nil Cl, C2 33.3%, C3 50.0% 
Failure/restructure v sale/alive 4.86 0.09 Cl nil, C2 13.3%, C3 39.5% 
failure/restructure 
THE COMPANY 
Turnover 11.12 0.03 Cl all less than 11m, C2 
33.3% greater than 0m, C3 
44.7% greater than L5rn 
Notc, Cl-Cluster 1; C2-Cluster 2, C3=Cluster 3 I- ý, ýiýýI 
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(2) The Team 
There was a significant difference in whether the team had known each other before (Chi- 
square=6.80, p=0.03) with Cluster 1 not knowing each other but 90.3 percent of Cluster 3. All 
of Cluster 1, buying the smallest companies, had a marketing skills gap which only occurred in 6.7 
percent of Cluster 3 (Chi-square= 9.3 1, p=0.01). 
(3) Structuring and Control Issues 
Significant differences were noted in terms of attitudes towards the provision of personal 
guarantees (Chi-square= 10.34, p=0.04) and bank covenants (Chi-square= 13.05, p=0.01). 
(4) Post Buy-in Managerial Actions 
A wide range of managerial actions was examined. Some marginal significant difference was seen 
in terms of re-organisation of administrative and financial systems (chi-square= 4.98, p=0.08). 
Certain other actions appeared to illustrate important differences- increasing customer base (Chi- 
square=5.40, p=0.07), subsequent acquisitions (Chi-square =6.94, p=0.03) with Cluster 3 being 
the most likely to acquire but none of Cluster 1 and changing a significant number of suppliers 
(Chi-square =6.96, p=0.03). 
(5) Post Buy-in Team/Management Re-organisation 
Significant differences in managerial changes post buy-in were noted only in terms of incentive 
system introductions: those for all Sales personnel (Chi-square =9.42, p=0.01) and directors (Chi- 
Square=9.42, p=O., Ol) with Cluster 2 in each case being the most likely to implement changes. 
(6) Financial Requirements 
Differences were noted in terms of further finance requirements (Chi-Square=4.65, p=0.09) with 
Cluster 3, the most acquisitive cluster, not surprisingly being the most likely to require further 
finance. 
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(7) Realisation 
Significant differences were noted in exit intentions where the possibility of floating on the Stock 
Market produced a significant result (Chi-square =6.47, p=0.04) with all of Cluster 2 being 
prepared to consider this form of exit but none of Cluster 1, the grouping with the smallest size 
of company considering this option. While consideration of whether the buy-ins had actually 
exited produced a significance of only 0.17, the current status (receivership or restructured v 
successfully exited or still alive) produced a more significant but still marginal result (Chi-Square 
4.86, p=0.09). 
(8) The Target Company 
When regrouped by size categories, the target companies showed significant difference in terms 
of size as measured by turnover (Chi-Square=11.12, p=0.03) with all of Cluster thaving a 
turnover of less than LI mn. While the two other clusters have similar average turnover, a higher 
percentage of Cluster 3 had a turnover greater than 0 mn. 
While some areas of difference have been noted between clusters especially in aspects of 
managerial re-organisation and exit, the majority of post buy-in performance variables including 
those referring specifically to achievement of Plan objectives produced no evidence to suggest any 
distinct pattern of behaviour across clusters. A major reason for this may be the limited time span 
and the prevailing economic conditions which may affect the interpretation of performance data. 
In this light the emergence of buy-in realisation achievements which show significance levels of 
less than 0.10 may point to the development of longer term significant differences between 
clusters. 
12.5 A Management Buy-out Team Uader Typology 
The previous sections of this Chapter have determined a typology for Management Buy-in Team 
Leaders. Given the relationship between buy-outs and buy-ins, comparison was sought with Team 
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Leaders of management buy-outs to identify possible differences in the type of managers who 
considered buy-outs and buy-ins. (Potential differences are reviewed in Chapters 3-2). This 
process utilised the earlier survey of 1983-85 management buy-outs, described in Chapter 4.3 and 
used as a comparator in Chapters 6 to 10. While the survey used similar methods to that of the 
buy-in survey (see Chapter 4.3), inevitably, as the questionnaire had not been designed with the 
same research aims as the buy-in survey, this earlier survey did not cover all the motivational and 
background characteristics contained in the later buy-in survey. Indeed, given the expected 
differences between buy-outs and buy-ins outlined in Chapter 3, this is not surprising. Despite the 
differences in survey design, some valid comparisons are possible. 
The buy-out survey covered basic motivational patterns such as desire to control one's own 
business, be free of Group restraints, seek financial reward, develop one's own talents, and having 
faith in the company as well as more defensive issues such as fear of redundancy or of a new 
owner. There was also considerable basic demographic background such as the age of individual 
members of the Team and their period of employment with the company, the type of vendor of 
the company and the initiator of the buy-out. Questions in the management buy-in survey 
included motivational questions on desire to do own kind of work, develop own strategy and avoid 
working for others which can be seen as having similarities with questions in the buy-out survey 
covering the motivation to control one's own business and develop own strategy. Financial rewards 
in the buy-out survey were covered in the buy-in survey by questions concerning capital gain and 
higher income considerations. The buy-in survey asked the importance of redundancy while the 
buy-out one covered fears of both redundancy and a new owner. Buy-out managers were also 
asked about the long term faith which they had in the company. 
Variables suitable for use in the buy-out factor analysis were selected in an identical way to those 
in the management buy-in analysis. First all the purely motivational factors were included. Second 
variables were sought from other areas of the survey which might add to an understanding of the 
296 
entrepreneurial nature and other experience of the managers. Thus both the Team Leader's age 
and his period of managerial experience in this role were included (providing a direct equivalence 
to age in the buy-in typology and partial equivalence to managerial experience and 
entrepreneurial experience), a variable reflecting the source of initiation of the transaction 
(reflecting the role of management in actually initiating the transaction, an act which can be seen 
as entrepreneurial itself, eg Green and Berry 1991) and the type of company ownership. This last 
variable was selected in that it could be hypothesised that the degree of managerial and 
entrepreneurial initiative allowed in companies may vary depending on the type of ownership and 
the restrictions placed by the owners on executive managers, eg companies in the public sector 
will attract managers who work under control and initiative restrictions which are very different 
from those facing managers in a quoted company subsidiary. 
As with the management buy-in survey, the motivational variables were tested for reliability using 
Cronbach's Alpha method. This produced an Alpha of 0.709 and Standardised Item Alpha of 
0.696. The direction of the motivational variables were re-coded to make them consistent with 
those of the buy-in managers. 71be initiative and type of company variables were recoded to 
produce consistent interval data. 
Through methods similar to those outlined in the factor analysis of management buy-ins, this 
series of motivational and entrepreneurial associated variables were subjected to factor analysis 
through a principal components analysis. The Bartlett Test of Sphericity (160.39) produced a 
significance level of 0.000. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.55. Five 
factors with Eigenvalues in excess of 1 were produced after the Oblimirn had converged in 85 
iterations, and explained 62.8 percent of the total variance (Table 12.6). These however were less 
satisfactory statistically than the buy-in factors, where 69.2 percent of the total variance was 
explained at this stage. An interpretation was then made of the five factors produced. 
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TABLE 12.6: MANAGEMENT BUY-OUT CHARACTERISTICS 
- 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Type of company 
. 
86382 
Develop own talents 
. 
30779 
-. 
30551 
Years of experience 
. 
86538 
CEO's Age 
. 
83090 
Fear of new owner 
. 
85550 
Rear of redundancy 
. 
61209 
. 
46620 
Failure company 
-. 
79257 
Initiator 
. 
46429 
. 
46557 
Free of group 
restraints 
. 
85885 
Financial rewards 
. 
32160 
-. 
54106 
Control own 
business 
-. 
38913 
. 
45509 
Eigen value 1.92163 1.50507 1.29673 1.19289 1.00098 
Variance 17.5 13.7 11.7 10.8 9.1 
Cumulative variance 17.5 31.2 42.8 53.7 62.8 
Factor 1, the largest group accounting for 17.5 percent of the variance, produced high positive 
loadings on the type of company, developing own talents, management as initiator and financial 
rewards. There was little evidence of fear of redundancy or of a new owner. This factor could be 
seen to reflect 'Personal and Commercial Ambition'. 
Factor 2, showed high loadings for age and length of experience of the Team Leader but with 
developing own talents being very unimportant. The type of company in which the team was 
working had moderate importance. This could be interpreted as an 'Experience' factor. 
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Factor 3 was dominated by the fear of redundancy and of a new owner with negative factor score 
coefficients for controlling own business, being free of group restraints and initiative. It appeared 
to represent a forcing into buy-outs and could be seen to be a defensive 'push' factor. 
Factor 4 had qualities which indicated a more pro-active version of Factor 3. Fear of redundancy 
(though not of a new owner) were important while initiative was more likely to come from the 
management. Age and length of service with the company were unimportant while the team 
placed emphasis on being free of group restraints. There was a high negative factor score 
coefficient in faith in the company. This Factor could be interpreted as a less defensive 'push' 
factor. 
Finally Factor 5 reflected a desire to be free of group restraints, control one's own business and 
to seek financial reward. Negative aspects of motivation such as fear of redundancy or a new 
owner were not in evidence. The Team Leaders were likely to have had some relative experience. 
This factor could be interpreted as 'Opportunist'. 
TABLE 12.7: MBO CLUSTER CHARACTERISTICS 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Anova Differences 
F-test (sig) between 
clusters, 
2 sample 
T-test 
Factor 1 
-0.18 0.69 0.53 
. 
000 1,2 
1,3 
Factor 2 0.22 
-1.52 0.20 
. 
000 1,2 
2,3 
Factor 3 
-0.26 -0.25 2.24 
. 
000 2,3 
1,3 
Factor 4 
-0.15 1.17 
-0.27 
. 
000 1,2 
2,3 
Factor 5 0.02 0.05 
-0.23 
. 
594 
Number 136 22 18 
% 77.3 12.5 10.2 
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lbe standardised matrix of component scores which were produced under this procedure were 
then subject to a cluster analysis to identify particular types of management buy-out Team Leaders 
using the same method as employed in the buy-in analysis, iterative partitioning. The 
characteristics of the individual clusters produced are outlined in Table 12.7. The number of buy- 
out manager types was reduced to three. Differences between mean scores across the cluster are 
indicated in the table based on the F-statistic from a one-way- analysis of variance and a series of 
individual two sample T-tes4 and confirm significant differences between the clusters. Only Factor 
5 ('Opportunist') show no differences across the clusters. Analysis by Cluster of the means of the 
variables is shown in Table 12.8. 
TABLE 12.8: CLUSTER CHARACTERISTICS 
- 
MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS 
Variable global standard 
deviation 
duster I duster 2 cluster 3 
Control own Business 5.772 1.86 5.7279 6.2273 5.5556 
Free of Group Restraints 3.1705 2.10 3.3088 2.5000 2.9444 
Financial Rewards 4.1761 2.12 3.9853 4.7273 4.9444 
Fear of Redundancy 2.0227 1.78 1.6618 2.8182 3.7778* 
Fear of New Owner 1.8409 1.68 1.4412 1.1364 5.7222* 
Faith in Company 4.9943 2.20 5.1544 3.5000* 5.6111 
Develop own Talents 3.5000 2.20 33M 3.9091 4.4444 
Team as Initiator 1.9716 0.81 1.8309 3.04550 1.7222 
Team Leadces Age 3-3864 1.12 3.5809 1.86360 3.7778 
Team Locader's Experience 2.4545 131 2.6838 1.0000* 2.5 
7ype of Company 3.4525 1.11 3.3588 3.8636 4.0556* 
. 
Varies by more than half of the standard deviation from the global mean. 
Cluster 1, by far the largest grouping accounting for 77.3 percent of the sample, was dominated 
by the 'Experience' factor with other factors being of relatively little importance. Given the 
dominant size of this grouping they were close to global means for a number of variables. They 
were slightly less driven by the needed to be rid of group restraints or to seek better financial 
rewards and did not appear to be afraid of either redundancy or a new owner. Iley tended to 
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be slightly older and had been with the company for a little longer. They had similarities to 
vcraftsmen' type entrepreneurs. 
Cluster 2, the next largest grouping, involved Team where push factors were important but this 
was also accompanied by a relatively high level of personal and commercial ambition. The push 
factor was driven by fear of redundancy rather than of a new owner. They were keen to seek 
better financial results, develop their own talents and had the highest mean for wanting to control 
their own business. They were also substantially younger and with less experience of the company 
than other Clusters. 'Mey were also more likely to have initiated the buy-out with assistance from 
outside. Without the push factors they could have been labelled as 'opportunist'. 
Cluster 3, the smallest grouping, was dominated by the defensive push factor (both the fear of 
redundancy and of a new owner) although there was also some evidence of an older management 
team also possessing some commercial and personal ambition. Like Cluster 2 they were keen to 
seek financial reward. Unlike Cluster 2 they had significant long term faith in the company. This 
Cluster can be best described as 'push'. 
TABLE 12.9: SIZE OF MBO CLUSTER FIRMS 
ariable Global Mean Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
mplo 
r 
in E ployees (number) 
a t ti t me of survey 246.6 250.7 119.1 365.4 
o pre  buy-out 257.8 251.8 106.0 480.1 
j 
Price 1 paid (L'OOO) 5,333 4,535___ 500 667 29, 
Examination was then made of the size of the company (Table 12.9). Cluster 2, those having 
basically opportunist characteristics although with a significant level of 'push' factors were 
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associated with the smallest companies in terms of both employment numbers and the value of 
the transaction. Clustcr 3, the 'push' Tcam Leadcrs, was associatcd with vcry largc buy-outs. 
Significant differences were then sought between the various grouping over a number of variables 
which were seen as being similar to the those used in 12.4 for assessing variations between buy-in 
Team Leader types. Cross tabulation of individual variables with the clusters was carried out, 
testing for significant differences through Chi-Square tests. The results of areas where interesting 
levels of significance were found are shown in Table 12.10 which also illustrates the main areas 
of difference between the Clusters in these variables. 
(1) Performance 
The most important area of difference which required to be examined was performance in terms 
of profit and sales turnover compared with both the buy-out Plan and the actual before buy-out. 
For all four measures of performance the null hypothesis of no difference between the clusters 
was not rejected. However in terms of profit compared to forecast the differences across clusters 
were significant at the 7 percent level (Chi-Square=8.75, p=0.07). Cluster 2 performed notably 
worse than the others while Cluster 3 had the best level of achievement compared to the Business 
Plan. 
(2) Deal Structuring 
Differences were sought between clusters in terms of structuring the transaction and the use of 
particular financing instruments and types of institutions. Differences which were observed were 
outside the 0.1 significance level, the most important being in terms of the use of merchant banks, 
venture capitalists, enterprise and development agencies and CCRPPO shares. 
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TABLE 12.10: AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
MANAGEMENT BUY-OUT CLUSTERS 
VARIABLE 
I 
CHI- 
SQUARE 
SIGNIF- 
ICANCE 
COMMENT 
PERFORMANCE 
Profit Compared to Forecast 8.75 0.07 CI 54-3% better, C2 28.6%, C3 
70.6% 
Profit Compared to Actual pre-mbo 0.95 0.92 Cl 69.0% better, C2 72.2% 
better, C3 58.8% better 
Sales Compared to Forecast 2.49 0.65 CI 48.4% better, C2 33.3% 
better, C3 47.1% better 
Sales Compared to Actual pre-mbo 3.72 0.45 C1 56.9% better, C2 77.7% 
better, C3 70.5% better 
STRUCTURING 
Use of Merchant bank 4.08 0.13 C2 4.9 %, C3 29.4 % 
Use of Venture Capitalist 3.59 0.17 C3 52.9%, C2 83 % 
Use of Enterprise and Development Agencies 3.73 0.15 C2 nil; C3 17.6 % 
Use of CCRPPO shares 3.65 0.16 CI 35.2%, C2 26.3%, C3 56.3%, 
CONTROL MECHANISMS 
Purchase other services 10.68 0.00 C2 22.7%, C3 nil 
Change of Auditor 3.84 0.15 None in C3 
APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONS 
Get best terms 6.77 0.03 C2 20%, CI 51.1% 
Initial Rejection 5.51 0.06 C1 11.9%, C2 30% 
MANAGEMENT 
Years of Experience of Finance Director 15.64 0.11 Cl older, C2 youngest 
Recruitment of Senior Specialists 4.03 0.14 C1 27.9%, C3 11.1% 
SUPPLIERICUSTOMER 
Relationship with customers 6.83 0.15 Cl 63.7% better, C3 39.9% 
better 
Customers Lost 5.28 0.07 C3 22.2%, C2 nil 
FINANCIAL ACTIONS 
' 
- 
4.62 Post-mbo cash flow problems 7 0.09 C2 35.6 %, C2 42.9%, C3 11.8% 
Note: CI-Cluster 1; C2=Cluster 2; C3=Cluster 3 
(3) Control Mechanisms 
Few differences were noted in the conditions imposed by the financiers other than requirement 
to purchase other services (Chi-square= 10.68, p= 0.00). 
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(4) Approaches for Finance 
Differences were however noted in the cases of managers approaching more than one institution. 
Ilis had been done to try to get better terms (Chi-square= 6.77, p=0.03) with over half of 
Cluster I doing so and because of initial rejection (Chi-squarc=5.51, p=0.06). 
(5) Managcment 
No significant differences were noted between clusters in subsequent managerial changes. 
(6) Supplier/Customer Relationships 
Differences were however noted in customer relationships with Cluster 3 being the most likely 
to lose customers (Chi-square =5.28, p=0.07) while CI were the buy-outs most likely to improve 
relationships with customers (Chi-square 6.83, p=0.15). 
(7) Financial Actions 
In terms of post buy-out financial problems, Cluster 3 were the least likely to suffer cash flow 
problems (Chi-square =4.62, p=0.09) and C2 the most likely. 
Despite 'the presence of those differences the majority of variables did not show significant 
differences across clusters implying that buy-outs actions may be seen to depend on individual 
circumstances rather than broad groupings of buy-out managers. 
12.6 Differences Between the Buy-out and Buy-in Clusters 
Both the factor and cluster analysis of management buy-outs and buy-ins produced three clusters 
which had broad similarities in types of the descriptions which could be given to them- 
opportunist, craftsmen and push. However, the relative positions of these were different, the most 
important for buy-ins being opportunist (67.8 %) while buy-outs were dominated by 'craftsmen' 
(77.3%). In both cases the smallest grouping were 'push' although they accounted for a larger 
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proportion in buy-outs. Ile two typologies therefore suggest hat the types of Team Leaders in 
buy-outs and buy-ins are intrinsically different, as hypothesised in Chapters 7 and 8. 
The nature of the 'push' cluster appeared to differ between buy-outs and buy-ins in terms of the 
target companies (see Tables 12.4 and 12.10). While the 'push' buy-in Team Leaders were 
targeting the smallest of companies in terms of average employment, turnover and price paid, the 
'push' management buy-out Team Leaders were in the largest companies. Thc'push'buy-in Team 
Leaders may well not be sufficiently attractive to venture capitalists to back in larger transactions 
while the 'push' buy-out Team Leaders may be associated with larger defensive buy-outs, 
sometimes in the public sector, in this period which, despite a high price, may actually have been 
bought at an attractive price in terms of earnings potential and discount to net asset value. 
Buy-out 'Opportunists' were also looking for companies which were considerably smaller than 
those sought by 'Craftsmen' while in the case of buy-ins size differences were marginal. 
Both typologies showed few significant differences between their respective clusters for variables 
concerning the Team, control mechanisms, management actions, Team re-organisation, financial 
requirements and rcalisation objectives. Comparison between the attributes and actions of for 
example buy-out and buy-in 'craftsmen' is made more difficult by questions in the two surveys not 
being identical. However certain comparisons can be made. 
Significant differences were not found in the performance measures between clusters for both 
buy-outs and buy-ins, although in the case of buy-outs profit compared to forecast was significant 
at the p=0.07 level. Buy-in opportunists were the most successful in bettering their profits plan 
although buy-out 'opportunists' were the worst. However buy-out 'opportunists' were the most 
successful at improving profits compared to the actual before. Similarly with turnover buy-in 
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'opportunists'were best at improving turnover compared to budget whereas buy-out 'opportunists' 
were best compared with actual before the buy-out. 
Structuring and investor control mechanism produced some differences within buy-outs and buy- 
ins but there was no communality of areas where significant differences e)dsted. Significant 
differences were noted for buy-out clusters in approaches to institutions, and customer 
relationships and management re-organisation which were not repeated in buy-in clusters. Some 
differences arose in buy-in exit intentions and actual method of exit which were not repeated in 
buy-out clusters. 
Ile most interesting area of difference appears to be in post transaction finance. Differences 
between clusters at the p=0.09 level were noted in buy-in requirements for further finance and 
at the same level for buy-out cash flow problems. 63.2 percent of buy-in 'opportunists', the largest 
of the three clusters, had required further finance while the buy-out grouping most likely to 
experience post buy-out cash flow problems was the 'opportunist' cluster. It should be noted that 
the buy-in 'opportunists' were also most likely to engage in subsequent acquisitions, which would 
involve further finance. 
12.7 Conclusions 
The use of Factor and Cluster Analysis has enabled respondents to both the Buy-in survey and 
an earlier Buy-out survey to be reduced to three respective I groupings of entrepreneurs reflecting 
motivational and basic personal dimensions. The Groups additionally have close resemblances with 
standard concepts of entrepreneurs identified in earlier studies of entrepreneurship- 'craftsmen' 
and 'opportunist'. For buy-ins, 'opportunists', 'craftsmen' and a 'push' cluster could be identified. 
For buy-outs, groupings were 'craftsmen', 'opportunistfpush' and 'push'. However the distribution 
of Team Leaders between the three groups appear very different between buy-outs and buy-ins, 
the former having a much higher proportion of 'craftsmen' and 'push' related Team Leaders than 
306 
buy-ins. Given the high degrees of initiative and general pro-active behaviour in establishing a 
buy-in, this is not unexpected. In the case of buy-ins this 'push' cluster was very small, 
representing only three cases. 
A search for significant variations across clusters produced only limited results with neither the 
buy-in nor buy-out clusters showing significant differences in terms of two basic aspects of 
performance- improvement in operating profit and in turnover compared to original plans. 
However a series of differences were noted in certain aspects of structuring the transaction, 
management action post transaction, senior management turnover, control mechanisms and exit 
intentions. Differences noted in buy-in clusters were not necessarily repeated in buy-out clusters. 
Lack of differences may be partially attributable to the timing of the survey. Although the actual 
completion of the buy-outs and buy-ins did not take place in recessionary conditions, the survey 
itself was carried out at a point in the case of buy-ins when the economy was going into recession 
but for buy-outs when significant economic growth had started: consequently factors governing 
structuring and management action may be different. Additionally buy-outs in the 1983-85 period 
did not suffer from the over-pricing and over-leveraging which affected both buy-outs and buy-ins 
in the latter 1980's (see eg Bleackley and Hay, 1992). Nevertheless despite the identification of 
certain areas where significant differences across clusters were identified, the majority of variables 
did not show significant difference. 
Another timing aspect was that many of the action and performance areas represented only a 
comparatively short period from the buy-in or buy-out completion and more significant results may 
have been obtained had a longer time frame been possible. It is interesting to note that the 
relationship of profit compared to plan for buy-outs was coming close to the p=0.05 level for buy- 
outs, where there was a larger proportion of companies with a longer period of post completion 
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trading than in the buy-in samplc. For buy-ins a level of p=0.09 was achieved for realisation status 
at a point two years after completion of the survey. 
The lack of differences between clusters in both the buy-out and buy-in surveys and important 
measures of performance is not unique. Similar outcomes were reported in a study by Roure and 
Keeley (1990) who noted that individual's characteristics, although no doubt important, were not 
statistically related to performance in new technology based ventures although team characteristics 
were. In the case of buy-outs and buy-ins, Team Leaders and members of the Team will have 
undergone extensive screening prior to receiving financial support from venture capitalists and 
banks; this will have been intended to eliminate potential under-performers. MacMillan et al 
(1987) have noted the strong dependence on the personality and experience of the entrepreneur. 
Timmons (1989, p 6) notes that the screening process results in very different performance results 
for venture capital backed ventures from new ventures in general. Storey (1982 p 120) saw the 
personal characteristics of the entrepreneurs exerting only the mildest influence on the subsequent 
performance of the firm. Stuart and Abetti (1990) found that the craftsman-opportunist 
orientation of the entrepreneur was only an extremely weak (p=0.21) influence on performance 
and that it was less of a determinant of success than other factors such as entrepreneurial 
experience. Westhead (1990) did not find significant differences between his six Welsh founder 
type clusters in terms of profitability or revenues. Lafuente and Salas (1989) could only find 
differences between four Spanish entrepreneurial cluster types in terms of sales growth and 
profitability at the 15 percent level. Begley and Boyd (1987) found little relationship between 
psychological attributes and financial performance between entrepreneurs and small business 
managers. 
The Proposition P9 cited in Chapter 3.3 that buy-in Team Leaders are mainly opportunistic but 
with a minority of craftsmen can be confirmed with the proviso that 'push' factors, originally seen 
as unlikely, did occur to a small extent. It can be confirmed that buy-out managers can be are less 
opportunist and more likely to be influenced by 'push' factors. 
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CHAPTER 13 
BUY-IN PERFORMANCE PREDICTION 
13.1 Introduction 
Chapter 12 has shown that while the clusters produced from a factor analysis of motivational and 
other entrepreneurial variables can identify specific types of Team Leaders significant differences 
did not emerge in terms of operating performance between these three. types of Buy-in Team 
Leaders. This may be attributable to the serious problems which emerged in the UK economy 
between buy-in completion and the time of the survey (causing corporate distress which may have 
distorted normal measures of comparative performance) and the effects of the venture capital 
screening process. Additionally the question on which this analysis was based relied on a general 
direction effect rather than actual accounting data. 71be results however had similarities with other 
studies of entrepreneurial cluster types (eg Westhead 1990, Lafuente and Salas 1989). 
Consequently performance may be determined possibly by a broader set of factors than just the 
type of entrepreneur. For instance the importance of product and market assumptions in Business 
Plans have been noted by Dubini (1989) and MacMillan et al (1987), the completeness of the 
founding team, technical superiority of the product, buyer concentration and product development 
time by Roure and Keeley (1990) and the actual entrepreneurial experience of the leader by 
Stuart and Abetti (1990) and Vesper (1980). Hofer and Sandberg (19S7) cite three factors as 
having a substantial impact on new venture performance- the structure of the industry entered, 
business strategy used by the new venture and the behavioural characteristics of the founding 
entrepreneurs. In determining high growth from low growth ventures Siegel et al (1993) noted 
the key role of experience in a similar industry. 
A series of possible influences on the performance of the sample which had been discussed in the 
literature survey was re-examined. Relevant aspects described in Chapter 2.3 include educational 
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and managerial backgrounds of the Team Leader, his age, the relationship of the incubator to the 
new venture and the management's knowledge of the target, attitude to risk, previous 
entrepreneurial experience and the presence of skills gaps. Chapter 2.6 in reviewing performance 
and life cycle aspects referred to the incentives of equity ratchets, the bonding effect of high levels 
of debt and the control and monitoring functions of venture capitalists. Size and the need for 
turnaround (Chapter 2.2.6 and 2.6.3) have also been seen to be relevant in assessing the 
performance of buy-ins. 
Chapter 13 widens the investigation into the features of initial buy-in performance to identify if 
more general entrepreneurial characteristics as well as target company demographics have an 
influence beyond the cluster types identified in Chapter 12. 
13.2 The Use of Discriminant Analysis 
The extension of the previous Chapter's investigation into buy-in performance involves first the 
identification of entrepreneurship, corporate restructuring and company specific variables which 
may have an impact on subsequent performance of the buy-in, followed by the use of discriminant 
analysis to identify which ones of the hypothesised variables are important. Alternative models are 
used to rind the most effective. 
Discriminant analysis classifies cases into one of several mutually exclusive groups on the basis of 
various characteristics and establishes which of these are important for distinguishing among the 
groups. It also evaluates , the accuracy of the classification. Linear combinations of the 
independent, 'predictor' variables are formed and serve as the basis for classifying cases into one 
of the groups (Norusis, 1985). The coefficients for the linear combinations are so chosen that they 
result in the 'best' separation between groups. Accuracy is assessed by applying the model to cases 
for whom group membership is known and comparing actual group membership to predicted. 
While each group must be a sample from a multivariate normal population the function has been 
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shown to be fairly robust in a variety of other situations. Consequently certain - dichotomous 
variables, which could not be used in the earlier factor analysis (Chapter 12.2), can be re-; 
introduced. 
Alternative approaches for the determination of a suitable dependent performance variable which 
could discriminate between unsuccessful and more successful cases were sought and two main 
possibilities identified- the existence of financial distress in the target company (as measured by 
buy-ins which had failed or been refinanced v those that had not) and the direction of operating 
profit compared to the Business Plan. It was noted that models which are used to predict failure 
may be flawed because of the low probability of failure, high classification accuracy obscuring the 
situation that in ex ante terms the overwhelming majority of failure signals are given in respect 
to survivor companies (Piesse and Wood 1992). Consequently the method using profit trend was 
therefore utiliscd. 
The operating profit trend variable gave respondents seven categories of percentage deviation of 
actual operating performance from the original buy-in Business Plan. The major limitations were 
that the relevant question was phrased in general terms, did not seek actual accounting figures 
and did not split the deviation from plan into specific time periods other than the overall time 
since the buy-in. It was, of course, difficult to obtain any more precise indicators given the 
relatively short time period after buy-in. The survey questionnaire did not examine the Business 
Plan performance relative to the actual being achieved before the buy-in. Given that the Plan in 
itself would be likely to reflect a significant improvement on earlier performance, the extent of 
improvement may be understated in this question. As discussed in Chapter 11.2 the use of this 
measure of performance has certain limitations, notably the varying periods being covered, the 
unusual economic and financial conditions at, the time of the survey, the use of financial as 
opposed to other types of operating performance and the non-use of accounting data. 
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The operating profit variable was then re-coded to produce two groupings- those companies which 
were performing worse than Plan and those better. The relatively small sample size meant that 
statistical validity assumptions could not be met using more than two groupings. 
Further to the description of variables outlined in the Introduction a selection of independent 
variables relevant to the entrepreneurial characteristics involved, corporate restructuring and 
company specific areas and which were felt to be relevant to the overall performance of the target 
company was made (see Chapters 3.7). The predictors were variables which could be determined 
at the time of buy-in rather than events happening subsequently. 
Variables selected to test for entrepreneurial related factors were: the Team Leader's 
entrepreneurial Experience; the, Team Leader's experience of being in a management buy-out; 
the Team's knowledge of the target company; whether the Team had moved within the same 
sector; the Team Leader's managerial background; the Team Leader's educational background; 
the presence of Finance or Marketing skill gaps; the Team Leader's attitude to personal financial 
risk; the Team Leader's age; the regression factor scores 1 (Commercial Ambition), 2 
(Independence), 3 (Investment), 4 (Practicality), 5 (Personal Ambition) and 6 (Pushed) (12.2). 
Variables seen as reflecting the influence of corporate restructuring were: the use of equity 
ratchets and the size of the management equity share (to test equity incentive theory); gearing 
ratio (to test debt bonding effects); and board representation and the leading equity investor (3i 
v clearing bank development capital institution v other venture capitalist) to examine monitoring 
and control arguments. 
Other variables reflecting deal specific and other effects were the source of the company, 
turnover and profit characteristics at the time of buy-in; and the year of buy-in. Where necessary 
variables were re-coded to put them on a more consistent basis. 
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Discriminant analysis represents an exploratory tool and it is not known in advance which of the 
selected variables are likely to be important for group separation and which are effectively 
extraneous. Clearly one of the desired end products of the analysis is identification of the good 
predictor variables (Norusis 1985). Ibis process can be assisted through using a step-wisc selection 
procedure. In this type of procedure the variables thought to be relevant are inserted in the 
model, the first of the list of variables selected is entered; this variable has the largest acceptable 
value for the selection criterion. After the first variable is entered, the value of the criterion is 
re-evaluated for all the variables not in the model and the variable with the next largest 
acceptable criterion entered next. At this point the variable entered first is rc-evaluated to 
determine whether it meets the removal criterion. If it does, it is removed. Various criteria can 
be used in stepwise analysis. In this case the analysis was based on minimising the overall Wilks 
Lambda'. Under this method at each step the variable which results in the smallest Wilks Lambda 
for the discriminant function is selected for entry. 
As described earlier certain assumptions must be met for discriminant analysis to prove 
satisfactory. Certain dichotomous variables were included in the selection. Although the linear 
discriminant function requires that the predictor variables have a multivariate normal distribution, 
the function has been shown to perform fairly well in a variety of other situations and the 
robustness of the technique suggest its use in this application (Norusis 1985). The group 
covariance matrices were checked for equality using Box's M test and a linear discriminant 
function was deemed to be most appropriate. While discriminant analysis does allow the use of 
prior probabilities, it was felt that given the relatively small sample numbers and the subjective 
nature of such a policy it would not be appropriate. 
'As an alternative method and a check to the Wilks Lambda stepwise selection method, the 
same variables were also run using a stepwise analysis based on two other methods. The first 
maximised the value in Rao's V. The second method maximised the Mahalanobis' distance 
between two closest groups. Both produced similar results to the Wilks Lambda minimising 
method. 
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Four basic models were used in the analysis: 
(a) All of the variables reflecting entrepreneurial characteristics of the Team Leader and aspects 
of the target company and deal structuring but excluding variables derived from the factor 
analysis; 
(b) All the variables in the first but also including the factor regression variables which had been 
calculated in the determination of the entrepreneurial typology (Chapter 12.2); 
(c) The factor regression variables themselves; and 
(d) The factor regression variables but not using a step-wise reduction procedure. 
13.3 The Results 
Before carrying out the discriminant functions, the means of the variables were determined to 
show overall directional patterns which might exist (Table 13.1). These indicated that buy-ins 
which had performed better than Plan could be associated with: an earlier year for the buy-in; a 
lower level of educational background of the Team Leader; the absence of a finance skills gap; 
lower personal financial gearing; more entrepreneurial experience of the Team Leader; more 
knowledge of the target company; a higher level of profitability at the time of buy-in; older Team 
Leaders; lower levels of educational achievement; the target not having been a privately owned 
company; a lower incidence of ratchets; board representation by venture capitalists; no experience 
of having been in a previous buy-out; and a lower share of equity by the management team. The 
results of the four models in terms of the canonical discriminant function coefficients and the 
grouped cases correctly classified are shown in Tables 13.2 and 13.3 respectively. Model 1, using 
the entrepreneurial and company variables but excluding the factor regression variables, 
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successfully predicted 84.6 percent of group membership with an eigenvalue of 0.90'. It had 
reached its conclusion in ten steps. 'ne sequence of inclusion of variables was the Team 
Leader's financial resources, source of the company, Team Leader's previous experience of being 
in a management buy-out, the Team Leader's education, team knowing each other before, the 
F- TABLE 13.1: MEANS OF DISCRIMINANT VARIABLES* 
VARIABLE GLOBAL 
MEAN 
WORSETHAN 
FORECAST 
BETTER THAN 
FORECAST 
TOTAL 
CASES 
Size (Turnover) 1.96 2.00 1.92 55 
Equity Institution 1.65 1.69 1.62 55 
Buy-in Year 3.13 3.24 3.00 55 
Same Sector 0.60 0.62 0.58 55 
Team Leader's Background 1.67 1.67 1.68 52 
Team Leader's Education 1.82 1.66 2.00 55 
Finance Skills Gap 0.29 031 0.27 55 
Marketing Skills Gap 0.20 0.17 0.23 55 
Team Leadees Finance 3.38 3.69 3.04 55 
Team Leader's Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
0.29 0.28 0.31 5S 
Knowledge of Company 0.89 0.83 0.96 55 
Size of Profits (pre-MBI) 1.93 1.91 1.96 55 
Gearing ratio 2.33 2.38 2.27 55 
Team Leader's Age 2.81 2.72 2.92 54 
Source of Company 2.53 2.66 2.38 55 
Ratchet 0.38 0.41 0.35 55 
Board representation 0.49 0.48 0.50 55 
CEO in Previous MBO 0.11 0.17 0.04 55 
Team % Equity 2.212 2.31 2.12 55 
Factorl (commercial ambition) 0.03 
-0.18 0.26 52 
Factor2 (independence) 
-0.02 
-0.01 -0.03 52 
Factor3 (investment) 0.05 
-0.07 0.18 52 
Factor4 (practicality) 
-0.05 0.07 -0.18 52 
Factor5 (personal ambition) 
-0.04 0.24 -0.33 52 
Factor6 (pushed) 0.02 
-0.10 0.14 52 
* All Cases 
2 An Eigcnvaluc of more than 0.40 is considered excellent (Hedderson, 1987). 
TABLE 13.2: CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
Model 1: Standardised Unstandardised 
Buy-in Year 0.39835 0.493810 
Team Leader-Managerial background 
-0.28819 -0.4040205 
Team Leader- Education 
-0.78773 . 1.016953 
Team Leader- Financial resources 0.40843 0.3148362 
Team's knowledge of each other 
-0.79443 -2.503676 
Team Leader's Age 
-0.39404 -0.3689661 
Source of company 0.86743 1.077130 
Use of equity ratchet 0.30601 0.6257191 
Equity % held by Team 0.65952 0.7433415 
Team Uader in previous MBO 0-37610 1.272552 
Constant 
- -1.400332 
Group centroid (1)0.89542 
(2) 
-0.96706 
Eigenvalue-0.90056 
Model 2. 
Size- Turnover 0.29806 0.3588693 
Buy-in year 
-0.46306 -0.4991332 
Team Leader-Managerial Background 0.24896 0.3490209 
Team Leader- Education 0.91074 1.175760 
Finance Skills Gap 0.44631 0.9498154 
Team's knowledge of each other 0.95583 3.012354 
Source of company 
-0.84507 -1.049368 
Use of Equity Ratchet 
-0.55078 . 1.126221 
Equity % held by Team 
-0.85165 -0.9598788 
Commercial Ambition 0.4&W 0.5070521 
Personal Ambition 
-0.62777 -0.6330574 
Constant 
- 
03977453 
Group Centroid (1) 
-1.04120 (2)1.12449 
Eigenvalue-1.21765 
Model 3: 
Commercial Ambition 0.58130 0.6029031 
Investment 0.46315 0.4718267 
Personal Ambition 
-0.73161 -0.7377807 
Pushed O-U968 '0.3595380 
Consiant 
-0.7608743 (E-01) 
Group ccntroid (1) 
-0.42737 (2)0.46156 
Eigenvalue-0.20515 
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Model 4: 
Commercial Ambition 0.56580 0.5868203 
Independence 0.11528 0.1133628 
Investment 0.46758 0.4763343 
Practicality 
-0.25253 -0.2519688 
Personal Ambition 
-0.70806 -0.7140343 
Pushed 0.36134 0.3333903 
Constant 
-0.8442897 (E-01) 
Group centroid (1) 
-0.44397 (2)0.47949 
Eigenvaluc=0.22140 
TABLE 13.3: DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: CLASSIFICATION RESULTS 
Predicted Group Membership: 
No of Cases 
No. 
Group I 
% No. 
Group 2 
% 
Model 1: 
Group 1 (Worse than budget) 27 22 81.5 5 18.5 
Group 2 (Better than budget) 25 3 12.0 22 88.0 
Ungrouped cases 4 1 25.0 3 75.0 
Percent of grouped cases correctly classified = 84.62 
Model 2: 
Group 1 (Worse than budget) 27 26 96.3 1 3.7 
Group 2 (Better than budget) 25 4 16.0 21 84.0 
Ungrouped cases 4 1 25.0 3 75.0 
Percent of grouped cases correctly classified = 90.38 
Model 3: 
Group 1 (Worse than budget) 27 is 55.6 12 44.4 
Group 2 (Better than budget) 25 9 36.0 16 64.0 
Ungrouped cases 4 3 75.0 1 25.0 
Percent of grouped cases correctly classified = 59.62 
Model 4: 
Group 1 (Worse than budget) 27 16 59.3 11 40.7 
Group 2 (Better than budget) 25 9 36.0 16 64.0 
ngrouped cases 4 3 75.0 1 25.0 
Percent of grouped cases correctly classified = 61.54 
year of the buy-in, the share of equity held by the Team, the CEO's age, the CEO's type of 
managerial background and the use of an equity ratchet. 
Examination of the 
-group centroids showed that variables describing educational status, team 
knowledge of each other and to a lesser extent background managerial experience, and the Team 
Leader's age were associated with performance which was better than projected in the Business 
Plan. Interpreting these indicate that good performance (which had a negative group centroid) 
was associated with lower educational qualifications (rather than higher); previous personal 
knowledge of each other in the team; the Team Leader's specific managerial background; and 
older Team Leaders. 
In contrast poor performance was associated with buying a private company (rather than a 
divestment from a quoted group); a high element of Team equity; a later year of buy-in; higher 
personal gearing by the Team Leader; the presence of a ratchet; and the Team Leader's 
experience of having been in a previous buy-out. Discussion and implication of these results 
follows after description of the results from the other models in 13.4. 
Model 2, containing both the Factor Variables and the normal -variables, produced the most 
accurate prediction rate. Ibis model which had a 90.4 percent correct prediction rate and an even 
more satisfactory eigenvalue of 1.22 had reached its conclusion in eleven steps but had used only 
two of the Factor variables, 'Personal Ambition' and 'Commercial Ambition'. In this process the 
variables had been selected in the order of 'Personal Ambition', source, team knowing each other 
before the MBI, the Team Leader's education, the share of the equity held by the Team, the year 
of the buy-in, 'Commercial ambition', the presence of a ratchet, a finance skills gap, the size of 
the company in terms of turnover and the Team Leader's managerial background. Common to 
both Models 1 and 2 were source, team's knowledge of each other before the buy-out, the Team 
Leader's education, the team's share of the equity, the presence of an equity ratchet and the 
CEO's managerial background. 
Examination of the discriminant function coefficients and the group centroids showed that 
performance better than Business Plan was associated with Commercial Ambition, the company's 
turnover, the managerial background of the Team Leader, his educational background, the 
presence of a Finance Skills gap and the team's knowledge of each other prior. to the buy-in. 
Interpreting these would indicate that better performance was achieved where companies were 
larger, the Team Leader had specific management experience, was less highly educated, there was 
a finance skills gap (ie allowing a new approach to finance and control systems to be introduced), 
where there was personal knowledge of the team beforehand and where there was a high degree 
of commercial ambition (perhaps reflecting specific commercial opportunity). In contrast poor 
performance was again associated with the later buy-ins, those bought from a private rather than 
publicly owned source, those involving a management equity ratchet, where there was a high 
percentage of Team equity (likely to be in the smaller transactions) and where there was a high 
degree of Personal Ambition. 
Model 3 using just the regression factor scores obtained in the initial factor analysis produced a 
less statistically acceptable result with an Eigen value of 0.21 and a classification result of 59.6 
percent. Two of the regression factors, 2 (Independence") and 4 (Tracticality'), were not selected 
in the procedure. Again Personal Ambition had a negative relationship while Commercial 
Ambition, Investment and Push had a positive relationship to good performance. 
Model 4 using all the Factor regression variables and not using a step wise procedure produced 
only a marginally better result, the Eigenvalue increasing to 0.22 and the percentage of group 
cases correctly classified to 61.5 percent. Factor Variable 5, 'Personal Ambition' had the highest 
standardised canonical discrimination function coefficients, again being associated with poor 
performance. Practicality was also associated with good performance. 
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13.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
Discriminant analysis provides a useful indication of the relevant factors which may determine an 
outcome although it does not in itself deduce causality. 'Ibis technique has been used in the 
Chapter to extend the conclusions in Chapter 12 that no major differences in performance could 
be seen across the entrepreneurial cluster types. The discriminant analysis confirmed that 
consideration of entrepreneurial typologies, especially those which are reliant on primarily 
motivational patterns alone (Models 3 and 4), do not act as satisfactory predictors of over or 
under performance by buy-ins. 
In contrast the use of variables reflecting basic parameters of the target company, the structuring 
arrangements and specific demographic information on the Team Leaders produced a much better 
statistical indication of performance possibilities. Where this is supplemented by the 'Personal 
Ambition' and 'Commercial Ambition'entrepreneurial factors over 90 percent of the sample could 
be categoriscd into the correct profit direction classification. The first two Models shared many 
common characteristics with the group centroids in both cases showing considerable discrimination 
between non-achievers of the Business Plan and those that did. Thus buy-ins which showed 
satisfactory performance in both Models reflected the Team's knowledge of each other, lower 
educational status and to a small extent the Team Leader's specific managerial background. In 
contrast poor performance was correlated with the target being privately owned previously, a 
higher management equity share percentage, the later 1980's buy-ins and the presence of a 
ratchet. 
Such results provide support for some of the theories outlined earlier in the Thesis although there 
are inconsistencies, some of which may be explainable. While the results do show some similarities 
to entrepreneurship research findings, they indicate that buy-ins, at least in the conditions at the 
end of the 1980s, work in a different way from what might be expected from earlier consideration 
of corporate restructuring. 
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The benefits from corporate restructuring are seen as coming from equity incentive effects, debt 
bonding and superior control and monitoring (Chapter 2.1 and 2.6). Consequently gearing, 
management equity shares, equity ratchets, the use of non-executive directors by the venture 
capitalists and the type of venture capitalist might have been expected to have had an important 
positive influence on performance. However this does not appear to have happened with some 
of the variables actually having a reverse effect. Buy-in gearing was not selected in the stepwise 
procedure indicating that high gearing was not a major determinant of operating profit direction. 
Personal financial gearing did emerge as an influence in Model 1 (but not Model 2) with higher 
personal reliance on loans reflected in Business Plan under achievement. Entrepreneurs may 
however be only moderate risk takers (eg Mancuso 1975). 
The role of management equity incentives also does not appear to behave in the way indicated 
by corporate restructuring arguments. Expectations would be that higher equity percentages and 
incentives through equity ratchets would lead to better performance, whereas in this survey the 
reverse appears to have applied. Higher initial equity stakes and the presence of a ratchet were 
both associated with lower performance in each of Models 1 and 2. This is counter to the case 
of buy-outs which have subsequently floated (see Thompson, - Wright, Robbie 1992) but may be 
related to two considerations. Ratchets may be imposed in cases where there are doubts in the 
venture capitalists' minds as to the feasibility of management projections being realised (Wright, 
Thompson, Chiplin, Robbie 1991, p 115) while high management equity percentages are likely to 
be associated with smaller deals (Chiplin, Wright, Robbie 1992) which themselves in Model 2 did 
show some (relatively weak) association with poor performance. 
Control devices in the form of appointment of non-executive directors or difference in type of 
venture capitalist were not included in any'of the steps. This lack of influence may reflect 
homogeneity of venture capital approaches. This may be caused for instance by the number of 
ex-3i employees working in other institutions and the role of professional. advisers in working on 
deals subsequently financed by a variety of venture capitalists. This lack of difference however 
supports MacMillan et al (1987) who noted that three different investment strategies identified 
as differentiating venture capitalist behaviour were about equally effective- the mean performance 
being similar for all three. Ruhnka and Young (1991) also believed that available empirical studies 
of risk perception of venture capital investors, interpreted in conjunction with psychological risk 
theory, are sufficient to suggest several common behaviours of venture capital investors towards 
some of the key risk and reward assessments in making investment decisions. 
The presence of particular skills gaps also did not appear to be a determinant of performance, 
evidence on management change post buy-in implying that these were filled shortly after buy-in. 
In terms of entrepreneurial factors the extent of the Team Leader's previous entrepreneurial 
experience somewhat surprisingly also was not as significant as had been expected. Actual 
experience of an entrepreneurial venture, which studies such as Stuart and Abetti (1990) and 
Vesper (1980) show as having a significant effect on new venture performance, did not enter the 
step-wise selection procedure. Contrarily experience of participation in an earlier management 
buy-out produced a negative relationship with performance in Model 1. Ibis may partially reflect 
the early stage of development of the market for second time entrepreneurs in the UK 
(Somerville 1993). Higher education was also negatively related to performance in both models. 
However entrepreneurship literature appears divided in this, some studies (eg Roubidoux and 
Garnicr, 1973, Pickles and O'Farrell, 1986) showing a positive relationship of education with 
performance while others indicate a less strong or'even negative relationship (eg Stuart and 
Abetti, 1990). While knowledge of the actual sector was not selected as an influence in the 
stepwise procedure, a key factor reflecting the stability of team formation (Timmons 1990) was 
whether members of the Team had known each other before hand. Under both models this 
variable produced at high correlation with good performance, appearing to have a stronger 
influence than whether the team remainedvithin the same sector or not. 
Among company specific factors the source of transaction- private company sale v plc divestment- 
produced important results, private sales showing a strong negative relationship to performance 
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in both models. 17his raises questions as to the ability of buy-ins to be successful as a corporate 
restructuring tool for private sales and whether it is more appropriate for larger subsidiaries of 
groups where information asymmetries during due*diligence procedures may not be so important. 
Major size related differences did not emerge while previous loss-making 
-characteristics did not 
appear to be determinants of early performance achievement. 
To a large extent poor performance also appeared as a reflection of the economic and financial 
cycle, buy-ins taking place near the top of the cycle being less likely to succeed. The year of the 
buy-in proved to be an important variable, buy-ins in the 19809 period generally believed to 
suffer from the consequences of having paid excessive prices for the business (and consequently 
general over leverage applying) and the effects of later poor economic and financial conditions 
(Dunne 1993). This is supported by worries by Jensen (1991) and Kaplan and Stein (1990) as to 
the comparative stability of later US LBOs compared to those in the earlier 1980's and by Argenti 
(1976) as to the general effects on a company of a combination of high leverage and economic 
downturn. 
In the case of management buy-ins the results of investigation into the importance of performance 
related variables must also be qualified by the distorting effects of problems of information 
asymmetry (Hutchings 1987) and the long period which may be required to achieve a turnaround 
(eg Zimmerman 1991) which may result in initial performance indicators being unreliable 
indicators of medium and long term profit direction. 
Overall, discriminant analysis of buy-ins have failed to meet major areas of the performance 
proposition outlined in P17. Notably corporate restructuring variables reflecting a high level of 
Team equity ownership did not appear to be determinants of good performance, there was little 
influence of governance mechanisms (through type of venture capital firm) and debt bonding (as 
shown through gearing) did not appear to determine good performance (Pl7b). Indeed ratchets 
had a negative influence. 
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Among more entrepreneurship orientated variables, earlier personal knowledge of the Team 
appeared to be strong determinant of good performance (Pl7a) but contrary to the proposition 
entrepreneurs who had not achieved higher education achieved their plans better. 
Ilic importance of source of buy-outs was confirmed (Pl7c). 
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CIUPTER 14 
AUNAGEMENT BUY-IN CASE STUDIES 
14.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 4.4, the quantitative data obtained through the questionnaire survey has 
been supplemented by a series of more in-depth case study interviews with Team Leaders. Such 
an approach was designed to provide a deeper insight into the management buy-in process, the 
backgrounds to the team, the weighting of problems which emerged, relationships with their 
venture capitalists and their longer term aims. Case studies were selected to represent a suitable 
cross section of private buy-in backgrounds with comparison made with James Neill, a buy-in more 
in the US LBO style rather than a UK private buy-in. 
14.2 The Management Buy-in Process 
For expositional purposes the analysis in the cases is structured to highlight the issues which arise 
in the buy-in process (Figure 14.1) and can be seen to refer to questions raised in Chapters 2 and 
3. They cover the formation of the Team, identification of the target, the completion of the 
transaction, assessment of action, initial performance and realisation issues. The individual parts 
of the process incorporate issues raised in earlier chapters as follows: 
(a) Formation of the Team. "Questions arise concerning the entrepreneurial experience of the 
Team (Chapter 2.3.3), personal and managerial background (Chapter 2.3.2), the motivation of the 
Team (Chapter 2.3.4) and their previous relationships with each other and incubators (Chapter 
2.4.2); 
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Figure 14.1 
The Management Buy-in Process 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics 
and Motivation 
Entrepreneurial Experience 
Previous Relationships 
Method of Identification 
Mollvatlon for Sal* 
Competition for The Target 
Use of Adviser& 
Financial Structuring 
Due Diligenoe 
Business Pion 
Unforseen Problems 
Operating v Strategic 
Action Balance 
b1fectlan of Performance 
Increased Actions 
-Strategic 
-Operating 
Management Team 
Changes to Financial Structure 
Intention& 
Actual Relleation 
Success v FalluFs 
(b) Identification of the target company. Wis section covers issues concerning the method of 
identification, including the role of formal and informal networks (Chapter 2.4.2), the vendor's 
motivation and reasons for selling the business and competition with other bidders (Chapters 2.3.3 
and 2.3.4); 
(c) The completion of the transaction. This includes the use of advisers, the deal negotiation and 
due diligence processes, the Business Plan and the selection of the venture capitalist (Chapter 
2.4.4) and the financial structuring of the deal (Chapter 2.5.1) including governance issues (2.6.5); 
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(d) Assessment of post Buy-in action. This covers the types of action which were seen as initially 
necessary and the relative importance of operating and strategic actions (Chapter 2.6.3). It also 
refers to problems which may not have been identified during the due diligence process and which 
subsequently proved to be significant; 
(e) Initial performance. 'Ibis analyses the initial direction of the firm's performance (backed up 
by accounting data) in terms of profit, turnover and balance sheet variables (see Chapter 2.6.2) 
and examines the reasons behind variances with original intentions. Ibis allows the impact of 
increased actions and in particular re-organisation of the management team to be assessed 
(Chapter 2.6.3,2.6.4). Changes to the financial structuring of the company to account for 
variations in performance are examined; 
Realisation. The Team's original realisation intentions are examined together with changes to 
these intentions and analysis of any realisation which has actually been achieved (Chapters 2.6.6). 
Such exits may reflect success or failure of the buy-in. 
The Cases, which are described in more detail in Appendix 7, have shown a wide diversity of 
backgrounds of both management and target companies and unlike other collections of buy-out 
case studies (eg Kreiger 1990, Clutterbuck and Devine 1987, Green and Berry 1991) have not 
been confined to successful transactions. The sixth case, James Neill, has been modelled on the 
more typical U. S. LBO style of transaction and presents an interesting contrast with the other 
cases. 
143 Formation of the Buy-in Team 
In the formation of the Team issues arise concerning the personal demographic backgrounds of 
the individual members, their previous relationship, evidence of entrepreneurial experience and 
the type of entrepreneur which the Team Leader appears to be. 
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There was considerable variation between the buy-ins in terms of the relative size of buy-in teams. 
The two largest case studies, European Brands and James Neill, both had rive members although 
in the former two of them were clearly the motivators and very much key. In contrast, Ile Maids, 
had three team members in a company one thirtieth the turnover of European Brands and 
Slingsby four with one third of the turnover. Larger teams in small companies may present 
problems in terms of cohesiveness and cost base; it is interesting to note the particular problems 
referred to in Anncxe 7 concerning the subsequent break-up of the Slingsby team. Whether the 
teams had worked together was seen by all Team Leaders as to be very important, giving an 
indication of both the personal and business strengths and weaknesses of individual team 
members. 
Previous working relationships may of course not prove to be a good indicator of future 
performance but were expected by Team Leaders to be a better indicator than involving new 
partners at the start of*the buy-in process. Indeed the Team Leader of The Maids felt that the 
strength of the Team was more important than the strength of the acquisition. The Maids Team 
had worked together as a nucleus for three years, knew each other's strengths and weaknesses 
(Both business and personal) and were able to bring themselves through the initial problems of 
the buy-in. There was some variation between the Tcams as to how closely and recent the 
working relationship had been. In the three smaller buy-ins the working relationship had been 
current at the time of planning the buy-in whereas in the cases of Metalliform it had been a more 
remote relationship and in European Brands the key relationship within the Team had reflected 
an earlier involvement. In the sixth case, James Neill, the majority of the team had several years 
of working together as well as during a very concentrated search period which created a very 
cohesive team. While differences could be seen in subsequent team relationships, there was no 
evidence to suggest that those with looser relationships were in fact less likely to succeed than 
those with current experience and mistakes had been made in team selection among those who 
were working together immediately pre buy-in. 
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Discussions with Team Leaders revealed major weaknesses in the team formations in both 
Metalliform and Slingsby. The first which was a small team in a relatively large buy-in, had not 
involved a full time day to day working relationship (the Leader having Group rather than 
individual profit centre responsibilities) and appeared to involve two quite different levels of 
background and experience where conflicts could exist. Indeed the Team Leader of this case 
reflected on the loneliness inherent in his particular position. Secondly the Slingsby buy-in had 
the largest team relative to company size, four members. The Team Leader was particularly 
incensed that the venture capitalist had strongly encouraged the formation of a larger Team than 
the Leader had initially considered necessary. All members of the Team had to relocate and in 
practice two of the Team failed to live up to the potential which the Team Leader had originally 
expected. While perfectly adequate in performing in management capacities in privately owned 
groups, they were unable to adjust to the differences required in a role as owner manager. In 
retrospect the Team Leader felt that his knowledge and the drive of one of the other members 
would have been sufficicrit; the extra two members were essentially superfluous and expensive to 
remove. 
While larger sizes of Teams could be justified on reducing potential skills gaps, only two of the 
Teams (The Maids and James Neill) claimed that there were no skills gaps. The other four Team 
Leaders identified specific Financial skills gaps. While financial skills may be relatively easy to buy 
in compared to certain production, technical and sales skills, their absence at the planning and 
due diligence stages may lead to subsequent problems. This for instance was seen in AGK and 
Slingsby where more active early financial involvement would have helped to identify potential 
problems. The skills gap could also result in the delay of important financial actions. This was 
apparent most noticeably in Metalliforin where the incumbent Accountant was replaced at too 
late a stage after buy-in, despite the Team Leader's early recognition of the Accountant's 
shortcomings. Team Leaders may themselves have some basic financial acumen and be able to 
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afford some cover for skills gaps, three of the six Team Leaders having specific managerial skills 
in addition to their general skills. 
A major issue relates to the degree of entrepreneurial experience (2.3.3) which Teams may have 
had previously. Case study interviews showed the influence of a high degree of entrepreneurial' 
experience in European Brands. Here the Team Leader had successfully managed the start-up 
and rapid expansion of a company and clearly saw himself as a 'serial' entrepreneur. ýIe felt that 
this experience had been very useful especially in attracting venture capital funds. The Team at 
James Ncill also had a high degree of entrepreneurial experience, including working for venture 
capital organisations. The other Teams had essentially been managers without previous experience 
of being owners. However in one case, AGK, the Team had attempted a management buy-out 
of their incubator company. While this had been unsuccessful, the experience had helped to 
nurture an entrepreneurial desire which had culminated in the buy-in. It had also provided a 
useful learning curve. ' 
Even if Team Leaders did not have entrepreneurial experience, there were issues concerning how 
applicable skills learnt as part of a large company would be for running a smaller independent 
buy-in as well as how Team Leaders would be able to adapt to the different type of culture and 
level of back-up support. Three of the Team Leaders had worked previously for Top 500 UK 
companies with only two for privately owned companies. There was evidence that for instance in 
the case of Metalliform there were considerable problems involved in adjusting to these different 
levels. Certainly the change to private ownership had caused problems for two of these three, 
although that is not to exclude problems which arose with the transfer to working as a shareholder 
of a privately owned company. 
Background characteristics of entrepreneurs (Chapters 2.3.2,12.7 may have significant influence 
on venture performance. Team Leaders emerged as being well educated or with professional 
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backgrounds. The majority had university degrees and in one case the Number Two additionally 
had an MBA degree and were aged in their early 40s. Only one of the Team Leaders did not 
have professional parents, and in this case they were skilled rather than unskilled. This broad 
similarity of personal backgrounds does raise questions as to the selection process by venture 
capitalists and whether potential Team Leaders with different educational and personal 
backgrounds arc disadvantaged in their approaches. 
14.4 Identification of the Target Company 
Consideration of the target company was seen to involve issues concerning the nature of the 
identification process, the reasons for the sale of the company by the vendor, the type of company 
being sold, whether there was an active market for control of the company and essential 
demographic features. 
The way in which the company was identified in the first place was seen to concern the use of 
formal or informal networks. Teams may know of a target through their own personal contacts 
or may take advantage of more formal methods such as the use of professional advisers who may 
have access to more scientific methods of identification than the Team themselves. Additionally 
links may be sought with the Team's individual incubator organisations. 
Cases confirmed that personal, professional and industrial contacts were the most likely to be 
applied with incubator organisations having particular roles to play. Three of the cases relied on 
knowledge gained in incubators whose activities were very similar to those of the eventual target 
company. A fourth has been obtained through an informal industrial contact. The remaining two 
appeared to rely more on formal networks, European Brands on approaches of a financial 
institutions while James Neill involved a much more scientific approach and a long period of 
active search using sophisticated techniques. Some had been able to make use of research carried 
out at their previous employment, eg'The Maids' parent had been considered as a possible 
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acquisition target by their previous employer while Slingsby had been a member of a purchasing 
co-opcrative whose Secretary was the Team Leader. The impression given by the majority of cases 
was one of relatively casual rather than scientific identification methods where luck had played 
an important role. Team Leaders were motivated to carry out a buy-in but at the same time were 
prepared to wait a considerable period- even years- before identifying it. Team Leaders also did 
not involve their advisers in the search for a target, employing their advisers and normally 
approaching the venture capitalist after target identification. An exception to this was AGY, 
where the team had failed in an earlier attempt to do a management buy-out. Even in this case, 
however, the actual identification of the target was carried out by the management. ý 
The reasons for sale provided a contrasting set of circumstances although basically could be 
summarised as either private owners seeking succession or re-definition of core activities by p1c's 
with an under-current of performance problems in both main sources. This provided support for 
the reasons for vendor motivation outlined in 2.3.4 and the role that management buy-ins may 
play in the corporate restructuring process. Of particular note was European Brands, the buy-in 
of the buy-out, where institutions were seeking to replace an existing (under performing) 
management team. Motivations for sale to the buy-in Teams in particular could also be seen in 
some cases through the incumbent management being considered not to have the appropriate 
skills to manage the turnaround which would have been necessary to attract venture capital 
backing. In the Slingsby case, it was important that the Team Leader was a personal acquaintance 
of the vendor. It was also significant that Team Leaders in the interviews felt that private vendors 
were keen for the company to iemain in independent hands rather than be part of a group. 
Clearly motivations in the case of James Neill, which had been excluded from the questionnaire 
on the grounds of its public buy-in status, were different. There were large share holdings held 
in the company which were felt to be potentially hostile and general investor disquiet at the poor 
level of performance of the company. There was however a significant shareholding held by the 
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Neill family who were clearly attracted to the LBO alternative through the possibilities both for 
some continuing relationship with the company and for it to remain in independent hands with 
access to significant funds for investment and growth. , 
The survey revealed the influence of competition in the market for corporate control both 
through failed bid attempts for other target companies as well as competition from other bidders 
in three cases for the target company. As such it confirmed earlier findings that the buy-in process 
does involve an active market for corporate control and implicitly more competition than is 
evident for management buy-outs. As should be expected, the final clinching factor for selling to 
the case study Teams were the lack of alternative offers and the price being paid. 
Consideration has also been given earlier in the Ilesis to whether buy-ins are likely to be 
relatively homogeneous or whether there may be considerable differences in basic demographic 
characteristics; in particular there is the issue of whether buy-ins are seen to conform to the US 
LBO stereotype of being in mature, cash generative industries. A major feature of the majority 
of case studies was that achievement of their business plan objectives relied on expansion and 
significant cash requirements despite some of the industries being reasonably cash positive in 
terms of existing operations. The whole philosophy of AGK revolved around winning several 
major new contracts which would require significant expenditure on plant and machinery. 
Metalliform expected to double its turnover in the plan period with consequent working capital 
requirements; it also planned to make acquisitions. European Brands made a major acquisition 
requiring considerable additional funding. The Maids expected to grow significantly. Consequently 
the case studies indicate that while buy-ins may be in cash generative industries, the planned 
growth of the companies effectively reduced the cash generative potential in the short and 
medium terms. 
.ý.., II., 
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The companies represented a variety of sizes and previous ownership forms. Although only one 
was actually loss making in the latest audited period prior to buy-in, they were all considered by 
the Team to be under performing. All Team Leaders felt that at the time of buy-in the Team 
possessed the skills necessary to achieve this turnaround. Team Leaders saw that an advantage 
they had was their ability to improve performance and this was recognised both by the vendor and 
the venture capital firms. Such lack of profitability was seen to be a common and important 
reason for the previous owner seeking a sale. Examination confirmed the relative lack of 
profitability of the case studies, with the majority earning inadequate returns as implied by the 
ratio of deal value to operating profit. Teams in appraising the target company had felt confident 
that the reasons for previous under performance were identifiable and could be corrected. For 
instance Slingsby was seen to be suffering from the current generation of family ownership losing 
interest, The Maids because of poor control and service and being outwith the main focus of the 
parent and Metalliform. because of the financial state of the parent (part of the Maxwell group). 
Thus a major common'underlying factor was the belief that the targets were not performing as 
well as they should and the new management would be able to bring the appropriate 
transformation. 
14.5 Transaction Completion 
The case study interviews throw further light on the issues arising in the transaction process. Both 
the roles of advisers in the identification of appropriate financiers and in the overall negotiation 
process differed between cases. Entrepreneurs may experience difficulties in seeking appropriate 
advice and where necessary may initially use advisers with whom they have had a previous 
professional or personal relationship. This, of course, may not be ideal in the context of specialist 
advice such as a buy-in. The Slingsby Team Leader for instance initially used an old contact as 
accounting adviser who failed to perform; change to another clearly delayed the buy-in process 
significantly. Another example of using earlier relationships was The Maids where an ex-colleague 
was now employed as a consultant at Ernst & Young. In this case no problems with the adviser 
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were identified. In general accounting advice offered to the Team was seen to have been 
competently delivered although there were concerns in one case over the quality of personal tax 
advice. A criticism made by the majority of case companies was that they felt that the fees charged 
by their advisers was excessive. 
Advisers' most important role appeared to be in helping with Team to select a venture capital 
financier, where the accounting adviser to management emerged as the key intermediary, 
approaching them and arranging meetings. This was often done very quickly, eg virtually over 
night in the case of Slingsby. In one case, AGY, an earlier buy-out attempt had introduced the 
Team to 3i; this had resulted in a continuing relationship between Team Leader and venture 
capitalist. 
The availability of funding for small regional transactions is a major issue. Such lack of alternative 
local venture capital sources may contrast with considerable competition by venture capitalists for 
larger sized transactions. In general lack of availability of alternative equity finance sources at the 
lower levels of deal size was noted. As the deal size increased, the more alternative approaches 
to financiers the intermediary advisers were able to make and a "beauty parade" of up to twelve 
potential funders held. Thus The Maids relied essentially on an approach to a local office of 3i 
with no other local venture capitalists being present. Slingsby involved seeking funds through 
Leeds based advisers in London. In the cases of the two largest private buy-ins, European Brands 
and Metalliform, advisers were able to interest over a dozen venture capitalists in providing equity 
finance. 
Such competition for the business could be seen in the equity terms which were agreed for the 
buy-ins. Four of the five private buy-ins involved initial management stakes of at least 60 percent, 
a level which in retrospect may be considered, to have been too high given the risk factors 
involved. Advisers had successfully played potential financiers against each others in several cases. 
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The way in which the financing structure helps to create the conditions which encourage 
efficiency and cost saving resulting in performance benefits is crucial to corporate restructuring 
(Chapter 2.5.1,2.6.1) involving both financial control and monitoring by the financiers and the 
financial commitment of individual Team members (and hence their incentive to perform); this 
may also be supplemented by other forms of incentive such as ratchets. Only the smallest did not 
involve a ratchet on management equity percentage. Another aspect was the considerable diversity 
in the amounts of management contribution, this in the case of the Maids, the smallest buy-in, 
being in fact larger than for the next three buy-ins. Indeed the amount of management capital in 
buy-outs and buy-ins appears inversely proportional to the size of the transaction! 
It was also clear that ratchets were an important element of financial structures. Advisers had 
negotiated their inclusion to provide more upside for Teams and competition emerged between 
financiers for better terms. Management appeared to encourage these improved terms, feeling 
that conditions attached to them were realistic and that it was part of the function of their 
accounting advisers. By the time of the case study interviews, the prospects of original positive 
ratchet effects being achieved had become highly unlikely. AGIC, Metalliform. and European 
Brands all had produced disappointing operating performance despite the determination of 
managers to introduce corrective measures. Management appeared to be resigned to this 
development. Ibis supports the earlier finding (Chapter 13) that the presence of equity incentive 
devices which should be a major control device to put pressure on management to improve 
performance under normal corporate restructuring considerations, was not sufficient to offset the 
problems encountered by these of buy-ins. 
The effect of debt bonding had also been identified as an important factor in corporate 
restructuring. The gearing ratios of the case studies varied considerably, partially reflecting the 
type of financial instruments used, eg subordinated loans being provided by some institutions as 
opposed to preference shares. As noted above the banking conditions were seen by most Team 
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Leaders to be restrictive, yet if one of the advantages of corporate restructuring comes through 
the debt bonding effect, this may be the most effective way of implementation. This can be seen 
in the restructuring of Mealliform, where the trigger for'urgent action was the pressure put on 
the company by the bank threatening to call in receivers as certain financial accounting ratios 
defined in the banking covenants were triggered. There was a feeling in one case, The Maids, that 
the real bonding effect was not through the corporate covenants but rather the commitment on 
their personal financing such as the second mortgages which had been taken out. A further 
notable aspect of all the cases was the relatively subservient role of the clearing banks compared 
to equity financiers (except in the special case of backing for AGK where a high degree of asset 
finance was required); these were brought into the deal process at a late stage. 
Teams had varying experiences of the due diligence mechanism, shedding some light over the 
'skeletons in the cupboard' experiences noted in the questionnaire survey. A major problem had 
been in obtaining adequate up to date information concerning the company especially in terms 
of management accounts and indications of current trading and the status of major contracts. Thus 
in Slingsby and AGK the level of business actually being transacted was significantly less than 
indicated to management. There were also concerns as to the robustness and accuracy of previous 
audited accounts which led to the consideration of legal action (European Brands) and actual 
legal action (The Maids). Appropriate assessment of valuation of stock and fixed assets had not 
taken place in both AGK and Slingsby. In theory the process of due diligence must be rigorously 
applied although in practice if deals are to be completed, management and their financial backers 
have to make realistic decisions which may leave some exposure to future risk. In retrospect, in 
the majority of cases insufficient thoroughness was exercised in the due diligence process to 
ensure risk was at acceptable levels. In one case, Mealliform, the risk had been effectively 
reduced through the Team Leader's previous group relationship; even so a warning in the due 
diligence report concerning the stability of local education authority purchasing arrangements had 
been effectively ignored, leading to considerable problems in the second year of the buy-in. While 
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relationship between the Team, other directors and the venture capitalist is fundamental to the 
company and the nature of the relationship important. This was seen in the care taken initially 
in most cascs to cnsurc that the cxternal non-cxecutive dircctors wcrc acccptablc to the Tcam. 
Issues arise as to how refinancings can be structured to keep management motivated to perform. 
In the case of funds being required to expand through acquisition, the European Brands team 
rccognised the inevitability of equity dilution, being prepared to accept this on the basis of 
retaining a share of a larger company which they saw as being worth more than a larger share of 
a smaller company. The restructuring in Metalliform, caused by the collapse of its main market 
following changes in local education authority purchasing arrangements, was more controversial 
and involved major criticism by the Team Leader of the degree of support offered by his venture 
capitalists. The nature of the business problem was seen to be the reaction to a one-off collapse 
in demand for the company's products. Change in purchasing patterns would in a 12-18 month 
period result in a resumptionof demand but in the interim major restructuring would be necessary 
requiring financial support. An action plan was worked out with accounting advisers but one of 
the two venture capitalists was unprepared to support this. The Team Leader ascribed the lack 
of support to a low level of involvement in the company since the buy-in resulting in a failure by 
the, venture capitalist to understand the business. This feeling was increased through the 
investment executive sent by the venture capitalist to consider the restructuring alternatives being 
seen as a young accountant with little industrial understanding. Conflicts clearly emerged between, 
the two venture capitalists, one of which was broadly willing to support the company. Given the 
seriousness to the survival of the company, the Team Leader had to find new local sources of 
finance which involved accepting much reduced levels of equity share. It was notable that the 
Bank of Scotland supported management hroughout this process. 
A further example of the need to maintain incentives for Teams was seen in the case of Slingsby 
where two issues were important. First the departure of Team members involved the sale of the 
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In AGK indirect representation (through the use of non-cxecutives who were both members of 
staff of the venture capital firm) was used resulting in inefficiencies in the venture capital process 
in terms of the quickness of response to impending problems. Team Leaders' advice was however 
sought on the choice of non-executives. 
The lack of interest in controlling at board level was surprising and may be part of the explanation 
as to why performance was disappointing. If venture capitalists who are supposed to add value 
to the investee company by their board influence are not exercising this right, difficulties may 
arise. This was clearly evident in Metalliform. Failure to control the company in this way led to 
misunderstanding by the lead venture capitalist of the business when it was faced with severe 
difficulties. NatWest Ventures were also severely criticised by the Team Leader for the quality 
of investment executive sent at this point, an accountant without industrial experience being 
considered inappropriate. The subsequent restructuring of the business was then made 
considerably more difficult with divergence of views between the two venture capitalists. 
The presence of extensive monitoring by the venture capital firm and the appointment of non- 
executives with relevant sector experience does not by itself mean financial success. For example 
European Brands, a company with high quality non-executive directors and well controlled by the 
lead investor, at the height of the M&A market made an excessively costly acquisition despite 
having gone through an extensive screening process for the required incremental finance. As such 
the findings of the case studies may provide evidence which could not be identified from the 
questionnaire survey as to the subsequent relatively poor performance of the sample. Indeed the 
relationship between the Team, other directors and the venture capitalist is fundamental to the 
company and the nature of the relationship important. This was seen in the care taken initially 
in most cases to ensure that the external non-executive directors were acceptable to the Team. 
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Issues arise as to how refinancings can be structured to keep management motivated to perform. 
In the case of funds being required to expand through acquisition, the European Brands team 
recognised the inevitability of equity dilution, being prepared to accept this on the basis of 
retaining a share of a larger company which they saw as being worth more than a larger share of 
a smaller company. Ile restructuring in Metalliform, caused by the collapse of its main market 
following changes in local education authority purchasing arrangements, was more controversial 
and involved major criticism by the Team Leader of the degree of support offered by his venture 
capitalists. The nature of the business problem was seen to be the reaction to a one-off collapse 
in demand for the company's products. Change in purchasing patterns would in a 12-18 month 
period result in a resumption of demand but in the interim major restructuring would be necessary 
requiring financial support. An action plan was worked out with accounting advisers but one of 
the two venture capitalists was unprepared to support this. The Team Leader ascribed the lack 
of support to a low level of involvement in the company since the buy-in resulting in a failure by 
the venture capitalist to understand the business. This feeling was increased through the 
investment executive sent by the venture capitalist to consider the restructuring alternatives being 
seen as a young accountant with little industrial understanding. Conflicts clearly emerged between 
the two venture capitalists, one of which was broadly willing to support the company. Given the 
seriousness to the survival of the company, the Team Leader had to find new local sources of 
finance which involved accepting much reduced levels of equity share. It was notable that the 
Bank of Scotland supported management hroughout this process. 
A further example of the need to maintain incentives for Teams was seen in the case of Slingsby 
where two issues were important. First the departure of Team members involved the sale of the 
departing members' shares. The remaining members of the Team ý no longer had financial 
resources to increase their holdings, leaving the venture capitalists to make the 'Purchase. This 
further increased the hold of the venture capitalists over the company. Secondly the reluctance 
of the venture capitalist to support an expansion plan put forward by management led to the 
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trade sale of the company. 71bis; exit however was carefully engineered so that management could 
exit without financial loss should certain performance targets be achieved and also illustrates the 
proactive stance taken by venture capitalists directly represented on the board 
14.7 Post Completion Actions and Problems 
Incoming Teams were aware that to achieve the turnaround in profitability of the target company, 
a carefully arranged plan of major operating and strategic action would need to be implemented 
after buy-in. 
However after buy-in the majority of companies interviewed had been hit by certain frequently 
unexpected problems greatly complicating the recovery programme which had been planned 
before completion and altering the planned mix of intended actions. Indeed one Team Leader 
commented that he had 'been to hell and back'. Such developments reflected major declines in 
the business which had taken place between the previous audited accounts and the point of buy- 
in, perhaps partially attributable to the first signs of recession, but also raising questions as the 
reliability of the audit and the state of accounting control systems in the target. 
In assessing a target company, Teams rely on both their own knowledge, experience and 
investigative abilities as well as the advise given by their own accounting advisers and the 
reporting accountants appointed'by the venture capital firm. Despite the breadth of these 
investigatory efforts, it was clear that decisions had been made in some cases on the basis of 
either inadequate or misleading information. Problems were reasonably widespread and costly. 
There were cases of stock being valued at unrealistically high levels as a result of over age 
elements (eg Slingsby), fixed assets being in a state of disrepair which had not been fully allowed 
for (AGK), accuracy of previously audited account (European Brands and The Maids) and the 
stability of contracts (AGK and The Maids). While legal action can be contemplated against 
auditors (eg European Brands) or even taken (The Maids), such developments are costly in both 
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time and expense and provide a major diversion for the Team Leader. Team Leaders rccognised 
the importance of careful wording of warranty provisions while one (The Maids) was adamant on 
the need for legal expenses insurance. 
While much of the rationale for the buy-in appeared to revolve around strategic actions- eg the 
development of new brands, entry into new markets- these proved difficult to achieve because of 
the time diversion as efforts of a more operating nature had to be implemented to correct 
frequently unforeseen problems. Consequently plans of a more strategic nature were effectively 
delayed by at least a year while management devoted time to operational strategy. In some cases, 
cg European Brands and The Maids, the possibilities of legal actions consequent to due diligence 
failures caused further distortions to plan implementation. 
In the cases of the 1988 and 1989 buy-ins, by the time such actions had been carried out, 
economic and financial conditions were deteriorating. This resulted in major difficulties emerging 
in being able to proceed with the original strategic aims. A major element was a series of actions 
to achieve rapid growth- eg development of new products, entry into new markets, acquisitions. 
These became very difficult to implement with much attention continuing to have to be placed 
as basic operating actions such as debtor and creditor control to conserve cash flow and overhead 
cost control. Metalliform and AGK in particular faced extremely serious problems in their second 
year as turnover projections could not be achieved. 
The case studies also provided further insight into managerial changes and whether or not a 
management buy-in Team can stay together. In the majority of cases significant management 
changes were implemented shortly after buy-in, usually leading to the dismissal of previous key 
managers. These involved not only direct replacement by Team members ý but 'also 'other 
recruitment. Team themselves had sometimes to be re-organised. In the Slingsby case two of the 
Team were forced to leave because of non-pcrformance. The Sales Director, who had been 
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successful in his previous position, survived two years, but proved in the Team Leader's view 'not 
up to the job'. Specifically he was not appropriate to an environment which required emphasis 
on field sales as opposed to being an inside salesman. The second person to leave, who had been 
put in charge of the warehouse and transport, was asked to leave after six months, the Team 
Leader being 'staggered' at his failure to adapt to changed circumstances and additionally how 
little he appeared to know. In retrospect it was felt that this person had been protected for the 
previous fifteen years under a Director who had retired from the incubator company at the time 
of the buy-in. 
A further problem area was the effect of relocation which may initially restrict the initial local 
market knowledge of the Team as well as leading to major personal problems, including high 
levels of stress. AGK faced particular strategic problems given their need to diversify into new 
markets and the Business Plan's reliance on achievement of phased expansion. The Team Leader 
remarked on local marketing problems. Slingsby and Mealliform Teams were away from home 
for the working week with stress problems evident. 
Problems also existed in correctly appraising non-Team members. This was particularly evident 
in the case of Metalliform, a small team. The Accountant was recognised initially as being more 
a book-keepcr rather than having the potential to be Finance Director. As he was only two-three 
years away from retirement, the Team Leader decided to retain him and delayed appointment of 
a Finance Director-This led to considerable problems'when a restructuring plan had to be 
formulated, the7cam Leader having to write the plan ý in conjunction with external financial 
advisers. 
The failure of buy-ins to achieve expected levels of profitability may have parallels with studies 
of low performance following corporate acquisition. Evidence from the case studies clearly poscs 
questions as to the exhaustiveness of due diligence procedures as well as the extent of the decline 
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in the-company's fortunes had the old system of ownership remained. Without the new emphasis 
on action, the subsequent decline in performance may have been much greater. 
14.8 Initial Performance 
The overall sample provided evidence of a disappointing level of buy-in performance compared 
to earlier surveys of buy-outs, although these must be qualified by different time frameworks. Tbe 
case studies showed in the main a failure to achieve targeted levels of profitability, and there were 
no outstanding performers. As such they provide both additional and supporting evidence for 
reasons for poor performance as well as the course of action which was embarked upon under 
the new governance arrangements. 
External pressures were frequently blamed for the failure to achieve target, and actions taken by 
management at that point did not always significantly improve profitability. As the venture 
capitalist and bankers began to perceive the seriousness of the under-performance (in some cases 
delayed through laxness of their monitoring and control systems), they initiated external action, 
paralleling developments which may be expected under the late recovery stage which may be 
derived from the Cyert and March model. This can be seen for instance in the belated 
management changes at European Brands and the background to the forced trade sale at Slingsby. 
There was variation in terms of the direction of initial profitability of the target company, ranging 
from significant shortfall to marginal improvement while the two largest private buy-ins were later 
hit by the need for massive financial restructuring. Both of these buy-ins had been early acquirers 
of other companies. European Brands, in particular, suffered from not being able to obtain the 
expected benefits from acquisitions; these were made at' a time 
-when the new management's 
ability to turnround the original target company was hardly proven. Only one company did not 
need to change its buy-in financial structure. It also did not appear that the most highly qualified 
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Team Leaders in term of level of education or management status reached were necessarily the 
most appropriate at achieving the improvement in performance required. 
A good example of the problems which can be faced was seen in the case of AGY- Here 
management were operating in a geographically new region with the aim to strategically re- 
orientate the markets in which the company operated. In this new area they lacked initial 
credibility, had no effective track record and suffered from financial credibility through lack of 
realistic accounts being a new company. 
The disappointing level of buy-in performance (Chapter 11.2) and lack of significant difference 
in performance between entrepreneurial types (Chapter 12.4) can be seen in this group of cases 
with only one opportunist performing marginally better than Plan. While Chapter 13.3 has shown 
the importance of previous personal knowledge, all rive private buy-in cases analysed had 
(varying) extent of previous working relationships. In the view of the Teams themselves, this was 
an important factor in the ability to successfully complete the buy-in. Skill gaps did exist and in 
one company, Metalliform, may have contributed to, but was unlikely to have been a determinant 
of, poor performance. 
While gearing had not emerged as a determinant of poor profitability (Chapter 13.3), some Team 
Leaders did comment that higher than average gearing did cause problems: these resulted in 
problems in obtaining credit status (limiting ability to win contracts) as well as providing reduced 
flexibility against a background of economic downturn, and high interest rates, there being little 
slack left in the system. The Slingsby Team Leader in particular felt that their stability had been 
threatened by high gearing. Clearly the cases of European Brands and Metalliform, also illustrated 
that initial financial structures could not be maintained in the difficult economic and financial 
conditions towards the end of this period. It is however significant that the initial performance 
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of the two earlier cases, Slingsby and European Brands, were also disappointing even before they 
were brought off course by recessionary conditions. 
As detailed in 14.7 considerable problems emerged in the majority of case studies; an issue which 
emerged was whether a major element of this reflected poor diligence procedures and if so 
whether these were particularly serious in specific types of company. It was clear that target 
companies which were reliant on more rigorous regulatory control pre buy-in (James Neill as a 
quoted company and Mctalliform as a subsidiary of a quoted company) were less likely to have 
suffered from major problems not noticed in due diligence. In the case of Metalliform a problem 
had been correctly identified but discounted by management. In contrast performance shortfalls 
because of failure to identify problems at the due diligence stage appeared to be a feature of 
privately owned companies where internal management accounting standards were found in 
retrospect to be lacking. 
14.9 Realisation 
Earlier discussion has shown that the different risk factors seen to be involved in buy-ins 
compared to buy-outs may produce different attitudes by Team Leaders to exit as well as actual 
different returns as well as showing some areas where there may be similarities. Although many 
venture capitalists may assume in their financial projections that an exit will be obtained from 
their investee companies within 3 to 5 years, and some would argue (eg Rappaport 1991) that 
buy-outs are essentially a short term form, analysis of exit intentions and realisations achieved 
confirmed the diversity which has been seen in UK buy-out studies (Chapter 2.6.2) and the overall 
results of the buy-in survey (11.5). Intentions ranged from ambitious and quick trade sales to 
family succession, ie spanning the range from permanent form to essentially a short term 
phenomenon. Furthermore failure to perform produced major problems in term of restructuring 
and dilution of managerial equity. While no changes were necesýary for the two smallest buy-ins, 
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the next largest only escaped heavy restructuring through a trade sale while the two largest ones 
required heavy re-structuring. 
Evidence as to the potential life cycle of buy-ins was of course too early to obtain for the survey 
companies although intentions provided interesting pointers to potential conflicts with the 
supporting venture capitalists. These intentions in the main were surprising in that most Teams 
wanted to remain independent, several not having any exit intentions at all. 'Ibis may partially 
reflect the institutional backers of the buy-ins and different approaches by them. For example the 
two largest buy-ins had investors who managed closed end funds: they had clear aims as to exit. 
The two smallest, backed by 3i, had no obvious exit intentions. 
Exits may of course not happen in the way which was originally intended. Evidence was provided 
for this both in terms of the forced restructuring of two of the case studies (European Brands and 
Metalliform) which reduced management's share although allowed the company to remain 
independent. 'Ilie latter also illustrated the problems whichmay emerge in joint and syndicated 
transactions, where there may be divergences of opinion between investors. The one exit achieved, 
Slingsby, had not been the initial preferred option, it being forced on the company by the 
institutional backers who were unprepared, given disappointing financial performance, to support 
the long term growth of the company. Indeed the Team Leader commented that venture 
capitalists are only prepared to take the long term view when things go well. The case studies 
appear to give strength to other findings on buy-outs that exit may be in a form which was not 
originally intended. 
14.9 Comparisons with LBOs 
Comparisons can be made with the more LBO style of operations of James Neill. In this case the 
buy-out represented essentially an institutionally mounted acquisition of an under-performing 
company. Considerable sophisticated resources were spent trying to identify the target and 
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carrying out due diligence. Managers seconded to James Neill were given high degrees of 
incentive compensation. The transaction involved an extremely high degree of monitoring and 
control. Ile immediate aftermath of the buy-in allowed both strategic and operating strategies 
to be implemented. 
The manner of appraisal allowed a full programme of actions to be implemented immediately 
following completion. 'ne resources of the venture capital firm were extensively used including 
the industrial knowledge of partners. Surplus subsidiaries were quickly sold although this was 
balanced by purchases of other companies. Ile direct involvement of the venture capitalist 
avoided the problems, of divergent aims of the Team and financial backers and enabled 
refinancing to be carried out within a previously suggested time table. I 
A critical consideration is whether this, alternative form resulted in superior selection of 
investment in terms of subsequent performance. Initial performance appears to have close to plan 
but the recession is believed to have subsequently curtailed the opportunities for development of 
the company and produced results which must be considered disappointing in terms of the original 
objectives. 
14.11 Conclusions I' 
Overall the case studies have helped to shed light on some of the main issues raised earlier in the 
Thesis as well as the findings from the questionnaire survey. 1, 
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While the economic recession clearly, affected the performance of the target companies, other 
factors which should have reduced this problem were offset by failure to correctly identify 
problems before the buy-in took place. In particular management equity incentive mechanisms 
did not seem to be enough to prevent the downturn in performance- 
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The reasons which emerged in case study interviews for this under-performance reflected both 
the particular problems of target investigation which can be seen in completing a buy-in rather 
than a buy-out (some of which may be related to the source of buy-in) and also the effects of 
recessionary and high interest rate pressures on the financing structures. 
The importance of the composition of the buy-in team needs to be stressed. Large teams in small 
companies appeared to lead to problems while previous working relationships between Team 
members were necessary but not always successful. 
Buy-in completion'through involving the purchase of a company of which the incoming Team may 
know generally but does not have specific knowledge implies a considerable risk factor which 
appears to have been under-estimated. Due diligence procedures typically did not reveal major 
downwards risk factors or even misrepresentation of assets or current year performance which are 
known to management in buy-outs. Remedies for these unexpected factors take time, which may 
not be available. Buy-ins, like turnarounds, may require to be judged over a long period for the 
complex of actions taken to be shown to be effective. Similarly there is evidence that corporate 
acquisitions may not perform as satisfactorily as originally expected. 
The case studies also confirmed the problems of completing transactions in the late 1980's, as 
indicated in Chapter 13.3. While Teams and their advisers and financiers should have been able 
to apply appropriate sensitivity analysis in their appraisal of the target company, the combination 
of paying too much for a target and having to fund a large proportion of this excess price through 
debt instruments brings considerable instability if there is a combination of substantial increases 
in interest rates and economic recession. 
A major issue relates to the control and aims of the venture capital backer. There was evidence 
in the case studies that venture capital firms were not exercising their control functions 
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appropriately which led to both a reduction in the value added that they could contribute to the 
development of the company and to a failure to appreciate performance difficulties to emerge. 
While venture capitalists in general will plan for exit, there was evidence that the aims of Teams 
and their venture capital backers were diverging. Ibis could result in serious relationship 
difficulties. 
Clearly the Team Leaders found disappointment in the performance of their companies and in 
some cases with the members of their team. At the same time they still appeared to be prepared, 
if given the opportunity, to pursue a second buy-in should that possibility arise in the future, 
feeling themselves able to use the experience learnt in this initial buy-in. 
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CHAPTER 15 
CONCLUSIONS 
15.1 Introduction 
This thesis has presented the results of the first major study of management buy-ins in the UK 
and examined their differences with management buy-outs. It has sought to identify characteristics 
of both Team Leaders and target companies, types of action taken following the buy-in, initial 
performance and life cycle intentions showing differences with buy-outs. 71be theoretical, empirical 
and case study elements of this thesis have been able to confirm that management buy-ins are a 
significant corporate restructuring form in their own right despite some similarities with 
management buy-outs. In particular Buy-in Team Leaders appear more 'opportunist' than buy-out 
managers and pursue substantially more innovative actions. Performance, however, in the short 
term, was disappointing, although, heavily influenced by a particularly adverse economic and 
financial background. 
" a' "' ý 't bi i The thesis examined the man gem n uy-in process in terms of the restructuring opportunity, 
Team Leader and Team, infrastructure aspects, deal completion and post transaction issues 
fisation. 'This Chap I tc Ir draws together the findings of including governance, perf6rman6e'and rea 
the theoretical and conceptual discussion and the empirical and case study evidence (15.2) to 
highlight the main conclusions. Policy implications for government, venture capitalists and Teams 
are raised and given the relative newness of ma'na'gement buy-ins and the consequent limitations 
this has placed on the study, areas are suggested for further research (15.3) before-stating the 
final conclusions'of the Thesis"(15.4). ", 
15.2 Issues and Findings 
Chapter 3 noted how management buy-out's and buy-ins could be seen principally in terms of 
intera 'som e"other corporate restructuring and entrepreneurship- but with importan 'ctions with 
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areas. It could be expected that the two ownership forms, despite some basic similarities, would 
result in different actions and hence outcomes. 
The case was made that both management buy-outs and buy-ins are part of the corporate 
restructuring phenomenon. They both enable management and ownership to be brought together 
in a new combination in partnership with specialist financiers. Buy-out and buy-in financial 
structuring involves considerable emphasis on management equity incentives and the bonding 
effect of debt instruments while strict monitoring and control by the external equity holders places 
a very important control on ensuring that operational efficiency is enhanced. It was also argued 
that Tcams in both management buy7outs and buy-ins would show higher degrees of 
entrepreneurship than is common in conventionally owned organisations, and this would help to 
improve performance further. The management buy-in, through involving external management 
entrepreneurs, was thought likely to bring a higher degree of entrepreneurial action and change 
than evidenced in buy-outs. It would also benefit from the role of new management in importing 
new vision and direction to under performing companies. The types of target companies sought 
were also considered to have some distinctive I characteristics while the different risk 
factors 
involved and more innovative plans may, result in distinct realisation and life cycle patterns. 
Performance was seen to be related to both entrepreneurship, and corporate restructuring 
characteristics. 
The empirical and analytical part of the thesis confirmed a considerable number of the 
propositions and hypotheses derived from the synthesis of the theoretical aspects although the 
apparent performance shortfall, in particular, raised a number of further issues. Buy-ins and their 
Teams appeared to have distinct qualities compared with their buy-out equivalents. 
Close similarities in backgrounds between buy-in Team Leadusland entrepreneurs surveyed in 
other studies were noted. A substantial number of buy7in, Team Leaders had previous business 
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ownership experience; had small business owners as parents; were frequently well qualified in 
terms of professional qualifications and university education; were attempting the buy-in as part 
of a mid-career change in what had been a relatively stable employment background; were likely 
to have known each other before; and were making the move within the same industry. In 
comparison, buy-out Teams were smaller and, not surprisingly, the identification and the process 
of completing the buy-in took longer than for buy-outs. Target company identification was highly 
reliant on the Team Leader's knowledge and contacts, informal networks being more important 
than formal networks. 
Buy-in Team Leaders could also be seen as falling into the classic entrepreneurial typologies with 
the majority being essentially opportunist but a minority craftsmen; unexpectedly there was a small 
"push" element. Analysis of differences with buy-outs saw the latter as being far more craftsmen 
orientated. 
More entrepreneurial orientatcdTeams than in buy-outs could be expected to lead to significant 
differences in terms of the type of actions pursued after deal completion with Team Leaders 
bringing a new vision and direction for the company. Significant differences with buy-outs were 
noted in areas such as financial control, marketing, production and administration. Team 
cohesiveness (as measured by "resignations" within the Team) was very similar to those in buy-outs 
despite the greater stress and other pressures in buy-ins. 
In terms of the corporate restructuring phenomenon buy-in financing structures were reasonably 
leveraged, although less so than buy-outs of the same period. There was a high'equity incentive' 
seen through the presence of ratchet devices. The nature of target companies again differed to 
some extent from the conventional buy-out company especially with regard to industry growth 
potential and future cash requirements, where buy-ins were expected to require additional funds 
for organic expansion and also to make acquisitions. Sources were significantly different with buy- 
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ins being more likely to come from private owners rather than subsidiaries of public companies. 
Buy-ins also appeared to involve a higher degree of monitoring than buy-outs. 
While these differences with buy-outs have been noted, the key question is whether buy-ins result 
in a form of organisation which has superior features to those of buy-outs especially in terms of 
performance and life cycle characteristics. Here evidence appeared disappointing with both buy-in 
financial operating performance worse than seen in buy-out surveys and buy-ins being significantly 
more likely to fail. Furthermore linking performance to certain key entrepreneurship and 
corporate restructuring variables did not show up significant differences in areas where they would 
be expected. Thus the opportunist Team Leader's performance was not significantly different from 
that of the craftsman. The discriminant analysis did not find gearing or type of venture capitalists 
a determinant of performance while the presence of a ratchet, seen as a key incentive device, in 
fact produced a negative relationship. This may of course reflect the effects in adverse 
circumstances of the more marginal nature of some transactions where ratchets may have been 
imposed because of valuation disputes between Tcams and venture capitalists during deal 
negotiation rather than acting simply as incentive devices. The year of the buy-in as well as the 
source emerged as important determinants. 
It can be argued that the year effect reflects the exceptional economic and financial conditions 
around the time of the survey in February 1990 which affected 1988 and especially 1989 buy-ins. 
Buy-out experience also shows an abnormally high rate of receivership of deals completed in 
1988/89, although far less so than in buy-ins. As shown in, Table 11.2, economic and financial 
conditions were severe: the later buy-ins were almost immediately faced with interest rates. of at 
least 15 percent and an economy entering serious recession. Given the re-organisation and 
turnaround elements contained in many buy-in Business Plans the margin for error under these 
circumstances was unusually low. * The better performance of the 1986 and 1987 companies in the 
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survey may reflect their having achieved initial restructuring and target strengthening before the 
contextual factors became so adverse. 
The theoretical seriousness of the situation is worsened by considering the entry Price Earnings 
(PE) ratios of 1988 and 1989 buy-ins. Stoy Hayward (1993) show virtually no difference between 
PE ratios of quoted and unquoted companies in 1988/89. However the classic buy-out and buy-in 
scenario is to invest when this PE differential is large, ie complete deals when PEs of subsidiaries 
and other unquoted companies are low but exit at prices which reflect high quoted company PEs. 
Given the implications of financing leveraged structures when the differentials between these PE 
ratios are low, the scope for failure to achieve performance and realisation objectives must be 
high. Indeed, given these circumstances, the actual results must be seen more favourably. 
The issue then arises as to why venture capitalists were prepared to go ahead under these 
circumstances. Some indications may be derived from US experience. For instance Kaplan and 
Stein (1993) have pointed out the, effect. of large sums of money being available from 1985 
through junk bonds for buy-outs; this significantly increased the prices which practitioners were 
willing to pay for target companies. In the UK there is evidence of high rates of equity and 
mezzanine fund raising in 1988-89 and large debt availability in this period which may have 
resulted in similar effects. UK venture capital in the mid to late 1980s also saw a large number 
of new entrants and increasing competition between players (Robbie and Murray 1992). 
As well as the implications of these competitive pressures and the failure to assess the impact of 
the recession and high interest rates, issues arise from the results of the Questionnaire and the 
Case Studies as to the effectiveness of venture capital due diligence procedures. In a management 
buy-out, the venture capitalist is helped by management's record in and deep knowledge of a 
business. In the buy-in there are more unknowns: part of the venture capital process, however, 
is to identify as many of these as possible and make revised judgments as to the risks involved 
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before agreeing final terms. Due diligence applies not only to the target, its industry and the 
Team but also to interpreting trends in the wider economic and financial context. It was clear that 
this process was not carried out to a sufficiently comprehensive extent in many cases. Reasons for 
such failure are varied but will reflect both the cost pressures of due diligence reports, the 
prospect of fee income on transaction completion and the need to agree terms quickly given the 
highly competitive market for equity finance at the time. Failure to identify problem areas not 
only led to their discovery later but also to the. use of financing structures which were 
inappropriate. In particular management, may have been given too large a share of equity as 
venture capitalist tried to gain business. 
Once into the deal a key element of corporate restructuring is the installation of new governance 
systems by the venture capitalist which inter alia allows quick identification of problem areas and 
compensatory action to be taken. Evidence from the case studies indicated that this did not 
appear to have happened in all cases: there'' can'be ý little,, doubt that more activeý investor 
involvement would have helped to prevent further major decline in these companies. 
A further issue concerns the type of company, purchased and whether it was suitable for 
restructuring by management buy-in. US experience has concentrated on larger transactions, 
frequently going privates, where there are high standards of existing information and clear agency 
cost savings. In contrast a large number of UK buy-ins have been relatively ý small and from 
privately owned companies. Smaller companies and those that are privately owned may not 
necessarily have the same scope for reduced agency costs. They may for instance involve relatively 
high monitoring and control costs leading to the venture capitalist concentrating more on the 
larger deals in his portfolio, where the overall sums at risk arc higher. There is also the danger 
that given the low overhead element of some, family owned companie's there, may not be 
significant amounts of cost saving that can be applied. Many Small privately owned companies may 
not have the degree of information available to ensure that due diligence can be satisfactorily 
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completed. Case studies consistently showed in the case of private companies that information and 
accounting systems at the time of takeover were inadequate. 
It is also important to see buy-ins in terms of the re-organisation which is required after 
completion. With a high motivation to purchase a turnaround company, which involves a sustained 
period of rectification action, Teams can be seen to take longer to achieve the efficiency 
improvements which incumbent management in a buy-out can introduce in a short time. The 
improvements sought in buy-ins are wider and hence take longer, especially if there are initial 
unforeseen problems as a result of information asymmetries or inadequate due diligence. As in 
turnarounds improvements are a long term process. The short period between completion and the 
survey may not have been enough to see the beneficial effects of the complete restructuring 
process. 
The longer term view is evident in the way that the decline in buy-in performance has been 
arrested. The past two years has seen some improvement in patterns in survey companies with no 
receiverships within the sample between September 1992 and 1993 and in terms of the overall 
CMBOR database a sharp reduction in the rate of receivership. Successful exits have increased. 
This gives encouragement to the notion that buy-ins can perform well in more propitious 
economic and financial backgrounds and that lessons have been Icarnt by venture capitalists 
following the experience of buy-in under-performance and failure in 1990 and 1991. 
153 Implications of the Research Findings 
The findings summarised above have clear policy implications in terms of government policy, 
venture capitalists' policies towards management buy-ins and the policies of management and 
entrepreneurs towards management buy-ins and venture capital firms. These, togcther: wi. th 
implications for future research are considered in detail below. 
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(a) Government Policy Makers 
Management buy-ins can be seen to have implications for government policy makers in terms of 
competition and mergers policy, employment, taxation, the new issues market and accounting 
regulations. 
First management buy-ins need to be, recognised as a valid option to more traditional methods 
of trade sale, merger, acquisition and management buy-out in corporate restructuring. They may 
be seen to have distinct advantages in two main policy making areas: first competition and mergers 
policy as seen in the workings of both t, he Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies Commission 
and secondly the use of insider information (as established both in legislation and the workings 
of the Takeover Panel). 
In terms of competition and mergers policy, management buy-ins, like management buy-outs, may 
have considerable advantages in ensuring that divested parts of groups are not sold to other 
competitors in the same market place. Sale to an external management group will avoid further 
concentration of market share and hence conditions which may have been susceptible to 
extending restrictive competitive practices. Competitive forces in the relevant markets may indeed 
be expected to -increase, given the high priority seen to exist in terms of actions taken by the 
incoming management to revitalise the company, adjust prices and introduce new products which 
may be expected to result in enhanced competition. In the, medium term, having improved an 
initial market position, different factors may evolve which may then lead to the strengthening of 
the new company, although as in a buy-out subsequent acquisition activity may in itself lead to 
referrals to the OFT or Monopolies Commission (see eg Wright, Thompson, Dobson, Robbie 
1992 rc bus buy-outs). Differences have been seen in the life cycles of buy-ins compared to buy- 
outs implying that buy-ins may be able to remain in an independent and competitive form' f6r 
longer than equivalent buy-outs. 
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A major criticism of buy-outs has been the concern over the possession of insider information 
both in the cases of divestment and going private buy-outs. Despite official policy through the 
Takeover Panel and Stock Exchange regulations controlling going privates and Class IV 
divestments there are still considerable institutional concerns as to the ethics of such buy-outs and 
the extent of such distortion to shareholder value. While a major problem from an external 
purchaser's view may be the lack of accurate information, the management buy-in, as in a more 
traditional trade sale, avoids criticism which may arise from management being in possession of 
insider information. This is of particular importance in the public buy-in. As seen in the results 
of the survey, the majority of private buy-in bids were in competition with rival offers made by 
incumbent management or trade purchasers indicating that an active market for the target 
company's assets existed: this must help to ensure a value for the company which is acceptable 
for the selling shareholders. 
Additionally the results of the survey did not show abnormally adverse employment effects from 
what would have been expected under alternative methods of corporate restructuring. Given that 
the incoming Team were providing innovative ideas which would strengthen and grow the 
company, government should encourage further development of buy-in transactions. 
Despite the environmental factors influencing the development of management buy-ins in the UK 
being much more favourable than a decade ago, policy makers should be aware of three areas 
where improvements could make the management buy-in process smoother: the overall personal 
and corporate taxation system and rates, the realisation of investments and the auditing and 
submission of company accounts. 
While the UK government has created a generally favourable corporate taxation system (including 
for instance the deductibility of interest) major problems have existed in the past for 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in terms of the realisation of capital gains or the offsetting 
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of losses made on investments. Changes announced in the Finance Bill (1993) allowing the rolling 
forward of gains if proceeds are re-invested in unlisted companies, as well as a reduction in the 
retirement relief qualifying equity stake, should help to alleviate the long term problems raised 
by this issue. 
Secondly, while the new issues market currently has the capacity to allow successful medium and 
large buy-ins to float, there are problems arranging for an exit, other than by a trade sale, for buy- 
ins with an original transaction value of less than 110 mn. This is especially important for teams 
who may wish to remain independent. Although the USM in the early and mid 1980S was able 
to do this for management buy-outs, the decline in importance and attractiveness of this market 
since then has meant that this exit route has only rarely been possible for management buy-ins. 
The size distribution of buy-ins as shown in this Thesis is such that many are unlikely to have 
reached the M mn capitalization value generally considered to be necessary to achieve a full 
listing flotation. Similar' problems have also been identified on a European scale (eg Bygrave et 
al 1992). The review of the USM currently in progress should take account of the need of an 
alternative market for smaller companies where costs are significantly lower than the Official 
Market and marketability and liquidity problems are reduced. 
Both responses to the questionnaire and case study interviews revealed considerable concerns as 
to the quality of audit work carried out under previous ownership (especially of privately owned 
companies) as well as delays in the provision of statutory accounts when Teams are engaged in 
the target company search process. These raise general issues concerning standards within the 
accountancy profession as well as the efficiency of policing by the DTI of companies accounts 
regulations. 
(b) Venture Capitalists 
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The Thesis has provided considerable evidence that the risk profile of management buy-ins in 
terms of the likelihood of failure is significantly different from that of buy-outs and that in the 
original financial structuring of many management buy-ins completed in the late 1980s not enough 
attention was paid to these differences. Such transactions were completed against a background 
of a maturing and increasingly competitive venture capital market and the peaking of the mergers 
and acquisitions market and were followed by severe economic and financial conditions. Lessons 
still require to be Icarnt in five main areas- financial structuring, type of company targeted, Team 
selection, the due diligence process and governance structures. 
On average buy-ins are structured with more equity than buy-outs but the difference in proportion 
of equity is statistically not significant despite the overall risk profile, for instance as measured by 
the propensity for receivership, being significantly higher. This implies that venture capitalists 
should take note of the risk profile in more depth when they examine deal propositions. While 
gearing as such did not emerge as a major reason for poor performance, other structuring related 
issues did and especially the relationship with equity share and ratchets. Subsequent interviews 
with both Team Leaders and venture capitalists indicated the negative features of ratchets in the 
creation of tensions and disputes between management and venture capitalist. Despite the 
evidence of such problems caused by ratchets, a considerable number of buy-ins still use ratchets. 
Venture capitalists require to consider alternative incentive systems. 
There may of course have been incentives for venture capital executives to complete deals in the 
face of competition from other venture capital firms., This may have led to bidding up of 
management stakes and the use of excessively ratcheted structures. Reliance on renumeration 
through high fee income on deal completion may also result in adoption of financial structures 
which are not sufficiently robust in adverse economic and financial circumstances. ", ,ý- 
--, -ýý 
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In the venture screening process considerable attention has to be paid to the type of managers. 
Cluster analysis showed that there were few significant differences across clusters in terms of 
performance, the discriminant analysis revealing the importance of teams where there had been 
strong personal knowledge of each other. Thus venture capitalists require to examine the 
formation of the team very carefully, and especially management's previous experience of each 
other. There was nothing to disprove the assumption that risks are likely to increase if the Team 
changes sector. Additionally the personal and commercial motivations of Teams have to be 
examined in depth. 
Venture capitalists may also wish to review the type of company being purchased. Buy-in target 
companies are significantly more likely than buy-outs to have been privately owned rather than 
divestments. However one of the major findings of this Ibcsis is that it is these formerly privately 
companies which are most likely to be the poor performers with particular problems emanating 
from previous control structures and management vacuum following the departure of a strong 
entrepreneurial owner. 
There was also considerable evidence that the due diligence process had not worked satisfactorily 
in many instances. Reasons for this failure may be varied but due diligence is a key part of the 
venture capital process. Venture capital firms may feel themselves under both cost and time 
pressures when carrying out due diligence, especially when there is competition from third parties 
to purchase the target or from rival venture capital firms to supply the Team's financial package. 
Venture capitalists must recognise the particular risk factors involved in buy-ins and be prepared 
to carry out particularly thorough due diligence investigatory work. Ibis analysis must cover 
exhaustive and thorough testing of all main downside risks in management buy-ins- reliability of 
financial and accounting data, backgrounds and suitability of management, market characteristics, 
etc. 
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Areas where due diligence was seen to have been weak included trading performance in the 
period running up to completion with critical trends not being identified. There were cases where 
previous year's profits had been misrepresented with in particular bad debt positions and stock 
valuations being unrealistic. Fixed asset book values may not accurately reflect actual valuation 
on realisation. I 
Clearly venture capitalists had not looked exhaustively enough at the actual management teams 
in some cases. Extensive due diligence procedures require to be carried out in this area, even 
though diplomacy may be necessary. 
There was also evidence from case studies that in many cases monitoring and control functions, 
which are as essential to the corporate restructuring framework as they are to the success of the 
buy-in, were not being consistently applied. While venture capitalists have an important role to 
play in using their experience, connections and resources to add value to their investce companies, 
they also require to be in a position of being able to react quickly should problems develop. While 
theoretically the type of governance employed in management buy-ins encourages this, there was 
evidence that in practice methods of monitoring and control were imperfect. Relationships had 
not developed to the extent that potential crises could be identified and understood by some 
venture capitalists. Reporting back through non-executives who did not work full time for the 
venture capitalist was frequently inefficient. Venture capitalists require to ensure that their control 
of investee companies is direct and current. 
(c) Management Buy-in Teams 
For management buy-in teams the main inference may be seen that buy-ins, although potentially 
providing significant personal financial gain, also imply risk. 'This risk may also be associated with 
the degree of personal leverage. 
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Management need to consider carefully the venture, their other Team members and their venture 
capital partner(s). They require a wide range of experience and must not be too influenced by the 
timing of a transaction, should this mean paying an excessive price. 
Teams, somewhat unexpectedly, remained together to a similar extent to buy-outs despite the 
different types of pressure and stress. More detailed consideration however underlined the 
importance of the degree of personal knowledge that there was of team members at the time of 
the buy-in. Team Leaders should be aware of the difficulties in team selection when working in 
a different environment. In particular a buy-in which involves moving to a different geographical 
region, may result in particular strains and personal under-performancc which are difficult to 
respond to. Additionally care requires to be taken over the size of the Team. 
While entrepreneurial experience may be important in determining performance, it appears to be 
subordinate to sector involvement and previous working relationships within a team. Ibis factor 
is particularly true of Team Leaders with previous buy-out experience. Teams must be aware that 
the buy-in is a different form which may not replicate the previous buy-out success especially if 
the team is incomplete, the target company is not known or the buy-out is in a different sector. 
Target selection is of paramount importance as is being able to purchase the company at the right 
price. Management should be aware of the passive role of the venture capitalist in the search for 
a target company. Although personal knowledge is important in the target search, the need for 
thorough due diligence is essential. Significant industry knowledge should place the Team Leader 
in the position of being able to use personal networks to carry out informal checks on statements 
being used. Additionally there is the need to ensure that formal procedures are thoroughly carried 
out. Considerable effort has also to be made to ensure that the target company matches the 
abilities and ambitions of the management. Evidence indicated a not very sophisticated approach 
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in this area, yet it is one of the key features of the management buy-in. Both the venture 
capitalists and management have to adopt more efficient search methods. 
Varying levels of support will be occasioned by different venture capitalists and it is important for 
managers to identify correctly the overall most appropriate venture capital firm. In this regard it 
may not be the institution which offers the most advantageous financial terms which will prove 
most valuable in the long term. A key element of this relationship will depend on the attitudes 
of both management and the venture capital firm to the realisation of the investment. In itself 
that may cause frictions and should be determined at the outset. While aggressive ratchets may 
help to reconcile differences between the two partners, in practice there appear to be 
considerable problems in achieving them. Management may therefore in the longer term be better 
to accept structures which are not so reliant on such instruments. 
It is also important for management to realise that buy-ins are not static: they imply a high degree 
of change and management must be of the personality to be able- to assess and implement 
necessary changes. 
(d) Further Areas For Research 
The Research carried out for this 'Ibesis needs to be seen as being of a preliminary part of longer 
term investigatory work into management buy-ins. Limitations have been recognised in terms of 
the relatively short period that buy-ins have existed and the extremely unusual combination of 
economic and financial factors between the time of the survey and the end of 1992. Further 
research requires to be carried out to include areas such as: louer term performance as 
determined by accounting information; direct comparisons with 
, 
management buy-outs; 
international aspects; public management buy-ins; venture capital returns; the use of second time 
entrepreneurs in management buy-ins; failure prediction; and venture capital screening and 
monitoring processes. These are described below:.,, --, , 1ý1 I_'', 
- 
:'I'-. ýI 
369 
1. Longer Term performance 
Although this thesis has included evidence on the realisation of management buy-ins (both 
generally and in terms of the survey respondents) and initial direction of performance, detailed 
monitoring of medium and long term financial performance is required to assess the longer term 
impact and benefits of buy-ins. Comparisons using accounting data need to be drawn between pre 
and post buy-in performance both in terms of the company, the sector and other under- 
performing companies. 
2. Comparisons of buy-ins with buy-out in simultaneous surveys 
Significant differences have been perceived to exist between managerial, financial and 
performance aspects of buy-ins and buy-outs as well as the characteristics of their Team Leaders. 
The majority of buy-in managers could be seen as being opportunist, purchasing stakes in under- 
performing companies and subsequently initiating a high degree of change. A major problem, 
however, has been the lack of direct comparisons possible between the two forms over an 
identical time period with the same questions. Simultaneous surveys of buy-outs and buy-ins using 
questionnaires with a high degree of common questions would enable appropriate testing to 
confirm the differences which have been identified in this Thesis. Additionally indications of 
disappointing buy-in performance might usefully be examined in conjunction with evidence that 
acquisitions by corporate entities are frequently unsuccessful and lead to subsequent unbundling 
of a large proportion of assets acquired (Kaplan and Wcisbach 1992, Ravenscraft and Scherer 
1987). 
3. International Aspects 
Given the development of buy-ins, in Europe, comparisons also require to be made on in 
international basis (see eg Clutterbuck, Snow, Robbie, Wright, 1991). Management buy-ins appear 
to have particular relevance for transfer of ownership in Eastern Europe during the privatisation 
process and also in West European countries where there may be considerable family business 
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transfer problems. In both cases the absence of available incumbent management possessing 
necessary managerial and entrepreneurial qualities may mean that corporate restructuring through 
a management buy-out is not feasible. There are however problems in finding and matching 
Teams and target companies as well as the possibility of resistance from insiders. It is suggested 
that a future survey could also involve an international comparison including countries such as the 
former East Germany and Italy. These could be linked to cultural theories of diversity between 
countries. 
4. Public Management Buy-ins I 
A major problem encountered by the survey was the lack of response from 'public' management 
buy-ins. These frequently appear to involve buy-ins of a partial kind which are allied to significant 
turnaround aspects. Financial and accounting data on them are however available through systems 
such as Datastrcam. Closer examination of these on an empirical basis and comparison of other 
under-performing companies where ownership change did not take place could make a further 
contribution to the theory of corporate turnaround. The success (or otherwise) of quoted 
companies where there is a venture capital involvement would raise further interesting issues 
concerning the monitoring and structuring benefits perceived to be introduced by venture capital. 
5. Returns on Venture Capital Investments 
Further research is also warranted into the area of relative rates of return on venture capital 
investments and in particular those of buy-outs and buy-ins. As yet little research has been carried 
out in the UK partially because of slow progress towards common treatment of valuation of 
unquoted investments. Now that BVCA guidelines on valuation have been introduced, 
professional interest in this area and venture capital portfolios are more mature, such a study 
should have reasonable prospects of success. 
6. The Role of Second Time Entrepreneurs in Management Buy-ins; II, -, " ý. ' ý ! '. -- "".,, 
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Motivational and success aspects concerned with the manager from a successful buy-out or buy-in 
going on to a new venture capital backed project also merits attention. This sample has produced 
several Team Leaders who are second time entrepreneurs although the performance of some of 
the sample with such experience has been disappointing. Research is called for into the mode of 
selection of these entrepreneurs by the venture capitalist for follow on ventures. 
7. Failure Prediction 
The recessionary conditions of the early 1990's have resulted in both a much increased proportion 
of buy-outs and buy-ins failing and a significant number of buy-outs or buy-ins being from failed 
groups. These developments provide a useful base for more detailed study of both failure 
prediction and the role of management as an important cause of corporate failure. 
S. Venture Capital Screening and Monitoring 
The ways in which venture capitalists screen buy-in candidates and subsequently monitor their 
investee companies requires further research and consideration by the venture capitalists. By 
indicating that different types of entrepreneurs do not necessarily produce different operating 
results, existing venture capitalist preferences may not be correct. Previous entrepreneurship 
experience in particular appears to be considerably less important than seen in surveys of new 
ventures. Case study interviews also indicated that benefits to be derived from effective 
monitoring and participation which are essential ingredients of the corporate restructuring process 
were not always being derived. 
15.4 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis provides the first major insight into a. recent area of corporate restructuring. The 
relative importance of management buy-ins can be seen in their growth to over 13 percent of the 
number of UK takeover transactions by 1992. While initial performance has appeared 
disappointing, the progress of buy-ins and the effect of their contribution to the regeneration of 
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individual companies must be seen in a longer term perspective. Turnround is a key element of 
many buy-ins but of necessity is a long process which can be badly distorted by the extreme 
economic and financial conditions of the past few years. Re-assessment of risks by venture 
capitalists, more active monitoring- of their investee companies and increasing realisation of the 
differences with buy-outs gives them the opportunity to be more successful in the future. 
The survey which formed the basis of the empirical section of this Thesis was limited by the 
relative youth of the buy-in market in that few buy-ins had been completed before 1986. While 
the interest shown in buy-ins in 1988)89 resulted in rapid expansion in the population of buy-ins, 
enabling an adequate sample for the survey questionnaire, it also resulted in a learning curve for 
the financing institutions. The relatively high failure rates encountered by buy-ins subsequently 
appears to have resulted in a reappraisal of investment in this form. Contraction in 1990 of the 
number of private buy-ins completed has been followed since mid 1991 by some recovery in 
activity which has been associated with lower entry prices and less highly geared structures 
(CMBOR 1993). In the current environment of more attractive corporate pricing, low interest 
rates and possibilities for economic recovery the prospects for a more successful future for 
recently completed buy-ins than for those in the survey are encouraging. The late 1980's buy-ins 
which have survived this far may themselves have prospects for profitable realisation. 
Key long term questions about management buy-ins can only be assessed after a reasonable time 
period and consequently in the main remain to be answered. However the initial characteristics 
do show management buy-ins as a distinctive area of corporate restructuring. They also reflect 
both entrepreneurial aspects of the Team Leaders, strategic lessons from examination of 
turnaround situations, introduce significant equity incentives and debt bonding effects and 
encompass new governance systems. 
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Team leaders do emerge as more proactive and entrepreneurial than in management buy-outs. 
71bey are innovative in the extent and type of change which is introduced after buy-in. Although 
optimistic as to what they hope to achieve in their new independence, they do however rind 
problems in gaining the performance improvements which had been forecast. Some of the reasons 
why theory indicates that performance improvements should be achieved are not seen to be valid- 
leverage or large management equity stakes or ratchet incentives do not necessarily produce the 
results which Jensen et al would have expected to obtain. However optimum levels of gearing and 
size may make the UK market very different from the US. 
Management buy-ins appear relevant in the UK to the transfer of ownership in medium sized 
companies and using financing structures which do not involve excessive personal and corporate 
leverage. The systems of control offer a new type of governance which, when properly managed 
should produce a much more closely monitored and flexible system with above average 
performance. 
While buy-ins are different from management buy-outs and can be seen to have particular risk 
factors, which may be more like those in general take-over transactions, their future success will 
depend on more careful analysis of general economic and financial trends, deal structuring and' 
due diligence procedures. Risks can of course be reduced through the use of inside knowledge- 
eg by including key incumbent management in the Team where this is feasible and there is no 
great divergence in long term aims between the external and internal members of the Team whose 
personalities and abilities can be seen as compatible. This concept, as seen in the growing number 
of such hybrid 'bimbo' transactions, may help to increase the success rates of management buy-ins, 
allowing the more innovative external management to introduce necessary actions with effectively 
a much more satisfactory degree of target company knowledge. 
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